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Laws



by Plato



May, 1999  [Etext #1750]





**********The Project Gutenberg Etext of Laws, by Plato*********

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LAWS



by Plato









Translated by Benjamin Jowett









INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.



The genuineness of the Laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than twenty

citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing at Athens

during the last twenty years of the life of Plato, and who, having left it

after his death (B.C. 347), returned thither twelve years later (B.C. 335);

(2) by the allusion of Isocrates 



(Oratio ad Philippum missa, p.84:  To men tais paneguresin enochlein kai

pros apantas legein tous sunprechontas en autais pros oudena legein estin,

all omoios oi toioutoi ton logon (sc. speeches in the assembly) akuroi

tugchanousin ontes tois nomois kai tais politeiais tais upo ton sophiston

gegrammenais.)



--writing 346 B.C., a year after the death of Plato, and probably not more

than three or four years after the composition of the Laws--who speaks of

the Laws and Republics written by philosophers (upo ton sophiston); (3) by

the reference (Athen.) of the comic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of

Plato (fl. B.C 356-306), to the enactment about prices, which occurs in

Laws xi., viz that the same goods should not be offered at two prices on

the same day



(Ou gegone kreitton nomothetes tou plousiou

Aristonikou tithesi gar nuni nomon,

ton ichthuopolon ostis an polon tini

ichthun upotimesas apodot elattonos

es eipe times, eis to desmoterion

euthus apagesthai touton, ina dedoikotes

tes axias agaposin, e tes esperas

saprous apantas apopherosin oikade.



Meineke, Frag. Com. Graec.);



(4) by the unanimous voice of later antiquity and the absence of any

suspicion among ancient writers worth speaking of to the contrary; for it

is not said of Philippus of Opus that he composed any part of the Laws, but

only that he copied them out of the waxen tablets, and was thought by some

to have written the Epinomis (Diog. Laert.)  That the longest and one of

the best writings bearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even if

its genuineness were unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular

phenomenon in ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the

consensus of late writers is generally not to be compared with the express

testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be attributed

to their consent in the present instance, because the admission of the Laws

is combined with doubts about the Epinomis, a spurious writing, which is a

kind of epilogue to the larger work probably of a much later date.  This

shows that the reception of the Laws was not altogether undiscriminating.



The suspicion which has attached to the Laws of Plato in the judgment of

some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in the style

and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and opinion which

they observe in them.  Their suspicion is increased by the fact that these

differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking to passages in

other Platonic writings.  They are sensible of a want of point in the

dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas, plan, manners, and style. 

They miss the poetical flow, the dramatic verisimilitude, the life and

variety of the characters, the dialectic subtlety, the Attic purity, the

luminous order, the exquisite urbanity; instead of which they find

tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency, sermonizing, rhetorical

declamation, pedantry, egotism, uncouth forms of sentences, and

peculiarities in the use of words and idioms.  They are unable to discover

any unity in the patched, irregular structure.  The speculative element

both in government and education is superseded by a narrow economical or

religious vein.  The grace and cheerfulness of Athenian life have

disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious intolerance has taken

their place.  The charm of youth is no longer there; the mannerism of age

makes itself unpleasantly felt.  The connection is often imperfect; and

there is a want of arrangement, exhibited especially in the enumeration of

the laws towards the end of the work.  The Laws are full of flaws and

repetitions.  The Greek is in places very ungrammatical and intractable.  A

cynical levity is displayed in some passages, and a tone of disappointment

and lamentation over human things in others.  The critics seem also to

observe in them bad imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in

Plato's other writings.  Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived

the Republic could have left the Critias, Hermocrates, and Philosophus

incomplete or unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the

Laws.



The questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be considered

by us under five or six heads:  I, the characters; II, the plan; III, the

style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato; V; the more general

relation of the Laws to the Republic and the other dialogues; and VI, to

the existing Athenian and Spartan states.



I.  Already in the Philebus the distinctive character of Socrates has

disappeared; and in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Statesman his function of

chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus, and to

the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent.  More and more

Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character and

method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his own

philosophy.  He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a hesitating

enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a legislator.  Even in

the Republic we have seen that the argument which is carried on by Socrates

in the old style with Thrasymachus in the first book, soon passes into the

form of exposition.  In the Laws he is nowhere mentioned.  Yet so

completely in the tradition of antiquity is Socrates identified with Plato,

that in the criticism of the Laws which we find in the so-called Politics

of Aristotle he is supposed by the writer still to be playing his part of

the chief speaker (compare Pol.).



The Laws are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and

Sparta.  The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief

speaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as one of

the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the conversation. 

At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his mouth.  The Spartan is

every inch a soldier, a man of few words himself, better at deeds than

words.  The Athenian talks to the two others, although they are his equals

in age, in the style of a master discoursing to his scholars; he frequently

praises himself; he entertains a very poor opinion of the understanding of

his companions.  Certainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the Laws is the

reverse of the refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier

dialogues.  We are no longer in such good company as in the Phaedrus and

Symposium.  Manners are lost sight of in the earnestness of the speakers,

and dogmatic assertions take the place of poetical fancies.



The scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course of a

walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus, which takes place on one

of the longest and hottest days of the year.  The companions start at dawn,

and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the fourth

book, about noon.  The God to whose temple they are going is the lawgiver

of Crete, and this may be supposed to be the very cave at which he gave his

oracles to Minos.  But the externals of the scene, which are briefly and

inartistically described, soon disappear, and we plunge abruptly into the

subject of the dialogue.  We are reminded by contrast of the higher art of

the Phaedrus, in which the summer's day, and the cool stream, and the

chirping of the grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus, and

the legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the

discourse.



The typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen 'to spin

a long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar spirit the

Lacedaemonian Megillus apologizes for the Spartan brevity (compare

Thucydid.), acknowledging at the same time that there may be occasions when

long discourses are necessary.  The family of Megillus is the proxenus of

Athens at Sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to the Athenian,

significant of the character of the work, which, though borrowing many

elements from Sparta, is also pervaded by an Athenian spirit.  A good

Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by

nature and not manufactured by law.  The love of listening which is

attributed to the Timocrat in the Republic is also exhibited in him.  The

Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to the Lacedaemonian of the

struggle in which their ancestors were jointly engaged against the

Persians.  A connexion with Athens is likewise intimated by the Cretan

Cleinias.  He is the relative of Epimenides, whom, by an anachronism of a

century,--perhaps arising as Zeller suggests (Plat. Stud.) out of a

confusion of the visit of Epimenides and Diotima (Symp.),--he describes as

coming to Athens, not after the attempt of Cylon, but ten years before the

Persian war.  The Cretan and Lacedaemonian hardly contribute at all to the

argument of which the Athenian is the expounder; they only supply

information when asked about the institutions of their respective

countries.  A kind of simplicity or stupidity is ascribed to them.  At

first, they are dissatisfied with the free criticisms which the Athenian

passes upon the laws of Minos and Lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his

greater experience and knowledge of the world.  They admit that there can

be no objection to the enquiry; for in the spirit of the legislator

himself, they are discussing his laws when there are no young men present

to listen.  They are unwilling to allow that the Spartan and Cretan

lawgivers can have been mistaken in honouring courage as the first part of

virtue, and are puzzled at hearing for the first time that 'Goods are only

evil to the evil.'  Several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and

by an effort learn to restrain their natural feeling (compare Shakespeare,

Henry V, act iii. sc. 2).  In Book vii., the Lacedaemonian expresses a

momentary irritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against

the Spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women, but

he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them freely

has been given, and cannot be retracted.  His only criterion of truth is

the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is 'interested,' in the novel

speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the ordinances of

Lycurgus.



The three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old men,

which forms a pleasant bond of union between them.  They have the feelings

of old age about youth, about the state, about human things in general. 

Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they are spectators

rather than actors, and men in general appear to the Athenian speaker to be

the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances.  Still they have a

fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed by sentiments of

religion.  They would give confidence to the aged by an increasing use of

wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their tongues and make them

sing.  The prospect of the existence of the soul after death is constantly

present to them; though they can hardly be said to have the cheerful hope

and resignation which animates Socrates in the Phaedo or Cephalus in the

Republic.  Plato appears to be expressing his own feelings in remarks of

this sort.  For at the time of writing the first book of the Laws he was at

least seventy-four years of age, if we suppose him to allude to the victory

of the Syracusans under Dionysius the Younger over the Locrians, which

occurred in the year 356.  Such a sadness was the natural effect of

declining years and failing powers, which make men ask, 'After all, what

profit is there in life?'  They feel that their work is beginning to be

over, and are ready to say, 'All the world is a stage;' or, in the actual

words of Plato, 'Let us play as good plays as we can,' though 'we must be

sometimes serious, which is not agreeable, but necessary.'  These are

feelings which have crossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages,

and there is no reason to connect the Laws any more than other parts of

Plato's writings with the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to

imagine that this melancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at

having failed to convert a Sicilian tyrant into a philosopher.



II.  The plan of the Laws is more irregular and has less connexion than any

other of the writings of Plato.  As Aristotle says in the Politics, 'The

greater part consists of laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the dialogue almost

entirely disappears.  Large portions of them are rather the materials for a

work than a finished composition which may rank with the other Platonic

dialogues.  To use his own image, 'Some stones are regularly inserted in

the building; others are lying on the ground ready for use.'  There is

probably truth in the tradition that the Laws were not published until

after the death of Plato.  We can easily believe that he has left

imperfections, which would have been removed if he had lived a few years

longer.  The arrangement might have been improved; the connexion of the

argument might have been made plainer, and the sentences more accurately

framed.  Something also may be attributed to the feebleness of old age. 

Even a rough sketch of the Phaedrus or Symposium would have had a very

different look.  There is, however, an interest in possessing one writing

of Plato which is in the process of creation.



We must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through

this comparative disorder.  The first four books are described by Plato

himself as the preface or preamble.  Having arrived at the conclusion that

each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at the end

of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the preamble of the

whole.  This preamble or introduction may be abridged as follows:--



The institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian and

Cretan to have one aim only:  they were intended by the legislator to

inspire courage in war.  To this the Athenian objects that the true

lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not to

one only.  Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he who

has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils, than he who

is a good soldier only.  Better, too, is peace than war; the reconciliation

than the defeat of an enemy.  And he who would attain all virtue should be

trained amid pleasures as well as pains.  Hence there should be convivial

intercourse among the citizens, and a man's temperance should be tested in

his cups, as we test his courage amid dangers.  He should have a fear of

the right sort, as well as a courage of the right sort.



At the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to

education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline imparted

by the means of pleasure and pain.  The discipline of pleasure is implanted

chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance.  Of these the forms

should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle breath of the

multitude.  There will be choruses of boys, girls, and grown-up persons,

and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that 'virtue is

happiness.'  One of them will give the law to the rest; this will be the

chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful and the most

useful of songs.  They will require a little wine, to mellow the austerity

of age, and make them amenable to the laws.



After having laid down as the first principle of politics, that peace, and

not war, is the true aim of the legislator, and briefly discussed music and

festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book Plato makes a

digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society.  He describes,

first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage, which is an

aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular cities, like

Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and political system, like

that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos and Messene, dating from the

return of the Heraclidae.  But the aims of states should be good, or else,

like the prayer of Theseus, they may be ruinous to themselves.  This was

the case in two out of three of the Heracleid kingdoms.  They did not

understand that the powers in a state should be balanced.  The balance of

powers saved Sparta, while the excess of tyranny in Persia and the excess

of liberty at Athens have been the ruin of both...This discourse on

politics is suddenly discovered to have an immediate practical use; for

Cleinias the Cretan is about to give laws to a new colony.



At the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the circumstances

and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make further

reflections.  Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator, all co-

operate in the formation of states.  And the most favourable condition for

the foundation of a new one is when the government is in the hands of a

virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great

legislator.  But a virtuous tyrant is a contradiction in terms; we can at

best only hope to have magistrates who are the servants of reason and the

law.  This leads to the enquiry, what is to be the polity of our new state.

And the answer is, that we are to fear God, and honour our parents, and to

cultivate virtue and justice; these are to be our first principles.  Laws

must be definite, and we should create in the citizens a predisposition to

obey them.  The legislator will teach as well as command; and with this

view he will prefix preambles to his principal laws.



The fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher

preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced the duties of

a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger.  He

should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts, forgiving

to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary; and he should

have a true taste.  The noblest life has the greatest pleasures and the

fewest pains...Having finished the preamble, and touched on some other

preliminary considerations, we proceed to the Laws, beginning with the

constitution of the state.  This is not the best or ideal state, having all

things common, but only the second-best, in which the land and houses are

to be distributed among 5040 citizens divided into four classes.  There is

to be no gold or silver among them, and they are to have moderate wealth,

and to respect number and numerical order in all things.



In the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the

constitution by the appointment of officers.  He explains the manner in

which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town and country,

ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be appointed; and also

in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted, and omissions in the

law to be supplied.  Next--and at this point the Laws strictly speaking

begin--there follow enactments respecting marriage and the procreation of

children, respecting property in slaves as well as of other kinds,

respecting houses, married life, common tables for men and women.  The

question of age in marriage suggests the consideration of a similar

question about the time for holding offices, and for military service,

which had been previously omitted.



Resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the previous

book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the seventh book. 

Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be continued for a time

by mothers and nurses under the supervision of the state; finally, to

comprehend music and gymnastics.  Under music is included reading, writing,

playing on the lyre, arithmetic, geometry, and a knowledge of astronomy

sufficient to preserve the minds of the citizens from impiety in after-

life.  Gymnastics are to be practised chiefly with a view to their use in

war.  The discussion of education, which was lightly touched upon in Book

ii, is here completed.



The eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with

festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like.  On such

occasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together, and

hence he is led into discussing the relations of the sexes, the evil

consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the

remedies for them.  Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and

trades, of buying and selling, and of foreign commerce.



The remaining books of the Laws, ix-xii, are chiefly concerned with

criminal offences.  In the first class are placed offences against the

Gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples:  next follow offences

against the state,--conspiracy, treason, theft.  The mention of thefts

suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and

incurable offences.  Proceeding to the greater crime of homicide, Plato

distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, which is partly

voluntary and partly involuntary, and murder, which arises from avarice,

ambition, fear.  He also enumerates murders by kindred, murders by slaves,

wounds with or without intent to kill, wounds inflicted in anger, crimes of

or against slaves, insults to parents.  To these, various modes of

purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and the terrors of

another world are also invoked against them.



At the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege, are

summed up in a single law.  The law is preceded by an admonition, in which

the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act or said an

unlawful word while he retained his belief in the existence of the Gods;

but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they took no care

of man, or that they might be turned from their course by sacrifices and

prayers.  The remainder of the book is devoted to the refutation of these

three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the means to be taken for

their reformation, and the announcement of their punishments if they

continue obstinate and impenitent.



The eleventh book is taken up with laws and with admonitions relating to

individuals, which follow one another without any exact order.  There are

laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves and

freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments,

poisonings, magical arts, and the like.  In the twelfth book the same

subjects are continued.  Laws are passed concerning violations of military

discipline, concerning the high office of the examiners and their burial;

concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the punishments of those

who neglect their duties as citizens.  Foreign travel is then discussed,

and the permission to be accorded to citizens of journeying in foreign

parts; the strangers who may come to visit the city are also spoken of, and

the manner in which they are to be received.  Laws are added respecting

sureties, searches for property, right of possession by prescription,

abduction of witnesses, theatrical competition, waging of private warfare,

and bribery in offices.  Rules are laid down respecting taxation,

respecting economy in sacred rites, respecting judges, their duties and

sentences, and respecting sepulchral places and ceremonies.  Here the Laws

end.  Lastly, a Nocturnal Council is instituted for the preservation of the

state, consisting of older and younger members, who are to exhibit in their

lives that virtue which is the basis of the state, to know the one in many,

and to be educated in divine and every other kind of knowledge which will

enable them to fulfil their office.



III.  The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from that

of the other dialogues of Plato:  (1) in the want of character, power, and

lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms (compare

Introduction to the Philebus); (3) in the form and rhythm of the sentences;

(4) in the use of words.  On the other hand, there are many passages (5)

which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur; and (6) in which,

perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a greater reach of

practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato's writings.



1.  The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an old

man's game of play.  Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game in

their mode of treating the subject.  They do not throw the ball to and fro,

but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is constantly

asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge, and

apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of speech.

He will 'carry them over the stream;' he will answer for them when the

argument is beyond their comprehension; he is afraid of their ignorance of

mathematics, and thinks that gymnastic is likely to be more intelligible to

them;--he has repeated his words several times, and yet they cannot

understand him.  The subject did not properly take the form of dialogue,

and also the literary vigour of Plato had passed away.  The old men speak

as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is a touch of

dramatic truth.  Plato has given the Laws that form or want of form which

indicates the failure of natural power.  There is no regular plan--none of

that consciousness of what has preceded and what is to follow, which makes

a perfect style,--but there are several attempts at a plan; the argument is

'pulled up,' and frequent explanations are offered why a particular topic

was introduced.



The fictions of the Laws have no longer the verisimilitude which is

characteristic of the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, or even of the Statesman. 

We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have placed the visit

of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the Persian war, or have imagined

that a war with Messene prevented the Lacedaemonians from coming to the

rescue of Hellas.  The narrative of the origin of the Dorian institutions,

which are said to have been due to a fear of the growing power of the

Assyrians, is a plausible invention, which may be compared with the tale of

the island of Atlantis and the poem of Solon, but is not accredited by

similar arts of deception.  The other statement that the Dorians were

Achaean exiles assembled by Dorieus, and the assertion that Troy was

included in the Assyrian Empire, have some foundation (compare for the

latter point, Diod. Sicul.).  Nor is there anywhere in the Laws that lively

enargeia, that vivid mise en scene, which is as characteristic of Plato as

of some modern novelists.



The old men are afraid of the ridicule which 'will fall on their heads more

than enough,' and they do not often indulge in a joke.  In one of the few

which occur, the book of the Laws, if left incomplete, is compared to a

monster wandering about without a head.  But we no longer breathe the

atmosphere of humour which pervades the Symposium and the Euthydemus, in

which we pass within a few sentences from the broadest Aristophanic joke to

the subtlest refinement of wit and fancy; instead of this, in the Laws an

impression of baldness and feebleness is often left upon our minds.  Some

of the most amusing descriptions, as, for example, of children roaring for

the first three years of life; or of the Athenians walking into the country

with fighting-cocks under their arms; or of the slave doctor who knocks

about his patients finely; and the gentleman doctor who courteously

persuades them; or of the way of keeping order in the theatre, 'by a hint

from a stick,' are narrated with a commonplace gravity; but where we find

this sort of dry humour we shall not be far wrong in thinking that the

writer intended to make us laugh.  The seriousness of age takes the place

of the jollity of youth.  Life should have holidays and festivals; yet we

rebuke ourselves when we laugh, and take our pleasures sadly.  The irony of

the earlier dialogues, of which some traces occur in the tenth book, is

replaced by a severity which hardly condescends to regard human things. 

'Let us say, if you please, that man is of some account, but I was speaking

of him in comparison with God.'



The imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not assisted

by the surrounding phraseology.  We have seen how in the Republic, and in

the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the wave,' 'the drone,'

'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at intervals.  Notes are

struck which are repeated from time to time, as in a strain of music. 

There is none of this subtle art in the Laws.  The illustrations, such as

the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of funerals,' the fear potion,

the puppet, the painter leaving a successor to restore his picture, the

'person stopping to consider where three ways meet,' the 'old laws about

water of which he will not divert the course,' can hardly be said to do

much credit to Plato's invention.  The citations from the poets have lost

that fanciful character which gave them their charm in the earlier

dialogues.  We are tired of images taken from the arts of navigation, or

archery, or weaving, or painting, or medicine, or music.  Yet the

comparisons of life to a tragedy, or of the working of mind to the

revolution of the self-moved, or of the aged parent to the image of a God

dwelling in the house, or the reflection that 'man is made to be the

plaything of God, and that this rightly considered is the best of him,'

have great beauty.



2.  The clumsiness of the style is exhibited in frequent mannerisms and

repetitions.  The perfection of the Platonic dialogue consists in the

accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another,

and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one

another.  This finish of style is no longer discernible in the Laws.  There

is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out of the

respondents but 'Yes' or 'No,' 'True,' 'To be sure,' etc.; the insipid

forms, 'What do you mean?'  'To what are you referring?' are constantly

returning.  Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges himself,

with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will explain his

views more clearly.  The process of thought which should be latent in the

mind of the writer appears on the surface.  In several passages the

Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner, very unlike the

irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares that 'the laws are a

divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and that 'youth should

commit them to memory instead of the compositions of the poets.'  The

prosopopoeia which is adopted by Plato in the Protagoras and other

dialogues is repeated until we grow weary of it.  The legislator is always

addressing the speakers or the youth of the state, and the speakers are

constantly making addresses to the legislator.  A tendency to a paradoxical

manner of statement is also observable.  'We must have drinking,' 'we must

have a virtuous tyrant'--this is too much for the duller wits of the

Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start back in surprise.  More than

in any other writing of Plato the tone is hortatory; the laws are sermons

as well as laws; they are considered to have a religious sanction, and to

rest upon a religious sentiment in the mind of the citizens.  The words of

the Athenian are attributed to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who are

supposed to have made them their own, after the manner of the earlier

dialogues.  Resumptions of subjects which have been half disposed of in a

previous passage constantly occur:  the arrangement has neither the

clearness of art nor the freedom of nature.  Irrelevant remarks are made

here and there, or illustrations used which are not properly fitted in. 

The dialogue is generally weak and laboured, and is in the later books

fairly given up, apparently, because unsuited to the subject of the work. 

The long speeches or sermons of the Athenian, often extending over several

pages, have never the grace and harmony which are exhibited in the earlier

dialogues.  For Plato is incapable of sustained composition; his genius is

dramatic rather than oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot make a

speech.  Even the Timaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full

of abrupt transitions.  There is the same kind of difference between the

dialogue and the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative and

speeches of Thucydides.



3.  The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease, clearness,

the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the scale of

human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift of language

possessed by Plato in the Symposium and Phaedrus.  From this there are many

fallings-off in the Laws:  first, in the structure of the sentences, which

are rhythmical and monotonous,--the formal and sophistical manner of the

age is superseding the natural genius of Plato:  secondly, many of them are

of enormous length, and the latter end often forgets the beginning of

them,--they seem never to have received the second thoughts of the author;

either the emphasis is wrongly placed, or there is a want of point in a

clause; or an absolute case occurs which is not properly separated from the

rest of the sentence; or words are aggregated in a manner which fails to

show their relation to one another; or the connecting particles are omitted

at the beginning of sentences; the uses of the relative and antecedent are

more indistinct, the changes of person and number more frequent, examples

of pleonasm, tautology, and periphrasis, antitheses of positive and

negative, false emphasis, and other affectations, are more numerous than in

the other writings of Plato; there is also a more common and sometimes

unmeaning use of qualifying formulae, os epos eipein, kata dunamin, and of

double expressions, pante pantos, oudame oudamos, opos kai ope--these are

too numerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an

over-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet, and other

artificial forms of cadence and expression take the place of natural

variety:  thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is remarkable--the

style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of a debased

rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the subject; there

is a great command of words, and a laboured use of them; forced attempts at

metaphor occur in several passages,--e.g. parocheteuein logois; ta men os

tithemena ta d os paratithemena; oinos kolazomenos upo nephontos eterou

theou; the plays on the word nomos = nou dianome, ode etara:  fourthly,

there is a foolish extravagance of language in other passages,--'the

swinish ignorance of arithmetic;' 'the justice and suitableness of the

discourse on laws;' over-emphasis; 'best of Greeks,' said of all the

Greeks, and the like:  fifthly, poor and insipid illustrations are also

common: sixthly, we may observe an excessive use of climax and hyperbole,

aischron legein chre pros autous doulon te kai doulen kai paida kai ei pos

oion te olen ten oikian:  dokei touto to epitedeuma kata phusin tas peri ta

aphrodisia edonas ou monon anthropon alla kai therion diephtharkenai.



4.  The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have been

collected by Zeller (Platonische Studien) and Stallbaum (Legg.):  first, in

the use of nouns, such as allodemia, apeniautesis, glukuthumia, diatheter,

thrasuxenia, koros, megalonoia, paidourgia:  secondly, in the use of

adjectives, such as aistor, biodotes, echthodopos, eitheos, chronios, and

of adverbs, such as aniditi, anatei, nepoivei:  thirdly, in the use of

verbs, such as athurein, aissein (aixeien eipein), euthemoneisthai,

parapodizesthai, sebein, temelein, tetan.  These words however, as

Stallbaum remarks, are formed according to analogy, and nearly all of them

have the support of some poetical or other authority.



Zeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws,

differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places: 

e.g. blabos for blabe, abios for abiotos, acharistos for acharis, douleios

for doulikos, paidelos for paidikos, exagrio for exagriaino, ileoumai for

ilaskomai, and the Ionic word sophronistus, meaning 'correction.'  Zeller

has noted a fondness for substantives ending in -ma and -sis, such as

georgema, diapauma, epithumema, zemioma, komodema, omilema; blapsis,

loidoresis, paraggelsis, and others; also a use of substantives in the

plural, which are commonly found only in the singular, maniai, atheotetes,

phthonoi, phoboi, phuseis; also, a peculiar use of prepositions in

composition, as in eneirgo, apoblapto, dianomotheteo, dieiretai,

dieulabeisthai, and other words; also, a frequent occurrence of the Ionic

datives plural in -aisi and -oisi, perhaps used for the sake of giving an

ancient or archaic effect.



To these peculiarities of words he has added a list of peculiar expressions

and constructions.  Among the most characteristic are the following: 

athuta pallakon spermata; amorphoi edrai; osa axiomata pros archontas; oi

kata polin kairoi; muthos, used in several places of 'the discourse about

laws;' and connected with this the frequent use of paramuthion and

paramutheisthai in the general sense of 'address,' 'addressing'; aimulos

eros; ataphoi praxeis; muthos akephalos; ethos euthuporon.  He remarks also

on the frequent employment of the abstract for the concrete; e.g. uperesia

for uperetai, phugai for phugades, mechanai in the sense of 'contrivers,'

douleia for douloi, basileiai for basileis, mainomena kedeumata for ganaika

mainomenen; e chreia ton paidon in the sense of 'indigent children,' and

paidon ikanotes; to ethos tes apeirias for e eiothuia apeiria; kuparitton

upse te kai kalle thaumasia for kuparittoi mala upselai kai kalai.  He

further notes some curious uses of the genitive case, e.g. philias

omologiai, maniai orges, laimargiai edones, cheimonon anupodesiai, anosioi

plegon tolmai; and of the dative, omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai, anosioi

plegon tolmai; and of the dative omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai epitropois;

and also some rather uncommon periphrases, thremmata Neilou, xuggennetor

teknon for alochos, Mouses lexis for poiesis, zographon paides, anthropon

spermata and the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially

tis and ge, sun tisi charisi, tois ge dunamenois and the like; the

pleonastic use of tanun, of os, of os eros eipein, of ekastote; and the

periphrastic use of the preposition peri.  Lastly, he observes the tendency

to hyperbata or transpositions of words, and to rhythmical uniformity as

well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the sentences.



For nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments

against the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of

authority.  There is no real ground for doubting that the work was written

by Plato, merely because several words occur in it which are not found in

his other writings.  An imitator may preserve the usual phraseology of a

writer better than he would himself.  But, on the other hand, the fact that

authorities may be quoted in support of most of these uses of words, does

not show that the diction is not peculiar.  Several of them seem to be

poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an attempt to enlarge the limits of

Greek prose by the introduction of Homeric and tragic expressions.  Most of

them do not appear to have retained any hold on the later language of

Greece.  Like several experiments in language of the writers of the

Elizabethan age, they were afterwards lost; and though occasionally found

in Plutarch and imitators of Plato, they have not been accepted by

Aristotle or passed into the common dialect of Greece.



5.  Unequal as the Laws are in style, they contain a few passages which are

very grand and noble.  For example, the address to the poets:  'Best of

strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for our whole

state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be

indeed the very truth of tragedy.'  Or again, the sight of young men and

maidens in friendly intercourse with one another, suggesting the dangers to

which youth is liable from the violence of passion; or the eloquent

denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same passage; or the charming

thought that the best legislator 'orders war for the sake of peace and not

peace for the sake of war;' or the pleasant allusion, 'O Athenian--

inhabitant of Attica, I will not say, for you seem to me worthy to be named

after the Goddess Athene because you go back to first principles;' or the

pithy saying, 'Many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors,

but education is never suicidal;' or the fine expression that 'the walls of

a city should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not

attempt to disinter them;' or the remark that 'God is the measure of all

things in a sense far higher than any man can be;' or that 'a man should be

from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long

as possible;' or the principle repeatedly laid down, that 'the sins of the

fathers are not to be visited on the children;' or the description of the

funeral rites of those priestly sages who depart in innocence; or the noble

sentiment, that we should do more justice to slaves than to equals; or the

curious observation, founded, perhaps, on his own experience, that there

are a few 'divine men in every state however corrupt, whose conversation is

of inestimable value;' or the acute remark, that public opinion is to be

respected, because the judgments of mankind about virtue are better than

their practice; or the deep religious and also modern feeling which

pervades the tenth book (whatever may be thought of the arguments); the

sense of the duty of living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the

will of God, who takes care of the least things as well as the greatest;

and the picture of parents praying for their children--not as we may say,

slightly altering the words of Plato, as if there were no truth or reality

in the Gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest--are very

striking to us.  We must remember that the Laws, unlike the Republic, do

not exhibit an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human

motives and feelings; they are also on the level of the popular religion,

though elevated and purified:  hence there is an attempt made to show that

the pleasant is also just.  But, on the other hand, the priority of the

soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always insisted upon as the

true incentive to virtue; especially with great force and eloquence at the

commencement of Book v.  And the work of legislation is carried back to the

first principles of morals.



6.  No other writing of Plato shows so profound an insight into the world

and into human nature as the Laws.  That 'cities will never cease from ill

until they are better governed,' is the text of the Laws as well as of the

Statesman and Republic.  The principle that the balance of power preserves

states; the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life in disbelief

of the Gods; the remark that the characters of men are best seen in

convivial intercourse; the observation that the people must be allowed to

share not only in the government, but in the administration of justice; the

desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only, but to all virtue;

the clear perception that education begins with birth, or even, as he would

say, before birth; the attempt to purify religion; the modern reflections,

that punishment is not vindictive, and that limits must be set to the power

of bequest; the impossibility of undeceiving the victims of quacks and

jugglers; the provision for water, and for other requirements of health,

and for concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible

to the living; above all, perhaps, the distinct consciousness that under

the actual circumstances of mankind the ideal cannot be carried out, and

yet may be a guiding principle--will appear to us, if we remember that we

are still in the dawn of politics, to show a great depth of political

wisdom.



IV.  The Laws of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble

other passages in his writings.  And at first sight a suspicion arises that

the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator.  For why should a

writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said

in his most finished style and manner?  And yet it may be urged on the

other side that an author whose original powers are beginning to decay will

be very liable to repeat himself, as in conversation, so in books.  He may

have forgotten what he had written before; he may be unconscious of the

decline of his own powers.  Hence arises a question of great interest,

bearing on the genuineness of ancient writers.  Is there any criterion by

which we can distinguish the genuine resemblance from the spurious, or, in

other words, the repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself

from the appropriation of it by another?  The question has, perhaps, never

been fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise

answer.  A few general considerations on the subject may be offered:--



(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different times

of life or under different circumstances?--There would be nothing

surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own

originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his age.  'What

a genius I had when I wrote that book!' was the pathetic exclamation of a

famous English author, when in old age he chanced to take up one of his

early works.  There would be nothing surprising again in his losing

somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less capable of framing

language into a harmonious whole.  There would also be a strong presumption

that if the variation of style was uniform, it was attributable to some

natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator.  The inferiority might

be the result of feebleness and of want of activity of mind.  But the

natural weakness of a great author would commonly be different from the

artificial weakness of an imitator; it would be continuous and uniform. 

The latter would be apt to fill his work with irregular patches, sometimes

taken verbally from the writings of the author whom he personated, but

rarely acquiring his spirit.  His imitation would be obvious, irregular,

superficial.  The patches of purple would be easily detected among his

threadbare and tattered garments.  He would rarely take the pains to put

the same thought into other words.  There were many forgeries in English

literature which attained a considerable degree of success 50 or 100 years

ago; but it is doubtful whether attempts such as these could now escape

detection, if there were any writings of the same author or of the same age

to be compared with them.  And ancient forgers were much less skilful than

modern; they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and had

rarely any motive for being so.



(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of

understanding or imitating that part of a great writer which is most

characteristic of him.  In every man's writings there is something like

himself and unlike others, which gives individuality.  To appreciate this

latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study and

observation.  There are a class of similarities which may be called

undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of being

borrowed from one another, and yet, when they are compared, find a natural

explanation in their being the work of the same mind.  The imitator might

copy the turns of style--he might repeat images or illustrations, but he

could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic philosophy.  He would

understand that part of it which became popular in the next generation, as

for example, the doctrine of ideas or of numbers:  he might approve of

communism.  But the higher flights of Plato about the science of dialectic,

or the unity of virtue, or a person who is above the law, would be

unintelligible to him.



(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when the

supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the impress

of original genius.  The strength of the argument from undesigned

coincidences of style is much increased when they are found side by side

with thoughts and expressions which can only have come from a great

original writer.  The great excellence, not only of the whole, but even of

the parts of writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness--for although

the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot rise much

above himself.  Whether we can attribute the worst parts of a work to a

forger and the best to a great writer,--as for example, in the case of some

of Shakespeare's plays,--depends upon the probability that they have been

interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers; and this can only

be established either by express evidence or by a comparison of other

writings of the same class.  If the interpolation or double authorship of

Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown to be common, then a

question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not whether the whole, but

whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are genuine, and, if parts only,

which parts.  Hebrew prophecies and Homeric poems and Laws of Manu may have

grown together in early times, but there is no reason to think that any of

the dialogues of Plato is the result of a similar process of accumulation.

It is therefore rash to say with Oncken (Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles)

that the form in which Aristotle knew the Laws of Plato must have been

different from that in which they have come down to us.



It must be admitted that these principles are difficult of application. 

Yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities or

impressions.  Great disputes will arise about the merits of different

passages, about what is truly characteristic and original or trivial and

borrowed.  Many have thought the Laws to be one of the greatest of Platonic

writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they hardly rise above the

level of the forged epistles.  The manner in which a writer would or would

not have written at a particular time of life must be acknowledged to be a

matter of conjecture.  But enough has been said to show that similarities

of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to detect them or not, may be

such as must be attributed to an original writer, and not to a mere

imitator.



(d) Applying these principles to the case of the Laws, we have now to point

out that they contain the class of refined or unconscious similarities

which are indicative of genuineness.  The parallelisms are like the

repetitions of favourite thoughts into which every one is apt to fall

unawares in conversation or in writing.  They are found in a work which

contains many beautiful and remarkable passages.  We may therefore begin by

claiming this presumption in their favour.  Such undesigned coincidences,

as we may venture to call them, are the following.  The conception of

justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage (Laws; Republic):  the

latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion of dividing laws after the

kinds of virtue (Laws); the approval of the method of looking at one idea

gathered from many things, 'than which a truer was never discovered by any

man' (compare Republic):  or again the description of the Laws as parents

(Laws; Republic):  the assumption that religion has been already settled by

the oracle of Delphi (Laws; Republic), to which an appeal is also made in

special cases (Laws):  the notion of the battle with self, a paradox for

which Plato in a manner apologizes both in the Laws and the Republic:  the

remark (Laws) that just men, even when they are deformed in body, may still

be perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds

(compare Republic):  the argument that ideals are none the worse because

they cannot be carried out (Laws; Republic):  the near approach to the idea

of good in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a truth

which the guardians must be compelled to recognize (Laws; compare

Republic):  or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and

pain, which had previously been matter of habit (Laws; Republic):  or the

blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure (Laws;

Republic):  again the story of the Sidonian Cadmus (Laws), which is a

variation of the Phoenician tale of the earth-born men (Republic):  the

comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the Republic and in

the Laws:  the remark that no man can practise two trades (Laws; Republic): 

or the advantage of the middle condition (Laws; Republic):  the tendency to

speak of principles as moulds or forms; compare the ekmageia of song

(Laws), and the tupoi of religion (Republic):  or the remark (Laws) that

'the relaxation of justice makes many cities out of one,' which may be

compared with the Republic:  or the description of lawlessness 'creeping in

little by little in the fashions of music and overturning all things,'--to

us a paradox, but to Plato's mind a fixed idea, which is found in the Laws

as well as in the Republic:  or the figure of the parts of the human body

under which the parts of the state are described (Laws; Republic):  the

apology for delay and diffuseness, which occurs not unfrequently in the

Republic, is carried to an excess in the Laws (compare Theaet.):  the

remarkable thought (Laws) that the soul of the sun is better than the sun,

agrees with the relation in which the idea of good stands to the sun in the

Republic, and with the substitution of mind for the idea of good in the

Philebus:  the passage about the tragic poets (Laws) agrees generally with

the treatment of them in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and

worked out in a nobler spirit.  Some lesser similarities of thought and

manner should not be omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years' old

students in the Republic, and the fifty years' old choristers in the Laws;

or the making of the citizens out of wax (Laws) compared with the other

image (Republic); or the number of the tyrant (729), which is NEARLY equal

with the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the

'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which is divisible by all

the numbers from 1 to 12 except 11, and divisible by 11, if two families be

deducted; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid geometry of

which he complains in the Republic and the puzzle about fractions with the

difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and incommensurable quantities--

and the malicious emphasis on the word gunaikeios (Laws) with the use of

the same word (Republic).  These and similar passages tend to show that the

author of the Republic is also the author of the Laws.  They are echoes of

the same voice, expressions of the same mind, coincidences too subtle to

have been invented by the ingenuity of any imitator.  The force of the

argument is increased, if we remember that no passage in the Laws is

exactly copied,--nowhere do five or six words occur together which are

found together elsewhere in Plato's writings.



In other dialogues of Plato, as well as in the Republic, there are to be

found parallels with the Laws.  Such resemblances, as we might expect,

occur chiefly (but not exclusively) in the dialogues which, on other

grounds, we may suppose to be of later date.  The punishment of evil is to

be like evil men (Laws), as he says also in the Theaetetus.  Compare again

the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he gives the

reason in the Laws--'For serious things cannot be understood without

laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to

have intelligence of either'; here he puts forward the principle which is

the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates in the Symposium, 'that the genius

of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of comedy

ought to be a writer of tragedy also.'  There is a truth and right which is

above Law (Laws), as we learn also from the Statesman.  That men are the

possession of the Gods (Laws), is a reflection which likewise occurs in the

Phaedo.  The remark, whether serious or ironical (Laws), that 'the sons of

the Gods naturally believed in the Gods, because they had the means of

knowing about them,' is found in the Timaeus.  The reign of Cronos, who is

the divine ruler (Laws), is a reminiscence of the Statesman.  It is

remarkable that in the Sophist and Statesman (Soph.), Plato, speaking in

the character of the Eleatic Stranger, has already put on the old man.  The

madness of the poets, again, is a favourite notion of Plato's, which occurs

also in the Laws, as well as in the Phaedrus, Ion, and elsewhere.  There

are traces in the Laws of the same desire to base speculation upon history

which we find in the Critias.  Once more, there is a striking parallel with

the paradox of the Gorgias, that 'if you do evil, it is better to be

punished than to be unpunished,' in the Laws:  'To live having all goods

without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal,

but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.'



The point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels which

would be the work of an imitator.  Would a forger have had the wit to

select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would he

have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly

borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed

them into a whole such as the Laws; would he have given another the credit

which he might have obtained for himself; would he have remembered and made

use of other passages of the Platonic writings and have never deviated into

the phraseology of them?  Without pressing such arguments as absolutely

certain, we must acknowledge that such a comparison affords a new ground of

real weight for believing the Laws to be a genuine writing of Plato.



V.  The relation of the Republic to the Laws is clearly set forth by Plato

in the Laws.  The Republic is the best state, the Laws is the best possible

under the existing conditions of the Greek world.  The Republic is the

ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may not have

existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or son of a God

(who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of all other states and

the exemplar of human life.  The Laws distinctly acknowledge what the

Republic partly admits, that the ideal is inimitable by us, but that we

should 'lift up our eyes to the heavens' and try to regulate our lives

according to the divine image.  The citizens are no longer to have wives

and children in common, and are no longer to be under the government of

philosophers.  But the spirit of communism or communion is to continue

among them, though reverence for the sacredness of the family, and respect

of children for parents, not promiscuous hymeneals, are now the foundation

of the state; the sexes are to be as nearly on an equality as possible;

they are to meet at common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the

women will consent), and to have a common education.  The legislator has

taken the place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained,

who are to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of

life.  The addition of younger persons to this council by co-optation is an

improvement on the governing body of the Republic.  The scheme of education

in the Laws is of a far lower kind than that which Plato had conceived in

the Republic.  There he would have his rulers trained in all knowledge

meeting in the idea of good, of which the different branches of

mathematical science are but the hand-maidens or ministers; here he treats

chiefly of popular education, stopping short with the preliminary

sciences,--these are to be studied partly with a view to their practical

usefulness, which in the Republic he holds cheap, and even more with a view

to avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing; he touches

very lightly on dialectic, which is still to be retained for the rulers. 

Yet in the Laws there remain traces of the old educational ideas.  He is

still for banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of prose writers

equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study of his own laws. 

He insists strongly on the importance of mathematics as an educational

instrument.  He is no more reconciled to the Greek mythology than in the

Republic, though he would rather say nothing about it out of a reverence

for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have recourse to fictions, if

they have a moral tendency.  His thoughts recur to a golden age in which

the sanctity of oaths was respected and in which men living nearer the Gods

were more disposed to believe in them; but we must legislate for the world

as it is, now that the old beliefs have passed away.  Though he is no

longer fired with dialectical enthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to

'look at one idea gathered from many things,' and to 'perceive the

principle which is the same in all the four virtues.'  He still recognizes

the enormous influence of music, in which every youth is to be trained for

three years; and he seems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the

Athenian state and the laxity of morals partly to musical innovation,

manifested in the unnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, of the

rhythm from the words, and partly to the influence of the mob who ruled at

the theatres.  He assimilates the education of the two sexes, as far as

possible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the Republic, he would

give to gymnastic a purely military character.  In marriage, his object is

still to produce the finest children for the state.  As in the Statesman,

he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures--the passionate with the dull,

the courageous with the gentle.  And the virtuous tyrant of the Statesman,

who has no place in the Republic, again appears.  In this, as in all his

writings, he has the strongest sense of the degeneracy and incapacity of

the rulers of his own time.



In the Laws, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are at

least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the regulation

of human life.  It must however be remembered that the religion of Plato is

co-extensive with morality, and is that purified religion and mythology of

which he speaks in the second book of the Republic.  There is no real

discrepancy in the two works.  In a practical treatise, he speaks of

religion rather than of philosophy; just as he appears to identify virtue

with pleasure, and rather seeks to find the common element of the virtues

than to maintain his old paradoxical theses that they are one, or that they

are identical with knowledge.  The dialectic and the idea of good, which

even Glaucon in the Republic could not understand, would be out of place in

a less ideal work.  There may also be a change in his own mind, the purely

intellectual aspect of philosophy having a diminishing interest to him in

his old age.



Some confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the Republic,

occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he proposes (D.V.) 

hereafter to expound.  Like many other thoughts in the Laws, the allusion

is obscure from not being worked out.  Aristotle (Polit.) speaks of a state

which is neither the best absolutely, nor the best under existing

conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior to either, destitute, as he

supposes, of the necessaries of life--apparently such a beginning of

primitive society as is described in Laws iii.  But it is not clear that by

this the third state of Plato is intended.  It is possible that Plato may

have meant by his third state an historical sketch, bearing the same

relation to the Laws which the unfinished Critias would have borne to the

Republic; or he may, perhaps, have intended to describe a state more nearly

approximating than the Laws to existing Greek states.



The Statesman is a mere fragment when compared with the Laws, yet combining

a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is wanting in the

larger work.  Several points of similarity and contrast may be observed

between them.  In some respects the Statesman is even more ideal than the

Republic, looking back to a former state of paradisiacal life, in which the

Gods ruled over mankind, as the Republic looks forward to a coming kingdom

of philosophers.  Of this kingdom of Cronos there is also mention in the

Laws.  Again, in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger rises above law to the

conception of the living voice of the lawgiver, who is able to provide for

individual cases.  A similar thought is repeated in the Laws:  'If in the

order of nature, and by divine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the

truth about these things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him;

for there is no law or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety

be deemed the subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.'  The

union of opposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political

web, is a favourite thought which occurs in both dialogues (Laws;

Statesman).



The Laws are confessedly a Second-best, an inferior Ideal, to which Plato

has recourse, when he finds that the city of Philosophers is no longer

'within the horizon of practical politics.'  But it is curious to observe

that the higher Ideal is always returning (compare Arist. Polit.), and that

he is not much nearer the actual fact, nor more on the level of ordinary

life in the Laws than in the Republic.  It is also interesting to remark

that the new Ideal is always falling away, and that he hardly supposes the

one to be more capable of being realized than the other.  Human beings are

troublesome to manage; and the legislator cannot adapt his enactments to

the infinite variety of circumstances; after all he must leave the

administration of them to his successors; and though he would have liked to

make them as permanent as they are in Egypt, he cannot escape from the

necessity of change.  At length Plato is obliged to institute a Nocturnal

Council which is supposed to retain the mind of the legislator, and of

which some of the members are even supposed to go abroad and inspect the

institutions of foreign countries, as a foundation for changes in their

own.  The spirit of such changes, though avoiding the extravagance of a

popular assembly, being only so much change as the conservative temper of

old members is likely to allow, is nevertheless inconsistent with the

fixedness of Egypt which Plato wishes to impress upon Hellenic

institutions.  He is inconsistent with himself as the truth begins to dawn

upon him that 'in the execution things for the most part fall short of our

conception of them' (Republic).



And is not this true of ideals of government in general?  We are always

disappointed in them.  Nothing great can be accomplished in the short space

of human life; wherefore also we look forward to another (Republic).  As we

grow old, we are sensible that we have no power actively to pursue our

ideals any longer.  We have had our opportunity and do not aspire to be

more than men:  we have received our 'wages and are going home.'  Neither

do we despair of the future of mankind, because we have been able to do so

little in comparison of the whole.  We look in vain for consistency either

in men or things.  But we have seen enough of improvement in our own time

to justify us in the belief that the world is worth working for and that a

good man's life is not thrown away.  Such reflections may help us to bring

home to ourselves by inward sympathy the language of Plato in the Laws, and

to combine into something like a whole his various and at first sight

inconsistent utterances.



VI.  The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended to

a government of philosophers.  But in the Laws an Athenian element is also

introduced.  Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four classes

are borrowed from the constitution of Cleisthenes, which Plato regards as

the best form of Athenian government, and the guardians of the law bear a

certain resemblance to the archons.  In the constitution of the Laws nearly

all officers are elected by a vote more or less popular and by lot.  But

the assembly only exists for the purposes of election, and has no

legislative or executive powers.  The Nocturnal Council, which is the

highest body in the state, has several of the functions of the ancient

Athenian Areopagus, after which it appears to be modelled.  Life is to

wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look; there are to be Bacchic

choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged in moderate potations.  On

the other hand, the common meals, the public education, the crypteia are

borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens, and the superintendence of

private life, which was to be practised by the governors, has also its

prototype in Sparta.  The extravagant dislike which Plato shows both to a

naval power and to extreme democracy is the reverse of Athenian.



The best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to

individual lawgivers.  These were real persons, though we are uncertain how

far they originated or only modified the institutions which are ascribed to

them.  But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea in the mind of

the Greek,--as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born Cadmus.  'This was

what Solon meant or said'--was the form in which the Athenian expressed his

own conception of right and justice, or argued a disputed point of law. 

And the constant reference in the Laws of Plato to the lawgiver is

altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking and speaking.



There is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element.  The highest

branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly

bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements, is

an important part of religion; the lives of the citizens are to have a

common measure, as also their vessels and coins; the great blessing of the

state is the number 5040.  Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity of

Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and dance. 

And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had made in the

mathematical sciences--in comparison of them the Greeks appeared to him to

be little better than swine.  Yet he censures the Egyptian meanness and

inhospitality to strangers.  He has traced the growth of states from their

rude beginnings in a philosophical spirit; but of any life or growth of the

Hellenic world in future ages he is silent.  He has made the reflection

that past time is the maker of states (Book iii.); but he does not argue

from the past to the future, that the process is always going on, or that

the institutions of nations are relative to their stage of civilization. 

If he could have stamped indelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the

legislator, he would have been satisfied.  The utmost which he expects of

future generations is that they should supply the omissions, or correct the

errors which younger statesmen detect in his enactments.  When institutions

have been once subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them

fixed for ever.



THE PREAMBLE.



BOOK I.  Strangers, let me ask a question of you--Was a God or a man the

author of your laws?  'A God, Stranger.  In Crete, Zeus is said to have

been the author of them; in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.' 

You Cretans believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to

converse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from

him.  'Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among

us to have been a most righteous judge.'  That is a reputation worthy of

the son of Zeus.  And as you and Megillus have been trained under these

laws, I may ask you to give me an account of them.  We can talk about them

in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus.  I am told that the

distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places under the

trees, where, being no longer young, we may often rest and converse.  'Yes,

Stranger, a little onward there are beautiful groves of cypresses, and

green meadows in which we may repose.'



My first question is, Why has the law ordained that you should have common

meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms?  'My answer is, that all our

institutions are of a military character.  We lead the life of the camp

even in time of peace, keeping up the organization of an army, and having

meals in common; and as our country, owing to its ruggedness, is ill-suited

for heavy-armed cavalry or infantry, our soldiers are archers, equipped

with bows and arrows.  The legislator was under the idea that war was the

natural state of all mankind, and that peace is only a pretence; he thought

that no possessions had any value which were not secured against enemies.' 

And do you think that superiority in war is the proper aim of government? 

'Certainly I do, and my Spartan friend will agree with me.'  And are there

wars, not only of state against state, but of village against village, of

family against family, of individual against individual?  'Yes.'  And is a

man his own enemy?  'There you come to first principles, like a true votary

of the goddess Athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner

recognize the truth of what I am saying--that all men everywhere are the

enemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself; and,

further, that there is a victory and defeat--the best and the worst--which

each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of himself.'  And does

this extend to states and villages as well as to individuals?  'Certainly;

there is a better in them which conquers or is conquered by the worse.' 

Whether the worse ever really conquers the better, is a question which may

be left for the present; but your meaning is, that bad citizens do

sometimes overcome the good, and that the state is then conquered by

herself, and that when they are defeated the state is victorious over

herself.  Or, again, in a family there may be several brothers, and the bad

may be a majority; and when the bad majority conquer the good minority, the

family are worse than themselves.  The use of the terms 'better or worse

than himself or themselves' may be doubtful, but about the thing meant

there can be no dispute.  'Very true.'  Such a struggle might be determined

by a judge.  And which will be the better judge--he who destroys the worse

and lets the better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the

others voluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who destroys no one, but

reconciles the two parties?  'The last, clearly.'  But the object of such a

judge or legislator would not be war.  'True.'  And as there are two kinds

of war, one without and one within a state, of which the internal is by far

the worse, will not the legislator chiefly direct his attention to this

latter?  He will reconcile the contending factions, and unite them against

their external enemies.  'Certainly.'  Every legislator will aim at the

greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil

or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body health is

preferable to the purgation of disease.  He who makes war his object

instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not a

true statesman.  'And yet, Stranger, the laws both of Crete and Sparta aim

entirely at war.'  Perhaps so; but do not let us quarrel about your

legislators--let us be gentle; they were in earnest quite as much as we

are, and we must try to discover their meaning.  The poet Tyrtaeus (you

know his poems in Crete, and my Lacedaemonian friend is only too familiar

with them)--he was an Athenian by birth, and a Spartan citizen:--'Well,' he

says, 'I sing not, I care not about any man, however rich or happy, unless

he is brave in war.'  Now I should like, in the name of us all, to ask the

poet a question.  Oh Tyrtaeus, I would say to him, we agree with you in

praising those who excel in war, but which kind of war do you mean?--that

dreadful war which is termed civil, or the milder sort which is waged

against foreign enemies?  You say that you abominate 'those who are not

eager to taste their enemies' blood,' and you seem to mean chiefly their

foreign enemies.  'Certainly he does.'  But we contend that there are men

better far than your heroes, Tyrtaeus, concerning whom another poet,

Theognis the Sicilian, says that 'in a civil broil they are worth their

weight in gold and silver.'  For in a civil war, not only courage, but

justice and temperance and wisdom are required, and all virtue is better

than a part.  The mercenary soldier is ready to die at his post; yet he is

commonly a violent, senseless creature.  And the legislator, whether

inspired or uninspired, will make laws with a view to the highest virtue;

and this is not brute courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger.  The

virtue of Tyrtaeus, although needful enough in his own time, is really of a

fourth-rate description.  'You are degrading our legislator to a very low

level.'  Nay, we degrade not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the

laws of Lycurgus and Minos had a view to war only.  A divine lawgiver would

have had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and have arranged his

laws in corresponding classes, and not in the modern fashion, which only

makes them after the want of them is felt,--about inheritances and

heiresses and assaults, and the like.  As you truly said, virtue is the

business of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all

legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part.  For the object

of laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy.  Now

happiness or good is of two kinds--there are divine and there are human

goods.  He who has the divine has the human added to him; but he who has

lost the greater is deprived of both.  The lesser goods are health, beauty,

strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, Pluto, but one who has

eyes to see and follow wisdom.  For mind or wisdom is the most divine of

all goods; and next comes temperance, and justice springs from the union of

wisdom and temperance with courage, which is the fourth or last.  These

four precede other goods, and the legislator will arrange all his

ordinances accordingly, the human going back to the divine, and the divine

to their leader mind.  There will be enactments about marriage, about

education, about all the states and feelings and experiences of men and

women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and peace; upon all the law

will fix a stamp of praise and blame.  There will also be regulations about

property and expenditure, about contracts, about rewards and punishments,

and finally about funeral rites and honours of the dead.  The lawgiver will

appoint guardians to preside over these things; and mind will harmonize his

ordinances, and show them to be in agreement with temperance and justice. 

Now I want to know whether the same principles are observed in the laws of

Lycurgus and Minos, or, as I should rather say, of Apollo and Zeus.  We

must go through the virtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show

that what has preceded has relation to virtue.



'I wish,' says the Lacedaemonian, 'that you, Stranger, would first

criticize Cleinias and the Cretan laws.'  Yes, is the reply, and I will

criticize you and myself, as well as him.  Tell me, Megillus, were not the

common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a

view to war?  'Yes; and next in the order of importance comes hunting, and

fourth the endurance of pain in boxing contests, and in the beatings which

are the punishment of theft.  There is, too, the so-called Crypteia or

secret service, in which our youth wander about the country night and day

unattended, and even in winter go unshod and have no beds to lie on. 

Moreover they wrestle and exercise under a blazing sun, and they have many

similar customs.'  Well, but is courage only a combat against fear and

pain, and not against pleasure and flattery?  'Against both, I should say.' 

And which is worse,--to be overcome by pain, or by pleasure?  'The latter.' 

But did the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta legislate for a courage which is

lame of one leg,--able to meet the attacks of pain but not those of

pleasure, or for one which can meet both?  'For a courage which can meet

both, I should say.'  But if so, where are the institutions which train

your citizens to be equally brave against pleasure and pain, and superior

to enemies within as well as without?  'We confess that we have no

institutions worth mentioning which are of this character.'  I am not

surprised, and will therefore only request forbearance on the part of us

all, in case the love of truth should lead any of us to censure the laws of

the others.  Remember that I am more in the way of hearing criticisms of

your laws than you can be; for in well-ordered states like Crete and

Sparta, although an old man may sometimes speak of them in private to a

ruler or elder, a similar liberty is not allowed to the young.  But now

being alone we shall not offend your legislator by a friendly examination

of his laws. 'Take any freedom which you like.'



My first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to endure

hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline would

run away from those who had.  But he ought to have considered further, that

those who had never learned to resist pleasure would be equally at the

mercy of those who had, and these are often among the worst of mankind. 

Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them and take away their courage and

freedom.  'Perhaps; but I must not be hasty in giving my assent.'



Next as to temperance:  what institutions have you which are adapted to

promote temperance?  'There are the common meals and gymnastic exercises.' 

These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine, what is good at

one time and for one person, is bad at another time and for another person.

Now although gymnastics and common meals do good, they are also a cause of

evil in civil troubles, and they appear to encourage unnatural love, as has

been shown at Miletus, in Boeotia, and at Thurii.  And the Cretans are said

to have invented the tale of Zeus and Ganymede in order to justify their

evil practices by the example of the God who was their lawgiver.  Leaving

the story, we may observe that all law has to do with pleasure and pain;

these are two fountains which are ever flowing in human nature, and he who

drinks of them when and as much as he ought, is happy, and he who indulges

in them to excess, is miserable.  'You may be right, but I still incline to

think that the Lacedaemonian lawgiver did well in forbidding pleasure, if I

may judge from the result.  For there is no drunken revelry in Sparta, and

any one found in a state of intoxication is severely punished; he is not

excused as an Athenian would be at Athens on account of a festival.  I

myself have seen the Athenians drunk at the Dionysia--and at our colony,

Tarentum, on a similar occasion, I have beheld the whole city in a state of

intoxication.'  I admit that these festivals should be properly regulated. 

Yet I might reply, 'Yes, Spartans, that is not your vice; but look at home

and remember the licentiousness of your women.'  And to all such

accusations every one of us may reply in turn:--'Wonder not, Stranger;

there are different customs in different countries.'  Now this may be a

sufficient answer; but we are speaking about the wisdom of lawgivers and

not about the customs of men.  To return to the question of drinking: 

shall we have total abstinence, as you have, or hard drinking, like the

Scythians and Thracians, or moderate potations like the Persians?  'Give us

arms, and we send all these nations flying before us.'  My good friend, be

modest; victories and defeats often arise from unknown causes, and afford

no proof of the goodness or badness of institutions.  The stronger

overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have overcome the Ceans, or the

Syracusans the Locrians, who are, perhaps, the best governed state in that

part of the world.  People are apt to praise or censure practices without

enquiring into the nature of them.  This is the way with drink:  one person

brings many witnesses, who sing the praises of wine; another declares that

sober men defeat drunkards in battle; and he again is refuted in turn.  I

should like to conduct the argument on some other method; for if you regard

numbers, there are two cities on one side, and ten thousand on the other. 

'I am ready to pursue any method which is likely to lead us to the truth.' 

Let me put the matter thus:  Somebody praises the useful qualities of a

goat; another has seen goats running about wild in a garden, and blames a

goat or any other animal which happens to be without a keeper.  'How

absurd!'  Would a pilot who is sea-sick be a good pilot?  'No.'  Or a

general who is sick and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? 

'A general of old women he ought to be.'  But can any one form an estimate

of any society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees

in an unruly and lawless state?  'No.'  There is a convivial form of

society--is there not?  'Yes.'  And has this convivial society ever been

rightly ordered?  Of course you Spartans and Cretans have never seen

anything of the kind, but I have had wide experience, and made many

enquiries about such societies, and have hardly ever found anything right

or good in them.  'We acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to

learn of you.'  Will you admit that in all societies there must be a

leader?  'Yes.'  And in time of war he must be a man of courage and

absolutely devoid of fear, if this be possible?  'Certainly.'  But we are

talking now of a general who shall preside at meetings of friends--and as

these have a tendency to be uproarious, they ought above all others to have

a governor.  'Very good.'  He should be a sober man and a man of the world,

who will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard in

charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing a

serious mischief.  'Indeed he would.'  Suppose a person to censure such

meetings--he may be right, but also he may have known them only in their

disorderly state, under a drunken master of the feast; and a drunken

general or pilot cannot save his army or his ships.  'True; but although I

see the advantage of an army having a good general, I do not equally see

the good of a feast being well managed.'  If you mean to ask what good

accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or a single

chorus, I should reply, 'Not much'; but if you ask what is the good of

education in general, I answer, that education makes good men, and that

good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in battle.  Victory is often

suicidal to the victors, because it creates forgetfulness of education, but

education itself is never suicidal.  'You imply that the regulation of

convivial meetings is a part of education; how will you prove this?'  I

will tell you.  But first let me offer a word of apology.  We Athenians are

always thought to be fond of talking, whereas the Lacedaemonian is

celebrated for brevity, and the Cretan is considered to be sagacious and

reserved.  Now I fear that I may be charged with spinning a long discourse

out of slender materials.  For drinking cannot be rightly ordered without

correct principles of music, and music runs up into education generally,

and to discuss all these matters may be tedious; if you like, therefore, we

will pass on to another part of our subject.  'Are you aware, Athenian,

that our family is your proxenus at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have

regarded Athens as a second country, and having often fought your battles

in my youth, I have become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic

dialect?  The saying is true, that the best Athenians are more than

ordinarily good, because they are good by nature; therefore, be assured

that I shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.'  'I, too,'

adds Cleinias, 'have a tie which binds me to you.  You know that

Epimenides, the Cretan prophet, came and offered sacrifices in your city by

the command of an oracle ten years before the Persian war.  He told the

Athenians that the Persian host would not come for ten years, and would go

away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted.  Now

Epimenides was of my family, and when he visited Athens he entered into

friendship with your forefathers.'  I see that you are willing to listen,

and I have the will to speak, if I had only the ability.  But, first, I

must define the nature and power of education, and by this road we will

travel on to the God Dionysus.  The man who is to be good at anything must

have early training;--the future builder must play at building, and the

husbandman at digging; the soldier must learn to ride, and the carpenter to

measure and use the rule,--all the thoughts and pleasures of children

should bear on their after-profession.--Do you agree with me?  'Certainly.' 

And we must remember further that we are speaking of the education, not of

a trainer, or of the captain of a ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows

how to rule and how to obey; and such an education aims at virtue, and not

at wealth or strength or mere cleverness.  To the good man, education is of

all things the most precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 

'We agree.'  And we have before agreed that good men are those who are able

to control themselves, and bad men are those who are not.  Let me offer you

an illustration which will assist our argument.  Man is one; but in one and

the same man are two foolish counsellors who contend within him--pleasure

and pain, and of either he has expectations which we call hope and fear;

and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason, when affirmed by

the state, becomes law.  'We cannot follow you.'  Let me put the matter in

another way:  Every creature is a puppet of the Gods--whether he is a mere

plaything or has any serious use we do not know; but this we do know, that

he is drawn different ways by cords and strings.  There is a soft golden

cord which draws him towards virtue--this is the law of the state; and

there are other cords made of iron and hard materials drawing him other

ways.  The golden reasoning influence has nothing of the nature of force,

and therefore requires ministers in order to vanquish the other principles. 

This explains the doctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are

conquered by themselves.  The individual follows reason, and the city law,

which is embodied reason, either derived from the Gods or from the

legislator.  When virtue and vice are thus distinguished, education will be

better understood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial

intercourse.  And now let us set wine before the puppet.  You admit that

wine stimulates the passions?  'Yes.'  And does wine equally stimulate the

reasoning faculties?  'No; it brings the soul back to a state of

childhood.'  In such a state a man has the least control over himself, and

is, therefore, worst.  'Very true.'  Then how can we believe that drinking

should be encouraged?  'You seem to think that it ought to be.'  And I am

ready to maintain my position.  'We should like to hear you prove that a

man ought to make a beast of himself.'  You are speaking of the degradation

of the soul:  but how about the body?  Would any man willingly degrade or

weaken that?  'Certainly not.'  And yet if he goes to a doctor or a

gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope of getting well?

for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or always to be in

training.  'True.'  And may not convivial meetings have a similar remedial

use?  And if so, are they not to be preferred to other modes of training

because they are painless?  'But have they any such use?'  Let us see:  Are

there not two kinds of fear--fear of evil and fear of an evil reputation? 

'There are.'  The latter kind of fear is opposed both to the fear of pain

and to the love of pleasure.  This is called by the legislator reverence,

and is greatly honoured by him and by every good man; whereas confidence,

which is the opposite quality, is the worst fault both of individuals and

of states.  This sort of fear or reverence is one of the two chief causes

of victory in war, fearlessness of enemies being the other.  'True.'  Then

every one should be both fearful and fearless?  'Yes.'  The right sort of

fear is infused into a man when he comes face to face with shame, or

cowardice, or the temptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them.  He

must learn by many trials to win the victory over himself, if he is ever to

be made perfect.  'That is reasonable enough.'  And now, suppose that the

Gods had given mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every

sort of evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence

of mind and became a coward for a time:--would such a drug have any value? 

'But is there such a drug?'  No; but suppose that there were; might not the

legislator use such a mode of testing courage and cowardice?  'To be sure.' 

The legislator would induce fear in order to implant fearlessness; and

would give rewards or punishments to those who behaved well or the reverse,

under the influence of the drug?  'Certainly.'  And this mode of training,

whether practised in the case of one or many, whether in solitude or in the

presence of a large company--if a man have sufficient confidence in himself

to drink the potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not

taking too much,--would be an equally good test of temperance?  'Very

true.'  Let us return to the lawgiver and say to him, 'Well, lawgiver, no

such fear-producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, but

there is a potion which will make men fearless.'  'You mean wine.'  Yes;

has not wine an effect the contrary of that which I was just now

describing,--first mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him

with confidence, making him ready to say or do anything?  'Certainly.'  Let

us not forget that there are two qualities which should be cultivated in

the soul--first, the greatest fearlessness, and, secondly, the greatest

fear, which are both parts of reverence.  Courage and fearlessness are

trained amid dangers; but we have still to consider how fear is to be

trained.  We desire to attain fearlessness and confidence without the

insolence and boldness which commonly attend them.  For do not love,

ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they stimulate courage,

also madden and intoxicate the soul?  What better and more innocent test of

character is there than festive intercourse?  Would you make a bargain with

a man in order to try whether he is honest?  Or would you ascertain whether

he is licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands?  No one

would deny that the test proposed is fairer, speedier, and safer than any

other.  And such a test will be particularly useful in the political

science, which desires to know human natures and characters.  'Very true.'



BOOK II.  And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations?  There

are; but in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right

education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of

convivial intercourse.  'A high assumption.'  I believe that virtue and

vice are originally present to the mind of children in the form of pleasure

and pain; reason and fixed principles come later, and happy is he who

acquires them even in declining years; for he who possesses them is the

perfect man.  When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are rightly

implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment of reason

are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the soul is

virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I call education. 

But the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be impaired in the

course of life; and therefore the Gods, pitying the toils and sorrows of

mortals, have allowed them to have holidays, and given them the Muses and

Apollo and Dionysus for leaders and playfellows.  All young creatures love

motion and frolic, and utter sounds of delight; but man only is capable of

taking pleasure in rhythmical and harmonious movements.  With these

education begins; and the uneducated is he who has never known the

discipline of the chorus, and the educated is he who has.  The chorus is

partly dance and partly song, and therefore the well-educated must sing and

dance well.  But when we say, 'He sings and dances well,' we mean that he

sings and dances what is good.  And if he thinks that to be good which is

really good, he will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a

far greater master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who is not of

this opinion.  'True.'  Then, if we know what is good and bad in song and

dance, we shall know what education is?  'Very true.'  Let us now consider

the beauty of figure, melody, song, and dance.  Will the same figures or

sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they are

in trouble?  'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces are

different?'  Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are

adapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the way,

that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters, is not

really applicable to music).  And one class of harmonies is akin to courage

and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice.  'We agree.'  And do

all men equally like all dances?  'Far otherwise.'  Do some figures, then,

appear to be beautiful which are not?  For no one will admit that the forms

of vice are more beautiful than the forms of virtue, or that he prefers the

first kind to the second.  And yet most persons say that the merit of music

is to give pleasure.  But this is impiety.  There is, however, a more

plausible account of the matter given by others, who make their likes or

dislikes the criterion of excellence.  Sometimes nature crosses habit, or

conversely, and then they say that such and such fashions or gestures are

pleasant, but they do not like to exhibit them before men of sense,

although they enjoy them in private.  'Very true.'  And do vicious measures

and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them? 

'Probably.'  Say, rather 'Certainly':  for the gentle indulgence which we

often show to vicious men inevitably makes us become like them.  And what

can be worse than this?  'Nothing.'  Then in a well-administered city, the

poet will not be allowed to make the songs of the people just as he

pleases, or to train his choruses without regard to virtue and vice. 

'Certainly not.'  And yet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt; for

there ages ago they discovered the great truth which I am now asserting,

that the young should be educated in forms and strains of virtue.  These

they fixed and consecrated in their temples; and no artist or musician is

allowed to deviate from them.  They are literally the same which they were

ten thousand years ago.  And this practice of theirs suggests the

reflection that legislation about music is not an impossible thing.  But

the particular enactments must be the work of God or of some God-inspired

man, as in Egypt their ancient chants are said to be the composition of the

goddess Isis.  The melodies which have a natural truth and correctness

should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty is not strong

enough to change the old fashions.  Is not the origin of music as follows? 

We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think that we prosper when

we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but our young men dance

dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have lost the elasticity of

youth, regale themselves with the memory of the past, while they

contemplate the life and activity of the young.  'Most true.'  People say

that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to win the palm: 

are they right?  'Possibly.'  Let us not be hasty in deciding, but first

imagine a festival at which the lord of the festival, having assembled the

citizens, makes a proclamation that he shall be crowned victor who gives

the most pleasure, from whatever source derived.  We will further suppose

that there are exhibitions of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic

poets, and even marionette-players--which of the pleasure-makers will win? 

Shall I answer for you?--the marionette-players will please the children;

youths will decide for comedy; young men, educated women, and people in

general will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod. 

Now which of them is right?  If you and I are asked, we shall certainly say

that the old men's way of thinking ought to prevail.  'Very true.'  So far

I agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by

pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated, or

better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man.  The true judge

must have both wisdom and courage.  For he must lead the multitude and not

be led by them, and must not weakly yield to the uproar of the theatre, nor

give false judgment out of that mouth which has just appealed to the Gods. 

The ancient custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily,

left the judgment to the spectators, but this custom has been the ruin of

the poets, who seek only to please their patrons, and has degraded the

audience by the representation of inferior characters.  What is the

inference?  The same which we have often drawn, that education is the

training of the young idea in what the law affirms and the elders approve. 

And as the soul of a child is too young to be trained in earnest, a kind of

education has been invented which tempts him with plays and songs, as the

sick are tempted by pleasant meats and drinks.  And the wise legislator

will compel the poet to express in his poems noble thoughts in fitting

words and rhythms.  'But is this the practice elsewhere than in Crete and

Lacedaemon?  In other states, as far as I know, dances and music are

constantly changed at the pleasure of the hearers.'  I am afraid that I

misled you; not liking to be always finding fault with mankind as they are,

I described them as they ought to be.  But let me understand:  you say that

such customs exist among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the rest

of the world would be improved by adopting them?  'Much improved.'  And you

compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that the

wicked man, even if he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy?  Or, in the words

of Tyrtaeus, 'I sing not, I care not about him' who is a great warrior not

having justice; if he be unjust, 'I would not have him look calmly upon

death or be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of every good--

that is, of every true good.  For even if he have the goods which men

regard, these are not really goods:  first health; beauty next; thirdly

wealth; and there are others.  A man may have every sense purged and

improved; he may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever:  but

you and I will maintain that all these things are goods to the just, but to

the unjust the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; not so great if he

live for a short time only.  If a man had health and wealth, and power, and

was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might be

fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if

basely evilly, and if evilly painfully.  'There I cannot agree with you.' 

Then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as convinced of

the truth of what I say as that Crete is an island; and, if I were a

lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would punish

them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that injustice is

profitable.  And these are not the only matters in which I should make my

citizens talk in a different way to the world in general.  If I asked Zeus

and Apollo, the divine legislators of Crete and Sparta,--'Are the just and

pleasant life the same or not the same'?--and they replied,--'Not the

same'; and I asked again--'Which is the happier'?  And they said'--'The

pleasant life,' this is an answer not fit for a God to utter, and therefore

I ought rather to put the same question to some legislator.  And if he

replies 'The pleasant,' then I should say to him, 'O my father, did you not

tell me that I should live as justly as possible'? and if to be just is to

be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is superior to

pleasure?  Is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good and

honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse?  Or is the

neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not

pleasant?  But you cannot make men like what is not pleasant, and therefore

you must make them believe that the just is pleasant.  The business of the

legislator is to clear up this confusion.  He will show that the just and

the unjust are identical with the pleasurable and the painful, from the

point of view of the just man, of the unjust the reverse.  And which is the

truer judgment?  Surely that of the better soul.  For if not the truth, it

is the best and most moral of fictions; and the legislator who desires to

propagate this useful lie, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have

believed the story of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may

be assured that he can make them believe anything, and need only consider

what fiction will do the greatest good.  That the happiest is also the

holiest, this shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three

choruses alike.  First will enter the choir of children, who will lift up

their voices on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God

Paean to be gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their

words; then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and sixty;

and, lastly, there will be the old men, and they will tell stories

enforcing the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle.  'Whom do you

mean by the third chorus?'  You remember how I spoke at first of the

restless nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a

disorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any perception

of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus

to be our playfellows.  Of the two first choruses I have already spoken,

and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian chorus, which is

composed of those who are between thirty and sixty years old.  'Let us

hear.'  We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women, and children should be

always charming themselves with strains of virtue, and that there should be

a variety in the strains, that they may not weary of them?  Now the fairest

and most useful of strains will be uttered by the elder men, and therefore

we cannot let them off.  But how can we make them sing?  For a discreet

elderly man is ashamed to hear the sound of his own voice in private, and

still more in public.  The only way is to give them drink; this will mellow

the sourness of age.  No one should be allowed to taste wine until they are

eighteen; from eighteen to thirty they may take a little; but when they

have reached forty years, they may be initiated into the mystery of

drinking.  Thus they will become softer and more impressible; and when a

man's heart is warm within him, he will be more ready to charm himself and

others with song.  And what songs shall he sing?  'At Crete and Lacedaemon

we only know choral songs.'  Yes; that is because your way of life is

military.  Your young men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together;

no one takes the individual colt and trains him apart, and tries to give

him the qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier.  He who was thus

trained would be a greater warrior than those of whom Tyrtaeus speaks, for

he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was only fourth

in the scale of virtue.  'Once more, I must say, Stranger, that you run

down our lawgivers.'  Not intentionally, my good friend, but whither the

argument leads I follow; and I am trying to find some style of poetry

suitable for those who dislike the common sort.  'Very good.'  In all

things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or they have

some accompanying truth or advantage.  For example, in eating and drinking

there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health; and in learning

there is a pleasure and also truth.  There is a pleasure or charm, too, in

the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or equality; but the

pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not the criterion of their

truth.  The test of pleasure cannot be applied except to that which has no

other good or evil, no truth or falsehood.  But that which has truth must

be judged of by the standard of truth, and therefore imitation and

proportion are to be judged of by their truth alone.  'Certainly.'  And as

music is imitative, it is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure,

and the Muse whom we seek is the muse not of pleasure but of truth, for

imitation has a truth.  'Doubtless.'  And if so, the judge must know what

is being imitated before he decides on the quality of the imitation, and he

who does not know what is true will not know what is good.  'He will not.' 

Will any one be able to imitate the human body, if he does not know the

number, proportion, colour, or figure of the limbs?  'How can he?'  But

suppose we know some picture or figure to be an exact resemblance of a man,

should we not also require to know whether the picture is beautiful or not? 

'Quite right.'  The judge of the imitation is required to know, therefore,

first the original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the

execution?  'True.'  Then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to

the standard of the Muses and of truth.  The Muses are not like human

poets; they never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and

human voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of

freemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals.  They do not

practise the baser sorts of musical arts, such as the 'matured judgments,'

of whom Orpheus speaks, would ridicule.  But modern poets separate metre

from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the instrument alone

without the voice.  The consequence is, that the meaning of the rhythm and

of the time are not understood.  I am endeavouring to show how our fifty-

year-old choristers are to be trained, and what they are to avoid.  The

opinion of the multitude about these matters is worthless; they who are

only made to step in time by sheer force cannot be critics of music. 

'Impossible.'  Then our newly-appointed minstrels must be trained in music

sufficiently to understand the nature of rhythms and systems; and they

should select such as are suitable to men of their age, and will enable

them to give and receive innocent pleasure.  This is a knowledge which goes

beyond that either of the poets or of their auditors in general.  For

although the poet must understand rhythm and music, he need not necessarily

know whether the imitation is good or not, which was the third point

required in a judge; but our chorus of elders must know all three, if they

are to be the instructors of youth.



And now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as

follows:  A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking

proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and fancies that he can rule the

whole world.  'Doubtless.'  And did we not say that the souls of the

drinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at the

hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them.  At

times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out of their

turn, and interrupting one another.  And the business of the legislator is

to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame, in opposition to

this disorderly boldness.  But in order to discipline them there must be

guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals who shall take charge

of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in drinking as in fighting,

and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders will be equally disgraced. 

'Very good.'  If a drinking festival were well regulated, men would go

away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but better friends.  Of the

greatest gift of Dionysus I hardly like to speak, lest I should be

misunderstood.  'What is that?'  According to tradition Dionysus was driven

mad by his stepmother Here, and in order to revenge himself he inspired

mankind with Bacchic madness.  But these are stories which I would rather

not repeat.  However I do acknowledge that all men are born in an imperfect

state, and are at first restless, irrational creatures:  this, as you will

remember, has been already said by us.  'I remember.'  And that Apollo and

the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony and rhythm?  'Very true.'  The other

story implies that wine was given to punish us and make us mad; but we

contend that wine is a balm and a cure; a spring of modesty in the soul,

and of health and strength in the body.  Again, the work of the chorus is

co-extensive with the work of education; rhythm and melody answer to the

voice, and the motions of the body correspond to all three, and the sound

enters in and educates the soul in virtue.  'Yes.'  And the movement which,

when pursued as an amusement, is termed dancing, when studied with a view

to the improvement of the body, becomes gymnastic.  Shall we now proceed to

speak of this?  'What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would approve of your

omitting gymnastic?'  Your question implies assent; and you will easily

understand a subject which is familiar to you.  Gymnastic is based on the

natural tendency of every animal to rapid motion; and man adds a sense of

rhythm, which is awakened by music; music and dancing together form the

choral art.  But before proceeding I must add a crowning word about

drinking.  Like other pleasures, it has a lawful use; but if a state or an

individual is inclined to drink at will, I cannot allow them.  I would go

further than Crete or Lacedaemon and have the law of the Carthaginians,

that no slave of either sex should drink wine at all, and no soldier while

he is on a campaign, and no magistrate or officer while he is on duty, and

that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal night.  And there are

so many other occasions on which wine ought to be prohibited, that there

will not be many vines grown or vineyards required in the state.



BOOK III.  If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he

should behold them from the point of view of time.  Thousands of cities

have come into being and have passed away again in infinite ages, every one

of them having had endless forms of government; and if we can ascertain the

cause of these changes in states, that will probably explain their origin.

What do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and destructions of

mankind, and the preservation of a remnant?  'Every one believes in them.' 

Then let us suppose the world to have been destroyed by a deluge.  The

survivors would be hill-shepherds, small sparks of the human race, dwelling

in isolation, and unacquainted with the arts and vices of civilization.  We

may further suppose that the cities on the plain and on the coast have been

swept away, and that all inventions, and every sort of knowledge, have

perished.  'Why, if all things were as they now are, nothing would have

ever been invented.  All our famous discoveries have been made within the

last thousand years, and many of them are but of yesterday.'  Yes,

Cleinias, and you must not forget Epimenides, who was really of yesterday;

he practised the lesson of moderation and abstinence which Hesiod only

preached.  'True.'  After the great destruction we may imagine that the

earth was a desert, in which there were a herd or two of oxen and a few

goats, hardly enough to support those who tended them; while of politics

and governments the survivors would know nothing.  And out of this state of

things have arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great

deal of vice; little by little the world has come to be what it is.  At

first, the few inhabitants would have had a natural fear of descending into

the plains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another,

they would have a difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts, and

having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling timber;

for even if they had saved any tools, these would soon have been worn out,

and they could get no more until the art of metallurgy had been again

revived.  Faction and war would be extinguished among them, for being

solitary they would incline to be friendly; and having abundance of pasture

and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have nothing to quarrel about.  We

may assume that they had also dwellings, clothes, pottery, for the weaving

and plastic arts do not require the use of metals.  In those days they were

neither poor nor rich, and there was no insolence or injustice among them;

for they were of noble natures, and lived up to their principles, and

believed what they were told; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or

of legal practices or party conflicts, they were simpler and more

temperate, and also more just than the men of our day.  'Very true.'  I am

showing whence the need of lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they

neither had nor wanted them.  Men lived according to the customs of their

fathers, in a simple manner, under a patriarchal government, such as still

exists both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is described in Homer as

prevailing among the Cyclopes:--



'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains,

and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not

trouble themselves about one another.'



'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in

Crete foreign poets are not much read.'  'But he is well known in Sparta,

though he describes Ionian rather than Dorian manners, and he seems to take

your view of primitive society.'  May we not suppose that government arose

out of the union of single families who survived the destruction, and were

under the rule of patriarchs, because they had originally descended from a

single father and mother?  'That is very probable.'  As time went on, men

increased in number, and tilled the ground, living in a common habitation,

which they protected by walls against wild beasts; but the several families

retained the laws and customs which they separately received from their

first parents.  They would naturally like their own laws better than any

others, and would be already formed by them when they met in a common

society:  thus legislation imperceptibly began among them.  For in the next

stage the associated families would appoint plenipotentiaries, who would

select and present to the chiefs those of all their laws which they thought

best.  The chiefs in turn would make a further selection, and would thus

become the lawgivers of the state, which they would form into an

aristocracy or a monarchy.  'Probably.'  In the third stage various other

forms of government would arise.  This state of society is described by

Homer in speaking of the foundation of Dardania, which, he says,



'was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium, the city of the

plain, as yet was not.'



Here, as also in the account of the Cyclopes, the poet by some divine

inspiration has attained truth.  But to proceed with our tale.  Ilium was

built in a wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams

descending from Ida.  This shows that many ages must have passed; for the

men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the

mercy of the waters.  When mankind began to multiply, many other cities

were built in similar situations.  These cities carried on a ten years' war

against Troy, by sea as well as land, for men were ceasing to be afraid of

the sea, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army were at Troy,

their homes fell into confusion.  The youth revolted and refused to receive

their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued.  Under the new name of

Dorians, which they received from their chief Dorieus, the exiles returned: 

the rest of the story is part of the history of Sparta.



Thus, after digressing from the subject of laws into music and drinking, we

return to the settlement of Sparta, which in laws and institutions is the

sister of Crete.  We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third

state, during the lapse of ages; and now we arrive at a fourth state, and

out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature of laws

and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them.  'If,'

replies the Spartan, 'our new discussion is likely to be as good as the

last, I would think the longest day too short for such an employment.'



Let us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messene were all

subject, Megillus, to your ancestors.  Afterwards, they distributed the

army into three portions, and made three cities--Argos, Messene,

Lacedaemon.  'Yes.'  Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene,

Procles and Eurysthenes ruled at Lacedaemon.  'Just so.'  And they all

swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was subverted. 

'Yes.'  But did we not say that kingdoms or governments can only be

subverted by themselves?  'That is true.'  Yes, and the truth is now proved

by facts:  there were certain conditions upon which the three kingdoms were

to assist one another; the government was to be mild and the people

obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting either of the

two others when they were wronged.  This latter condition was a great

security.  'Clearly.'  Such a provision is in opposition to the common

notion that the lawgiver should make only such laws as the people like; but

we say that he should rather be like a physician, prepared to effect a cure

even at the cost of considerable suffering.  'Very true.'  The early

lawgivers had another great advantage--they were saved from the reproach

which attends a division of land and the abolition of debts.  No one could

quarrel with the Dorians for dividing the territory, and they had no debts

of long standing.  'They had not.'  Then what was the reason why their

legislation signally failed?  For there were three kingdoms, two of them

quickly lost their original constitution.  That is a question which we

cannot refuse to answer, if we mean to proceed with our old man's game of

enquiring into laws and institutions.  And the Dorian institutions are more

worthy of consideration than any other, having been evidently intended to

be a protection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes

against the Barbarians.  For the capture of Troy by the Achaeans had given

great offence to the Assyrians, of whose empire it then formed part, and

they were likely to retaliate.  Accordingly the royal Heraclid brothers

devised their military constitution, which was organised on a far better

plan than the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorians themselves were far

superior to the Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had

been conquered by them.  Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared

with one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle,

under the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of

permanence.  'Naturally.'  Yet this has not proved to be the case.  Instead

of the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been united,

in accordance with the original intention, they would have been invincible.



And what caused their ruin?  Did you ever observe that there are beautiful

things of which men often say, 'What wonders they would have effected if

rightly used?' and yet, after all, this may be a mistake.  And so I say of

the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may perhaps have been

justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me the general

reflection,--'What wonders might not strength and military resources have

accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use them!'  For

consider:  if the generals of the army had only known how to arrange their

forces, might they not have given their subjects everlasting freedom, and

the power of doing what they would in all the world?  'Very true.'  Suppose

a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so

under the idea that by the help of these he can attain his desires?  All

men wish to obtain the control of all things, and they are always praying

for what they desire.  'Certainly.'  And we ask for our friends what they

ask for themselves.  'Yes.'  Dear is the son to the father, and yet the

son, if he is young and foolish, will often pray to obtain what the father

will pray that he may not obtain.  'True.'  And when the father, in the

heat of youth or the dotage of age, makes some rash prayer, the son, like

Hippolytus, may have reason to pray that the word of his father may be

ineffectual.  'You mean that a man should pray to have right desires,

before he prays that his desires may be fulfilled; and that wisdom should

be the first object of our prayers?'  Yes; and you will remember my saying

that wisdom should be the principal aim of the legislator; but you said

that defence in war came first.  And I replied, that there were four

virtues, whereas you acknowledged one only--courage, and not wisdom which

is the guide of all the rest.  And I repeat--in jest if you like, but I am

willing that you should receive my words in earnest--that 'the prayer of a

fool is full of danger.'  I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that

the ruin of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war,

but by ignorance of human affairs.  'Pray proceed:  our attention will show

better than compliments that we prize your words.'  I maintain that

ignorance is, and always has been, the ruin of states; wherefore the

legislator should seek to banish it from the state; and the greatest

ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of what

is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of pleasure and

reason in the soul.  I say the greatest, because affecting the greater part

of the soul; for the passions are in the individual what the people are in

a state.  And when they become opposed to reason or law, and instruction no

longer avails--that is the last and greatest ignorance of states and men. 

'I agree.'  Let this, then, be our first principle:--That the citizen who

does not know how to choose between good and evil must not have authority,

although he possess great mental gifts, and many accomplishments; for he is

really a fool.  On the other hand, he who has this knowledge may be unable

either to read or swim; nevertheless, he shall be counted wise and

permitted to rule.  For how can there be wisdom where there is no harmony?-

-the wise man is the saviour, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the

destroyer of states and households.  There are rulers and there are

subjects in states.  And the first claim to rule is that of parents to rule

over their children; the second, that of the noble to rule over the

ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in the fourth place,

the slave must obey his master; fifthly, there is the power of the

stronger, which the poet Pindar declares to be according to nature;

sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according to nature,

as I must inform Pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule of law over

obedient subjects.  'Most true.'  And there is a seventh kind of rule which

the Gods love,--in this the ruler is elected by lot.



Then, now, we playfully say to him who fancies that it is easy to make

laws:--You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to authority;

here is a spring of troubles which you must stay.  And first of all you

must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messene in olden days

destroyed their famous empire--did they forget the saying of Hesiod, that

'the half is better than the whole'?  And do we suppose that the ignorance

of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples?  'Probably the evil

is increased by their way of life.'  The kings of those days transgressed

the laws and violated their oaths.  Their deeds were not in harmony with

their words, and their folly, which seemed to them wisdom, was the ruin of

the state.  And how could the legislator have prevented this evil?--the

remedy is easy to see now, but was not easy to foresee at the time.  'What

is the remedy?'  The institutions of Sparta may teach you, Megillus. 

Wherever there is excess, whether the vessel has too large a sail, or the

body too much food, or the mind too much power, there destruction is

certain.  And similarly, a man who possesses arbitrary power is soon

corrupted, and grows hateful to his dearest friends.  In order to guard

against this evil, the God who watched over Sparta gave you two kings

instead of one, that they might balance one another; and further to lower

the pulse of your body politic, some human wisdom, mingled with divine

power, tempered the strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the

moderation of age in the institution of your senate.  A third saviour

bridled your rising and swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to

officers elected by lot:  and thus the kingly power was preserved, and

became the preserver of all the rest.  Had the constitution been arranged

by the original legislators, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have

been saved; for they had no political experience, and imagined that a

youthful spirit invested with power could be restrained by oaths.  Now that

God has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in

seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event.  But if the coming

danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then no Persian

or other enemy would have dared to attack Hellas; and indeed there was not

so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit in our disloyalty

to one another.  For of the three cities one only fought on behalf of

Hellas; and of the two others, Argos refused her aid; and Messenia was

actually at war with Sparta:  and if the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had

not united, the Hellenes would have been absorbed in the Persian empire,

and dispersed among the barbarians.  We make these reflections upon past

and present legislators because we desire to find out what other course

could have been followed.  We were saying just now, that a state can only

be free and wise and harmonious when there is a balance of powers.  There

are many words by which we express the aims of the legislator,--temperance,

wisdom, friendship; but we need not be disturbed by the variety of

expression,--these words have all the same meaning.  'I should like to know

at what in your opinion the legislator should aim.'  Hear me, then.  There

are two mother forms of states--one monarchy, and the other democracy:  the

Persians have the first in the highest form, and the Athenians the second;

and no government can be well administered which does not include both. 

There was a time when both the Persians and Athenians had more the

character of a constitutional state than they now have.  In the days of

Cyrus the Persians were freemen as well as lords of others, and their

soldiers were free and equal, and the kings used and honoured all the

talent which they could find, and so the nation waxed great, because there

was freedom and friendship and communion of soul.  But Cyrus, though a wise

general, never troubled himself about the education of his family.  He was

a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born in the

purple to be educated by women, who humoured and spoilt them.  'A rare

education, truly!'  Yes, such an education as princesses who had recently

grown rich might be expected to give them in a country where the men were

solely occupied with warlike pursuits.  'Likely enough.'  Their father had

possessions of men and animals, and never considered that the race to whom

he was about to make them over had been educated in a very different

school, not like the Persian shepherd, who was well able to take care of

himself and his own.  He did not see that his children had been brought up

in the Median fashion, by women and eunuchs.  The end was that one of the

sons of Cyrus slew the other, and lost the kingdom by his own folly. 

Observe, again, that Darius, who restored the kingdom, had not received a

royal education.  He was one of the seven chiefs, and when he came to the

throne he divided the empire into seven provinces; and he made equal laws,

and implanted friendship among the people.  Hence his subjects were greatly

attached to him, and cheerfully helped him to extend his empire.  Next

followed Xerxes, who had received the same royal education as Cambyses, and

met with a similar fate.  The reflection naturally occurs to us--How could

Darius, with all his experience, have made such a mistake!  The ruin of

Xerxes was not a mere accident, but the evil life which is generally led by

the sons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator

has seriously to consider.  Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for

not giving special honour to birth or wealth; for such advantages are not

to be highly esteemed without virtue, and not even virtue is to be esteemed

unless it be accompanied by temperance.  'Explain.'  No one would like to

live in the same house with a courageous man who had no control over

himself, nor with a clever artist who was a rogue.  Nor can justice and

wisdom ever be separated from temperance.  But considering these qualities

with reference to the honour and dishonour which is to be assigned to them

in states, would you say, on the other hand, that temperance, if existing

without the other virtues in the soul, is worth anything or nothing?  'I

cannot tell.'  You have answered well.  It would be absurd to speak of

temperance as belonging to the class of honourable or of dishonourable

qualities, because all other virtues in their various classes require

temperance to be added to them; having the addition, they are honoured not

in proportion to that, but to their own excellence.  And ought not the

legislator to determine these classes?  'Certainly.'  Suppose then that,

without going into details, we make three great classes of them.  Most

honourable are the goods of the soul, always assuming temperance as a

condition of them; secondly, those of the body; thirdly, external

possessions.  The legislator who puts them in another order is doing an

unholy and unpatriotic thing.



These remarks were suggested by the history of the Persian kings; and to

them I will now return.  The ruin of their empire was caused by the loss of

freedom and the growth of despotism; all community of feeling disappeared.

Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the people no longer

fought heartily for their masters; the rulers, finding their myriads

useless on the field of battle, resorted to mercenaries as their only

salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances to proclaim the

stupidest of falsehoods--that virtue is a trifle in comparison of money.



But enough of the Persians:  a different lesson is taught by the Athenians,

whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than an unlimited. 

Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion, had such a limited

freedom.  The people were divided into four classes, according to the

amount of their property, and the universal love of order, as well as the

fear of the approaching host, made them obedient and willing citizens.  For

Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes, commanding them under pain of death

to subjugate the Eretrians and Athenians.  A report, whether true or not,

came to Athens that all the Eretrians had been 'netted'; and the Athenians

in terror sent all over Hellas for assistance.  None came to their relief

except the Lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late, when the battle

of Marathon had been already fought.  In process of time Xerxes came to the

throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the bridge over the

Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable host and fleet. 

They knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of Marathon.  Their

case seemed desperate, for there was no Hellene likely to assist them by

land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand vessels;--their

only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they relied upon themselves

and upon the Gods.  Their common danger, and the influence of their ancient

constitution, greatly tended to promote harmony among them.  Reverence and

fear--that fear which the coward never knows--made them fight for their

altars and their homes, and saved them from being dispersed all over the

world.  'Your words, Athenian, are worthy of your country.'  And you

Megillus, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, are worthy to

hear them.  Let me ask you to take the moral of my tale.  The Persians have

lost their liberty in absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom.  In

ancient times the Athenian people were not the masters, but the servants of

the laws.  'Of what laws?'  In the first place, there were laws about

music, and the music was of various kinds:  there was one kind which

consisted of hymns, another of lamentations; there was also the paean and

the dithyramb, and the so-called 'laws' (nomoi) or strains, which were

played upon the harp.  The regulation of such matters was not left to the

whistling and clapping of the crowd; there was silence while the judges

decided, and the boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by

raps of a stick.  But after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of

genius certainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made

pleasure the only criterion of excellence.  That was a test which the

spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience, instead of being

mute, became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an

aristocracy.  Could the judges have been free, there would have been no

great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough--but

conceit has been our ruin.  Everybody knows everything, and is ready to say

anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence and

licentiousness has succeeded.  'Most true.'  And with this freedom comes

disobedience to rulers, parents, elders,--in the latter days to the law

also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic nature

reappears--men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the evils of

the human race seem as if they would never cease.  Whither are we running

away?  Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and curb, lest, as

the proverb says, we should fall off our ass.  'Good.'  Our purpose in what

we have been saying is to prove that the legislator ought to aim at

securing for a state three things--freedom, friendship, wisdom.  And we

chose two states;--one was the type of freedom, and the other of despotism;

and we showed that when in a mean they attained their highest perfection. 

In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian expedition, and of the

settlement on the hills and in the plains of Troy; and of music, and the

use of wine, and of all that preceded.



And now, has our discussion been of any use?  'Yes, stranger; for by a

singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony, of which

the settlement has been confided to the Cnosians.  Ten commissioners, of

whom I am one, are to give laws to the colonists, and we may give any which

we please--Cretan or foreign.  And therefore let us make a selection from

what has been said, and then proceed with the construction of the state.' 

Very good:  I am quite at your service.  'And I too,' says Megillus.



BOOK IV.  And now, what is this city?  I do not want to know what is to be

the name of the place (for some accident,--a river or a local deity, will

determine that), but what the situation is, whether maritime or inland. 

'The city will be about eleven miles from the sea.'  Are there harbours? 

'Excellent.'  And is the surrounding country self-supporting?  'Almost.' 

Any neighbouring states?  'No; and that is the reason for choosing the

place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.'  And is there a fair

proportion of hill and plain and wood?  'Like Crete in general, more hill

than plain.'  Then there is some hope for your citizens; had the city been

on the sea, and dependent for support on other countries, no human power

could have preserved you from corruption.  Even the distance of eleven

miles is hardly enough.  For the sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous

companion, and a highway of strange morals and manners as well as of

commerce.  But as the country is only moderately fertile there will be no

great export trade and no great returns of gold and silver, which are the

ruin of states.  Is there timber for ship-building?  'There is no pine, nor

much cypress; and very little stone-pine or plane wood for the interior of

ships.'  That is good.  'Why?'  Because the city will not be able to

imitate the bad ways of her enemies.  'What is the bearing of that remark?' 

To explain my meaning, I would ask you to remember what we said about the

Cretan laws, that they had an eye to war only; whereas I maintained that

they ought to have included all virtue.  And I hope that you in your turn

will retaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle.  For I consider

that the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and

disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue.  What

further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will illustrate

by the story of Minos, if our Cretan friend will allow me to mention it. 

Minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the Athenians a cruel

tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they had no

timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate their

enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for them to

have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the tribute than

to have turned soldiers into sailors.  Naval warfare is not a very

praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and then again

to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for throwing away

their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine words.  And

retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he introduces

Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships being at hand when

soldiers are disposed to fly.  An army of lions trained in such ways would

fly before a herd of deer.  Further, a city which owes its preservation to

a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other undeserving persons, cannot bestow

rewards of honour properly; and this is the ruin of states.  'Still, in

Crete we say that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.'  Such

is the prevailing opinion.  But I and Megillus say that the battle of

Marathon began the deliverance, and that the battle of Plataea completed

it; for these battles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and

Artemisium made them no better.  And we further affirm that mere existence

is not the great political good of individuals or states, but the

continuance of the best existence.  'Certainly.'  Let us then endeavour to

follow this principle in colonization and legislation.



And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists?  May any one come

from any city of Crete?  For you would surely not send a general invitation

to all Hellas.  Yet I observe that in Crete there are people who have come

from Argos and Aegina and other places.  'Our recruits will be drawn from

all Crete, and of other Hellenes we should prefer Peloponnesians.  As you

observe, there are Argives among the Cretans; moreover the Gortynians, who

are the best of all Cretans, have come from Gortys in Peloponnesus.'



Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm

from one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or

war.  In this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have a

community of race, language, and laws.  But then again, they are less

obedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very

laws and customs which caused their ruin at home.  A mixed multitude, on

the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty in making

them pull together.  There is nothing, however, which perfects men's virtue

more than legislation and colonization.  And yet I have a word to say which

may seem to be depreciatory of legislators.  'What is that?'



I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all sorts

are the true legislators,--wars and pestilences and famines and the

frequent recurrence of bad seasons.  The observer will be inclined to say

that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true about

navigation and medicine, and the art of the general.  But there is another

thing which may equally be said.  'What is it?'  That God governs all

things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him.  And according

to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a storm it is

well to have a pilot?  And the same is true of legislation:  even if

circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still necessary.  'Most

true.'  All artists would pray for certain conditions under which to

exercise their art:  and would not the legislator do the same? 

'Certainly?'  Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the

conditions which you would have?  He will answer, Grant me a city which is

ruled by a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable,

courageous, magnanimous; and let him have the inseparable condition of all

virtue, which is temperance--not prudence, but that natural temperance

which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly reckoned among

goods--with this he must be endowed, if the state is to acquire the form

most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner.  And I must add one

other condition:  the tyrant must be fortunate, and his good fortune must

consist in his having the co-operation of a great legislator.  When God has

done all this, He has done the best which He can for a state; not so well

if He has given them two legislators instead of one, and less and less well

if He has given them a great many.  An orderly tyranny most easily passes

into the perfect state; in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third

degree, a democracy; an oligarchy is worst of all.  'I do not understand.' 

I suppose that you have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 

'I have no desire to see one.'  You would have seen what I am describing,

if you ever had.  The tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state,

and affix the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for

the citizens readily follow the example which he sets.  There is no quicker

way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty.  It is

hard to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any

powerful form of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy.  In

olden days there were chiefs like Nestor, who was the most eloquent and

temperate of mankind, but there is no one his equal now.  If such an one

ever arises among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to

his words.  For where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there

are the best laws and constitutions.  I am endeavouring to show you how

easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other, is

the task of giving a city good laws.  'How do you mean?'  Let us old men

attempt to mould in words a constitution for your new state, as children

make figures out of wax.  'Proceed.  What constitution shall we give--

democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?'  To which of these classes,

Megillus, do you refer your own state?  'The Spartan constitution seems to

me to contain all these elements.  Our state is a democracy and also an

aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have an ancient

monarchy.'  'Much the same,' adds Cleinias, 'may be said of Cnosus.'  The

reason is that you have polities, but other states are mere aggregations of

men dwelling together, which are named after their several ruling powers;

whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should be called a theocracy.  A

tale of old will explain my meaning.  There is a tradition of a golden age,

in which all things were spontaneous and abundant.  Cronos, then lord of

the world, knew that no mortal nature could endure the temptations of

power, and therefore he appointed demons or demi-gods, who are of a

superior race, to have dominion over man, as man has dominion over the

animals.  They took care of us with great ease and pleasure to themselves,

and no less to us; and the tradition says that only when God, and not man,

is the ruler, can the human race cease from ill.  This was the manner of

life which prevailed under Cronos, and which we must strive to follow so

far as the principle of immortality still abides in us and we live

according to law and the dictates of right reason.  But in an oligarchy or

democracy, when the governing principle is athirst for pleasure, the laws

are trampled under foot, and there is no possibility of salvation.  Is it

not often said that there are as many forms of laws as there are

governments, and that they have no concern either with any one virtue or

with all virtue, but are relative to the will of the government?  Which is

as much as to say that 'might makes right.'  'What do you mean?'  I mean

that governments enact their own laws, and that every government makes

self-preservation its principal aim.  He who transgresses the laws is

regarded as an evil-doer, and punished accordingly.  This was one of the

unjust principles of government which we mentioned when speaking of the

different claims to rule.  We were agreed that parents should rule their

children, the elder the younger, the noble the ignoble.  But there were

also several other principles, and among them Pindar's 'law of violence.' 

To whom then is our state to be entrusted?  For many a government is only a

victorious faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to

the conquered, lest when they get into office they should remember their

wrongs.  Such governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws

good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not of

the whole.  And in our state I mean to protest against making any man a

ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble.  But those who are obedient

to the laws, and who win the victory of obedience, shall be promoted to the

service of the Gods according to the degree of their obedience.  When I

call the ruler the servant or minister of the law, this is not a mere

paradox, but I mean to say that upon a willingness to obey the law the

existence of the state depends.  'Truly, Stranger, you have a keen vision.' 

Why, yes; every man when he is old has his intellectual vision most keen. 

And now shall we call in our colonists and make a speech to them?  Friends,

we say to them, God holds in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all

things, and He moves in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His

will.  Justice always bears Him company, and punishes those who fall short

of His laws.  He who would be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who

is lifted up with pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted

by God, and, being deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder.  To many

he seems a great man; but in a short time he comes to utter destruction. 

Wherefore, seeing these things, what ought we to do or think?  'Every man

ought to follow God.'  What life, then, is pleasing to God?  There is an

old saying that 'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and God

ought to be our measure in all things.  The temperate man is the friend of

God because he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not His friend,

because he is not like Him.  And the conclusion is, that the best of all

things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad man

has a polluted soul; and therefore his service is wasted upon the Gods,

while the good are accepted of them.  I have told you the mark at which we

ought to aim.  You will say, How, and with what weapons?  In the first

place we affirm, that after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the state,

honour should be given to the Gods below, and to them should be offered

everything in even numbers and of the second choice; the auspicious odd

numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved for the Gods above. 

Next demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and then heroes, and after them

family gods, who will be worshipped at their local seats according to law. 

Further, the honour due to parents should not be forgotten; children owe

all that they have to them, and the debt must be repaid by kindness and

attention in old age.  No unbecoming word must be uttered before them; for

there is an avenging angel who hears them when they are angry, and the

child should consider that the parent when he has been wronged has a right

to be angry.  After their death let them have a moderate funeral, such as

their fathers have had before them; and there shall be an annual

commemoration of them.  Living on this wise, we shall be accepted of the

Gods, and shall pass our days in good hope.  The law will determine all our

various duties towards relatives and friends and other citizens, and the

whole state will be happy and prosperous.  But if the legislator would

persuade as well as command, he will add prefaces to his laws which will

predispose the citizens to virtue.  Even a little accomplished in the way

of gaining the hearts of men is of great value.  For most men are in no

particular haste to become good.  As Hesiod says:



'Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue,

But when you have reached the top the rest is easy.'



'Those are excellent words.'  Yes; but may I tell you the effect which the

preceding discourse has had upon me?  I will express my meaning in an

address to the lawgiver:--O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do and

say, you can surely tell us;--you are not like the poet, who, as you were

just now saying, does not know the effect of his own words.  And the poet

may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is not in

his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed to say all

sorts of opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is true.  But this

licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver.  For example, there are three

kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another mean, a third

moderate, and you say that the last is right.  Now if I had a rich wife,

and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her burial, I should

praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would commend a funeral of the

meaner sort, and a man of moderate means would prefer a moderate funeral. 

But you, as legislator, would have to say exactly what you meant by

'moderate.'  'Very true.'  And is our lawgiver to have no preamble or

interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice to his

subjects, after the manner of some doctors?  For of doctors are there not

two kinds?  The one gentle and the other rough, doctors who are freemen and

learn themselves and teach their pupils scientifically, and doctor's

assistants who get their knowledge empirically by attending on their

masters?  'Of course there are.'  And did you ever observe that the

gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine

themselves to slaves?  The latter go about the country or wait for the

slaves at the dispensaries.  They hold no parley with their patients about

their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule of thumb,

and give their decrees in the most arbitrary manner.  When they have

doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with equal

assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care of his sick

slaves.  But the other doctor, who practises on freemen, proceeds in quite

a different way.  He takes counsel with his patient and learns from him,

and never does anything until he has persuaded him of what he is doing.  He

trusts to influence rather than force.  Now is not the use of both methods

far better than the use of either alone?  And both together may be

advantageously employed by us in legislation.



We may illustrate our proposal by an example.  The laws relating to

marriage naturally come first, and therefore we may begin with them.  The

simple law would be as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of

thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall be fined or deprived of

certain privileges.  The double law would add the reason why:  Forasmuch as

man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of children,

no one should deprive himself of his share in this good.  He who obeys the

law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer by his celibacy;

and therefore he shall pay a yearly fine, and shall not be allowed to

receive honour from the young.  That is an example of what I call the

double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition of persuasion

to threats is desirable.  'Lacedaemonians in general, Stranger, are in

favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer length.  But Cleinias is

the real lawgiver, and he ought to be first consulted.'  'Thank you,

Megillus.'  Whether words are to be many or few, is a foolish question:--

the best and not the shortest forms are always to be approved.  And

legislators have never thought of the advantages which they might gain by

using persuasion as well as force, but trust to force only.  And I have

something else to say about the matter.  Here have we been from early dawn

until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that we have been saying is

only the preamble of the laws which we are about to give.  I tell you this,

because I want you to observe that songs and strains have all of them

preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (nomoi), have never

any prelude.  Now I am disposed to give preludes to laws, dividing them

into two parts--one containing the despotic command, which I described

under the image of the slave doctor--the other the persuasive part, which I

term the preamble.  The legislator should give preludes or preambles to his

laws.  'That shall be the way in my colony.'  I am glad that you agree with

me; this is a matter which it is important to remember.  A preamble is not

always necessary to a law:  the lawgiver must determine when it is needed,

as the musician determines when there is to be a prelude to a song.  'Most

true:  and now, having a preamble, let us recommence our discourse.' 

Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider

what relates to the citizens--their souls, bodies, properties,--their

occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.



The first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which

is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that Law is of

divine origin.  In the words of a great English writer--'Her seat is the

bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.'  Though the particular

laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true

of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and

not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment.  They have their natural

divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue; very unlike the

discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an English Parliament.

Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato's treatment of the subject: 

first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the Cretan and

Spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those other laws of

Zeus and Apollo which are said to be divine, and to comprehend all virtue.

Secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint against Sparta and Crete,

that he has himself given us a code of laws, which for the most part have a

military character; and that we cannot point to 'obvious examples of

similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure;' at least there is

only one such, that which relates to the regulation of convivial

intercourse.  The military spirit which is condemned by him in the

beginning of the Laws, reappears in the seventh and eighth books.



The mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the righteous

administrator of the law, suggests the two divisions of the laws into

enactments and appointments of officers.  The legislator and the judge

stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly distinguished. 

For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at any rate in small matters;

and his decisions growing into precedents, must determine the innumerable

details which arise out of the conflict of circumstances.  These Plato

proposes to leave to a younger generation of legislators.  The action of

courts of law in making law seems to have escaped him, probably because the

Athenian law-courts were popular assemblies; and, except in a mythical

form, he can hardly be said to have had before his eyes the ideal of a

judge.  In reading the Laws of Plato, or any other ancient writing about

Laws, we should consider how gradual the process is by which not only a

legal system, but the administration of a court of law, becomes perfected.



There are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is,

early in the work.  First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they

are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from

birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly

executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of

describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony. 

Secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so great an

influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers especially to

the great offence--which he mentions again, and which he had condemned in

the Republic--of varying the modes and rhythms, as well as to that of

separating the words from the music.  Thirdly, he reprobates the prevalence

of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which he attributes to the practice

of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, and considers to be almost inseparable

from them.  To this subject he again returns in the eighth book.  Fourthly,

the virtues are affirmed to be inseparable from one another, even if not

absolutely one; this, too, is a principle which he reasserts at the

conclusion of the work.  As in the beginnings of Plato's other writings, we

have here several 'notes' struck, which form the preludes of longer

discussions, although the hint is less ingeniously given, and the promise

more imperfectly fulfilled than in the earlier dialogues.



The distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon Plato's

mind.  To him, law is still floating in a region between the two.  He would

have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should have regard to

all virtue.  But he did not see that politics and law are subject to their

own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by natural differences. 

The actions of which politics take cognisance are necessarily collective or

representative; and law is limited to external acts which affect others as

well as the agents.  Ethics, on the other hand, include the whole duty of

man in relation both to himself and others.  But Plato has never reflected

on these differences.  He fancies that the life of the state can be as

easily fashioned as that of the individual.  He is favourable to a balance

of power, but never seems to have considered that power might be so

balanced as to produce an absolute immobility in the state.  Nor is he

alive to the evils of confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of

governments abstaining from excessive interference with their subjects.



Yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer

side.  If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any rate

seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down the

principles of men to their practice, or narrow the conception of the state

to the immediate necessities of politics.  Political ideals of freedom and

equality, of a divine government which has been or will be in some other

age or country, have greatly tended to educate and ennoble the human race.

And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are as old as Hesiod),

Plato has done more than any other writer to impress them on the world.  To

those who censure his idealism we may reply in his own words--'He is not

the worse painter who draws a perfectly beautiful figure, because no such

figure of a man could ever have existed' (Republic).



A new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time

exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books of

the Laws it is forgotten or overlooked.  As true courage is allied to

temperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to

resist pleasure as well as to endure pain.  No one can be on his guard

against that of which he has no experience.  The perfectly trained citizen

should have been accustomed to look his enemy in the face, and to measure

his strength against her.  This education in pleasure is to be given,

partly by festive intercourse, but chiefly by the song and dance.  Youth

are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained and

tested at drinking parties.  According to the old proverb, in vino veritas,

they will then be open and visible to the world in their true characters;

and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more easily moulded by

the hand of the legislator.  The first reason is curious enough, though not

important; the second can hardly be thought deserving of much attention. 

Yet if Plato means to say that society is one of the principal instruments

of education in after-life, he has expressed in an obscure fashion a

principle which is true, and to his contemporaries was also new.  That at a

banquet a degree of moral discipline might be exercised is an original

thought, but Plato has not yet learnt to express his meaning in an abstract

form.  He is sensible that moderation is better than total abstinence, and

that asceticism is but a one-sided training.  He makes the sagacious

remark, that 'those who are able to resist pleasure may often be among the

worst of mankind.'  He is as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the

love of pleasure is the great motive of human action.  This cannot be

eradicated, and must therefore be regulated,--the pleasure must be of the

right sort.  Such reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly

expressed, groundwork of the discussion.  As in the juxtaposition of the

Bacchic madness and the great gift of Dionysus, or where he speaks of the

different senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative

art, or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions from

the prayer of Theseus, we have to gather his meaning as well as we can from

the connexion.



The feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several other

passages of the Laws.  Plato has arrived at the time when men sit still and

look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others the few

pleasures which remain to them.  Wine is to cheer them now that their limbs

are old and their blood runs cold.  They are the best critics of dancing

and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they have been

enlivened by drinking.  Youth has no need of the stimulus of wine, but age

can only be made young again by its invigorating influence.  Total

abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing potations for the old, is

Plato's principle.  The fire, of which there is too much in the one, has to

be brought to the other.  Drunkenness, like madness, had a sacredness and

mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand, as in the case of the

Tarentines, it degraded a whole population, it was also a mode of

worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised on certain

occasions.  Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit of the vine

was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness which prevail

among some modern nations.



The physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine

within narrow limits.  He would tell us that you cannot restore strength by

a stimulus.  Wine may call back the vital powers in disease, but cannot

reinvigorate old age.  In his maxims of health and longevity, though aware

of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to dwell on the

perfect rule of moderation.  His commendation of wine is probably a passing

fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits or tastes.  If so, he is

not the only philosopher whose theory has been based upon his practice.



Plato's denial of wine to the young and his approval of it for their elders

has some points of view which may be illustrated by the temperance

controversy of our own times.  Wine may be allowed to have a religious as

well as a festive use; it is commended both in the Old and New Testament;

it has been sung of by nearly all poets; and it may be truly said to have a

healing influence both on body and mind.  Yet it is also very liable to

excess and abuse, and for this reason is prohibited by Mahometans, as well

as of late years by many Christians, no less than by the ancient Spartans;

and to sound its praises seriously seems to partake of the nature of a

paradox.  But we may rejoin with Plato that the abuse of a good thing does

not take away the use of it.  Total abstinence, as we often say, is not the

best rule, but moderate indulgence; and it is probably true that a

temperate use of wine may contribute some elements of character to social

life which we can ill afford to lose.  It draws men out of their reserve;

it helps them to forget themselves and to appear as they by nature are when

not on their guard, and therefore to make them more human and greater

friends to their fellow-men.  It gives them a new experience; it teaches

them to combine self-control with a measure of indulgence; it may sometimes

restore to them the simplicity of childhood.  We entirely agree with Plato

in forbidding the use of wine to the young; but when we are of mature age

there are occasions on which we derive refreshment and strength from

moderate potations.  It is well to make abstinence the rule, but the rule

may sometimes admit of an exception.  We are in a higher, as well as in a

lower sense, the better for the use of wine.  The question runs up into

wider ones--What is the general effect of asceticism on human nature? and,

Must there not be a certain proportion between the aspirations of man and

his powers?--questions which have been often discussed both by ancient and

modern philosophers.  So by comparing things old and new we may sometimes

help to realize to ourselves the meaning of Plato in the altered

circumstances of our own life.



Like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his

depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue appears

to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated.  But he is speaking of courage

in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or temperance.  He

does not insist in this passage, as in the Protagoras, on the unity of the

virtues; or, as in the Laches, on the identity of wisdom and courage.  But

he says that they all depend upon their leader mind, and that, out of the

union of wisdom and temperance with courage, springs justice.  Elsewhere he

is disposed to regard temperance rather as a condition of all virtue than

as a particular virtue.  He generalizes temperance, as in the Republic he

generalizes justice.  The nature of the virtues is to run up into one

another, and in many passages Plato makes but a faint effort to distinguish

them.  He still quotes the poets, somewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or

playing with their meaning.  The martial poet Tyrtaeus, and the oligarch

Theognis, furnish him with happy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. 

The fear of fear, the division of goods into human and divine, the

acknowledgment that peace and reconciliation are better than the appeal to

the sword, the analysis of temperance into resistance of pleasure as well

as endurance of pain, the distinction between the education which is

suitable for a trade or profession, and for the whole of life, are

important and probably new ethical conceptions.  Nor has Plato forgotten

his old paradox (Gorgias) that to be punished is better than to be

unpunished, when he says, that to the bad man death is the only mitigation

of his evil.  He is not less ideal in many passages of the Laws than in the

Gorgias or Republic.  But his wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any

sustained flight.



There is more attempt at dramatic effect in the first book than in the

later parts of the work.  The outburst of martial spirit in the

Lacedaemonian, 'O best of men'; the protest which the Cretan makes against

the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment on the part

of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly by those who

live under their rule; the difficulty which they alike experience in

following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly characteristic.



In the second book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by a

right use of pleasure.  He begins by conceiving an endless power of

youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and

rhythm.  Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of

musical discipline.  But music, like all art, must be truly imitative, and

imitative of what is true and good.  Art and morality agree in rejecting

pleasure as the criterion of good.  True art is inseparable from the

highest and most ennobling ideas.  Plato only recognizes the identity of

pleasure and good when the pleasure is of the higher kind.  He is the enemy

of 'songs without words,' which he supposes to have some confusing or

enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also opposed to the

modern degeneracy of the drama, which he would probably have illustrated,

like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon.  From this passage may be

gathered a more perfect conception of art than from any other of Plato's

writings.  He understands that art is at once imitative and ideal, an exact

representation of truth, and also a representation of the highest truth. 

The same double view of art may be gathered from a comparison of the third

and tenth books of the Republic, but is here more clearly and pointedly

expressed.



We are inclined to suspect that both here and in the Republic Plato

exaggerates the influence really exercised by the song and the dance.  But

we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the

perfection to which these arts were carried by him.  Further, the music had

a sacred and Pythagorean character; the dance too was part of a religious

festival.  And only at such festivals the sexes mingled in public, and the

youths passed under the eyes of their elders.



At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question, What

is the origin of states?  The answer is, Infinite time.  We have already

seen--in the Theaetetus, where he supposes that in the course of ages every

man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks and

barbarians; and in the Critias, where he says that nine thousand years have

elapsed since the island of Atlantis fought with Athens--that Plato is no

stranger to the conception of long periods of time.  He imagines human

society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions; and beginning from

the last of these, he traces the steps by which the family has grown into

the state, and the original scattered society, becoming more and more

civilised, has finally passed into military organizations like those of

Crete and Sparta.  His conception of the origin of states is far truer in

the Laws than in the Republic; but it must be remembered that here he is

giving an historical, there an ideal picture of the growth of society.



Modern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the explanation

not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the world itself; like

him, also, they have detected in later institutions the vestiges of a

patriarchal state still surviving.  Thus far Plato speaks as 'the spectator

of all time and all existence,' who may be thought by some divine instinct

to have guessed at truths which were hereafter to be revealed.  He is far

above the vulgar notion that Hellas is the civilized world (Statesman), or

that civilization only began when the Hellenes appeared on the scene.  But

he has no special knowledge of 'the days before the flood'; and when he

approaches more historical times, in preparing the way for his own theory

of mixed government, he argues partially and erroneously.  He is desirous

of showing that unlimited power is ruinous to any state, and hence he is

led to attribute a tyrannical spirit to the first Dorian kings.  The decay

of Argos and the destruction of Messene are adduced by him as a manifest

proof of their failure; and Sparta, he thinks, was only preserved by the

limitations which the wisdom of successive legislators introduced into the

government.  But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian rule of

life which was followed at Sparta ever prevailed in Argos and Messene, than

to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect the Greeks

against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria was in any way

affected by the Trojan war; or that the return of the Heraclidae was only

the return of Achaean exiles, who received a new name from their leader

Dorieus.  Such fancies were chiefly based, as far as they had any

foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great part in the dawn of

historical and geographical research.  Because there was a Persian empire

which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there must also have been an

Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility; and not only the fable of

the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war, in Plato's mind derived some

features from the Persian struggle.  So Herodotus makes the Nile answer to

the Ister, and the valley of the Nile to the Red Sea.  In the Republic,

Plato is flying in the air regardless of fact and possibility--in the Laws,

he is making history by analogy.  In the former, he appears to be like some

modern philosophers, absolutely devoid of historical sense; in the latter,

he is on a level, not with Thucydides, or the critical historians of

Greece, but with Herodotus, or even with Ctesias.



The chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society is to show the

point at which regular government superseded the patriarchical authority,

and the separate customs of different families were systematized by

legislators, and took the form of laws consented to by them all.  According

to Plato, the only sound principle on which any government could be based

was a mixture or balance of power.  The balance of power saved Sparta, when

the two other Heraclid states fell into disorder.  Here is probably the

first trace of a political idea, which has exercised a vast influence both

in ancient and modern times.  And yet we might fairly ask, a little

parodying the language of Plato--O legislator, is unanimity only 'the

struggle for existence'; or is the balance of powers in a state better than

the harmony of them?



In the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato begins

to ascend to the height of his great argument.  The reign of Cronos has

passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded, which are all

based on self-interest and self-preservation.  Right and wrong, instead of

being measured by the will of God, are created by the law of the state. 

The strongest assertions are made of the purely spiritual nature of

religion--'Without holiness no man is accepted of God'; and of the duty of

filial obedience,--'Honour thy parents.'  The legislator must teach these

precepts as well as command them.  He is to be the educator as well as the

lawgiver of future ages, and his laws are themselves to form a part of the

education of the state.  Unlike the poet, he must be definite and rational;

he cannot be allowed to say one thing at one time, and another thing at

another--he must know what he is about.  And yet legislation has a poetical

or rhetorical element, and must find words which will wing their way to the

hearts of men.  Laws must be promulgated before they are put in execution,

and mankind must be reasoned with before they are punished.  The

legislator, when he promulgates a particular law, will courteously entreat

those who are willing to hear his voice.  Upon the rebellious only does the

heavy blow descend.  A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular

punishment with the religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which

might have a great result in reforming the world.  The experiment had never

been tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any

preambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his

discovery.



In these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of morals

and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time.  They all go back

to mind and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things in

His hand.  The adjustment of the divine and human elements in the world is

conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy, differing not much in

the mode of expression.  At first sight the legislator appears to be

impotent, for all things are the sport of chance.  But we admit also that

God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him

(compare the saying, that chance is the name of the unknown cause). 

Lastly, while we acknowledge that God and chance govern mankind and provide

the conditions of human action, experience will not allow us to deny a

place to art.  We know that there is a use in having a pilot, though the

storm may overwhelm him; and a legislator is required to provide for the

happiness of a state, although he will pray for favourable conditions under

which he may exercise his art.



BOOK V.  Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and ancestors:  Of

all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's own.

For in every man there are two parts--a better which rules, and an inferior

which serves; and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant.  Wherefore I

bid every one next after the Gods to honour his own soul, and he can only

honour her by making her better.  A man does not honour his soul by

flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of knowledge, nor when

he blames others for his own errors; nor when he indulges in pleasure or

refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good,

because he fears the world below, which, far from being an evil, may be the

greatest good; nor when he prefers beauty to virtue--not reflecting that

the soul, which came from heaven, is more honourable than the body, which

is earth-born; nor when he covets dishonest gains, of which no amount is

equal in value to virtue;--in a word, when he counts that which the

legislator pronounces evil to be good, he degrades his soul, which is the

divinest part of him.  He does not consider that the real punishment of

evil-doing is to grow like evil men, and to shun the conversation of the

good:  and that he who is joined to such men must do and suffer what they

by nature do and say to one another, which suffering is not justice but

retribution.  For justice is noble, but retribution is only the companion

of injustice.  And whether a man escapes punishment or not, he is equally

miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other case he

perishes that the rest may be saved.



The glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior.  And the

soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil and dwell

with the good.  Wherefore also the soul is second only to the Gods in

honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which often has

a false honour.  For honour is not to be given to the fair or the strong,

or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy, any more than to their

opposites, but to the mean states of all these habits; and so of property

and external goods.  No man should heap up riches that he may leave them to

his children.  The best condition for them as for the state is a middle

one, in which there is a freedom without luxury.  And the best inheritance

of children is modesty.  But modesty cannot be implanted by admonition

only--the elders must set the example.  He who would train the young must

first train himself.



He who honours his kindred and family may fairly expect that the Gods will

give him children.  He who would have friends must think much of their

favours to him, and little of his to them.  He who prefers to an Olympic,

or any other victory, to win the palm of obedience to the laws, serves best

both the state and his fellow-citizens.  Engagements with strangers are to

be deemed most sacred, because the stranger, having neither kindred nor

friends, is immediately under the protection of Zeus, the God of strangers.

A prudent man will not sin against the stranger; and still more carefully

will he avoid sinning against the suppliant, which is an offence never

passed over by the Gods.



I will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and blame

only, and which, although not enforced by the law, greatly affect the

disposition to obey the law.  Truth has the first place among the gifts of

Gods and men, for truth begets trust; but he is not to be trusted who loves

voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. 

Neither the ignorant nor the untrustworthy man is happy; for they have no

friends in life, and die unlamented and untended.  Good is he who does no

injustice--better who prevents others from doing any--best of all who joins

the rulers in punishing injustice.  And this is true of goods and virtues

in general; he who has and communicates them to others is the man of men;

he who would, if he could, is second-best; he who has them and is jealous

of imparting them to others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which

he has is to be valued still. Let every man contend in the race without

envy; for the unenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself

foremost in the race, he harms no one with calumny.  Whereas the envious

man is weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders,

thus depriving the whole city of incentives to the exercise of virtue, and

tarnishing her glory.  Every man should be gentle, but also passionate; for

he must have the spirit to fight against incurable and malignant evil.  But

the evil which is remediable should be dealt with more in sorrow than

anger.  He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for no man

voluntarily does evil or allows evil to exist in his soul.  And therefore

he who deals with the curable sort must be long-suffering and forbearing;

but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured out upon him. 

The greatest of all evils is self-love, which is thought to be natural and

excusable, and is enforced as a duty, and yet is the cause of many errors. 

The lover is blinded about the beloved, and prefers his own interests to

truth and right; but the truly great man seeks justice before all things. 

Self-love is the source of that ignorant conceit of knowledge which is

always doing and never succeeding.  Wherefore let every man avoid self-

love, and follow the guidance of those who are better than himself.  There

are lesser matters which a man should recall to mind; for wisdom is like a

stream, ever flowing in and out, and recollection flows in when knowledge

is failing.  Let no man either laugh or grieve overmuch; but let him

control his feelings in the day of good- or ill-fortune, believing that the

Gods will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of the righteous. 

These are thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should

remember them both in lighter and in more serious hours, and remind others

of them.



So much of divine matters and the relation of man to God.  But man is man,

and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true taste

respecting either is a great matter.  And what is a true taste?  This can

only be explained by a comparison of one life with another.  Pleasure is an

object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of pain is to be

preferred to pain, but not to pleasure.  There are infinite kinds and

degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more pleasure and

avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life in which the

elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced with pain.  All

the lives which we desire are pleasant; the choice of any others is due to

inexperience.



Now there are four lives--the temperate, the rational, the courageous, the

healthful; and to these let us oppose four others--the intemperate, the

foolish, the cowardly, the diseased.  The temperate life has gentle pains

and pleasures and placid desires, the intemperate life has violent

delights, and still more violent desires.  And the pleasures of the

temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed the

pleasures.  But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate, but all

who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in self-control:  for

men always choose the life which (as they think) exceeds in pleasure.  The

wise, the healthful, the courageous life have a similar advantage--they

also exceed their opposites in pleasure.  And, generally speaking, the life

of virtue is far more pleasurable and honourable, fairer and happier far,

than the life of vice.  Let this be the preamble of our laws; the strain

will follow.



As in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be

stronger than their half-educated subjects.  Let us suppose, then, that in

the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment of the

rulers, and the laws which they have to administer.  But, before going

further, there are some preliminary matters which have to be considered.



As of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made; the bad breed must

be got rid of, and the good retained.  The legislator must purify them, and

if he be not a despot he will find this task to be a difficult one.  The

severer kinds of purification are practised when great offenders are

punished by death or exile, but there is a milder process which is

necessary when the poor show a disposition to attack the property of the

rich, for then the legislator will send them off to another land, under the

name of a colony.  In our case, however, we shall only need to purify the

streams before they meet.  This is often a troublesome business, but in

theory we may suppose the operation performed, and the desired purity

attained.  Evil men we will hinder from coming, and receive the good as

friends.



Like the old Heraclid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition of

debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous

questions.  But, perhaps, now that we are speaking of the subject, we ought

to say how, if the danger existed, the legislator should try to avert it. 

He would have recourse to prayers, and trust to the healing influence of

time.  He would create a kindly spirit between creditors and debtors: 

those who have should give to those who have not, and poverty should be

held to be rather the increase of a man's desires than the diminution of

his property.  Good-will is the only safe and enduring foundation of the

political society; and upon this our city shall be built.  The lawgiver, if

he is wise, will not proceed with the arrangement of the state until all

disputes about property are settled.  And for him to introduce fresh

grounds of quarrel would be madness.



Let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the size

of the territory and the number of the allotments.  The territory should be

sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the population

should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes to aid their

neighbours.  We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to which the

number of houses and portions of land shall correspond.  Let the number be

divided into two parts and then into three; for it is very convenient for

the purposes of distribution, and is capable of fifty-nine divisions, ten

of which proceed without interval from one to ten.  Here are numbers enough

for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings.  These properties of

numbers are true, and should be ascertained with a view to use.



In carrying out the distribution of the land, a prudent legislator will be

careful to respect any provision for religious worship which has been

sanctioned by ancient tradition or by the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, or

Ammon.  All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their

origin, should remain as they are.  Every division should have a patron God

or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated, and at

their temples the inhabitants of the districts should meet together from

time to time, for the sake of mutual help and friendship.  All the citizens

of a state should be known to one another; for where men are in the dark

about each other's characters, there can be no justice or right

administration.  Every man should be true and single-minded, and should not

allow himself to be deceived by others.



And now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces.  At first sight,

our constitution may appear singular and ill-adapted to a legislator who

has not despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be, if not

the very best, the second best.  For there are three forms of government, a

first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to choose.

The first and highest form is that in which friends have all things in

common, including wives and property,--in which they have common fears,

hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or their hands their own. 

This is the ideal state; than which there never can be a truer or better--a

state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, which will make the

dwellers therein blessed.  Here is the pattern on which we must ever fix

our eyes; but we are now concerned with another, which comes next to it,

and we will afterwards proceed to a third.



Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to

receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain

their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their

country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of the

land.  Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. 

This may be secured in the following manner:  when the possessor of a lot

dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become the

heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the Gods and to the

family, to the living and to the dead.  Of the remaining children, the

females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter

enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of

their own.  How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the

chief cares of the guardians of the laws.  When parents have too many

children they may give to those who have none, or couples may abstain from

having children, or, if there is a want of offspring, special care may be

taken to obtain them; or if the number of citizens becomes excessive, we

may send away the surplus to found a colony.  If, on the other hand, a war

or plague diminishes the number of inhabitants, new citizens must be

introduced; and these ought not, if possible, to be men of low birth or

inferior training; but even God, it is said, cannot always fight against

necessity.



Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:--Good friends, honour order

and equality, and above all the number 5040.  Secondly, respect the

original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and

selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is

given to him by God.  And priests and priestesses will offer frequent

sacrifices and pray that he who alienates either house or lot may receive

the punishment which he deserves, and their prayers shall be inscribed on

tablets of cypress-wood for the instruction of posterity.  The guardians

will keep a vigilant watch over the citizens, and they will punish those

who disobey God and the law.



To appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be well

educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state, in which

all illiberal occupations are forbidden to freemen.  The law also provides

that no private person shall have gold or silver, except a little coin for

daily use, which will not pass current in other countries.  The state must

also possess a common Hellenic currency, but this is only to be used in

defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of embassies, or while a man is

on foreign travels; but in the latter case he must deliver up what is over,

when he comes back, to the treasury in return for an equal amount of local

currency, on pain of losing the sum in question; and he who does not inform

against an offender is to be mulcted in a like sum.  No money is to be

given or taken as a dowry, or to be lent on interest.  The law will not

protect a man in recovering either interest or principal.  All these

regulations imply that the aim of the legislator is not to make the city as

rich or as mighty as possible, but the best and happiest.  Now men can

hardly be at the same time very virtuous and very rich.  And why?  Because

he who makes twice as much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving

where he ought not and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice

as rich as he who makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought. 

On the other hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor,

while he who acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble

objects, can hardly be very rich.  A very rich man is therefore not a good

man, and therefore not a happy one.  But the object of our laws is to make

the citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they cannot be if

they are always at law and injuring each other in the pursuit of gain.  And

therefore we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state, nor

usury, nor the rearing of the meaner kinds of live-stock, but only

agriculture, and only so much of this as will not lead men to neglect that

for the sake of which money is made, first the soul and afterwards the

body; neither of which are good for much without music and gymnastic. 

Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest interests being

those of the soul, and in the second class are to be ranked those of the

body.  This is the true order of legislation, which would be inverted by

placing health before temperance, and wealth before health.



It might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal

property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes of

offence by having property valued and by equalizing taxation.  To this end,

let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed according to

the measure of their original property, and the changes of their fortune. 

The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the law will say, is

caused by extremes of poverty or wealth.  The limit of poverty shall be the

lot, which must not be diminished, and may be increased fivefold, but not

more.  He who exceeds the limit must give up the excess to the state; but

if he does not, and is informed against, the surplus shall be divided

between the informer and the Gods, and he shall pay a sum equal to the

surplus out of his own property.  All property other than the lot must be

inscribed in a register, so that any disputes which arise may be easily

determined.



The city shall be placed in a suitable situation, as nearly as possible in

the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards.  First,

we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which shall be

placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene.  From this shall be

drawn lines dividing the city, and also the country, into twelve sections,

and the country shall be subdivided into 5040 lots.  Each lot shall contain

two parts, one at a distance, the other near the city; and the distance of

one part shall be compensated by the nearness of the other, the badness and

goodness by the greater or less size.  Twelve lots will be assigned to

twelve Gods, and they will give their names to the tribes.  The divisions

of the city shall correspond to those of the country; and every man shall

have two habitations, one near the centre of the country, the other at the

extremity.



The objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we

have been speaking will never concur.  The citizens will not tolerate a

settlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the

number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed by

law.  It will be said that our city is a mere image of wax.  And the

legislator will answer:  'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set

forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible.  If difficulties arise in

the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the remainder. 

But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea without

interruption.'



The number twelve, which we have chosen for the number of division, must

run through all parts of the state,--phratries, villages, ranks of

soldiers, coins, and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made

commensurable with one another.  There is no meanness in requiring that the

smallest vessels should have a common measure; for the divisions of number

are useful in measuring height and depth, as well as sounds and motions,

upwards or downwards, or round and round.  The legislator should impress on

his citizens the value of arithmetic.  No instrument of education has so

much power; nothing more tends to sharpen and inspire the dull intellect. 

But the legislator must be careful to instil a noble and generous spirit

into the students, or they will tend to become cunning rather than wise. 

This may be proved by the example of the Egyptians and Phoenicians, who,

notwithstanding their knowledge of arithmetic, are degraded in their

general character; whether this defect in them is due to some natural cause

or to a bad legislator.  For it is clear that there are great differences

in the power of regions to produce good men:  heat and cold, and water and

food, have great effects both on body and soul; and those spots are

peculiarly fortunate in which the air is holy, and the Gods are pleased to

dwell.  To all this the legislator must attend, so far as in him lies.



BOOK VI.  And now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of

magistrates; (2) the laws which they will have to administer must be

determined.  I may observe by the way that laws, however good, are useless

and even injurious unless the magistrates are capable of executing them. 

And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary state should be

tested from their youth upwards until the time of their election; and (2)

those who are to elect them ought to be trained in habits of law, that they

may form a right judgment of good and bad men.  But uneducated colonists,

who are unacquainted with each other, will not be likely to choose well. 

What, then, shall we do?  I will tell you:  The colony will have to be

intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you are one, and I will help

you and them, which is my reason for inventing this romance.  And I cannot

bear that the tale should go wandering about the world without a head,--it

will be such an ugly monster.  'Very good.'  Yes; and I will be as good as

my word, if God be gracious and old age permit.  But let us not forget what

a courageously mad creation this our city is.  'What makes you say so?' 

Why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new colonists will

quietly receive our laws?  For no man likes to receive laws when they are

first imposed:  could we only wait until those who had been educated under

them were grown up, and of an age to vote in the public elections, there

would be far greater reason to expect permanence in our institutions. 

'Very true.'  The Cnosian founders should take the utmost pains in the

matter of the colony, and in the election of the higher officers,

particularly of the guardians of the law.  The latter should be appointed

in this way:  The Cnosians, who take the lead in the colony, together with

the colonists, will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be

colonists, and the remaining eighteen Cnosians--you must be one of the

eighteen yourself, and become a citizen of the new state.  'Why do not you

and Megillus join us?'  Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both

a long way off.  But let me proceed with my scheme.  When the state is

permanently established, the mode of election will be as follows:  All who

are serving, or have served, in the army will be electors; and the election

will be held in the most sacred of the temples.  The voter will place on

the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon the name of the candidate whom he

prefers, and of his father, tribe, and ward, writing at the side of them

his own name in like manner; and he may take away any tablet which does not

appear written to his mind, and place it in the Agora for thirty days.  The

300 who obtain the greatest number of votes will be publicly announced, and

out of them there will be a second election of 100; and out of the 100 a

third and final election of thirty-seven, accompanied by the solemnity of

the electors passing through victims.  But then who is to arrange all this? 

There is a common saying, that the beginning is half the whole; and I

should say a good deal more than half.  'Most true.'  The only way of

making a beginning is from the parent city; and though in after ages the

tie may be broken, and quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days

the child naturally looks to the mother for care and education.  And, as I

said before, the Cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and

select 100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the

colonists, to arrange and supervise the first elections and scrutinies; and

when the colony has been started, the Cnosians may return home and leave

the colonists to themselves.



The thirty-seven magistrates who have been elected in the manner described,

shall have the following duties:  first, they shall be guardians of the

law; secondly, of the registers of property in the four classes--not

including the one, two, three, four minae, which are allowed as a surplus.

He who is found to possess what is not entered in the registers, in

addition to the confiscation of such property shall be proceeded against by

law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share in the public property and

in distributions of money; and his sentence shall be inscribed in some

public place.  The guardians are to continue in office twenty years only,

and to commence holding office at fifty years, or if elected at sixty they

are not to remain after seventy.



Generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers of

foot.  The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the guardians

of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the age for

military service.  Any one may challenge the person nominated and start

another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better qualified.  The

three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall be elected.  The

generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or brigadiers, and the

challenge may be made, and the voting shall take place, in the same manner

as before.  The elective assembly will be presided over in the first

instance, and until the prytanes and council come into being, by the

guardians of the law in some holy place; and they shall divide the citizens

into three divisions,--hoplites, cavalry, and the rest of the army--placing

each of them by itself.  All are to vote for generals and cavalry officers. 

The brigadiers are to be voted for only by the hoplites.  Next, the cavalry

are to choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of archers and other

irregular troops are to be appointed by the generals themselves.  The

cavalry-officers shall be proposed and voted upon by the same persons who

vote for the generals.  The two who have the greatest number of votes shall

be leaders of all the horse.  Disputes about the voting may be raised once

or twice, but, if a third time, the presiding officers shall decide.



The council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into four

sections, making ninety councillors of each class.  In the first place, all

the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; and they shall

be compelled to vote under pain of a fine.  This shall be the business of

the first day.  On the second day a similar selection shall be made from

the second class under the same conditions.  On the third day, candidates

shall be selected from the third class; but the compulsion to vote shall

only extend to the voters of the first three classes.  On the fourth day,

members of the council shall be selected from the fourth class; they shall

be selected by all, but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the

second class, who, if they do not vote, shall pay a fine of triple the

amount which was exacted at first, and to the first class, who shall pay a

quadruple fine.  On the fifth day, the names shall be exhibited, and out of

them shall be chosen by all the citizens 180 of each class:  these are

severally to be reduced by lot to ninety, and 90 x 4 will form the council

for the year.



The mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy

and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state.  For

servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes

friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality.  One of

them is the rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher

equality, which is the judgment of Zeus.  Of this he grants but little to

mortal men; yet that little is the source of the greatest good to cities

and individuals.  It is proportioned to the nature of each man; it gives

more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political

justice; to this we in our state desire to look, as every legislator

should, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs.  But justice cannot

always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to be

substituted:  and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be

endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which God

must be entreated to guide.



These are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual care

will also be required.  When a ship is sailing on the sea, vigilance must

not be relaxed night or day; and the vessel of state is tossing in a

political sea, and therefore watch must continually succeed watch, and

rulers must join hands with rulers.  A small body will best perform this

duty, and therefore the greater part of the 360 senators may be permitted

to go and manage their own affairs, but a twelfth portion must be set aside

in each month for the administration of the state.  Their business will be

to receive information and answer embassies; also they must endeavour to

prevent or heal internal disorders; and with this object they must have the

control of all assemblies of the citizens.



Besides the council, there must be wardens of the city and of the agora,

who will superintend houses, ways, harbours, markets, and fountains, in the

city and the suburbs, and prevent any injury being done to them by man or

beast.  The temples, also, will require priests and priestesses.  Those who

hold the priestly office by hereditary tenure shall not be disturbed; but

as there will probably be few or none such in a new colony, priests and

priestesses shall be appointed for the Gods who have no servants.  Some of

these officers shall be elected by vote, some by lot; and all classes shall

mingle in a friendly manner at the elections.  The appointment of priests

should be left to God,--that is, to the lot; but the person elected must

prove that he is himself sound in body and of legitimate birth, and that

his family has been free from homicide or any other stain of impurity. 

Priests and priestesses are to be not less than sixty years of age, and

shall hold office for a year only.  The laws which are to regulate matters

of religion shall be brought from Delphi, and interpreters appointed to

superintend their execution.  These shall be elected in the following

manner:--The twelve tribes shall be formed into three bodies of four, each

of which shall select four candidates, and this shall be done three times: 

of each twelve thus selected the three who receive the largest number of

votes, nine in all, after undergoing a scrutiny shall go to Delphi, in

order that the God may elect one out of each triad.  They shall be

appointed for life; and when any of them dies, another shall be elected by

the four tribes who made the original appointment.  There shall also be

treasurers of the temples; three for the greater temples, two for the

lesser, and one for those of least importance.



The defence of the city should be committed to the generals and other

officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora.  The

defence of the country shall be on this wise:--The twelve tribes shall

allot among themselves annually the twelve divisions of the country, and

each tribe shall appoint five wardens and commanders of the watch.  The

five wardens in each division shall choose out of their own tribe twelve

guards, who are to be between twenty-five and thirty years of age.  Both

the wardens and the guards are to serve two years; and they shall make a

round of the divisions, staying a month in each.  They shall go from West

to East during the first year, and back from East to West during the

second.  Thus they will gain a perfect knowledge of the country at every

season of the year.



While on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is well

protected by means of fortifications and entrenchments; they will use the

beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot, taking care

however not to interfere with the regular course of agriculture.  But while

they thus render the country as inaccessible as possible to enemies, they

will also make it as accessible as possible to friends by constructing and

maintaining good roads.  They will restrain and preserve the rain which

comes down from heaven, making the barren places fertile, and the wet

places dry.  They will ornament the fountains with plantations and

buildings, and provide water for irrigation at all seasons of the year. 

They will lead the streams to the temples and groves of the Gods; and in

such spots the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for

the aged; there the rustic worn with toil will receive a kindly welcome,

and be far better treated than at the hands of an unskilful doctor.



These works will be both useful and ornamental; but the sixty wardens must

not fail to give serious attention to other duties.  For they must watch

over the districts assigned to them, and also act as judges.  In small

matters the five commanders shall decide:  in greater matters up to three

minae, the five commanders and the twelve guards.  Like all other judges,

except those who have the final decision, they shall be liable to give an

account.  If the wardens impose unjust tasks on the villagers, or take by

force their crops or implements, or yield to flattery or bribes in deciding

suits, let them be publicly dishonoured.  In regard to any other wrong-

doing, if the question be of a mina, let the neighbours decide; but if the

accused person will not submit, trusting that his monthly removals will

enable him to escape payment, and also in suits about a larger amount, the

injured party may have recourse to the common court; in the former case, if

successful, he may exact a double penalty.



The wardens and guards, while on their two years' service, shall live and

eat together, and the guard who is absent from the daily meals without

permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a deserter, and may

be punished by any one who meets him.  If any of the commanders is guilty

of such an irregularity, the whole sixty shall have him punished; and he of

them who screens him shall suffer a still heavier penalty than the offender

himself.  Now by service a man learns to rule; and he should pride himself

upon serving well the laws and the Gods all his life, and upon having

served ancient and honourable men in his youth.  The twelve and the five

should be their own servants, and use the labour of the villagers only for

the good of the public.  Let them search the country through, and acquire a

perfect knowledge of every locality; with this view, hunting and field

sports should be encouraged.



Next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and of

the city.  The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they shall

have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, and also of the water-

supply.  They shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when the number

of candidates has been reduced to six who have the greatest number of

votes, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after a scrutiny,

shall be admitted to their office.  The wardens of the agora shall be five

in number--ten are to be first elected, and every one shall vote for all

the vacant places; the ten shall be afterwards reduced to five by lot, as

in the former election.  The first and second class shall be compelled to

go to the assembly, but not the third and fourth, unless they are specially

summoned.  The wardens of the agora shall have the care of the temples and

fountains which are in the agora, and shall punish those who injure them by

stripes and bonds, if they be slaves or strangers; and by fines, if they be

citizens.  And the wardens of the city shall have a similar power of

inflicting punishment and fines in their own department.



In the next place, there must be directors of music and gymnastic; one

class of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the attendance and

lodging of the boys and girls--the other having to do with contests of

music and gymnastic.  In musical contests there shall be one kind of judges

of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists, flute-players,

harp-players and the like, and another of choruses.  There shall be

choruses of men and boys and maidens--one director will be enough to

introduce them all, and he should not be less than forty years of age;

secondly, of solos also there shall be one director, aged not less than

thirty years; he will introduce the competitors and give judgment upon

them.  The director of the choruses is to be elected in an assembly at

which all who take an interest in music are compelled to attend, and no one

else.  Candidates must only be proposed for their fitness, and opposed on

the ground of unfitness.  Ten are to be elected by vote, and the one of

these on whom the lot falls shall be director for a year.  Next shall be

elected out of the second and third classes the judges of gymnastic

contests, who are to be three in number, and are to be tested, after being

chosen by lot out of twenty who have been elected by the three highest

classes--these being compelled to attend at the election.



One minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of

education.  He must be not less than fifty years old, and be himself the

father of children born in wedlock.  His office must be regarded by all as

the highest in the state.  For the right growth of the first shoot in

plants and animals is the chief cause of matured perfection.  Man is

supposed to be a tame animal, but he becomes either the gentlest or the

fiercest of creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated. 

Wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best

man possible.  He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected

out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates with

the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be held by

ballot in the temple of Apollo.



When a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another shall

be elected in his place; and, if the guardian of an orphan dies, the

relations shall appoint another within ten days, or be fined a drachma a

day for neglect.



The city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a

judge who sits in silence and leaves the enquiry to the litigants, as in

arbitrations, is not a good judge.  A few judges are better than many, but

the few must be good.  The matter in dispute should be clearly elicited;

time and examination will find out the truth.  Causes should first be tried

before a court of neighbours:  if the decision is unsatisfactory, let them

be referred to a higher court; or, if necessary, to a higher still, of

which the decision shall be final.



Every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day on

which he is deciding the suit.  This will therefore be an appropriate place

to speak of judges and their functions.  The supreme tribunal will be that

on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other tribunals, one for

public and the other for private causes.  The high court of appeal shall be

composed as follows:--All the officers of state shall meet on the last day

but one of the year in some temple, and choose for a judge the best man out

of every magistracy:  and those who are elected, after they have undergone

a scrutiny, shall be judges of appeal.  They shall give their decisions

openly, in the presence of the magistrates who have elected them; and the

public may attend.  If anybody charges one of them with having

intentionally decided wrong, he shall lay his accusation before the

guardians of the law, and if the judge be found guilty he shall pay damages

to the extent of half the injury, unless the guardians of the law deem that

he deserves a severer punishment, in which case the judges shall assess the

penalty.



As the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they should

share in the trial of them.  Such causes should originate with the people

and be decided by them:  the enquiry shall take place before any three of

the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff can agree. 

Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible, and therefore

there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who has no share in

the administration of justice, believes that he has no share in the state. 

The judges in these courts shall be elected by lot and give their decision

at once.  The final judgment in all cases shall rest with the court of

appeal.  And so, having done with the appointment of courts and the

election of officers, we will now make our laws.



'Your way of proceeding, Stranger, is admirable.'



Then so far our old man's game of play has gone off well.



'Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.'



Perhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in

which painters put in and rub out colour:  yet their endless labour will

last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who

will restore the picture and remove its defects.  'Certainly.'  And have we

not a similar object at the present moment?  We are old ourselves, and

therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved and

perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for our guardians,

but making them lawgivers.  'We must at least do our best.'  Let us address

them as follows.  Beloved saviours of the laws, we give you an outline of

legislation which you must fill up, according to a rule which we will

prescribe for you.  Megillus and Cleinias and I are agreed, and we hope

that you will agree with us in thinking, that the whole energies of a man

should be devoted to the attainment of manly virtue, whether this is to be

gained by study, or habit, or desire, or opinion.  And rather than accept

institutions which tend to degrade and enslave him, he should fly his

country and endure any hardship.  These are our principles, and we would

ask you to judge of our laws, and praise or blame them, accordingly as they

are or are not capable of improving our citizens.



And first of laws concerning religion.  We have already said that the

number 5040 has many convenient divisions:  and we took a twelfth part of

this (420), which is itself divisible by twelve, for the number of the

tribe.  Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months of

the year and to the revolution of the universe.  All cities have a number,

but none is more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by all

numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two families

are deducted.  And now let us divide the state, assigning to each division

some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them, and sacrifices

offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held in their honour, twelve

for the tribes, and twelve for the city, corresponding to their divisions.

The object of them will be first to promote religion, secondly to encourage

friendship and intercourse between families; for families must be

acquainted before they marry into one another, or great mistakes will

occur.  At these festivals there shall be innocent dances of young men and

maidens, who may have the opportunity of seeing one another in modest

undress.  To the details of all this the masters of choruses and the

guardians will attend, embodying in laws the results of their experience;

and, after ten years, making the laws permanent, with the consent of the

legislator, if he be alive, or, if he be not alive, of the guardians of the

law, who shall perfect them and settle them once for all.  At least, if any

further changes are required, the magistrates must take the whole people

into counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.



Whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five

wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which we

will address to him:--



My son, you ought to marry, but not in order to gain wealth or to avoid

poverty; neither should you, as men are wont to do, choose a wife who is

like yourself in property and character.  You ought to consult the

interests of the state rather than your own pleasure; for by equal

marriages a society becomes unequal.  And yet to enact a law that the rich

and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the quick shall be

united to the slow, and the slow to the quick, will arouse anger in some

persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand that opposite

elements ought to be mingled in the state, as wine should be mingled with

water.  The object at which we aim must therefore be left to the influence

of public opinion.  And do not forget our former precept, that every one

should seek to attain immortality and raise up a fair posterity to serve

God.--Let this be the prelude of the law about the duty of marriage.  But

if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five years of age is still

unmarried, he shall pay an annual fine:  if he be of the first class, 100

drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third, 60; and if of the fourth,

30.  This fine shall be sacred to Here; and if he refuse to pay, a tenfold

penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of Here, who shall be responsible

for the payment.  Further, the unmarried man shall receive no honour or

obedience from the young, and he shall not retain the right of punishing

others.  A man is neither to give nor receive a dowry beyond a certain

fixed sum; in our state, for his consolation, if he be poor, let him know

that he need neither receive nor give one, for every citizen is provided

with the necessaries of life.  Again, if the woman is not rich, her husband

will not be her humble servant.  He who disobeys this law shall pay a fine

according to his class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of Here

and Zeus.



The betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin, or if there

are none, by the guardians.  The offerings and ceremonies of marriage shall

be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites.  Let the wedding party

be moderate; five male and five female friends, and a like number of

kinsmen, will be enough.  The expense should not exceed, for the first

class, a mina; and for the second, half a mina; and should be in like

proportion for the other classes.  Extravagance is to be regarded as

vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties.  Much wine is only to be

drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the occasion of a

marriage.  The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great step in life,

ought to have all their wits about them; they should be especially careful

of the night on which God may give them increase, and which this will be

none can say.  Their bodies and souls should be in the most temperate

condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of the nature of

disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary.  There is an

original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper

respect.  He who marries should make one of the two houses on the lot the

nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father and mother, and

then his affection for them will be only increased by absence.  He will go

forth as to a colony, and will there rear up his offspring, handing on the

torch of life to another generation.



About property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception of

property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful character. 

The slavery of the Helots is approved by some and condemned by others; and

there is some doubt even about the slavery of the Mariandynians at Heraclea

and of the Thessalian Penestae.  This makes us ask, What shall we do about

slaves?  To which every one would agree in replying,--Let us have the best

and most attached whom we can get.  All of us have heard stories of slaves

who have been better to their masters than sons or brethren.  Yet there is

an opposite doctrine, that slaves are never to be trusted; as Homer says,

'Slavery takes away half a man's understanding.'  And different persons

treat them in different ways:  there are some who never trust them, and

beat them like dogs, until they make them many times more slavish than they

were before; and others pursue the opposite plan.  Man is a troublesome

animal, as has been often shown, Megillus, notably in the revolts of the

Messenians; and great mischiefs have arisen in countries where there are

large bodies of slaves of one nationality.  Two rules may be given for

their management:  first that they should not, if possible, be of the same

country or have a common language; and secondly, that they should be

treated by their master with more justice even than equals, out of regard

to himself quite as much as to them.  For he who is righteous in the

treatment of his slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of

virtue.  Masters should never jest with their slaves:  this, which is a

common but foolish practice, increases the difficulty and painfulness of

managing them.



Next as to habitations.  These ought to have been spoken of before; for no

man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them to live

in.  Let us supply the omission.  The temples should be placed round the

Agora, and the city built in a circle on the heights.  Near the temples,

which are holy places and the habitations of the Gods, should be buildings

for the magistrates, and the courts of law, including those in which

capital offences are to be tried.  As to walls, Megillus, I agree with

Sparta that they should sleep in the earth; 'cold steel is the best wall,'

as the poet finely says.  Besides, how absurd to be sending out our youth

to fortify and guard the borders of our country, and then to build a city

wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to make people fancy that they

may run there and rest in idleness, not knowing that true repose comes from

labour, and that idleness is only a renewal of trouble.  If, however, there

must be a wall, the private houses had better be so arranged as to form one

wall; this will have an agreeable aspect, and the building will be safer

and more defensible.  These objects should be attended to at the foundation

of the city.  The wardens of the city must see that they are carried out;

and they must also enforce cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings

from encroachments.  Moreover, they must take care to let the rain flow off

easily, and must regulate other matters concerning the general

administration of the city.  If any further enactments prove to be

necessary, the guardians of the law must supply them.



And now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens, we

will proceed to speak of their mode of life.  In a well-constituted state,

individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please.  Why do I say this? 

Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not absent himself

from the common meals.  They were instituted originally on the occasion of

some war, and, though deemed singular when first founded, they have tended

greatly to the security of states.  There was a difficulty in introducing

them, but there is no difficulty in them now.  There is, however, another

institution about which I would speak, if I dared.  I may preface my

proposal by remarking that disorder in a state is the source of all evil,

and order of all good.  Now in Sparta and Crete there are common meals for

men, and this, as I was saying, is a divine and natural institution.  But

the women are left to themselves; they live in dark places, and, being

weaker, and therefore wickeder, than men, they are at the bottom of a good

deal more than half the evil of states.  This must be corrected, and the

institution of common meals extended to both sexes.  But, in the present

unfortunate state of opinion, who would dare to establish them?  And still

more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public?  They will defy the

legislator to drag them out of their holes.  And in any other state such a

proposal would be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can

show the attempt to be just and reasonable.  'There is nothing which we

should like to hear better.'  Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will

go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us. 

'Right.'  Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never

have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into being

is all but infinite.  'No doubt.'  And in this infinity of time there have

been changes of every kind, both in the order of the seasons and in the

government of states and in the customs of eating and drinking.  Vines and

olives were at length discovered, and the blessings of Demeter and

Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been the minister;

before his time the animals had been eating one another.  And there are

nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow-men, and other

nations in which they lead a kind of Orphic existence, and will not

sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow--they offer fruits or cakes

moistened with honey.  Perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of these

remarks?  'We would gladly hear.'  I will endeavour to explain their drift.

I see that the virtue of human life depends on the due regulation of three

wants or desires.  The first is the desire of meat, the second of drink;

these begin with birth, and make us disobedient to any voice other than

that of pleasure.  The third and fiercest and greatest need is felt latest;

this is love, which is a madness setting men's whole nature on fire.  These

three disorders of mankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty

influences--fear, and law, and reason, which, with the aid of the Muses and

the Gods of contests, may extinguish our lusts.



But to return.  After marriage let us proceed to the generation of

children, and then to their nurture and education--thus gradually

approaching the subject of syssitia.  There are, however, some other points

which are suggested by the three words--meat, drink, love.  'Proceed,'  the

bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a brave offspring. 

Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore the bridegroom ought

to take special care of the bride, and the bride of the bridegroom, at the

time when their children are about to be born.  And let there be a

committee of matrons who shall meet every day at the temple of Eilithyia at

a time fixed by the magistrates, and inform against any man or woman who

does not observe the laws of married life.  The time of begetting children

and the supervision of the parents shall last for ten years only; if at the

expiration of this period they have no children, they may part, with the

consent of their relatives and the official matrons, and with a due regard

to the interests of either; if a dispute arise, ten of the guardians of the

law shall be chosen as arbiters.  The matrons shall also have power to

enter the houses of the young people, if necessary, and to advise and

threaten them.  If their efforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the

law; and if they too fail, the offender, whether man or woman, shall be

forbidden to be present at all family ceremonies.  If when the time for

begetting children has ceased, either husband or wife have connexion with

others who are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the

same penalties as those who are still having a family.  But when both

parties have ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties.  If men

and women live soberly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber;

punishment is necessary only when there is great disorder of manners.



The first year of children's lives is to be registered in their ancestral

temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed on a whited

wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members of the phratry

close to them, to be erased at their decease.  The proper time of marriage

for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for a man, from thirty

to thirty-five (compare Republic).  The age of holding office for a woman

is to be forty, for a man thirty years.  The time for military service for

a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a woman, from the time that

she has ceased to bear children until fifty.



BOOK VII.  Now that we have married our citizens and brought their children

into the world, we have to find nurture and education for them.  This is a

matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely regulated by

the legislator.  For minute regulations are apt to be transgressed, and

frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience to the laws.  I speak

darkly, but I will also try to exhibit my wares in the light of day.  Am I

not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body

and mind?  'Certainly.'  And the body is fairest which grows up straight

and well-formed from the time of birth.  'Very true.'  And we observe that

the first shoot of every living thing is the greatest; many even contend

that man is not at twenty-five twice the height that he was at five. 

'True.'  And growth without exercise of the limbs is the source of endless

evils in the body.  'Yes.'  The body should have the most exercise when

growing most.  'What, the bodies of young infants?'  Nay, the bodies of

unborn infants.  I should like to explain to you this singular kind of

gymnastics.  The Athenians are fond of cock-fighting, and the people who

keep cocks carry them about in their hands or under their arms, and take

long walks, to improve, not their own health, but the health of the birds.

Here is a proof of the usefulness of motion, whether of rocking, swinging,

riding, or tossing upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion greatly

increase strength and the powers of digestion.  Hence we infer that our

women, when they are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo;

and the children, when born, should be carried by strong nurses,--there

must be more than one of them,--and should not be suffered to walk until

they are three years old.  Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of

these rules?  The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty

of making the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves. 

'Then why speak of such matters?'  In the hope that heads of families may

learn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order in

the state.



And now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first

repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for the young

creature.  This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the

practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at the

same time in sweet strains.  And the reason of this is obvious.  The

affections, both of the Bacchantes and of the children, arise from fear,

and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on within

them.  Now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent internal

one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving to the children sleep,

and bringing back the Bacchantes to their right minds by the help of dances

and acceptable sacrifices.  But if fear has such power, will not a child

who is always in a state of terror grow up timid and cowardly, whereas if

he learns from the first to resist fear he will develop a habit of courage?

'Very true.'  And we may say that the use of motion will inspire the souls

of children with cheerfulness and therefore with courage.  'Of course.' 

Softness enervates and irritates the temper of the young, and violence

renders them mean and misanthropical.  'But how is the state to educate

them when they are as yet unable to understand the meaning of words?'  Why,

surely they roar and cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse

knows the meaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes,

and the occasions which call them forth.  About three years is passed by

children in a state of imperfect articulation, which is quite long enough

time to make them either good- or ill-tempered.  And, therefore, during

these first three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear

and pain.  'Yes, and he should have as much pleasure as possible.'  There,

I think, you are wrong; for the influence of pleasure in the beginning of

education is fatal.  A man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly avoid

pain.  He should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm which

mankind, taught by some inspiration, attribute to God; and he who would be

like God should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor should he

permit any other to be thus given; above all, not the infant, whose

character is just in the making.  It may sound ridiculous, but I affirm

that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully tended, and kept from

excessive pleasures and pains.



'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and following

the mean.'



Let us consider a further point.  The matters which are now in question are

generally called customs rather than laws; and we have already made the

reflection that, though they are not, properly speaking, laws, yet neither

can they be neglected.  For they fill up the interstices of law, and are

the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole building

depends.  Laws without customs never last; and we must not wonder if habit

and custom sometimes lengthen out our laws.  'Very true.'  Up to their

third year, then, the life of children may be regulated by customs such as

we have described.  From three to six their minds have to be amused; but

they must not be allowed to become self-willed and spoilt.  If punishment

is necessary, the same rule will hold as in the case of slaves; they must

neither be punished in hot blood nor ruined by indulgence.  The children of

that age will have their own modes of amusing themselves; they should be

brought for their play to the village temples, and placed under the care of

nurses, who will be responsible to twelve matrons annually chosen by the

women who have authority over marriage.  These shall be appointed, one out

of each tribe, and their duty shall be to keep order at the meetings: 

slaves who break the rules laid down by them, they shall punish by the help

of some of the public slaves; but citizens who dispute their authority

shall be brought before the magistrates.  After six years of age there

shall be a separation of the sexes; the boys will go to learn riding and

the use of arms, and the girls may, if they please, also learn.  Here I

note a practical error in early training.  Mothers and nurses foolishly

believe that the left hand is by nature different from the right, whereas

the left leg and foot are acknowledged to be the same as the right.  But

the truth is that nature made all things to balance, and the power of using

the left hand, which is of little importance in the case of the plectrum of

the lyre, may make a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should

be a skilled gymnast and able to fight and balance himself in any position.

If a man were a Briareus, he should use all his hundred hands at once; at

any rate, let everybody employ the two which they have.  To these matters

the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women superintending

the nursing and amusement of the children, and the men superintending their

education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound, wind and

limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.



Education has two branches--gymnastic, which is concerned with the body;

and music, which improves the soul.  And gymnastic has two parts, dancing

and wrestling.  Of dancing one kind imitates musical recitation and aims at

stateliness and freedom; another kind is concerned with the training of the

body, and produces health, agility, and beauty.  There is no military use

in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the names of Antaeus

and Cercyon, or in the tricks of boxing, which are attributed to Amycus and

Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of extricating the neck, hands,

and sides, should be diligently learnt and taught.  In our dances

imitations of war should be practised, as in the dances of the Curetes in

Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as in the dances in complete armour

which were taught us Athenians by the goddess Athene.  Youths who are not

yet of an age to go to war should make religious processions armed and on

horseback; and they should also engage in military games and contests. 

These exercises will be equally useful in peace and war, and will benefit

both states and families.



Next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall

venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence on

laws.  He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the same

playthings will be content with the same laws.  There is no greater evil in

a state than the spirit of innovation.  In the case of the seasons and

winds, in the management of our bodies and in the habits of our minds,

change is a dangerous thing.  And in everything but what is bad the same

rule holds.  We all venerate and acquiesce in the laws to which we are

accustomed; and if they have continued during long periods of time, and

there is no remembrance of their ever having been otherwise, people are

absolutely afraid to change them.  Now how can we create this quality of

immobility in the laws?  I say, by not allowing innovations in the games

and plays of children.  The children who are always having new plays, when

grown up will be always having new laws.  Changes in mere fashions are not

serious evils, but changes in our estimate of men's characters are most

serious; and rhythms and music are representations of characters, and

therefore we must avoid novelties in dance and song.  For securing

permanence no better method can be imagined than that of the Egyptians. 

'What is their method?'  They make a calendar for the year, arranging on

what days the festivals of the various Gods shall be celebrated, and for

each festival they consecrate an appropriate hymn and dance.  In our state

a similar arrangement shall in the first instance be framed by certain

individuals, and afterwards solemnly ratified by all the citizens.  He who

introduces other hymns or dances shall be excluded by the priests and

priestesses and the guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he

may be prosecuted for impiety.  But we must not be too ready to speak about

such great matters.  Even a young man, when he hears something

unaccustomed, stands and looks this way and that, like a traveller at a

place where three ways meet; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of

his ground in so singular an argument.  'Very true.'  Then, leaving the

subject for further examination at some future time, let us proceed with

our laws about education, for in this manner we may probably throw light

upon our present difficulty.  'Let us do as you say.'  The ancients used

the term nomoi to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they fancied that

there was a connexion between the songs and laws of a country.  And we say

--Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a

transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of the law

and by the priests and priestesses.  'Very good.'  How can we legislate

about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule?  Moulds or

types must be first framed, and one of the types shall be--Abstinence from

evil words at sacrifices.  When a son or brother blasphemes at a sacrifice

there is a sound of ill-omen heard in the family; and many a chorus stands

by the altar uttering inauspicious words, and he is crowned victor who

excites the hearers most with lamentations.  Such lamentations should be

reserved for evil days, and should be uttered only by hired mourners; and

let the singers not wear circlets or ornaments of gold.  To avoid every

evil word, then, shall be our first type.  'Agreed.'  Our second law or

type shall be, that prayers ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that,

inasmuch as all prayers are requests, they shall be only for good; this the

poets must be made to understand.  'Certainly.'  Have we not already

decided that no gold or silver Plutus shall be allowed in our city?  And

did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets?  And may we not

fear that, if they are allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will

bring the greatest misfortunes on the state?  And we must therefore make a

law that the poet is not to contradict the laws or ideas of the state; nor

is he to show his poems to any private persons until they have first

received the imprimatur of the director of education.  A fourth musical law

will be to the effect that hymns and praises shall be offered to Gods, and

to heroes and demigods.  Still another law will permit eulogies of eminent

citizens, whether men or women, but only after their death.  As to songs

and dances, we will enact as follows:--There shall be a selection made of

the best ancient musical compositions and dances; these shall be chosen by

judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age.  They will accept

some, and reject or amend others, for which purpose they will call, if

necessary, the poets themselves into council.  The severe and orderly music

is the style in which to educate children, who, if they are accustomed to

this, will deem the opposite kind to be illiberal, but if they are

accustomed to the other, will count this to be cold and unpleasing. 

'True.'  Further, a distinction should be made between the melodies of men

and women.  Nature herself teaches that the grand or manly style should be

assigned to men, and to women the moderate and temperate.  So much for the

subjects of education.  But to whom are they to be taught, and when?  I

must try, like the shipwright, who lays down the keel of a vessel, to build

a secure foundation for the vessel of the soul in her voyage through life. 

Human affairs are hardly serious, and yet a sad necessity compels us to be

serious about them.  Let us, therefore, do our best to bring the matter to

a conclusion.  'Very good.'  I say then, that God is the object of a man's

most serious endeavours.  But man is created to be the plaything of the

Gods; and therefore the aim of every one should be to pass through life,

not in grim earnest, but playing at the noblest of pastimes, in another

spirit from that which now prevails.  For the common opinion is, that work

is for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there is neither

amusement nor instruction worth speaking of.  The life of peace is that

which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve.  They should

live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating Gods

and heroes.  I have already told you the types of song and dance which they

should follow:  and



'Some things,' as the poet well says, 'you will devise for yourself--

others, God will suggest to you.'



These words of his may be applied to our pupils.  They will partly teach

themselves, and partly will be taught by God, the art of propitiating Him;

for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth.  'You

have a poor opinion of man.'  No wonder, when I compare him with God; but,

if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.



Next follow the building for gymnasia and schools; these will be in the

midst of the city, and outside will be riding-schools and archery-grounds.

In all of them there ought to be instructors of the young, drawn from

foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music and war.  Education

shall be compulsory; the children must attend school, whether their parents

like it or not; for they belong to the state more than to their parents. 

And I say further, without hesitation, that the same education in riding

and gymnastic shall be given both to men and women.  The ancient tradition

about the Amazons confirms my view, and at the present day there are

myriads of women, called Sauromatides, dwelling near the Pontus, who

practise the art of riding as well as archery and the use of arms.  But if

I am right, nothing can be more foolish than our modern fashion of training

men and women differently, whereby the power the city is reduced to a half. 

For reflect--if women are not to have the education of men, some other must

be found for them, and what other can we propose?  Shall they, like the

women of Thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin

and weave, and take care of the house? or shall they follow the Spartan

custom, which is between the two?--there the maidens share in gymnastic

exercises and in music; and the grown women, no longer engaged in spinning,

weave the web of life, although they are not skilled in archery, like the

Amazons, nor can they imitate our warrior goddess and carry shield or

spear, even in the extremity of their country's need.  Compared with our

women, the Sauromatides are like men.  But your legislators, Megillus, as I

maintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left the

women to take care of themselves.



'Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this way?'



'Why, yes; for we cannot withdraw the liberty which we have already

conceded to him.'



What will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed

from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common tables for

themselves and their families which are under the inspection of

magistrates, male and female?  Are men who have these institutions only to

eat and fatten like beasts?  If they do, how can they escape the fate of a

fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast more

valiant than himself?  True, theirs is not the perfect way of life, for

they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life also

confers great blessings.  Even those who live in the second state have a

work to do twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic victor; for

their labour is for the body only, but ours both for body and soul.  And

this higher work ought to be pursued night and day to the exclusion of

every other.  The magistrates who keep the city should be wakeful, and the

master of the household should be up early and before all his servants; and

the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens, and not be awakened by

them.  Much sleep is not required either for our souls or bodies.  When a

man is asleep, he is no better than if he were dead; and he who loves life

and wisdom will take no more sleep than is necessary for health. 

Magistrates who are wide awake at night are terrible to the bad; but they

are honoured by the good, and are useful to themselves and the state.



When the morning dawns, let the boy go to school.  As the sheep need the

shepherd, so the boy needs a master; for he is at once the most cunning and

the most insubordinate of creatures.  Let him be taken away from mothers

and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a freeman in

that he learns and is taught, but as a slave in that he may be chastised by

all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to chastise him shall be

disgraced.  All these matters will be under the supervision of the Director

of Education.



Him we will address as follows:  We have spoken to you, O illustrious

teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial

strains; but of the learning of letters and of prose writings, and of

music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes we

have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning divine

things--such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements of days,

months, and years, of which the true calculation is necessary in order that

seasons and festivals may proceed in regular course, and arouse and enliven

the city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making men know them better. 

There are, we say, many things about which we have not as yet instructed

you--and first, as to reading and music:  Shall the pupil be a perfect

scholar and musician, or not even enter on these studies?  He should

certainly enter on both:--to letters he will apply himself from the age of

ten to thirteen, and at thirteen he will begin to handle the lyre, and

continue to learn music until he is sixteen; no shorter and no longer time

will be allowed, however fond he or his parents may be of the pursuit. The

study of letters he should carry to the extent of simple reading and

writing, but he need not care for calligraphy and tachygraphy, if his

natural gifts do not enable him to acquire them in the three years.  And

here arises a question as to the learning of compositions when

unaccompanied with music, I mean, prose compositions.  They are a dangerous

species of literature.  Speak then, O guardians of the law, and tell us

what we shall do about them.  'You seem to be in a difficulty.'  Yes; it is

difficult to go against the opinion of all the world.  'But have we not

often already done so?'  Very true.  And you imply that the road which we

are taking, though disagreeable to many, is approved by those whose

judgment is most worth having.  'Certainly.'  Then I would first observe

that we have many poets, comic as well as tragic, with whose compositions,

as people say, youth are to be imbued and saturated.  Some would have them

learn by heart entire poets; others prefer extracts.  Now I believe, and

the general opinion is, that some of the things which they learn are good,

and some bad.  'Then how shall we reject some and select others?'  A happy

thought occurs to me; this long discourse of ours is a sample of what we

want, and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem.  I am naturally

pleased in reflecting upon all our words, which appear to me to be just the

thing for a young man to hear and learn.  I would venture, then, to offer

to the Director of Education this treatise of laws as a pattern for his

guidance; and in case he should find any similar compositions, written or

oral, I would have him carefully preserve them, and commit them in the

first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them (he should turn

off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate the lesson to the

young.



I have said enough to the teacher of letters; and now we will proceed to

the teacher of the lyre.  He must be reminded of the advice which we gave

to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive the

rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the opposite. 

With a view to the attainment of this object, the pupil and his instructor

are to use the lyre because its notes are pure; the voice and string should

coincide note for note:  nor should there be complex harmonies and

contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms.  Three years'

study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these intricacies; and our

pupils will have many things of more importance to learn.  The tunes and

hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival have been already

determined by us.



Having given these instructions to the Director of Music, let us now

proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and

girls by masters and mistresses.  Our minister of education will have a

great deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much

work?  There is no difficulty;--the law will provide him with assistants,

male and female; and he will consider how important his office is, and how

great the responsibility of choosing them.  For if education prospers, the

vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education fails, the

consequences are not even to be mentioned.  Of dancing and gymnastics

something has been said already.  We include under the latter military

exercises, the various uses of arms, all that relates to horsemanship, and

military evolutions and tactics.  There should be public teachers of both

arts, paid by the state, and women as well as men should be trained in

them.  The maidens should learn the armed dance, and the grown-up women be

practised in drill and the use of arms, if only in case of extremity, when

the men are gone out to battle, and they are left to guard their families. 

Birds and beasts defend their young, but women instead of fighting run to

the altars, thus degrading man below the level of the animals.  'Such a

lack of education, Stranger, is both unseemly and dangerous.'



Wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of this,

and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action is combined

with words.  Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds; imitative, first,

of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the ludicrous and

grotesque.  The first kind may be further divided into the dance of war and

the dance of peace.  The former is called the Pyrrhic; in this the

movements of attack and defence are imitated in a direct and manly style,

which indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind.  The latter of

the two, the dance of peace, is suitable to orderly and law-abiding men. 

These must be distinguished from the Bacchic dances which imitate drunken

revelry, and also from the dances by which purifications are effected and

mysteries celebrated.  Such dances cannot be characterized either as

warlike or peaceful, and are unsuited to a civilized state.  Now the dances

of peace are of two classes:--the first of them is the more violent, being

an expression of joy and triumph after toil and danger; the other is more

tranquil, symbolizing the continuance and preservation of good.  In

speaking or singing we naturally move our bodies, and as we have more or

less courage or self-control we become less or more violent and excited. 

Thus from the imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing arises. 

Now one man imitates in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner:  and so

the peaceful kinds of dance have been appropriately called Emmeleiai, or

dances of order, as the warlike have been called Pyrrhic.  In the latter a

man imitates all sorts of blows and the hurling of weapons and the avoiding

of them; in the former he learns to bear himself gracefully and like a

gentleman.  The types of these dances are to be fixed by the legislator,

and when the guardians of the law have assigned them to the several

festivals, and consecrated them in due order, no further change shall be

allowed.



Thus much of the dances which are appropriate to fair forms and noble

souls.  Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered. 

For the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be understood

without opposites.  But a man of repute will desire to avoid doing what is

ludicrous.  He should leave such performances to slaves,--they are not fit

for freemen; and there should be some element of novelty in them. 

Concerning tragedy, let our law be as follows:  When the inspired poet

comes to us with a request to be admitted into our state, we will reply in

courteous words--We also are tragedians and your rivals; and the drama

which we enact is the best and noblest, being the imitation of the truest

and noblest life, with a view to which our state is ordered.  And we cannot

allow you to pitch your stage in the agora, and make your voices to be

heard above ours, or suffer you to address our women and children and the

common people on opposite principles to our own.  Come then, ye children of

the Lydian Muse, and present yourselves first to the magistrates, and if

they decide that your hymns are as good or better than ours, you shall have

your chorus; but if not, not.



There remain three kinds of knowledge which should be learnt by freemen--

arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly, astronomy. 

Few need make an accurate study of such sciences; and of special students

we will speak at another time.  But most persons must be content with the

study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may be said to be a

necessity of that nature against which God himself is unable to contend. 

'What are these divine necessities of knowledge?'  Necessities of a

knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods, can govern mankind. 

And far is he from being a divine man who cannot distinguish one, two, odd

and even; who cannot number day and night, and is ignorant of the

revolutions of the sun and stars; for to every higher knowledge a knowledge

of number is necessary--a fool may see this; how much, is a matter

requiring more careful consideration.  'Very true.'  But the legislator

cannot enter into such details, and therefore we must defer the more

careful consideration of these matters to another occasion.  'You seem to

fear our habitual want of training in these subjects.'  Still more do I

fear the danger of bad training, which is often worse than none at all. 

'Very true.'  I think that a gentleman and a freeman may be expected to

know as much as an Egyptian child.  In Egypt, arithmetic is taught to

children in their sports by a distribution of apples or garlands among a

greater or less number of people; or a calculation is made of the various

combinations which are possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or they

distribute cups among the children, sometimes of gold, brass, and silver

intermingled, sometimes of one metal only.  The knowledge of arithmetic

which is thus acquired is a great help, either to the general or to the

manager of a household; wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-

awake in their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. 

'What do you mean?'  I have observed this ignorance among my countrymen--

they are like pigs--and I am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on

that of all the Hellenes.  'In what respect?'  Let me ask you a question. 

You know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth?  'Yes.' 

And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with themselves,

and (2) with each other; whereas they are only commensurable with

themselves.  But if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate case, and

may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary knowledge is

a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing very grand. 

'Certainly.'  The discussion of arithmetical problems is a much better

amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts.  'True.' 

Mathematics, then, will be one of the subjects in which youth should be

trained.  They may be regarded as an amusement, as well as a useful and

innocent branch of knowledge;--I think that we may include them

provisionally.  'Yes; that will be the way.'  The next question is, whether

astronomy shall be made a part of education.  About the stars there is a

strange notion prevalent.  Men often suppose that it is impious to enquire

into the nature of God and the world, whereas the very reverse is the

truth.  'How do you mean?'  What I am going to say may seem absurd and at

variance with the usual language of age, and yet if true and advantageous

to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be withheld.  'Let us

hear.'  My dear friend, how falsely do we and all the Hellenes speak about

the sun and moon!  'In what respect?'  We are always saying that they and

certain of the other stars do not keep the same path, and we term them

planets.  'Yes; and I have seen the morning and evening stars go all manner

of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we know that they always do.  But

I wish that you would explain your meaning further.'  You will easily

understand what I have had no difficulty in understanding myself, though we

are both of us past the time of learning.  'True; but what is this

marvellous knowledge which youth are to acquire, and of which we are

ignorant?'  Men say that the sun, moon, and stars are planets or wanderers;

but this is the reverse of the fact.  Each of them moves in one orbit only,

which is circular, and not in many; nor is the swiftest of them the

slowest, as appears to human eyes.  What an insult should we offer to

Olympian runners if we were to put the first last and the last first!  And

if that is a ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in speaking

of the Gods?  They cannot be pleased at our telling falsehoods about them. 

'They cannot.'  Then people should at least learn so much about them as

will enable them to avoid impiety.



Enough of education.  Hunting and similar pursuits now claim our attention.

These require for their regulation that mixture of law and admonition of

which we have often spoken; e.g., in what we were saying about the nurture

of young children.  And therefore the whole duty of the citizen will not

consist in mere obedience to the laws; he must regard not only the

enactments but also the precepts of the legislator.  I will illustrate my

meaning by an example.  Of hunting there are many kinds--hunting of fish

and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; and the legislator can

neither omit to speak about these things, nor make penal ordinances about

them all.  'What is he to do then?'  He will praise and blame hunting,

having in view the discipline and exercise of youth.  And the young man

will listen obediently and will regard his praises and censures; neither

pleasure nor pain should hinder him.  The legislator will express himself

in the form of a pious wish for the welfare of the young:--O my friends, he

will say, may you never be induced to hunt for fish in the waters, either

by day or night; or for men, whether by sea or land.  Never let the wish to

steal enter into your minds; neither be ye fowlers, which is not an

occupation for gentlemen.  As to land animals, the legislator will

discourage hunting by night, and also the use of nets and snares by day;

for these are indolent and unmanly methods.  The only mode of hunting which

he can praise is with horses and dogs, running, shooting, striking at close

quarters.  Enough of the prelude:  the law shall be as follows:--



Let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly hunters

who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited.  Let the fowler confine

himself to waste places and to the mountains.  The fisherman is also

permitted to exercise his calling, except in harbours and sacred streams,

marshes and lakes; in all other places he may fish, provided he does not

make use of poisonous mixtures.



BOOK VIII.  Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint

festivals and sacrifices.  There shall be 365 of them, one for every day in

the year; and one magistrate, at least, shall offer sacrifice daily

according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and interpreters,

who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and supply what the

legislator has omitted.  Moreover there shall be twelve festivals to the

twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named:  these shall be

celebrated every month with appropriate musical and gymnastic contests. 

There shall also be festivals for women, to be distinguished from the men's

festivals.  Nor shall the Gods below be forgotten, but they must be

separated from the Gods above--Pluto shall have his own in the twelfth

month.  He is not the enemy, but the friend of man, who releases the soul

from the body, which is at least as good a work as to unite them.  Further,

those who have to regulate these matters should consider that our state has

leisure and abundance, and wishing to be happy, like an individual, should

lead a good life; for he who leads such a life neither does nor suffers

injury, of which the first is very easy, and the second very difficult of

attainment, and is only to be acquired by perfect virtue.  A good city has

peace, but the evil city is full of wars within and without.  To guard

against the danger of external enemies the citizens should practise war at

least one day in every month; they should go out en masse, including their

wives and children, or in divisions, as the magistrates determine, and have

mimic contests, imitating in a lively manner real battles; they should also

have prizes and encomiums of valour, both for the victors in these

contests, and for the victors in the battle of life.  The poet who

celebrates the victors should be fifty years old at least, and himself a

man who has done great deeds.  Of such an one the poems may be sung, even

though he is not the best of poets.  To the director of education and the

guardians of the law shall be committed the judgment, and no song, however

sweet, which has not been licensed by them shall be recited.  These

regulations about poetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally to

men and to women.



The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to himself:--

With what object am I training my citizens?  Are they not strivers for

mastery in the greatest of combats?  Certainly, will be the reply.  And if

they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of entering the lists

without many days' practice?  Would they not as far as possible imitate all

the circumstances of the contest; and if they had no one to box with, would

they not practise on a lifeless image, heedless of the laughter of the

spectators?  And shall our soldiers go out to fight for life and kindred

and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be ridiculous?

Will not the legislator require that his citizens shall practise war daily,

performing lesser exercises without arms, while the combatants on a greater

scale will carry arms, and take up positions, and lie in ambuscade?  And

let their combats be not without danger, that opportunity may be given for

distinction, and the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of

honour or disgrace.  If occasionally a man is killed, there is no great

harm done--there are others as good as he is who will replace him; and the

state can better afford to lose a few of her citizens than to lose the only

means of testing them.



'We agree, Stranger, that such warlike exercises are necessary.'  But why

are they so rarely practised?  Or rather, do we not all know the reasons? 

One of them (1) is the inordinate love of wealth.  This absorbs the soul of

a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit.  Knowledge is valued

by him only as it tends to the attainment of wealth.  All is lost in the

desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything,

right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of

his animal passions.  'Most true.'  This is one of the causes which

prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else which is good; it

converts the temperate and orderly into shopkeepers or servants, and the

brave into burglars or pirates.  Many of these latter are men of ability,

and are greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and

thirsting all their lives long.  The bad forms of government (2) are

another reason--democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which, as I was saying, are

not states, but states of discord, in which the rulers are afraid of their

subjects, and therefore do not like them to become rich, or noble, or

valiant.  Now our state will escape both these causes of evil; the society

is perfectly free, and has plenty of leisure, and is not allowed by the

laws to be absorbed in the pursuit of wealth; hence we have an excellent

field for a perfect education, and for the introduction of martial

pastimes.  Let us proceed to describe the character of these pastimes.  All

gymnastic exercises in our state must have a military character; no other

will be allowed.  Activity and quickness are most useful in war; and yet

these qualities do not attain their greatest efficiency unless the

competitors are armed.  The runner should enter the lists in armour, and in

the races which our heralds proclaim, no prize is to be given except to

armed warriors.  Let there be six courses--first, the stadium; secondly,

the diaulos or double course; thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, the long

course; fifthly, races (1) between heavy-armed soldiers who shall pass over

sixty stadia and finish at a temple of Ares, and (2) between still more

heavily-armed competitors who run over smoother ground; sixthly, a race for

archers, who shall run over hill and dale a distance of a hundred stadia,

and their goal shall be a temple of Apollo and Artemis.  There shall be

three contests of each kind--one for boys, another for youths, a third for

men; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the youths

at two-thirds of the entire length.  Women shall join in the races:  young

girls who are not grown up shall run naked; but after thirteen they shall

be suitably dressed; from thirteen to eighteen they shall be obliged to

share in these contests, and from eighteen to twenty they may if they

please and if they are unmarried.  As to trials of strength, single combats

in armour, or battles between two and two, or of any number up to ten,

shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy exercises.  And there must

be umpires, as there are now in wrestling, to determine what is a fair hit

and who is conqueror.  Instead of the pancratium, let there be contests in

which the combatants carry bows and wear light shields and hurl javelins

and throw stones.  The next provision of the law will relate to horses,

which, as we are in Crete, need be rarely used by us, and chariots never;

our horse-racing prizes will only be given to single horses, whether colts,

half-grown, or full-grown.  Their riders are to wear armour, and there

shall be a competition between mounted archers.  Women, if they have a

mind, may join in the exercises of men.



But enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music.  All musical contests

will take place at festivals, whether every third or every fifth year,

which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the judges of the games,

and the director of education, who for this purpose shall become

legislators and arrange times and conditions.  The principles on which such

contests are to be ordered have been often repeated by the first

legislator; no more need be said of them, nor are the details of them

important.  But there is another subject of the highest importance, which,

if possible, should be determined by the laws, not of man, but of God; or,

if a direct revelation is impossible, there is need of some bold man who,

alone against the world, will speak plainly of the corruption of human

nature, and go to war with the passions of mankind.  'We do not understand

you.'  I will try to make my meaning plainer.  In speaking of education, I

seemed to see young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one

another; and there arose in my mind a natural fear about a state, in which

the young of either sex are well nurtured, and have little to do, and

occupy themselves chiefly with festivals and dances.  How can they be saved

from those passions which reason forbids them to indulge, and which are the

ruin of so many?  The prohibition of wealth, and the influence of

education, and the all-seeing eye of the ruler, will alike help to promote

temperance; but they will not wholly extirpate the unnatural loves which

have been the destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can

be devised?  Lacedaemon and Crete give no assistance here; on the subject

of love, as I may whisper in your ear, they are against us.  Suppose a

person were to urge that you ought to restore the natural use which existed

before the days of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be

supported by public opinion in either of your states.  Or try the matter by

the test which we apply to all laws,--who will say that the permission of

such things tends to virtue?  Will he who is seduced learn the habit of

courage; or will the seducer acquire temperance?  And will any legislator

be found to make such actions legal?



But to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love

and friendship, which may take very different forms.  For we speak of

friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue;

secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when in excess, is

termed love.  The first kind is gentle and sociable; the second is fierce

and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is akin to both,

and is under the dominion of opposite principles.  The one is of the body,

and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who is under the

influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker rather than a

lover, and desires only with his soul to be knit to the soul of his friend;

while the intermediate sort is both of the body and of the soul.  Here are

three kinds of love:  ought the legislator to prohibit all of them equally,

or to allow the virtuous love to remain?  'The latter, clearly.'  I

expected to gain your approval; but I will reserve the task of convincing

our friend Cleinias for another occasion.  'Very good.'  To make right laws

on this subject is in one point of view easy, and in another most

difficult; for we know that in some cases most men abstain willingly from

intercourse with the fair.  The unwritten law which prohibits members of

the same family from such intercourse is strictly obeyed, and no thought of

anything else ever enters into the minds of men in general.  A little word

puts out the fire of their lusts.  'What is it?'  The declaration that such

things are hateful to the Gods, and most abominable and unholy.  The reason

is that everywhere, in jest and earnest alike, this is the doctrine which

is repeated to all from their earliest youth.  They see on the stage that

an Oedipus or a Thyestes or a Macareus, when undeceived, are ready to kill

themselves.  There is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath

is heard adverse to the law; and the legislator who would enslave these

enslaving passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the

city.  'Good:  but how can you create it?'  A fair objection; but I

promised to try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural

objects.  A law which would extirpate unnatural love as effectually as

incest is at present extirpated, would be the source of innumerable

blessings, because it would be in accordance with nature, and would get rid

of excess in eating and drinking and of adulteries and frenzies, making men

love their wives, and having other excellent effects.  I can imagine that

some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive

terms that we are legislating for impossibilities.  And so a person might

have said of the syssitia, or common meals; but this is refuted by facts,

although even now they are not extended to women.  'True.'  There is no

impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as I shall endeavour to

prove.  'Do so.'  Will not a man find abstinence more easy when his body is

sound than when he is in ill-condition?  'Yes.'  Have we not heard of Iccus

of Tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly for a time?  Yet they

were infinitely worse educated than our citizens, and far more lusty in

their bodies.  And shall they have abstained for the sake of an athletic

contest, and our citizens be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake

of a much nobler victory,--the victory over pleasure, which is true

happiness?  Will not the fear of impiety enable them to conquer that which

many who were inferior to them have conquered?  'I dare say.'  And

therefore the law must plainly declare that our citizens should not fall

below the other animals, who live all together in flocks, and yet remain

pure and chaste until the time of procreation comes, when they pair, and

are ever after faithful to their compact.  But if the corruption of public

opinion is too great to allow our first law to be carried out, then our

guardians of the law must turn legislators, and try their hand at a second

law.  They must minimize the appetites, diverting the vigour of youth into

other channels, allowing the practice of love in secret, but making

detection shameful.  Three higher principles may be brought to bear on all

these corrupt natures.  'What are they?'  Religion, honour, and the love of

the higher qualities of the soul.  Perhaps this is a dream only, yet it is

the best of dreams; and if not the whole, still, by the grace of God, a

part of what we desire may be realized.  Either men may learn to abstain

wholly from any loves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives;

or, at least, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, they shall

be punished with loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their

morals.  'I entirely agree with you,' said Megillus, 'but Cleinias must

speak for himself.'  'I will give my opinion by-and-by.'



We were speaking of the syssitia, which will be a natural institution in a

Cretan colony.  Whether they shall be established after the model of Crete

or Lacedaemon, or shall be different from either, is an unimportant

question which may be determined without difficulty.  We may, therefore,

proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens, which will be far

less complex than in other cities; a state which is inland and not maritime

requires only half the number of laws.  There is no trouble about trade and

commerce, and a thousand other things.  The legislator has only to regulate

the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds, which will be easily arranged, now

that the principal questions, such as marriage, education, and government,

have been settled.



Let us begin with husbandry:  First, let there be a law of Zeus against

removing a neighbour's landmark, whether he be a citizen or stranger.  For

this is 'to move the immoveable'; and Zeus, the God of kindred, witnesses

to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers, to the wrongs of

strangers.  The offence of removing a boundary shall receive two

punishments--the first will be inflicted by the God himself; the second by

the judges.  In the next place, the differences between neighbours about

encroachments must be guarded against.  He who encroaches shall pay twofold

the amount of the injury; of all such matters the wardens of the country

shall be the judges, in lesser cases the officers, and in greater the whole

number of them belonging to any one division.  Any injury done by cattle,

the decoying of bees, the careless firing of woods, the planting unduly

near a neighbour's ground, shall all be visited with proper damages.  Such

details have been determined by previous legislators, and need not now be

mixed up with greater matters.  Husbandmen have had of old excellent rules

about streams and waters; and we need not 'divert their course.'  Anybody

may take water from a common stream, if he does not thereby cut off a

private spring; he may lead the water in any direction, except through a

house or temple, but he must do no harm beyond the channel.  If land is

without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay, and if at this depth

he find no water, he shall have a right of getting water from his

neighbours for his household; and if their supply is limited, he shall

receive from them a measure of water fixed by the wardens of the country. 

If there be heavy rains, the dweller on the higher ground must not

recklessly suffer the water to flow down upon a neighbour beneath him, nor

must he who lives upon lower ground or dwells in an adjoining house refuse

an outlet.  If the two parties cannot agree, they shall go before the

wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuse to abide by their

decision, he shall pay double the damage which he has caused.



In autumn God gives us two boons--one the joy of Dionysus not to be laid

up--the other to be laid up.  About the fruits of autumn let the law be as

follows:  He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or

figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of Arcturus,

shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers on his own

ground; if on his neighbour's ground, a mina, and two-thirds of a mina if

on that of any one else.  The grapes or figs not used for storing a man may

gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that of others he must pay

the penalty of removing what he has not laid down.  If he be a slave who

has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig.  A metic

must purchase the choice fruit; but a stranger may pluck for himself and

his attendant.  This right of hospitality, however, does not extend to

storing grapes.  A slave who eats of the storing grapes or figs shall be

beaten, and the freeman be dismissed with a warning.  Pears, apples,

pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who is detected in the act of

taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if he be not more than thirty

years of age.  The stranger and the elder may partake of them, but not

carry any away; the latter, if he does not obey the law, shall fail in the

competition of virtue, if anybody brings up his offence against him.



Water is also in need of protection, being the greatest element of

nutrition, and, unlike the other elements--soil, air, and sun--which

conspire in the growth of plants, easily polluted.  And therefore he who

spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by

trenching, or theft, or by means of poisonous substances, shall pay the

damage and purify the stream.  At the getting-in of the harvest everybody

shall have a right of way over his neighbour's ground, provided he is

careful to do no damage beyond the trespass, or if he himself will gain

three times as much as his neighbour loses.  Of all this the magistrates

are to take cognizance, and they are to assess the damage where the injury

does not exceed three minae; cases of greater damage can be tried only in

the public courts.  A charge against a magistrate is to be referred to the

public courts, and any one who is found guilty of deciding corruptly shall

pay twofold to the aggrieved person.  Matters of detail relating to

punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses, and witnesses to

summonses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged legislator; the

younger generation may determine them according to their experience; but

when once determined, they shall remain unaltered.



The following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts:--No

citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them.  For the citizen has

already an art and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no man can

practise two arts, or practise one and superintend another.  No smith

should be a carpenter, and no carpenter, having many slaves who are smiths,

should look after them himself; but let each man practise one art which

shall be his means of livelihood.  The wardens of the city should see to

this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary deprival of his

rights--the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined, exiled.  Any disputes

about contracts shall be determined by the wardens of the city up to fifty

drachmae--above that sum by the public courts.  No customs are to be

exacted either on imports or exports.  Nothing unnecessary is to be

imported from abroad, whether for the service of the Gods or for the use of

man--neither purple, nor other dyes, nor frankincense,--and nothing needed

in the country is to be exported.  These things are to be decided on by the

twelve guardians of the law who are next in seniority to the five elders. 

Arms and the materials of war are to be imported and exported only with the

consent of the generals, and then only by the state.  There is to be no

retail trade either in these or any other articles.  For the distribution

of the produce of the country, the Cretan laws afford a rule which may be

usefully followed.  All shall be required to distribute corn, grain,

animals, and other valuable produce, into twelve portions.  Each of these

shall be subdivided into three parts--one for freemen, another for

servants, and the third shall be sold for the supply of artisans,

strangers, and metics.  These portions must be equal whether the produce be

much or little; and the master of a household may distribute the two

portions among his family and his slaves as he pleases--the remainder is to

be measured out to the animals.



Next as to the houses in the country--there shall be twelve villages, one

in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village there

shall be temples and an agora--also shrines for heroes or for any old

Magnesian deities who linger about the place.  In every division there

shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athene, as well as of the local

deity, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the guard-houses

of the rural police.  The dwellings of the artisans will be thus arranged:

--The artisans shall be formed into thirteen guilds, one of which will be

divided into twelve parts and settled in the city; of the rest there shall

be one in each division of the country.  And the magistrates will fix them

on the spots where they will cause the least inconvenience and be most

serviceable in supplying the wants of the husbandmen.



The care of the agora will fall to the wardens of the agora.  Their first

duty will be the regulation of the temples which surround the market-place;

and their second to see that the markets are orderly and that fair dealing

is observed.  They will also take care that the sales which the citizens

are required to make to strangers are duly executed.  The law shall be,

that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to whom the sale is

entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth part of the whole

shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his wants for a month.  On

the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and on the twenty-third of

animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and other things which husbandmen

have to sell and foreigners want to buy.  None of these commodities, any

more than barley or flour, or any other food, may be retailed by a citizen

to a citizen; but foreigners may sell them to one another in the

foreigners' market.  There must also be butchers who will sell parts of

animals to foreigners and craftsmen, and their servants; and foreigners may

buy firewood wholesale of the commissioners of woods, and may sell retail

to foreigners.  All other goods must be sold in the market, at some place

indicated by the magistrates, and shall be paid for on the spot.  He who

gives credit, and is cheated, will have no redress.  In buying or selling,

any excess or diminution of what the law allows shall be registered.  The

same rule is to be observed about the property of metics.  Anybody who

practises a handicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on

which he is enrolled; at the expiration of this time he shall take what he

has and depart.  The only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the

tax of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being

allowed to buy or sell.  But if he wants to extend the time of his sojourn,

and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the council and

assembly to grant his request, he may remain.  The children of metics may

also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during which they are

permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from their fifteenth

year.



No mention occurs in the Laws of the doctrine of Ideas.  The will of God,

the authority of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have taken

their place in the mind of Plato.  If we ask what is that truth or

principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed him

most, like the idea of good in the Republic, or of beauty in the Symposium,

or of the unity of virtue in the Protagoras, we should answer--The priority

of the soul to the body:  his later system mainly hangs upon this.  In the

Laws, as in the Sophist and Statesman, we pass out of the region of

metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of psychology.



The opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style, is

one of the most elevated passages in Plato.  The religious feeling which he

seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the blessedness of

living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living for himself, the

pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil, the kindness due to the

suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of Christian philosophy.  The

remark that elder men, if they want to educate others, should begin by

educating themselves; the necessity of creating a spirit of obedience in

the citizens; the desirableness of limiting property; the importance of

parochial districts, each to be placed under the protection of some God or

demigod, have almost the tone of a modern writer.  In many of his views of

politics, Plato seems to us, like some politicians of our own time, to be

half socialist, half conservative.



In the Laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure

and pain.  There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals may

regard them:  either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say that

pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may affirm

that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says, 'to be

brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises a great and

paramount influence on human life' (Arist. Eth. Nic.).  Or as Plato says in

the Laws, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the greatest

pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.'  If we admit that

pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two modes of

speaking is rather verbal than real; and in the greater part of the

writings of Plato they alternate with each other.  In the Republic, the

mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received by

Socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the Philebus, innocent pleasures

vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods.  In the Protagoras,

speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own, Plato admits the

calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics, while in the Phaedo

he indignantly denies that the exchange of one pleasure for another is the

exchange of virtue.  So wide of the mark are they who would attribute to

Plato entire consistency in thoughts or words.



He acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first--in this, at

any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the ideal.

Several features of the first are retained in the second:  the education of

men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they are to have common

meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the women with their

children; and they are both to serve in the army; the citizens, if not

actually communists, are in spirit communistic; they are to be lovers of

equality; only a certain amount of wealth is permitted to them, and their

burdens and also their privileges are to be proportioned to this.  The

constitution in the Laws is a timocracy of wealth, modified by an

aristocracy of merit.  Yet the political philosopher will observe that the

first of these two principles is fixed and permanent, while the latter is

uncertain and dependent on the opinion of the multitude.  Wealth, after

all, plays a great part in the Second Republic of Plato.  Like other

politicians, he deems that a property qualification will contribute

stability to the state.  The four classes are derived from the constitution

of Athens, just as the form of the city, which is clustered around a

citadel set on a hill, is suggested by the Acropolis at Athens.  Plato,

writing under Pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that

the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on

justice and moderation.  But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism from

observing the effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of

nations.



He was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state

could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that

whether it existed or not made no difference to the philosopher, who will

in any case regulate his life by it (Republic).  He has now lost faith in

the practicability of his scheme--he is speaking to 'men, and not to Gods

or sons of Gods' (Laws).  Yet he still maintains it to be the true pattern

of the state, which we must approach as nearly as possible:  as Aristotle

says, 'After having created a more general form of state, he gradually

brings it round to the other' (Pol.).  He does not observe, either here or

in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would be little room for

the development of individual character.  In several respects the second

state is an improvement on the first, especially in being based more

distinctly on the dignity of the soul.  The standard of truth, justice,

temperance, is as high as in the Republic;--in one respect higher, for

temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as the condition of all

virtue.  It is finally acknowledged that the virtues are all one and

connected, and that if they are separated, courage is the lowest of them. 

The treatment of moral questions is less speculative but more human.  The

idea of good has disappeared; the excellences of individuals--of him who is

faithful in a civil broil, of the examiner who is incorruptible, are the

patterns to which the lives of the citizens are to conform.  Plato is never

weary of speaking of the honour of the soul, which can only be honoured

truly by being improved.  To make the soul as good as possible, and to

prepare her for communion with the Gods in another world by communion with

divine virtue in this, is the end of life.  If the Republic is far superior

to the Laws in form and style, and perhaps in reach of thought, the Laws

leave on the mind of the modern reader much more strongly the impression of

a struggle against evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement.  When

Plato says that he must carry out that part of his ideal which is

practicable, he does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal

cannot be detached from the whole.



The great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he seeks

to impress upon them.  He had seen the Athenian empire, almost within the

limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems to have asked

himself what would happen if, a century from the time at which he was

writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as in the century

which had preceded.  He fails to perceive that the greater part of the

political life of a nation is not that which is given them by their

legislators, but that which they give themselves.  He has never reflected

that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere order can only

be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression.  The possibility of a

great nation or of an universal empire arising never occurred to him.  He

sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the Hellenic world in his own

later life, and thinks that the remedy is to make the laws unchangeable. 

The same want of insight is apparent in his judgments about art.  He would

like to have the forms of sculpture and of music fixed as in Egypt.  He

does not consider that this would be fatal to the true principles of art,

which, as Socrates had himself taught, was to give life (Xen. Mem.).  We

wonder how, familiar as he was with the statues of Pheidias, he could have

endured the lifeless and half-monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture.  The

'chants of Isis' (Laws), we might think, would have been barbarous in an

Athenian ear. But although he is aware that there are some things which are

not so well among 'the children of the Nile,' he is deeply struck with the

stability of Egyptian institutions.  Both in politics and in art Plato

seems to have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by

taking a step backwards.  Antiquity, compared with the world in which he

lived, had a sacredness and authority for him:  the men of a former age

were supposed by him to have had a sense of reverence which was wanting

among his contemporaries.  He could imagine the early stages of

civilization; he never thought of what the future might bring forth.  His

experience is confined to two or three centuries, to a few Greek states,

and to an uncertain report of Egypt and the East.  There are many ways in

which the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the Greeks. 

In criticism they were like children, having an acute vision of things

which were near to them, blind to possibilities which were in the distance.



The colony is to receive from the mother-country her original constitution,

and some of the first guardians of the law.  The guardians of the law are

to be ministers of justice, and the president of education is to take

precedence of them all.  They are to keep the registers of property, to

make regulations for trade, and they are to be superannuated at seventy

years of age.  Several questions of modern politics, such as the limitation

of property, the enforcement of education, the relations of classes, are

anticipated by Plato.  He hopes that in his state will be found neither

poverty nor riches; every man having the necessaries of life, he need not

go fortune-hunting in marriage.  Almost in the spirit of the Gospel he

would say, 'How hardly can a rich man dwell in a perfect state.'  For he

cannot be a good man who is always gaining too much and spending too little

(Laws; compare Arist. Eth. Nic.).  Plato, though he admits wealth as a

political element, would deny that material prosperity can be the

foundation of a really great community.  A man's soul, as he often says, is

more to be esteemed than his body; and his body than external goods.  He

repeats the complaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of

money is the corruption of states.  He has a sympathy with thieves and

burglars, 'many of whom are men of ability and greatly to be pitied,

because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long;' but

he has little sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers, although he makes the

reflection, which sometimes occurs to ourselves, that such occupations, if

they were carried on honestly by the best men and women, would be

delightful and honourable.  For traders and artisans a moderate gain was,

in his opinion, best.  He has never, like modern writers, idealized the

wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the problems of

political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a

science.  The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the want of a

free industrial population, and of the modern methods and instruments of

'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them; and so

hindered them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the

accumulation and distribution of wealth.



The constitution of the army is aristocratic and also democratic; official

appointment is combined with popular election.  The two principles are

carried out as follows:  The guardians of the law nominate generals out of

whom three are chosen by those who are or have been of the age for military

service; and the generals elected have the nomination of certain of the

inferior officers.  But if either in the case of generals or of the

inferior officers any one is ready to swear that he knows of a better man

than those nominated, he may put the claims of his candidate to the vote of

the whole army, or of the division of the service which he will, if

elected, command.  There is a general assembly, but its functions, except

at elections, are hardly noticed.  In the election of the Boule, Plato

again attempts to mix aristocracy and democracy.  This is effected, first

as in the Servian constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers; for it

cannot be supposed that those who possessed a higher qualification were

equal in number with those who had a lower, and yet they have an equal

number of representatives.  In the second place, all classes are compelled

to vote in the election of senators from the first and second class; but

the fourth class is not compelled to elect from the third, nor the third

and fourth from the fourth.  Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus

chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by

lot; these form the council for the year.



These political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the practical

statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual.  He will

observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy is the

division into classes.  The second of the three proposals, though

ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which is

often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little power

in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most needed.  At

such political crises, all the lower classes would vote equally with the

higher.  The subtraction of half the persons chosen at the first election

by the chances of the lot would not raise the character of the senators,

and is open to the objection of uncertainty, which necessarily attends this

and similar schemes of double representative government.  Nor can the

voters be expected to retain the continuous political interest required for

carrying out such a proposal as Plato's.  Who could select 180 persons of

each class, fitted to be senators?  And whoever were chosen by the voter in

the first instance, his wishes might be neutralized by the action of the

lot.  Yet the scheme of Plato is not really so extravagant as the actual

constitution of Athens, in which all the senators appear to have been

elected by lot (apo kuamou bouleutai), at least, after the revolution made

by Cleisthenes; for the constitution of the senate which was established by

Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise nature

is unknown to us.  The ancients knew that election by lot was the most

democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the objectionable

sense, that 'one man is as good as another.'  Plato, who is desirous of

mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot, which he

applies to candidates already elected by vote.  He attempts also to devise

a system of checks and balances such as he supposes to have been intended

by the ancient legislators.  We are disposed to say to him, as he himself

says in a remarkable passage, that 'no man ever legislates, but accidents

of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways.  The violence of

war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning

governments and changing laws.'  And yet, as he adds, the true legislator

is still required:  he must co-operate with circumstances.  Many things

which are ascribed to human foresight are the result of chance.  Ancient,

and in a less degree modern political constitutions, are never consistent

with themselves, because they are never framed on a single design, but are

added to from time to time as new elements arise and gain the preponderance

in the state.  We often attribute to the wisdom of our ancestors great

political effects which have sprung unforeseen from the accident of the

situation.  Power, not wisdom, is most commonly the source of political

revolutions.  And the result, as in the Roman Republic, of the co-existence

of opposite elements in the same state is, not a balance of power or an

equable progress of liberal principles, but a conflict of forces, of which

one or other may happen to be in the ascendant.  In Greek history, as well

as in Plato's conception of it, this 'progression by antagonism' involves

reaction:  the aristocracy expands into democracy and returns again to

tyranny.



The constitution of the Laws may be said to consist, besides the

magistrates, mainly of three elements,--an administrative Council, the

judiciary, and the Nocturnal Council, which is an intellectual aristocracy,

composed of priests and the ten eldest guardians of the law and some

younger co-opted members.  To this latter chiefly are assigned the

functions of legislation, but to be exercised with a sparing hand.  The

powers of the ordinary council are administrative rather than legislative.

The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution, is distributed

among the months of the year according to the number of the tribes.  Not

more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once, so that the government

would be made up of twelve administrations succeeding one another in the

course of the year.  They are to exercise a general superintendence, and,

like the Athenian counsellors, are to preside in monthly divisions over all

assemblies.  Of the ecclesia over which they presided little is said, and

that little relates to comparatively trifling duties.  Nothing is less

present to the mind of Plato than a House of Commons, carrying on year by

year the work of legislation.  For he supposes the laws to be already

provided.  As little would he approve of a body like the Roman Senate.  The

people and the aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies,

but by officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the

law, who are elected for twenty years.



The evils of this system are obvious.  If in any state, as Plato says in

the Statesman, it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty

good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be

unfitted to rule.  The unfitness would be increased by the short period

during which they held office.  There would be no traditions of government

among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no individual would be

responsible for any of their acts.  Everything seems to have been

sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a

turn of ruling and being ruled.  In the constitution of the Magnesian state

Plato has not emancipated himself from the limitations of ancient politics.

His government may be described as a democracy of magistrates elected by

the people.  He never troubles himself about the political consistency of

his scheme.  He does indeed say that the greater part of the good of this

world arises, not from equality, but from proportion, which he calls the

judgment of Zeus (compare Aristotle's Distributive Justice), but he hardly

makes any attempt to carry out the principle in practice.  There is no

attempt to proportion representation to merit; nor is there any body in his

commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole

state.  The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the old

democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the worst

features, such as the use of the lot, while by doing away with the

political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the machine

is taken out.  The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number, of whom

the ten eldest reappear as a part of the Nocturnal Council at the end of

the twelfth book, are to be elected by the whole military class, but they

are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore have an

oligarchical rather than a democratic character.  Nothing is said of the

manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal Council are to be harmonized

with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the ordinary council

is related to it.



Similar principles are applied to inferior offices.  To some the

appointment is made by vote, to others by lot.  In the elections to the

priesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner 'demus

and not demus.'  The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic, cannot

dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both--the oracle of

Delphi.  From this the laws about all divine things are to be derived.  The

final selection of the Interpreters, the choice of an heir for a vacant

lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be determined by

it.  Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion

in states.  For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute religious rites is

the work of a great intelligence.'



Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boule, the law

courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian

dicasteries.  Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:

--this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a

few judges only, but good ones.  He is nevertheless aware that both in

public and private suits there must be a popular element.  He insists that

the whole people must share in the administration of justice--in public

causes they are to take the first step, and the final decision is to remain

with them.  In private suits they are also to retain a share; 'for the

citizen who has no part in the administration of justice is apt to think

that he has no share in the state.  For this reason there is to be a court

of law in every tribe (i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges

are to be chosen by lot.'  Of the courts of law he gives what he calls a

superficial sketch.  Nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his various

accounts of them.  It is however clear that although some officials, like

the guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have

power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in the

main popular.  The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and

fact between a judge and jury, which would have enabled Plato to combine

the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or to any other

ancient political philosopher.  Though desirous of limiting the number of

judges, and thereby confining the office to persons specially fitted for

it, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed

by decisions as well as by legal enactments.



He would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and

neighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions at

issue; these are called in another passage arbiters rather than judges. 

But if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to the courts of

the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the party who is

unsuccessful in the suit.  There is a further appeal allowed to the select

judges, with a further increase of penalty.  The select judges are to be

appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one from every magistracy.

They are to be elected annually, and therefore probably for a year only,

and are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law.  In

cases of which death is the penalty, the trial takes place before a special

court, which is composed of the guardians of the law and of the judges of

appeal.



In treating of the subject in Book ix, he proposes to leave for the most

part the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators; the

procedure in capital causes he determines himself.  He insists that the

vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to

hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant.  They are then to take

evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses.  The

eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and then

the third.  The interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the

evidence is to be written down.  Apparently he does not expect the judges

to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the

council to be trained statesmen.



In forming marriage connexions, Plato supposes that the public interest

will prevail over private inclination.  There was nothing in this very

shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards

the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance.  Married life is

to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state.  The newly-

married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective

syssitia, even during their honeymoon; they are to give their whole mind to

the procreation of children; their duties to one another at a later period

of life are not a matter about which the state is equally solicitous. 

Divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper.  As in the

Republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and social

ones.  To modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in Plato's

treatment of the subject.  Yet he also makes some shrewd remarks on

marriage, as for example, that a man who does not marry for money will not

be the humble servant of his wife.  And he shows a true conception of the

nature of the family, when he requires that the newly-married couple

'should leave their father and mother,' and have a separate home.  He also

provides against extravagance in marriage festivals, which in some states

of society, for instance in the case of the Hindoos, has been a social evil

of the first magnitude.



In treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in

slaves.  They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own

sake, to be kept at a distance.  The motive is not so much humanity to the

slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows that

many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than members of

their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes

to himself (compare Republic).  If they commit crimes, they are doubly

punished; if they inform against illegal practices of their masters, they

are to receive a protection, which would probably be ineffectual, from the

guardians of the law; in rare cases they are to be set free.  Plato still

breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in which slavery was a

necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen.



The education propounded in the Laws differs in several points from that of

the Republic.  Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly on the

importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (compare the saying of the

latter--'Not the moment of death, but the moment of birth, is probably the

more important').  He would fix the amusements of children in the hope of

fixing their characters in after-life.  In the spirit of the statesman who

said, 'Let me make the ballads of a country, and I care not who make their

laws,' Plato would say, 'Let the amusements of children be unchanged, and

they will not want to change the laws.  The 'Goddess Harmonia' plays a

great part in Plato's ideas of education.  The natural restless force of

life in children, 'who do nothing but roar until they are three years old,'

is gradually to be reduced to law and order.  As in the Republic, he fixes

certain forms in which songs are to be composed:  (1) they are to be

strains of cheerfulness and good omen; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers

addressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good. 

The poets are again expelled or rather ironically invited to depart; and

those who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of

the magistrates.  Youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many

thousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is in

store for them.  Plato has no belief in 'liberty of prophesying'; and

having guarded against the dangers of lyric poetry, he remembers that there

is an equal danger in other writings.  He cannot leave his old enemies, the

Sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he proposes that youth

shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of poets or prose

writers, his own inspired work on laws.  These, and music and mathematics,

are the chief parts of his education.



Mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the Republic with a view to the

science of the idea of good,--though the higher use of them is not

altogether excluded,--but rather with a religious and political aim.  They

are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions of a

state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not to

blaspheme about astronomy.  Against three mathematical errors Plato is in

profound earnest.  First, the error of supposing that the three dimensions

of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable with one another.

The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the difficulty which he

formerly felt about the connexion of ideas, and is equally characteristic

of ancient philosophy:  he fixes his mind on the point of difference, and

cannot at the same time take in the similarity.  Secondly, he is puzzled

about the nature of fractions:  in the Republic, he is disposed to deny the

possibility of their existence.  Thirdly, his optimism leads him to insist

(unlike the Spanish king who thought that he could have improved on the

mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect or circular movement of the

heavenly bodies.  He appears to mean, that instead of regarding the stars

as overtaking or being overtaken by one another, or as planets wandering in

many paths, a more comprehensive survey of the heavens would enable us to

infer that they all alike moved in a circle around a centre (compare

Timaeus; Republic).  He probably suspected, though unacquainted with the

true cause, that the appearance of the heavens did not agree with the

reality:  at any rate, his notions of what was right or fitting easily

overpowered the results of actual observation.  To the early astronomers,

who lived at the revival of science, as to Plato, there was nothing absurd

in a priori astronomy, and they would probably have made fewer real

discoveries of they had followed any other track.  (Compare Introduction to

the Republic.)



The science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor is

anything said of the education of after-life.  The child is to begin to

learn at ten years of age:  he is to be taught reading and writing for

three years, from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years more,

from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music.  The great fault

which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the almost total

ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks would do well to

take a lesson from the Egyptians (compare Republic).  Dancing and wrestling

are to have a military character, and women as well as men are to be taught

the use of arms.  The military spirit which Plato has vainly endeavoured to

expel in the first two books returns again in the seventh and eighth.  He

has evidently a sympathy with the soldier, as well as with the poet, and he

is no mean master of the art, or at least of the theory, of war (compare

Laws; Republic), though inclining rather to the Spartan than to the

Athenian practice of it (Laws).  Of a supreme or master science which was

to be the 'coping-stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws.  He

seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time

for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the

outline which he had sketched. There is no requirement that the guardians

of the law shall be philosophers, although they are to know the unity of

virtue, and the connexion of the sciences.  Nor are we told that the

leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to be devoted to any

intellectual employment.  In this respect we note a falling off from the

Republic, but also there is 'the returning to it' of which Aristotle speaks

in the Politics.  The public and family duties of the citizens are to be

their main business, and these would, no doubt, take up a great deal more

time than in the modern world we are willing to allow to either of them. 

Plato no longer entertains the idea of any regular training to be pursued

under the superintendence of the state from eighteen to thirty, or from

thirty to thirty-five; he has taken the first step downwards on

'Constitution Hill' (Republic).  But he maintains as earnestly as ever that

'to men living under this second polity there remains the greatest of all

works, the education of the soul,' and that no bye-work should be allowed

to interfere with it.  Night and day are not long enough for the

consummation of it.



Few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later life;

five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university, or in the

preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a lecture to

which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare from house-

keeping or money-making--these comprise, as a matter of fact, the education

even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished 'more truly than

Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again' (Republic).  The description

which Plato gives in the Republic of the state of adult education among his

contemporaries may be applied almost word for word to our own age.  He does

not however acquiesce in this widely-spread want of a higher education; he

would rather seek to make every man something of a philosopher before he

enters on the duties of active life.  But in the Laws he no longer

prescribes any regular course of study which is to be pursued in mature

years.  Nor does he remark that the education of after-life is of another

kind, and must consist with the majority of the world rather in the

improvement of character than in the acquirement of knowledge.  It comes

from the study of ourselves and other men:  from moderation and experience: 

from reflection on circumstances:  from the pursuit of high aims:  from a

right use of the opportunities of life.  It is the preservation of what we

have been, and the addition of something more.  The power of abstract study

or continuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be

given by every one to himself.



The singular passage in Book vii., in which Plato describes life as a

pastime, like many other passages in the Laws is imperfectly expressed. 

Two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind:  first, the reflection, to

which he returns at the end of the passage, that men are playthings or

puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours; this

suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they are the

playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best of them.  The cynical,

ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious sentiment. 

In another passage he says that life is a game of which God, who is the

player, shifts the pieces so as to procure the victory of good on the

whole.  Or once more:  Tragedies are acted on the stage; but the best and

noblest of them is the imitation of the noblest life, which we affirm to be

the life of our whole state.  Again, life is a chorus, as well as a sort of

mystery, in which we have the Gods for playmates.  Men imagine that war is

their serious pursuit, and they make war that they may return to their

amusements.  But neither wars nor amusements are the true satisfaction of

men, which is to be found only in the society of the Gods, in sacrificing

to them and propitiating them.  Like a Christian ascetic, Plato seems to

suppose that life should be passed wholly in the enjoyment of divine

things.  And after meditating in amazement on the sadness and unreality of

the world, he adds, in a sort of parenthesis, 'Be cheerful, Sirs'

(Shakespeare, Tempest.)



In one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of the

sexes.  Natural relations between members of the same family have been

established of old; a 'little word' has put a stop to incestuous

connexions.  But unnatural unions of another kind continued to prevail at

Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the Gods. 

They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy and

abominable could sink into the minds of men.  The legislator is to cry

aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the beasts.' 

Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from 'carrying on war

against the mightiest lusts of mankind;' neither does he expect to

extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural use and purpose,

by the enactments of law, and by the influence of public opinion.  He will

not feed them by an over-luxurious diet, nor allow the healthier instincts

of the soul to be corrupted by music and poetry.  The prohibition of

excessive wealth is, as he says, a very considerable gain in the way of

temperance, nor does he allow of those enthusiastic friendships between

older and younger persons which in his earlier writings appear to be

alluded to with a certain degree of amusement and without reproof (compare

Introduction to the Symposium).  Sappho and Anacreon are celebrated by him

in the Charmides and the Phaedrus; but they would have been expelled from

the Magnesian state.



Yet he does not suppose that the rule of absolute purity can be enforced on

all mankind.  Something must be conceded to the weakness of human nature. 

He therefore adopts a 'second legal standard of honourable and

dishonourable, having a second standard of right.'  He would abolish

altogether 'the connexion of men with men...As to women, if any man has to

do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites,

and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in

enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges.'  But feeling

also that it is impossible wholly to control the mightiest passions of

mankind,' Plato, like other legislators, makes a compromise.  The offender

must not be found out; decency, if not morality, must be respected.  In

this he appears to agree with the practice of all civilized ages and

countries.  Much may be truly said by the moralist on the comparative harm

of open and concealed vice.  Nor do we deny that some moral evils are

better turned out to the light, because, like diseases, when exposed, they

are more easily cured.  And secrecy introduces mystery which enormously

exaggerates their power; a mere animal want is thus elevated into a

sentimental ideal.  It may very well be that a word spoken in season about

things which are commonly concealed may have an excellent effect.  But

having regard to the education of youth, to the innocence of children, to

the sensibilities of women, to the decencies of society, Plato and the

world in general are not wrong in insisting that some of the worst vices,

if they must exist, should be kept out of sight; this, though only a

second-best rule, is a support to the weakness of human nature.  There are

some things which may be whispered in the closet, but should not be shouted

on the housetop.  It may be said of this, as of many other things, that it

is a great part of education to know to whom they are to be spoken of, and

when, and where.



BOOK IX.  Punishments of offences and modes of procedure come next in

order.  We have a sense of disgrace in making regulations for all the

details of crime in a virtuous and well-ordered state.  But seeing that we

are legislating for men and not for Gods, there is no uncharitableness in

apprehending that some one of our citizens may have a heart, like the seed

which has touched the ox's horn, so hard as to be impenetrable to the law.

Let our first enactment be directed against the robbing of temples.  No

well-educated citizen will be guilty of such a crime, but one of their

servants, or some stranger, may, and with a view to him, and at the same

time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity of human nature, I will

lay down the law, beginning with a prelude.  To the intending robber we

will say--O sir, the complaint which troubles you is not human; but some

curse has fallen upon you, inherited from the crimes of your ancestors, of

which you must purge yourself:  go and sacrifice to the Gods, associate

with the good, avoid the wicked; and if you are cured of the fatal impulse,

well; but if not, acknowledge death to be better than life, and depart.



These are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the would-be

criminal.  And if he will not listen, then cry aloud as with the sound of a

trumpet:  Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall be

branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and cast naked beyond the

border.  And perhaps this may improve him:  for the law aims either at the

reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime.  No punishment is

designed to inflict useless injury.  But if the offender be a citizen, he

must be incurable, and for him death is the only fitting penalty.  His

iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children, nor shall his

property be confiscated.



As to the exaction of penalties, any person who is fined for an offence

shall not be liable to pay the fine, unless he have property in excess of

his lot.  For the lots must never go uncultivated for lack of means; the

guardians of the law are to provide against this.  If a fine is inflicted

upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends are unwilling to

give security, he shall be imprisoned and otherwise dishonoured.  But no

criminal shall go unpunished:--whether death, or imprisonment, or stripes,

or fines, or the stocks, or banishment to a remote temple, be the penalty. 

Capital offences shall come under the cognizance of the guardians of the

law, and a college of the best of the last year's magistrates.  The order

of suits and similar details we shall leave to the lawgivers of the future,

and only determine the mode of voting.  The judges are to sit in order of

seniority, and the proceedings shall begin with the speeches of the

plaintiff and the defendant; and then the judges, beginning with the

eldest, shall ask questions and collect evidence during three days, which,

at the end of each day, shall be deposited in writing under their seals on

the altar of Hestia; and when they have evidence enough, after a solemn

declaration that they will decide justly, they shall vote and end the case.

The votes are to be given openly in the presence of the citizens.



Next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first object

of the law.  The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to set up a

tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in guilt is a

magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to bring the

offender to justice.  Any one who is good for anything will give

information against traitors.  The mode of proceeding at such trials will

be the same as at trials for sacrilege; the penalty, death.  But neither in

this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of the father,

unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of them been

capitally convicted, and then the family of the criminal are to be sent off

to the country of their ancestor, retaining their property, with the

exception of the lot and its fixtures.  And ten are to be selected from the

younger sons of the other citizens--one of whom is to be chosen by the

oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot.



Our third law will be a general one, concerning the procedure and the

judges in cases of treason.  As regards the remaining or departure of the

family of the offender, the same law shall apply equally to the traitor,

the sacrilegious, and the conspirator.



A thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount, if

he can do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to prison

until he either pays the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft, the city,

or they agree to forgive him.  'But should all kinds of theft incur the

same penalty?'  You remind me of what I know--that legislation is never

perfect.  The men for whom laws are now made may be compared to the slave

who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the unscientific

doctor.  For the empirical practitioner, if he chance to meet the educated

physician talking to his patient, and entering into the philosophy of his

disease, would burst out laughing and say, as doctors delight in doing,

'Foolish fellow, instead of curing the patient you are educating him!' 

'And would he not be right?'  Perhaps; and he might add, that he who

discourses in our fashion preaches to the citizens instead of legislating

for them.  'True.'  There is, however, one advantage which we possess--that

being amateurs only, we may either take the most ideal, or the most

necessary and utilitarian view.  'But why offer such an alternative?  As if

all our legislation must be done to-day, and nothing put off until the

morrow.  We may surely rough-hew our materials first, and shape and place

them afterwards.'  That will be the natural way of proceeding.  There is a

further point.  Of all writings either in prose or verse the writings of

the legislator are the most important.  For it is he who has to determine

the nature of good and evil, and how they should be studied with a view to

our instruction.  And is it not as disgraceful for Solon and Lycurgus to

lay down false precepts about the institutions of life as for Homer and

Tyrtaeus?  The laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what

is at variance with them should be deemed ridiculous.  And we may further

imagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or mother,

and not to be the fiats of a tyrant.  'Very true.'



Let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other crimes,

for which we have already legislated in part.  And this leads us to ask,

first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the nature of the

honourable and just.  'To what are you referring?'  I will endeavour to

explain.  All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether in men or

things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly men who is just, is in

his mind fair, would be thought extravagant.  'Very true.'  But if honour

is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only

just actions?  'What do you mean?'  Our laws supply a case in point; for we

enacted that the robber of temples and the traitor should die; and this was

just, but the reverse of honourable.  In this way does the language of the

many rend asunder the just and honourable.  'That is true.'  But is our own

language consistent?  I have already said that the evil are involuntarily

evil; and the evil are the unjust.  Now the voluntary cannot be the

involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, 'Then shall we legislate

for our city?'  Of course, I shall reply.--'Then will you distinguish what

crimes are voluntary and what involuntary, and shall we impose lighter

penalties on the latter, and heavier on the former?  Or shall we refuse to

determine what is the meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain

that our words have come down from heaven, and that they should be at once

embodied in a law?'  All states legislate under the idea that there are two

classes of actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there is great

confusion about them in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless

they are distinguished.  Either we must abstain from affirming that unjust

actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement. 

Believing, then, that acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary

and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other mode of classifying

them.  Hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but all hurts are not injuries: 

on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly conferred may be an injury.  An

act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just; but the

legislator who has to decide whether the case is one of hurt or injury,

must consider the animus of the agent; and when there is hurt, he must as

far as possible, provide a remedy and reparation:  but if there is

injustice, he must, when compensation has been made, further endeavour to

reconcile the two parties.  'Excellent.'  Where injustice, like disease, is

remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word or deed, with the

assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and penalties, or any other

influence which may inspire man with the love of justice, or hatred of

injustice; and this is the noblest work of law.  But when the legislator

perceives the evil to be incurable, he will consider that the death of the

offender will be a good to himself, and in two ways a good to society: 

first, as he becomes an example to others; secondly, because the city will

be quit of a rogue; and in such a case, but in no other, the legislator

will punish with death.  'There is some truth in what you say.  I wish,

however, that you would distinguish more clearly the difference of injury

and hurt, and the complications of voluntary and involuntary.'  You will

admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature?  'Certainly.'  And

further, that pleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power,

working by persuasion and deceit?  'Yes.'  Ignorance is the third source of

crimes; this is of two kinds--simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by

conceit of knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source

of terrible errors, but is excusable when only weak and childish.  'True.' 

We often say that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure and

anger.  'Just so.'  But no one says that one man masters, and another is

mastered by ignorance. 'You are right.'  All these motives actuate men and

sometimes drive them in different ways.  'That is so.'  Now, then, I am in

a position to define the nature of just and unjust.  By injustice I mean

the dominion of anger and fear, pleasure and pain, envy and desire, in the

soul, whether doing harm or not:  by justice I mean the rule of the opinion

of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to the whole of

life; although actions done in error are often thought to be involuntary

injustice.  No controversy need be raised about names at present; we are

only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of error.  And the pain

which is called fear and anger is our first head of error; the second is

the class of pleasures and desires; and the third, of hopes which aim at

true opinion about the best;--this latter falls into three divisions (i.e.

(1) when accompanied by simple ignorance, (2) when accompanied by conceit

of wisdom combined with power, or (3) with weakness), so that there are in

all five.  And the laws relating to them may be summed up under two heads,

laws which deal with acts of open violence and with acts of deceit; to

which may be added acts both violent and deceitful, and these last should

be visited with the utmost rigour of the law.  'Very properly.'



Let us now return to the enactment of laws.  We have treated of sacrilege,

and of conspiracy, and of treason.  Any of these crimes may be committed by

a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood of old age.  If

this is proved to be the fact before the judges, the person in question

shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be punished further, unless

he have on his hands the stain of blood.  In this case he shall be exiled

for a year, and if he return before the expiration of the year, he shall be

retained in the public prison two years.



Homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary:  and first of

involuntary homicide.  He who unintentionally kills another man at the

games or in military exercises duly authorized by the magistrates, whether

death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be acquitted, subject

only to the purification required by the Delphian Oracle.  Any physician

whose patient dies against his will shall in like manner be acquitted.  Any

one who unintentionally kills the slave of another, believing that he is

his own, with or without weapons, shall bear the master of the slave

harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to twice the value of the slave, and

to this let him add a purification greater than in the case of homicide at

the games.  If a man kill his own slave, a purification only is required of

him.  If he kill a freeman unintentionally, let him also make purification;

and let him remember the ancient tradition which says that the murdered man

is indignant when he sees the murderer walk about in his own accustomed

haunts, and that he terrifies him with the remembrance of his crime.  And

therefore the homicide should keep away from his native land for a year,

or, if he have slain a stranger, let him avoid the land of the stranger for

a like period.  If he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of

the deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he

refuses to remain in exile, or visits the temples unpurified, then let the

kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double penalty.  The kinsman who

neglects this duty shall himself incur the curse, and any one who likes may

proceed against him, and compel him to leave his country for five years. 

If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any one may proceed against

him in the same manner:  and the homicide, if he be a metic, shall be

banished for a year; but if he be an entire stranger, whether he have

murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall be banished for ever; and if

he return, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall go to

the next of kin of the murdered man.  If he come back by sea against his

will, he shall remain on the seashore, wetting his feet in the water while

he waits for a vessel to sail; or if he be brought back by land, the

magistrates shall send him unharmed beyond the border.



Next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds--either arising

out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or committed with

premeditation, and unattended with remorse.  The cause of both is anger,

and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary.  The one which

is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly involuntary, bears the

image of the involuntary, and is therefore the more excusable of the two,

and should receive a gentler punishment.  The act of him who nurses his

wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more culpable.  The degree of

culpability depends on the presence or absence of intention, to which the

degree of punishment should correspond.  For the first kind of murder, that

which is done on a momentary impulse, let two years' exile be the penalty;

for the second, that which is accompanied with malice prepense, three. 

When the time of any one's exile has expired, the guardians shall send

twelve judges to the borders of the land, who shall have authority to

decide whether he may return or not.  He who after returning repeats the

offence, shall be exiled and return no more, and, if he return, shall be

put to death, like the stranger in a similar case.  He who in a fit of

anger kills his own slave, shall purify himself; and he who kills another

man's slave, shall pay to his master double the value.  Any one may proceed

against the offender if he appear in public places, not having been

purified; and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and

the homicide, and compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double

penalty.  If a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master,

in anger, the kinsmen of the murdered person may do with the murderer

whatever they please, but they must not spare his life.  If a father or

mother kill their son or daughter in anger, let the slayer remain in exile

for three years; and on the return of the exile let the parents separate,

and no longer continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred rites with those

whom he or she has deprived of a brother or sister.  The same penalty is

decreed against the husband who murders his wife, and also against the wife

who murders her husband.  Let them be absent three years, and on their

return never again share in the same sacred rites with their children, or

sit at the same table with them.  Nor is a brother or sister who have

lifted up their hands against a brother or sister, ever to come under the

same roof or share in the same rites with those whom they have robbed of a

child.  If a son feels such hatred against his father or mother as to take

the life of either of them, then, if the parent before death forgive him,

he shall only suffer the penalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be

unforgiven, there are many laws against which he has offended; he is guilty

of outrage, impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death

many times over.  For if the law will not allow a man to kill the authors

of his being even in self-defence, what other penalty than death can be

inflicted upon him who in a fit of passion wilfully slays his father or

mother?  If a brother kill a brother in self-defence during a civil broil,

or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a stranger, let

them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle.  But if a

slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide.  In all cases, however,

the forgiveness of the injured party shall acquit the agents; and then they

shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a year.



Enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed to

voluntary and premeditated actions.  The great source of voluntary crime is

the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education; and this arises

out of the false praise of riches, common both among Hellenes and

barbarians; they think that to be the first of goods which is really the

third.  For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but wealth for the

body, as the body is for the soul.  If this were better understood, the

crime of murder, of which avarice is the chief cause, would soon cease

among men.  Next to avarice, ambition is a source of crime, troublesome to

the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief men of the state.  And

next to ambition, base fear is a motive, which has led many an one to

commit murder in order that he may get rid of the witnesses of his crimes. 

Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments about crimes of violence;

and the tradition must not be forgotten, which tells that the murderer is

punished in the world below, and that when he returns to this world he

meets the fate which he has dealt out to others.  If a man is deterred by

the prelude and the fear of future punishment, he will have no need of the

law; but in case he disobey, let the law be declared against him as

follows:--He who of malice prepense kills one of his kindred, shall in the

first place be outlawed; neither temple, harbour, nor agora shall be

polluted by his presence.  And if a kinsman of the deceased refuse to

proceed against his slayer, he shall take the curse of pollution upon

himself, and also be liable to be prosecuted by any one who will avenge the

dead.  The prosecutor, however, must observe the customary ceremonial

before he proceeds against the offender.  The details of these observances

will be best determined by a conclave of prophets and interpreters and

guardians of the law, and the judges of the cause itself shall be the same

as in cases of sacrilege.  He who is convicted shall be punished with

death, and not be buried within the country of the murdered person.  He who

flies from the law shall undergo perpetual banishment; if he return, he may

be put to death with impunity by any relative of the murdered man or by any

other citizen, or bound and delivered to the magistrates.  He who accuses a

man of murder shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is

not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the day of

trial.  If a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall be tried in

the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the offender be a

citizen, his body after execution shall be buried within the land.



If a slave kill a freeman, either with his own hand or by contrivance, let

him be led either to the grave or to a place whence he can see the grave of

the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand of the

public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he survive he

shall be put to death.  If a slave be put out of the way to prevent his

informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like that of a

citizen.  If there are any of those horrible murders of kindred which

sometimes occur even in well-regulated societies, and of which the

legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will

repeat the old myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of

such atrocities.  The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he

has done:  if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children;

if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his

offspring in another age of the world.  Such a preamble may terrify him;

but if, notwithstanding, in some evil hour he murders father or mother or

brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as follows:--Him who

is convicted, the officers of the judges shall lead to a spot without the

city where three ways meet, and there slay him and expose his body naked;

and each of the magistrates shall cast a stone upon his head and justify

the city, and he shall be thrown unburied beyond the border.  But what

shall we say of him who takes the life which is dearest to him, that is to

say, his own; and this not from any disgrace or calamity, but from

cowardice and indolence?  The manner of his burial and the purification of

his crime is a matter for God and the interpreters to decide and for his

kinsmen to execute.  Let him, at any rate, be buried alone in some

uncultivated and nameless spot, and be without name or monument.  If a

beast kill a man, not in a public contest, let it be prosecuted for murder,

and after condemnation slain and cast without the border.  Also inanimate

things which have caused death, except in the case of lightning and other

visitations from heaven, shall be carried without the border.  If the body

of a dead man be found, and the murderer remain unknown, the trial shall

take place all the same, and the unknown murderer shall be warned not to

set foot in the temples or come within the borders of the land; if

discovered, he shall die, and his body shall be cast out.  A man is

justified in taking the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of

women or youth; and he may take the life of another with impunity in

defence of father, mother, brother, wife, or other relations.



The nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men have

been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which destroy life.

There remain maiming, wounding, and the like, which admit of a similar

division into voluntary and involuntary.  About this class of actions the

preamble shall be:  Whereas men would be like wild beasts unless they

obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care of the public

interests, which unite and preserve states, as private interests distract

them.  A man may know what is for the public good, but if he have absolute

power, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure instead of virtue, and

so darkness will come over his soul and over the state.  If he had mind, he

would have no need of law; for mind is the perfection of law.  But such a

freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is hardly to be found; and therefore

law and order are necessary, which are the second-best, and they regulate

things as they exist in part only, but cannot take in the whole.  For

actions have innumerable characteristics, which must be partly determined

by the law and partly left to the judge.  The judge must determine the

fact; and to him also the punishment must sometimes be left.  What shall

the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge?  A city is

unfortunate in which the tribunals are either secret and speechless, or,

what is worse, noisy and public, when the people, as if they were in a

theatre, clap and hoot the various speakers.  Such courts a legislator

would rather not have; but if he is compelled to have them, he will speak

distinctly, and leave as little as possible to their discretion.  But where

the courts are good, and presided over by well-trained judges, the

penalties to be inflicted may be in a great measure left to them; and as

there are to be good courts among our colonists, we need not determine

beforehand the exact proportion of the penalty and the crime.  Returning,

then, to our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall

run as follows:--He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his

object, shall be tried as if he had succeeded.  But since God has favoured

both him and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed

to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the

sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be the

same as would have tried the case if death had ensued.  If a child should

intentionally wound a parent, or a servant his master, or brother or sister

wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty shall be death. 

If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to kill, the penalty

which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile; and if they have

young children, the guardians shall take care of them and administer their

property as if they were orphans.  If they have no children, their kinsmen

male and female shall meet, and after a consultation with the priests and

guardians of the law, shall appoint an heir of the house; for the house and

family belong to the state, being a 5040th portion of the whole.  And the

state is bound to preserve her families happy and holy; therefore, when the

heir of a house has committed a capital offence, or is in exile for life,

the house is to be purified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the

guardians of the law are to find out a family which has a good name and in

which there are many sons, and introduce one of them to be the heir and

priest of the house.  He shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the

family, while the first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out.



Some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary.  Those

done from anger are of this class.  If a man wound another in anger, let

him pay double the damage, if the injury is curable; or fourfold, if

curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold, if incurable;

the amount is to be assessed by the judges.  If the wounded person is

rendered incapable of military service, the injurer, besides the other

penalties, shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit for refusing to

serve.  If brother wounds brother, then their parents and kindred, of both

sexes, shall meet and judge the crime.  The damages shall be assessed by

the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is disputed, an appeal shall

be made to the male kindred; or in the last resort to the guardians of the

law.  Parents who wound their children are to be tried by judges of at

least sixty years of age, who have children of their own; and they are to

determine whether death, or some lesser punishment, is to be inflicted upon

them--no relatives are to take part in the trial.  If a slave in anger

smite a freeman, he is to be delivered up by his master to the injured

person.  If the master suspect collusion between the slave and the injured

person, he may bring the matter to trial:  and if he fail he shall pay

three times the injury; or if he obtain a conviction, the contriver of the

conspiracy shall be liable to an action for kidnapping.  He who wounds

another unintentionally shall only pay for the actual harm done.



In all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded than

the younger.  An injury done by a younger man to an elder is abominable and

hateful; but the younger man who is struck by an elder is to bear with him

patiently, considering that he who is twenty years older is loco parentis,

and remembering the reverence which is due to the Gods who preside over

birth.  Let him keep his hands, too, from the stranger; instead of taking

upon himself to chastise him when he is insolent, he shall bring him before

the wardens of the city, who shall examine into the case, and if they find

him guilty, shall scourge him with as many blows as he has given; or if he

be innocent, they shall warn and threaten his accuser.  When an equal

strikes an equal, whether an old man an old man, or a young man a young

man, let them use only their fists and have no weapons.  He who being above

forty years of age commences a fight, or retaliates, shall be counted mean

and base.



To this preamble, let the law be added:  If a man smite another who is his

elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be older than

the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the person struck, or

of the same age with him, let him defend him as he would a father or

brother; and let the striker be brought to trial, and if convicted

imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of the judges.  If a

stranger smite one who is his elder by twenty years or more, he shall be

imprisoned for two years, and a metic, in like case, shall suffer three

years' imprisonment.  He who is standing by and gives no assistance, shall

be punished according to his class in one of four penalties--a mina, fifty,

thirty, twenty drachmas.  The generals and other superior officers of the

army shall form the court which tries this class of offences.



Laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may be no

need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not be

hindered from crime.  The uttermost penalty will fall upon those who lay

violent hands upon a parent, having no fear of the Gods above, or of the

punishments which will pursue them in the world below.  They are too wise

in their own conceits to believe in such things:  wherefore the tortures

which await them in another life must be anticipated in this.  Let the law

be as follows:--



If a man, being in his right mind, dare to smite his father and mother, or

his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the rescue; and

if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he shall have the

first place at the games; or if he do not come to the rescue, he shall be a

perpetual exile.  Let the citizen in the like case be praised or blamed,

and the slave receive freedom or a hundred stripes.  The wardens of the

agora, the city, or the country, as the case may be, shall see to the

execution of the law.  And he who is an inhabitant of the same place and is

present shall come to the rescue, or he shall fall under a curse.



If a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished for

ever from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred

rites; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of the

country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death.  If any

freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he returns to the

city.  If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let the

bystander be obliged to seize and deliver him into the hands of the injured

person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he pleases, and shall

then return him to his master.  The law will be as follows:--The slave who

strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master, and not set at liberty

without the consent of the person whom he has injured.  All these laws

apply to women as well as to men.



BOOK X.  The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the

greatest of all are committed against public temples; they are in the

second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in the

third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree, when

they are done against the authority or property of the rulers; in the fifth

degree, when the rights of individuals are violated.  Most of these

offences have been already considered; but there remains the question of

admonition and punishment of offences against the Gods.  Let the admonition

be in the following terms:--No man who ever intentionally did or said

anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the Gods; but

either he thought that there were no Gods, or that they did not care about

men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers.  'What

shall we say or do to such persons?'  My good sir, let us first hear the

jests which they in their superiority will make upon us.  'What will they

say?'  Probably something of this kind:--'Strangers you are right in

thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of the Gods; while

others assert that they do not care for us, and others that they are

propitiated by prayers and offerings.  But we want you to argue with us

before you threaten; you should prove to us by reasonable evidence that

there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed.  Poets, priests,

prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak to us of atoning for

evil, and not of avoiding it.  From legislators who profess to be gentle we

ask for instruction, which may, at least, have the persuasive power of

truth, if no other.'  What have you to say?  'Well, there is no difficulty

in proving the being of the Gods.  The sun, and earth, and stars, moving in

their courses, the recurring seasons, furnish proofs of their existence;

and there is the general opinion of mankind.'  I fear that the unbelievers-

-not that I care for their opinion--will despise us.  You are not aware

that their impiety proceeds, not from sensuality, but from ignorance taking

the garb of wisdom.  'What do you mean?'  At Athens there are tales current

both in prose and verse of a kind which are not tolerated in a well-

regulated state like yours.  The oldest of them relate the origin of the

world, and the birth and life of the Gods.  These narratives have a bad

influence on family relations; but as they are old we will let them pass,

and consider another kind of tales, invented by the wisdom of a younger

generation, who, if any one argues for the existence of the Gods and claims

that the stars have a divine being, insist that these are mere earth and

stones, which can have no care of human things, and that all theology is a

cooking up of words.  Now what course ought we to take?  Shall we suppose

some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods, and

make a defence?  Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the laws? 

'There is no hurry, and we have often said that the shorter and worse

method should not be preferred to the longer and better.  The proof that

there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the best

preamble of all our laws.'  Come, let us talk with the impious, who have

been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and have

heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking with the

Gods as if they were absolutely convinced of their existence; who have seen

mankind prostrate in prayer at the rising and setting of the sun and moon

and at every turn of fortune, and have dared to despise and disbelieve all

this.  Can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us to argue on

such a theme?  We must; or like them we shall go mad, though with more

reason.  Let us select one of them and address him as follows:



O my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many of

your opinions.  Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the divine

nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know.  You and your

friends are not the first or the only persons who have had these notions

about the Gods.  There are always a considerable number who are infected by

them:  I have known many myself, and can assure you that no one who was an

unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in denying the

existence of the Gods.  The two other opinions, first, that the Gods exist

and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for men, but may be

propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last through life in a

few instances, but even this is not common.  I would beg of you to be

patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and others; in the mean time

abstain from impiety.  'So far, our discourse has gone well.'



I will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the

crown of philosophy.  They affirm that all things come into being either by

art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by nature and

chance, and the lesser things by art, which receiving from nature the

greater creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are

termed works of art.  Their meaning is that fire, water, earth, and air all

exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of these,

according to certain chance affinities of opposites, the sun, the moon, the

stars, and the earth have been framed, not by any action of mind, but by

nature and chance only.  Thus, in their opinion, the heaven and earth were

created, as well as the animals and plants.  Art came later, and is of

mortal birth; by her power were invented certain images and very partial

imitations of the truth, of which kind are the creations of musicians and

painters:  but they say that there are other arts which combine with

nature, and have a deeper truth, such as medicine, husbandry, gymnastic. 

Also the greater part of politics they imagine to co-operate with nature,

but in a less degree, having more of art, while legislation is declared by

them to be wholly a work of art.  'How do you mean?'  In the first place,

they say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws

of states, which are different in different countries; and that virtue is

one thing by nature and another by convention; and that justice is

altogether conventional, made by law, and having authority for the moment

only.  This is repeated to young men by sages and poets, and leads to

impiety, and the pretended life according to nature and in disobedience to

law; for nobody believes the Gods to be such as the law affirms.  'How

true! and oh! how injurious to states and to families!'  But then, what

should the lawgiver do?  Should he stand up in the state and threaten

mankind with the severest penalties if they persist in their unbelief,

while he makes no attempt to win them by persuasion?  'Nay, Stranger, the

legislator ought never to weary of trying to persuade the world that there

are Gods; and he should declare that law and art exist by nature.'  Yes,

Cleinias; but these are difficult and tedious questions.  'And shall our

patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, fail

now that we are discoursing about the Gods?  There may be a difficulty in

framing laws, but when written down they remain, and time and diligence

will make them clear; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor

religion in rejecting them on account of their length.'  Most true.  And

the general spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do

something in vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad

men.  'He should.'  You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists

in supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things. 

These the heretics call nature, conceiving them to be prior to the soul. 

'I agree.'  You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source

of this impiety--the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way.  'In what

way do you mean?'  The error consists in transposing first and second

causes.  They do not see that the soul is before the body, and before all

other things, and the author and ruler of them all.  And if the soul is

prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior to the things of

the body.  In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art, law, are prior to

sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of creation are the

results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature, as they are

improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent.  'Why do you say

"improperly"?'  Because when they speak of nature they seem to mean the

first creative power.  But if the soul is first, and not fire and air, then

the soul above all things may be said to exist by nature.  And this can

only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body.  Shall we

try to prove that it is so?  'By all means.'  I fear that the greenness of

our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages.  But

as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, I will first

attempt to cross by myself, and if I arrive at the bank, you shall follow. 

Remembering that you are unaccustomed to such discussions, I will ask and

answer the questions myself, while you listen in safety.  But first I must

pray the Gods to assist at the demonstration of their own existence--if

ever we are to call upon them, now is the time.  Let me hold fast to the

rope, and enter into the depths:  Shall I put the question to myself in

this form?--Are all things at rest, and is nothing in motion? or are some

things in motion, and some things at rest?  'The latter.'  And do they move

and rest, some in one place, some in more?  'Yes.'  There may be (1) motion

in the same place, as in revolution on an axis, which is imparted swiftly

to the larger and slowly to the lesser circle; and there may be motion in

different places, having sometimes (2) one centre of motion and sometimes

(3) more.  (4) When bodies in motion come against other bodies which are at

rest, they are divided by them, and (5) when they are caught between other

bodies coming from opposite directions they unite with them; and (6) they

grow by union and (7) waste by dissolution while their constitution remains

the same, but are (8) destroyed when their constitution fails.  There is a

growth from one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then

becomes perceptible to sense; this process is called generation, and the

opposite, destruction.  We have now enumerated all possible motions with

the exception of two.  'What are they?'  Just the two with which our

enquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul.  There is one

kind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another

which can move itself as well, working in composition and decomposition, by

increase and diminution, by generation and destruction.  'Granted.'  (9)

That which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of motion; (10)

that which is self-moved and moves others is the tenth.  And this tenth

kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and is followed

by that which was improperly called the ninth.  'How do you mean?'  Must

not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved

by itself?  Nothing can be affected by any transition prior to self-motion. 

Then the first and eldest principle of motion, whether in things at rest or

not at rest, will be the principle of self-motion; and that which is moved

by others and can move others will be the second.  'True.'  Let me ask

another question:



What is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any

material substance?  'Life.'  And soul too is life?  'Very good.'  And are

there not three kinds of knowledge--a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2) of

the definition, (3) of the name?  And sometimes the name leads us to ask

the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name.  For example,

number can be divided into equal parts, and when thus divided is termed

even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' refer to the same

thing.  'Very true.'  And what is the definition of the thing which is

named 'soul'?  Must we not reply, 'The self-moved'?  And have we not proved

that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things?  'Yes.'  And

the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this?  'True.'  And

if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior and superior to

the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul?  'Quite

right.'  And we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things

of the soul were prior to the things of the body?  'Certainly.'  And

therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true opinions, and

recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and force of bodies. 

'To be sure.'  In the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause

of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of all

things?  'Certainly.'  And the soul which orders all things must also order

the heavens?  'Of course.'  One soul or more?  More; for less than two are

inconceivable, one good, the other evil.  'Most true.'  The soul directs

all things by her movements, which we call will, consideration, attention,

deliberation, opinion true and false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred,

love, and similar affections.  These are the primary movements, and they

receive the secondary movements of bodies, and guide all things to increase

and diminution, separation and union, and to all the qualities which

accompany them--cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet,

bitter; these and other such qualities the soul, herself a goddess, uses,

when truly receiving the divine mind she leads all things rightly to their

happiness; but under the impulse of folly she works out an opposite result.

For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the world is

either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul, working in

them.  'What do you mean?'  If we say that the whole course and motion of

heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and reasonings of mind,

clearly the best soul must have the care of the heaven, and guide it along

that better way.  'True.'  But if the heavens move wildly and disorderly,

then they must be under the guidance of the evil soul.  'True again.'  What

is the nature of the movement of the soul?  We must not suppose that we can

see and know the soul with our bodily eyes, any more than we can fix them

on the midday sun; it will be safer to look at an image only.  'How do you

mean?'  Let us find among the ten kinds of motion an image of the motion of

the mind.  You remember, as we said, that all things are divided into two

classes; and some of them were moved and some at rest.  'Yes.'  And of

those which were moved, some were moved in the same place, others in more

places than one.  'Just so.'  The motion which was in one place was

circular, like the motion of a spherical body; and such a motion in the

same place, and in the same relations, is an excellent image of the motion

of mind.  'Very true.'  The motion of the other sort, which has no fixed

place or manner or relation or order or proportion, is akin to folly and

nonsense.  'Very true.'  After what has been said, it is clear that, since

the soul carries round all things, some soul which is either very good or

the opposite carries round the circumference of heaven.  But that soul can

be no other than the best.  Again, the soul carries round the sun, moon,

and stars, and if the sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is

within and moves the sun as the human soul moves the body; or, secondly,

the sun is contained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides

and through which she operates; or, thirdly, the course of the sun is

guided by the soul acting in a wonderful manner without a body.  'Yes, in

one of those ways the soul must guide all things.'  And this soul of the

sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or

employing any other agency, is by every man called a God?  'Yes, by every

man who has any sense.'  And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in like

manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they derive

their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner of their

working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods.  'No one.'  And

now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there are Gods. 

Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all things, or he

must live for the future in the belief that there are Gods.



Next, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge

that they take care of human things--let him too have a word of admonition.

'Best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the Gods leads you to

honour them and to believe in them.  But you have heard the happiness of

wicked men sung by poets and admired by the world, and this has drawn you

away from your natural piety.  Or you have seen the wicked growing old in

prosperity, and leaving great offices to their children; or you have

watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of crime; and considering all

these things you have been led to believe in an irrational way that the

Gods take no care of human affairs.  That your error may not increase, I

will endeavour to purify your soul.'  Do you, Megillus and Cleinias, make

answer for the youth, and when we come to a difficulty, I will carry you

over the water as I did before.  'Very good.'  He will easily be convinced

that the Gods care for the small as well as the great; for he heard what

was said of their goodness and of their having all things under their care.

'He certainly heard.'  Then now let us enquire what is meant by the virtue

of the Gods.  To possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice.

'That is what we say.'  And is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice

of vice?  'Certainly.'  And to the Gods we ascribe virtues; but idleness

and indolence are not virtues.  'Of course not.'  And is God to be

conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, such as the poet would compare

to a stingless drone?  'Impossible.'  Can we be right in praising any one

who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take care of

themselves?  Whether God or man, he who does so, must either think the

neglect of such matters to be of no consequence, or he is indolent and

careless.  For surely neither of them can be charged with neglect if they

fail to attend to something which is beyond their power?  'Certainly not.'



And now we will examine the two classes of offenders who admit that there

are Gods, but say,--the one that they may be appeased, the other that they

take no care of small matters:  do they not acknowledge that the Gods are

omnipotent and omniscient, and also good and perfect?  'Certainly.'  Then

they cannot be indolent, for indolence is the offspring of idleness, and

idleness of cowardice, and there is no cowardice in God.  'True.'  If the

Gods neglect small matters, they must either know or not know that such

things are not to be regarded.  But of course they know that they should be

regarded, and knowing, they cannot be supposed to neglect their duty,

overcome by the seductions of pleasure or pain.  'Impossible.'  And do not

all human things share in soul, and is not man the most religious of

animals and the possession of the Gods?  And the Gods, who are the best of

owners, will surely take care of their property, small or great.  Consider

further, that the greater the power of perception, the less the power of

action.  For it is harder to see and hear the small than the great, but

easier to control them.  Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient--

would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little?

'Impossible.'  Is not life made up of littles?--the pilot, general,

householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder will

tell you that large stones do not lie well without small ones.  And God is

not inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their skill are

careful in the details of their work; we must not imagine the best and

wisest to be a lazy good-for-nothing, who wearies of his work and hurries

over small and easy matters.  'Never, never!'  He who charges the Gods with

neglect has been forced to admit his error; but I should like further to

persuade him that the author of all has made every part for the sake of the

whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed state of action or

passion, and that the least action or passion of any part has a presiding

minister.  You, we say to him, are a minute fraction of this universe,

created with a view to the whole; the world is not made for you, but you

for the world; for the good artist considers the whole first, and

afterwards the parts.  And you are annoyed at not seeing how you and the

universe are all working together for the best, so far as the laws of the

common creation admit.  The soul undergoes many changes from her contact

with bodies; and all that the player does is to put the pieces into their

right places.  'What do you mean?'  I mean that God acts in the way which

is simplest and easiest.  Had each thing been formed without any regard to

the rest, the transposition of the Cosmos would have been endless; but now

there is not much trouble in the government of the world.  For when the

king saw the actions of the living souls and bodies, and the virtue and

vice which were in them, and the indestructibility of the soul and body

(although they were not eternal), he contrived so to arrange them that

virtue might conquer and vice be overcome as far as possible; giving them a

seat and room adapted to them, but leaving the direction of their separate

actions to men's own wills, which make our characters to be what they are.

'That is very probable.'  All things which have a soul possess in

themselves the principle of change, and in changing move according to fate

and law; natures which have undergone lesser changes move on the surface;

but those which have changed utterly for the worse, sink into Hades and the

infernal world.  And in all great changes for good and evil which are

produced either by the will of the soul or the influence of others, there

is a change of place.  The good soul, which has intercourse with the divine

nature, passes into a holier and better place; and the evil soul, as she

grows worse, changes her place for the worse.  This,--as we declare to the

youth who fancies that he is neglected of the Gods,--is the law of divine

justice--the worse to the worse, the better to the better, like to like, in

life and in death.  And from this law no man will ever boast that he has

escaped.  Even if you say--'I am small, and will creep into the earth,' or

'I am high, and will mount to heaven'--you are not so small or so high that

you shall not pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below.

This is also the explanation of the seeming prosperity of the wicked, in

whose actions as in a mirror you imagined that you saw the neglect of the

Gods, not considering that they make all things contribute to the whole. 

And how then could you form any idea of true happiness?--If Cleinias and

Megillus and I have succeeded in persuading you that you know not what you

say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still any deficiency

of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent.



Enough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us; that

they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts, is not to be allowed

or admitted for an instant.  'Let us proceed with the argument.'  Tell me,

by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us?  Are they not

rulers, who may be compared to charioteers, pilots, perhaps generals, or

physicians providing against the assaults of disease, husbandmen observing

the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their flocks?  To whom shall

we compare them?  We acknowledged that the world is full both of good and

evil, but having more of evil than of good.  There is an immortal conflict

going on, in which Gods and demigods are our allies, and we their property;

for injustice and folly and wickedness make war in our souls upon justice

and temperance and wisdom.  There is little virtue to be found on earth;

and evil natures fawn upon the Gods, like wild beasts upon their keepers,

and believe that they can win them over by flattery and prayers.  And this

sin, which is termed dishonesty, is to the soul what disease is to the

body, what pestilence is to the seasons, what injustice is to states. 

'Quite so.'  And they who maintain that the Gods can be appeased must say

that they forgive the sins of men, if they are allowed to share in their

spoils; as you might suppose wolves to mollify the dogs by throwing them a

portion of the prey.  'That is the argument.'  But let us apply our images

to the Gods--are they the pilots who are won by gifts to wreck their own

ships--or the charioteers who are bribed to lose the race--or the generals,

or doctors, or husbandmen, who are perverted from their duty--or the dogs

who are silenced by wolves?  'God forbid.'  Are they not rather our best

guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate

degree of human or even canine virtue, which will not betray justice for

reward?  'Impossible.'  He, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is the

most blasphemous of mankind.



And now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there are

Gods, (2) that they care for men, (3) that they cannot be bribed to do

injustice.  I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of theirs

should lead to a perversion of life.  And our warmth will not have been in

vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate themselves,

and to change their ways.  'So let us hope.'  Then now that the preamble is

completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the impious to renounce

their evil ways; and in case they refuse, the law shall be added:--If a man

is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let the bystander inform the

magistrates, and let the magistrates bring the offender before the court;

and if any of the magistrates refuses to act, he likewise shall be tried

for impiety.  Any one who is found guilty of such an offence shall be fined

at the discretion of the court, and shall also be punished by a term of

imprisonment.  There shall be three prisons--one for common offences

against life and property; another, near by the spot where the Nocturnal

Council will assemble, which is to be called the 'House of Reformation';

the third, to be situated in some desolate region in the centre of the

country, shall be called by a name indicating retribution.  There are three

causes of impiety, and from each of them spring impieties of two kinds, six

in all.  First, there is the impiety of those who deny the existence of the

Gods; these may be honest men, haters of evil, who are only dangerous

because they talk loosely about the Gods and make others like themselves;

but there is also a more vicious class, who are full of craft and

licentiousness.  To this latter belong diviners, jugglers, despots,

demagogues, generals, hierophants of private mysteries, and sophists.  The

first class shall be only imprisoned and admonished.  The second class

should be put to death, if they could be, many times over.  The two other

sorts of impiety, first of those who deny the care of the Gods, and

secondly, of those who affirm that they may be propitiated, have similar

subdivisions, varying in degree of guilt.  Those who have learnt to

blaspheme from mere ignorance shall be imprisoned in the House of

Reformation for five years at least, and not allowed to see any one but

members of the Nocturnal Council, who shall converse with them touching

their souls health.  If any of the prisoners come to their right mind, at

the end of five years let them be restored to sane company; but he who

again offends shall die.  As to that class of monstrous natures who not

only believe that the Gods are negligent, or may be propitiated, but

pretend to practise on the souls of quick and dead, and promise to charm

the Gods, and to effect the ruin of houses and states--he, I say, who is

guilty of these things, shall be bound in the central prison, and shall

have no intercourse with any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of

food from the public slaves; and when he dies, let him be cast beyond the

border; and if any freeman assist to bury him, he shall be liable to a suit

for impiety.  But the sins of the father shall not be visited upon his

children, who, like other orphans, shall be educated by the state. 

Further, let there be a general law which will have a tendency to repress

impiety.  No man shall have religious services in his house, but he shall

go with his friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples.  The reason of

this is, that religious institutions can only be framed by a great

intelligence.  But women and weak men are always consecrating the event of

the moment; they are under the influence of dreams and apparitions, and

they build altars and temples in every village and in any place where they

have had a vision.  The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter

men from attempting to propitiate the Gods by secret sacrifices, which only

multiply their sins.  Therefore let the law run:--No one shall have private

religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been previously noted

for any impiety offend in this way, let them be admonished to remove their

rites to a public temple; but if the offender be one of the obstinate sort,

he shall be brought to trial before the guardians, and if he be found

guilty, let him die.



BOOK XI.  As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is

simple--Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and shalt do to others as

thou wouldst that they should do to thee.  First, of treasure trove:--May I

never desire to find, or lift, if I find, or be induced by the counsel of

diviners to lift, a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has laid

down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in virtue.  The

saying, 'Move not the immovable,' may be repeated in a new sense; and there

is a common belief which asserts that such deeds prevent a man from having

a family.  To him who is careless of such consequences, and, despising the

word of the wise, takes up a treasure which is not his--what will be done

by the hand of the Gods, God only knows,--but I would have the first person

who sees the offender, inform the wardens of the city or the country; and

they shall send to Delphi for a decision, and whatever the oracle orders,

they shall carry out.  If the informer be a freeman, he shall be honoured,

and if a slave, set free; but he who does not inform, if he be a freeman,

shall be dishonoured, and if a slave, shall be put to death.  If a man

leave anywhere anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally,

let him who may find the property deem the deposit sacred to the Goddess of

ways.  And he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be beaten

with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be held to have

done a dishonourable action.  If a person says that another has something

of his, and the other allows that he has the property in dispute, but

maintains it to be his own, let the ownership be proved out of the

registers of property.  If the property is registered as belonging to some

one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who offers sufficient

security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property is not registered,

let it remain with the three eldest magistrates, and if it should be an

animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep.  A man may arrest

his own slave, and he may also imprison for safe-keeping the runaway slave

of a friend.  Any one interfering with him must produce three sureties;

otherwise, he will be liable to an action for violence, and if he be cast,

must pay a double amount of damages to him from whom he has taken the

slave.  A freedman who does not pay due respect to his patron, may also be

seized.  Due respect consists in going three times a month to the house of

his patron, and offering to perform any lawful service for him; he must

also marry as his master pleases; and if his property be greater than his

master's, he must hand over to him the excess.  A freedman may not remain

in the state, except with the consent of the magistrates and of his master,

for more than twenty years; and whenever his census exceeds that of the

third class, he must in any case leave the country within thirty days,

taking his property with him.  If he break this regulation, the penalty

shall be death, and his property shall be confiscated.  Suits about these

matters are to be decided in the courts of the tribes, unless the parties

have settled the matter before a court of neighbours or before arbiters. 

If anybody claim a beast, or anything else, let the possessor refer to the

seller or giver of the property within thirty days, if the latter reside in

the city, or, if the goods have been received from a stranger, within five

months, of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice.  All

purchases and exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the

spot; the law will not allow credit to be given.  No law shall protect the

money subscribed for clubs.  He who sells anything of greater value than

fifty drachmas shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his

whereabouts be known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation.  When a

slave is sold who is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible

disorder, the buyer, if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned,

shall have no redress; but in other cases within six months, or within

twelve months in epileptic disorders, he may bring the matter before a jury

of physicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses

the suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the price; or if he be a

private person, the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall simply refund. 

If a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is informed of his

character, there is no redress.  But if the judges--who are to be the five

youngest guardians of the law--decide that the purchaser was not aware,

then the seller is to pay threefold, and to purify the house of the buyer.



He who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant either

of them to be sound and good.  As in the case of other laws, let us have a

preamble, relating to all this class of crime.  Adulteration is a kind of

falsehood about which the many commonly say that at proper times the

practice may often be right, but they do not define at what times.  But the

legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the Gods when he is

practising deceit or fraud, in word or deed.  For he is the enemy of

heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods by whom he

swears, and secondly, he who lies to his superiors.  (Now the superiors are

the betters of inferiors,--the elder of the younger, parents of children,

men of women, and rulers of subjects.)  The trader who cheats in the agora

is a liar and is perjured--he respects neither the name of God nor the

regulations of the magistrates.  If after hearing this he will still be

dishonest, let him listen to the law:--The seller shall not have two prices

on the same day, neither must he puff his goods, nor offer to swear about

them.  If he break the law, any citizen not less than thirty years of age

may smite him.  If he sell adulterated goods, the slave or metic who

informs against him shall have the goods; the citizen who brings such a

charge, if he prove it, shall offer up the goods in question to the Gods of

the agora; or if he fail to prove it, shall be dishonoured.  He who is

detected in selling adulterated goods shall be deprived of them, and shall

receive a stripe for every drachma of their value.  The wardens of the

agora and the guardians of the law shall take experienced persons into

counsel, and draw up regulations for the agora.  These shall be inscribed

on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora.--As to the

wardens of the city, enough has been said already.  But if any omissions in

the law are afterwards discovered, the wardens and the guardians shall

supply them, and have them inscribed after the original regulations on a

column before the court of the wardens of the city.



Next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their natural

use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a benefactor who

reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion.  Money is the

instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keeper, the

merchant, and hotel-keeper do but supply the wants and equalize the

possessions of mankind.  Why, then, does any dishonour attach to a

beneficent occupation?  Let us consider the nature of the accusation first,

and then see whether it can be removed.  'What is your drift?'  Dear

Cleinias, there are few men who are so gifted by nature, and improved by

education, as to be able to control the desire of making money; or who are

sober in their wishes and prefer moderation to accumulation.  The great

majority think that they can never have enough, and the consequence is that

retail trade has become a reproach.  Whereas, however ludicrous the idea

may seem, if noble men and noble women could be induced to open a shop, and

to trade upon incorruptible principles, then the aspect of things would

change, and retail traders would be regarded as nursing fathers and

mothers.  In our own day the trader goes and settles in distant places, and

receives the weary traveller hospitably at first, but in the end treats him

as an enemy and a captive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. 

This is what has brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the

legislator ought to provide.  Men have said of old, that to fight against

two opponents is hard; and the two opponents of whom I am thinking are

wealth and poverty--the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through

misery, depriving them of the sense of shame.  What remedies can a city

find for this disease?  First, to have as few retail traders as possible;

secondly, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not

injure the state; and thirdly, to restrain the insolence and meanness of

the retailers.



Let us make the following laws:--(1) In the city of the Magnetes none of

the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to any

private persons who do not equally serve him, except to his father and

mother and their fathers and mothers, and generally to his elders who are

freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman.  He who follows an illiberal

pursuit may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept in bonds for a

year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two years; and for

every offence his punishment shall be doubled:  (2) Every retailer shall be

a metic or a foreigner:  (3) The guardians of the law shall have a special

care of this part of the community, whose calling exposes them to peculiar

temptations.  They shall consult with persons of experience, and find out

what prices will yield the traders a moderate profit, and fix them.



When a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or other

impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the tribes, if

not previously settled by arbitration.  The class of artisans is

consecrated to Hephaestus and Athene; the makers of weapons to Ares and

Athene:  all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors, should

be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft.  If any man is lazy

in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, foolish fellow, that his patron

God will not deal hardly with him, he will be punished by the God; and let

the law follow:--He who fails in his undertaking shall pay the value, and

do the work gratis in a specified time.  The contractor, like the seller,

is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his work; in a free city,

art should be a true thing, and the artist must not practise on the

ignorance of others.  On the other hand, he who has ordered any work and

does not pay the workman according to agreement, dishonours Zeus and

Athene, and breaks the bonds of society.  And if he does not pay at the

time agreed, let him pay double; and although interest is forbidden in

other cases, let the workman receive after the expiration of a year

interest at the rate of an obol a month for every drachma (equal to 200 per

cent. per ann.).  And we may observe by the way, in speaking of craftsmen,

that if our military craft do their work well, the state will praise those

who honour them, and blame those who do not honour them.  Not that the

first place of honour is to be assigned to the warrior; a higher still is

reserved for those who obey the laws.



Most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the

exception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships.  These lead us to

speak of the intentions of the dying, about which we must make regulations. 

I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to dispose of their property as

they please, in ways at variance with one another and with law and custom. 

But a dying person is a strange being, and is not easily managed; he wants

to be master of all he has, and is apt to use angry words.  He will say,--

'May I not do what I will with my own, and give much to my friends, and

little to my enemies?'  'There is reason in that.'  O Cleinias, in my

judgment the older lawgivers were too soft-hearted, and wanting  in insight

into human affairs.  They were too ready to listen to the outcry of a dying

man, and hence they were induced to give him an absolute power of bequest.

But I would say to him:--O creature of a day, you know neither what is

yours nor yourself:  for you and your property are not your own, but belong

to your whole family, past and to come, and property and family alike

belong to the State.  And therefore I must take out of your hands the

charge of what you leave behind you, with a view to the interests of all. 

And I hope that you will not quarrel with us, now that you are going the

way of all mankind; we will do our best for you and yours when you are no

longer here.  Let this be our address to the living and dying, and let the

law be as follows:--The father who has sons shall appoint one of them to be

the heir of the lot; and if he has given any other son to be adopted by

another, the adoption shall also be recorded; and if he has still a son who

has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony, he may give him what he

has more than the lot; or if he has more than one son unprovided for, he

may divide the money between them.  A son who has a house of his own, and a

daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of money; and

the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires another, is to

bequeath the new inheritance to the next of kin.  If a man have only

daughters, he may adopt the husband of any one of them; or if he have lost

a son, let him make mention of the circumstance in his will and adopt

another.  If he have no children, he may give away a tenth of his acquired

property to whomsoever he likes; but he must adopt an heir to inherit the

lot, and may leave the remainder to him.  Also he may appoint guardians for

his children; or if he die without appointing them or without making a

will, the nearest kinsmen,--two on the father's and two on the mother's

side,--and one friend of the departed, shall be appointed guardians.  The

fifteen eldest guardians of the law are to have special charge of all

orphans, the whole number of fifteen being divided into bodies of three,

who will succeed one another according to seniority every year for five

years.  If a man dying intestate leave daughters, he must pardon the law

which marries them for looking, first to kinship, and secondly to the

preservation of the lot.  The legislator cannot regard the character of the

heir, which to the father is the first consideration.  The law will

therefore run as follows:--If the intestate leave daughters, husbands are

to be found for them among their kindred according to the following table

of affinity:  first, their father's brothers; secondly, the sons of their

father's brothers; thirdly, of their father's sisters; fourthly, their

great-uncles; fifthly, the sons of a great-uncle; sixthly, the sons of a

great-aunt.  The kindred in such cases shall always be reckoned in this

way; the relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters

and brothers' and sisters' children, and first the male line must be taken

and then the female.  If there is a dispute in regard to fitness of age for

marriage, this the judge shall decide, after having made an inspection of

the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the waist.  If the maiden

has no relations within the degree of third cousin, she may choose whom she

likes, with the consent of her guardians; or she may even select some one

who has gone to a colony, and he, if he be a kinsman, will take the lot by

law; if not, he must have her guardians' consent, as well as hers.  When a

man dies without children and without a will, let a young man and a young

woman go forth from the family and take up their abode in the desolate

house.  The woman shall be selected from the kindred in the following order

of succession:--first, a sister of the deceased; second, a brother's

daughter; third, a sister's daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a

daughter of a father's brother; sixth, a daughter of a father's sister. 

For the man the same order shall be observed as in the preceding case.  The

legislator foresees that laws of this kind will sometimes press heavily,

and that his intention cannot always be fulfilled; as for example, when

there are mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to

marry.  But he must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the

general principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of

individuals; and he is willing to allow, in like manner, that the

individual cannot always do what the lawgiver wishes.  And then arbiters

must be chosen, who will determine equitably the cases which may arise

under the law:  e.g. a rich cousin may sometimes desire a grander match, or

the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a madwoman. 

To meet such cases let the following law be enacted:--If any one comes

forward and says that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would not have

required the carrying out of the law in a particular case, let him go to

the fifteen eldest guardians of the law who have the care of orphans; but

if he thinks that too much power is thus given to them, he may bring the

case before the court of select judges.



Thus will orphans have a second birth.  In order to make their sad

condition as light as possible, the guardians of the law shall be their

parents, and shall be admonished to take care of them.  And what admonition

can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave, that the

souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs?  About this there are many

ancient traditions, which may be taken on trust from the legislator.  Let

men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly, the souls of the

departed, who naturally care for their own descendants; thirdly, the aged

living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family duties, especially

in the case of orphans.  For they are the holiest and most sacred of all

deposits, and the peculiar care of guardians and magistrates; and those who

try to bring them up well will contribute to their own good and to that of

their families.  He who listens to the preamble of the law will never know

the severity of the legislator; but he who disobeys, and injures the

orphan, will pay twice the penalty he would have paid if the parents had

been alive.  More laws might have been made about orphans, did we not

suppose that the guardians have children and property of their own which

are protected by the laws; and the duty of the guardian in our state is the

same as that of a father, though his honour or disgrace is greater.  A

legal admonition and threat may, however, be of service:  the guardian of

the orphan and the guardian of the law who is over him, shall love the

orphan as their own children, and take more care of his or her property

than of their own.  If the guardian of the child neglect his duty, the

guardian of the law shall fine him; and the guardian may also have the

magistrate tried for neglect in the court of select judges, and he shall

pay, if convicted, a double penalty.  Further, the guardian of the orphan

who is careless or dishonest may be fined on the information of any of the

citizens in a fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the

prosecutor of the suit.  When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he

has been ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five

years, and the penalty shall be fixed by the court.  Or if the magistrate

has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have

defrauded him, he shall make compensation and also be deposed from his

office of guardian of the law.



If irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father may

want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for imbecility: 

such violent separations only take place when the family are 'a bad lot';

if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do not grow to so

great a height.  But here arises a difficulty.  Although in any other state

a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a citizen, in ours he does;

for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040.  And therefore he who is to

suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured, not only by his father, but by

the whole family.  The law, then, should run as follows:--If any man's evil

fortune or temper incline him to disinherit his son, let him not do so

lightly or on the instant; but let him have a council of his own relations

and of the maternal relations of his son, and set forth to them the

propriety of disinheriting him, and allow his son to answer.  And if more

than half of the kindred male and female, being of full age, condemn the

son, let him be disinherited.  If any other citizen desires to adopt him,

he may, for young men's characters often change in the course of life.  But

if, after ten years, he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony.  If

disease, or old age, or evil disposition cause a man to go out of his mind,

and he is ruining his house and property, and his son doubts about

indicting him for insanity, let him lay the case before the eldest

guardians of the law, and consult with them.  And if they advise him to

proceed, and the father is decided to be imbecile, he shall have no more

control over his property, but shall live henceforward like a child in the

house.



If a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the law

and ten of the matrons who regulate marriage shall take their case in hand,

and reconcile them, if possible.  If, however, their swelling souls cannot

be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and the husband a new

wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and should therefore be

joined to milder natures.  The younger of those who are separated should

also select their partners with a view to the procreation of children;

while the older should seek a companion for their declining years.  If a

woman dies, leaving children male or female, the law will advise, but not

compel, the widower to abstain from a second marriage; if she leave no

children, he shall be compelled to marry.  Also a widow, if she is not old

enough to live honestly without marriage, shall marry again; and in case

she have no children, she should marry for the sake of them.  There is

sometimes an uncertainty which parent the offspring is to follow:  in

unions of a female slave with a male slave, or with a freedman or free man,

or of a free woman with a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the

master; but if the master or mistress be themselves the parent of the

child, the slave and the child are to be sent away to another land.



Concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:--We honour the

Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we thus propitiate them. 

But he who has an aged father or mother has a living image, which if he

cherish it will do him far more good than any statue.  'What do you mean by

cherishing them?'  I will tell you.  Oedipus and Amyntor and Theseus cursed

their children, and their curses took effect.  This proves that the Gods

hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they

hear and fulfil their blessings too?'  'Surely not.'  And, as we were

saying, no image is more honoured by the Gods than an aged father and

mother, to whom when honour is done, the God who hears their prayers is

rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of the lifeless statue;

for they pray that good or evil may come to us in proportion as they are

honoured or dishonoured, but the statue is silent.  'Excellent.'  Good men

are glad when their parents live to extreme old age, or if they depart

early, lament their loss; but to bad man their parents are always terrible.

Wherefore let every one honour his parents, and if this preamble fails of

influencing him, let him hear the law:--If any one does not take sufficient

care of his parents, let the aggrieved person inform the three eldest

guardians of the law and three of the women who are concerned with

marriages.  Women up to forty years of age, and men up to thirty, who thus

offend, shall be beaten and imprisoned.  After that age they are to be

brought before a court composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any

punishment upon them which they please.  If the injured party cannot

inform, let any freeman who hears of the case inform; a slave who does so

shall be set free,--if he be the slave of the one of the parties, by the

magistrate,--if owned by another, at the cost of the state; and let the

magistrates, take care that he is not wronged by any one out of revenge.



The injuries which one person does to another by the use of poisons are of

two kinds;--one affects the body by the employment of drugs and potions;

the other works on the mind by the practice of sorcery and magic.  Fatal

cases of either sort have been already mentioned; and now we must have a

law respecting cases which are not fatal.  There is no use in arguing with

a man whose mind is disturbed by waxen images placed at his own door, or on

the sepulchre of his father or mother, or at a spot where three ways meet.

But to the wizards themselves we must address a solemn preamble, begging

them not to treat the world as if they were children, or compel the

legislator to expose them, and to show men that the poisoner who is not a

physician and the wizard who is not a prophet or diviner are equally

ignorant of what they are doing.  Let the law be as follows:--He who by the

use of poison does any injury not fatal to a man or his servants, or any

injury whether fatal or not to another's cattle or bees, is to be punished

with death if he be a physician, and if he be not a physician he is to

suffer the punishment awarded by the court:  and he who injures another by

sorcery, if he be a diviner or prophet, shall be put to death; and, if he

be not a diviner, the court shall determine what he ought to pay or suffer.



Any one who injures another by theft or violence shall pay damages at least

equal to the injury; and besides the compensation, a suitable punishment

shall be inflicted.  The foolish youth who is the victim of others is to

have a lighter punishment; he whose folly is occasioned by his own jealousy

or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily.  Punishment is to be

inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be

undone, but for the sake of prevention and reformation.  And there should

be a proportion between the punishment and the crime, in which the judge,

having a discretion left him, must, by estimating the crime, second the

legislator, who, like a painter, furnishes outlines for him to fill up.



A madman is not to go about at large in the city, but is to be taken care

of by his relatives.  Neglect on their part is to be punished in the first

class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in the others. 

Now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that which arises from

disease there is the madness which originates in a passionate temperament,

and makes men when engaged in a quarrel use foul and abusive language

against each other.  This is intolerable in a well-ordered state; and

therefore our law shall be as follows:--No one is to speak evil of another,

but when men differ in opinion they are to instruct one another without

speaking evil.  Nor should any one seek to rouse the passions which

education has calmed; for he who feeds and nurses his wrath is apt to make

ribald jests at his opponent, with a loss of character or dignity to

himself.  And for this reason no one may use any abusive word in a temple,

or at sacrifices, or games, or in any public assembly, and he who offends

shall be censured by the proper magistrate; and the magistrate, if he fail

to censure him, shall not claim the prize of virtue.  In any other place

the angry man who indulges in revilings, whether he be the beginner or not,

may be chastised by an elder.  The reviler is always trying to make his

opponent ridiculous; and the use of ridicule in anger we cannot allow.  We

forbid the comic poet to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of

expulsion from the country or a fine of three minae.  Jest in which there

is no offence may be allowed; but the question of offence shall be

determined by the director of education, who is to be the licenser of

theatrical performances.



The righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in a

well-ordered city; he will never be a beggar.  Nor is a man to be pitied,

merely because he is hungry, unless he be temperate.  Therefore let the law

be as follows:--Let there be no beggars in our state; and he who begs shall

be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.



If a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another, who

is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the injury

or give up the offending slave.  But if the master argue that the charge

has arisen by collusion, with the view of obtaining the slave, he may put

the plaintiff on his trial for malpractices, and recover from him twice the

value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good the damage and

deliver up the slave.  The injury done by a horse or other animal shall be

compensated in like manner.



A witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail in

appearing, he shall be liable for any harm which may ensue:  if he swears

that he does not know, he may leave the court.  A judge who is called upon

as a witness must not vote.  A free woman, if she is over forty, may bear

witness and plead, and, if she have no husband, she may also bring an

action.  A slave, male or female, and a child may witness and plead only in

case of murder, but they must give sureties that they will appear at the

trial, if they should be charged with false witness.  Such charges must be

made pending the trial, and the accusations shall be sealed by both parties

and kept by the magistrates until the trial for perjury comes off.  If a

man is twice convicted of perjury, he is not to be required, if three

times, he is not to be allowed to bear witness, or, if he persists in

bearing witness, is to be punished with death.  When more than half the

evidence is proved to be false there must be a new trial.



The best and noblest things in human life are liable to be defiled and

perverted.  Is not justice the civilizer of mankind?  And yet upon the

noble profession of the advocate has come an evil name.  For he is said to

make the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money in return

for his services.  Such an art will be forbidden by the legislator, and if

existing among us will be requested to depart to another city.  To the

disobedient let the voice of the law be heard saying:--He who tries to

pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or to increase litigation,

shall be brought before the supreme court.  If he does so from

contentiousness, let him be silenced for a time, and, if he offend again,

put to death.  If he have acted from a love of gain, let him be sent out of

the country if he be a foreigner, or if he be a citizen let him be put to

death.



BOOK XII.  If a false message be taken to or brought from other states,

whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, they shall be

indicted for having dishonoured their sacred office, and, if convicted,

shall suffer a penalty.--Stealing is mean; robbery is shameless.  Let no

man deceive himself by the supposed example of the Gods, for no God or son

of a God ever really practised either force or fraud.  On this point the

legislator is better informed than all the poets put together.  He who

listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen shall

have the following law directed against him:--He who steals much, or he who

steals little of the public property is deserving of the same penalty; for

they are both impelled by the same evil motive.  When the law punishes one

man more lightly than another, this is done under the idea, not that he is

less guilty, but that he is more curable.  Now a thief who is a foreigner

or slave may be curable; but the thief who is a citizen, and has had the

advantages of education, should be put to death, for he is incurable.



Much consideration and many regulations are necessary about military

expeditions; the great principal of all is that no one, male or female, in

war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a commander. 

Whether men stand or walk, or drill, or pursue, or retreat, or wash, or

eat, they should all act together and in obedience to orders.  We should

practise from our youth upwards the habits of command and obedience.  All

dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks, of cold and heat, and

of hard couches, should have a view to war, and care should be taken not to

destroy the natural covering and use of the head and feet by wearing shoes

and caps; for the head is the lord of the body, and the feet are the best

of servants.  The soldier should have thoughts like these; and let him hear

the law:--He who is enrolled shall serve, and if he absent himself without

leave he shall be indicted for failure of service before his own branch of

the army when the expedition returns, and if he be found guilty he shall

suffer the penalty which the courts award, and never be allowed to contend

for any prize of valour, or to accuse another of misbehaviour in military

matters.  Desertion shall also be tried and punished in the same manner. 

After the courts for trying failure of service and desertion have been

held, the generals shall hold another court, in which the several arms of

the service will award prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. 

The prize is to be a crown of olive, which the victor shall offer up at the

temple of his favourite war God...In any suit which a man brings, let the

indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden, to

whom falsehood is naturally hateful.  For example, when men are prosecuted

for having lost their arms, great care should be taken by the witnesses to

distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from necessity and

from cowardice.  If the hero Patroclus had not been killed but had been

brought back alive from the field, he might have been reproached with

having lost the divine armour.  And a man may lose his arms in a storm at

sea, or from a fall, and under many other circumstances.  There is a

distinction of language to be observed in the use of the two terms,

'thrower away of a shield' (ripsaspis), and 'loser of arms' (apoboleus

oplon), one being the voluntary, the other the involuntary relinquishment

of them.  Let the law then be as follows:--If any one is overtaken by the

enemy, having arms in his hands, and he leaves them behind him voluntarily,

choosing base life instead of honourable death, let justice be done.  The

old legend of Caeneus, who was changed by Poseidon from a woman into a man,

may teach by contraries the appropriate punishment.  Let the thrower away

of his shield be changed from a man into a woman--that is to say, let him

be all his life out of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander

into the ranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his

class.  And any commander who permits him to serve shall also be punished

by a fine.



All magistrates, whatever be their tenure of office, must give an account

of their magistracy.  But where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy

to supervise them or look into their short-comings and crooked ways?  The

examiner must be more than man who is sufficient for these things.  For the

truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which,

like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily

relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and preservation than the

supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates;

failing in this they fall to pieces, and each becomes many instead of one.

Wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precincts

of Apollo and the Sun, and appoint three men of not less than fifty years

of age.  They shall proceed as follows:--Each citizen shall select some

one, not himself, whom he thinks the best.  The persons selected shall be

reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if they are an

even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes

shall be previously withdrawn.  The voting shall continue in the same

manner until three only remain; and if the number of votes cast for them be

equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made by

lot.  The three shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and proclamation

made, that the city of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods,

presents her three best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates

them as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them.  They

shall choose in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to

continue until they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three shall

be added annually.  While they hold office, they shall dwell within the

precinct of the God.  They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve

classes, and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments

which they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together,

announcing the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate on a tablet which

they will place in the agora.  A magistrate who has been condemned by the

examiners may appeal to the select judges, and, if he gain his suit, may in

turn prosecute the examiners; but if the appellant is cast, his punishment

shall be doubled, unless he was previously condemned to death.



And what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state

counts worthy of the rewards of virtue?  They shall have the first place at

all sacrifices and other ceremonies, and in all assemblies and public

places; they shall go on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive privilege

of wearing a crown of laurel.  They are priests of Apollo and the Sun, and

he of their number who is judged first shall be high priest, and give his

name to the year.  The manner of their burial, too, shall be different from

that of the other citizens.  The colour of their funeral array shall be

white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation, around the bier shall

stand a chorus of fifteen boys and fifteen maidens, chanting hymns in

honour of the deceased in alternate strains during an entire day; and at

dawn a band of a hundred youths shall carry the bier to the grave, marching

in the garb of warriors, and the boys in front of the bier shall sing their

national hymn, while the maidens and women past child-bearing follow after.

Priests and priestesses may also follow, unless the Pythian oracle forbids.

The sepulchre shall be a vault built underground, which will last for ever,

having couches of stone placed side by side; on one of these they shall lay

the departed saint, and then cover the tomb with a mound, and plant trees

on every side except one, where an opening shall be left for other

interments.  Every year there shall be games--musical, gymnastic, or

equestrian, in honour of those who have passed every ordeal.  But if any of

them, after having been acquitted on any occasion, begin to show the

wickedness of human nature, he who pleases may bring them to trial before a

court composed of the guardians of the law, and of the select judges, and

of any of the examiners who are alive.  If he be convicted he shall be

deprived of his honours, and if the accuser do not obtain a fifth part of

the votes, he shall pay a fine according to his class.



What is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of faith,'

but not to our days.  He knew that his contemporaries believed in the Gods,

for many of them were the sons of Gods; and he thought that the easiest and

surest method of ending litigation was to commit the decision to Heaven. 

In our own day, men either deny the existence of Gods or their care of men,

or maintain that they may be bribed by attentions and gifts; and the

procedure of Rhadamanthus would therefore be out of date.  When the

religious ideas of mankind change, their laws should also change.  Thus

oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff and defendant; simple

statements of affirmation and denial should be substituted.  For there is

something dreadful in the thought, that nearly half the citizens of a state

are perjured men.  There is no objection to an oath, where a man has no

interest in forswearing himself; as, for example, when a judge is about to

give his decision, or in voting at an election, or in the judgment of games

and contests.  But where there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and

imprecations should be prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. 

Let the principles of justice be learned and taught without words of evil

omen.  The oaths of a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because

strangers are not permitted to become permanent residents in our state.



Trials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser

offences against the state.  The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice,

or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first instance

remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he forfeits the

security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money given to the state.

And for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall have the power of

inflicting greater penalties.



A city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do

about the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers. 

For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of

manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the

confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great

evil.  Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion of

strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of

mankind.  Public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many are

not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives.  Even the worst of

men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge of the

differences between the good and bad.  States are rightly advised when they

desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest praise is

that of virtue.  And our Cretan colony should, and probably will, have a

character for virtue, such as few cities have.  Let this, then, be our law

about foreign travel and the reception of strangers:--No one shall be

allowed to leave the country who is under forty years of age--of course

military service abroad is not included in this regulation--and no one at

all except in a public capacity.  To the Olympic, and Pythian, and Nemean,

and Isthmian games, shall be sent the fairest and best and bravest, who

shall support the dignity of the city in time of peace.  These, when they

come home, shall teach the youth the inferiority of all other governments.

Besides those who go on sacred missions, other persons shall be sent out by

permission of the guardians to study the institutions of foreign countries. 

For a people which has no experience, and no knowledge of the characters of

men or the reason of things, but lives by habit only, can never be

perfectly civilized.  Moreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there

are holy and inspired men; these the citizen of a well-ordered city should

be ever seeking out; he should go forth to find them over sea and over

land, that he may more firmly establish institutions in his own state which

are good already and amend the bad.  'What will be the best way of

accomplishing such an object?'  In the first place, let the visitor of

foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him be a

citizen of repute, especially in military matters.  On his return he shall

appear before the Nocturnal Council:  this is a body which sits from dawn

to sunrise, and includes amongst its members the priests who have gained

the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the law, and the

director and past directors of education; each of whom has power to bring

with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is between thirty and

forty.  The assembly thus constituted shall consider the laws of their own

and other states, and gather information relating to them.  Anything of the

sort which is approved by the elder members of the council shall be studied

with all diligence by the younger; who are to be specially watched by the

rest of the citizens, and shall receive honour, if they are deserving of

honour, or dishonour, if they prove inferior.  This is the assembly to

which the visitor of foreign countries shall come and tell anything which

he has heard from others in the course of his travels, or which he has

himself observed.  If he be made neither better nor worse, let him at least

be praised for his zeal; and let him receive still more praise, and special

honour after death, if he be improved.  But if he be deteriorated by his

travels, let him be prohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit,

he may live as a private individual:  but if he be convicted of attempting

to make innovations in education and the laws, let him die.



Next, as to the reception of strangers.  Of these there are four classes:--

First, merchants, who, like birds of passage, find their way over the sea

at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their wares.  These

should be received in markets and public buildings without the city, by

proper officers, who shall see that justice is done them, and shall also

watch against any political designs which they may entertain; no more

intercourse is to be held with them than is absolutely necessary. 

Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals, who shall be entertained

by hospitable persons at the temples for a reasonable time; the priests and

ministers of the temples shall have a care of them.  In small suits brought

by them or against them, the priests shall be the judges; but in the more

important, the wardens of the agora.  Thirdly, there are ambassadors of

foreign states; these are to be honourably received by the generals and

commanders, and placed under the care of the Prytanes and of the persons

with whom they are lodged.  Fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger,

who, like our own spectators, from time to time goes to see what is rich

and rare in foreign countries.  Like them he must be fifty years of age: 

and let him go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, that he may

learn from them, and they from him.



These are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the

reception of strangers.  Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured; and

let not the stranger be excluded, as in Egypt, from meals and sacrifices,

or, (as at Sparta,) driven away by savage proclamations.



Let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses.  The

number of witnesses shall be three when the sum lent is under a thousand

drachmas, or five when above.  The agent and principal at a fraudulent sale

shall be equally liable.  He who would search another man's house for

anything must swear that he expects to find it there; and he shall enter

naked, or having on a single garment and no girdle.  The owner shall place

at the disposal of the searcher all his goods, sealed as well as unsealed;

if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value of the property, if it

shall prove to be in his possession.  If the owner be absent, the searcher

may counter-seal the property which is under seal, and place watchers. if

the owner remain absent more than five days, the searcher shall take the

magistrates, and open the sealed property, and seal it up again in their

presence.  The recovery of goods disputed, except in the case of lands and

houses, (about which there can be no dispute in our state), is to be barred

by time.  The public and unimpeached use of anything for a year in the

city, or for five years in the country, or the private possession and

domestic use for three years in the city, or for ten years in the country,

is to give a right of ownership.  But if the possessor have the property in

a foreign country, there shall be no bar as to time.  The proceedings of

any trial are to be void, in which either the parties or the witnesses,

whether bond or free, have been prevented by violence from attending:--if a

slave be prevented, the suit shall be invalid; or if a freeman, he who is

guilty of the violence shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall also be

liable to an action for kidnapping.  If one competitor forcibly prevents

another from attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor

in the temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be liable to an

action for damages.  The receiver of stolen goods shall undergo the same

punishment as the thief.  The receiver of an exile shall be punished with

death.  A man ought to have the same friends and enemies as his country;

and he who makes war or peace for himself shall be put to death.  And if a

party in the state make war or peace, their leaders shall be indicted by

the generals, and, if convicted, they shall be put to death.  The ministers

and officers of a country ought not to receive gifts, even as the reward of

good deeds.  He who disobeys shall die.



With a view to taxation a man should have his property and income valued: 

and the government may, at their discretion, levy the tax upon the annual

return, or take a portion of the whole.



The good man will offer moderate gifts to the Gods; his land or hearth

cannot be offered, because they are already consecrated to all Gods.  Gold

and silver, which arouse envy, and ivory, which is taken from the dead body

of an animal, are unsuitable offerings; iron and brass are materials of

war.  Wood and stone of a single piece may be offered; also woven work

which has not occupied one woman more than a month in making.  White is a

colour which is acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and similar

offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the painter can

execute in a day.



Next concerning lawsuits.  Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed upon

by the plaintiff and defendant; and if no decision is obtained from them,

their fellow-tribesmen shall judge.  At this stage there shall be an

increase of the penalty:  the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a fifth

more than the damages claimed.  If he further persist, and appeal a second

time, the case shall be heard before the select judges; and he shall pay,

if defeated, the penalty and half as much again.  And the pursuer, if on

the first appeal he is defeated, shall pay one fifth of the damages claimed

by him; and if on the second, one half.  Other matters relating to trials,

such as the assignment of judges to courts, the times of sitting, the

number of judges, the modes of pleading and procedure, as we have already

said, may be determined by younger legislators.



These are to be the rules of private courts.  As regards public courts,

many states have excellent modes of procedure which may serve for models;

these, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and made

permanent by us.



Let the judge be accomplished in the laws.  He should possess writings

about them, and make a study of them; for laws are the highest instrument

of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind (nous, nomos).  They

afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in verse or prose, in

conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the vain disputes of men

and their equally vain acquiescence in each other's opinions.  The just

judge, who imbibes their spirit, makes the city and himself to stand

upright.  He establishes justice for the good, and cures the tempers of the

bad, if they can be cured; but denounces death, which is the only remedy,

to the incurable, the threads of whose life cannot be reversed.



When the suits of the year are completed, execution is to follow.  The

court is to award to the plaintiff the property of the defendant, if he is

cast, reserving to him only his lot of land.  If the plaintiff is not

satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the property

of the defendant.  If the defendant fails in payment to the amount of a

drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court; or if he rebel

against the authority of the court, he shall be brought before the

guardians of the law, and if found guilty he shall be put to death.



Man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up children,

and gone to law, fulfils the debt of nature.  The rites which are to be

celebrated after death in honour of the Gods above and below shall be

determined by the Interpreters.  The dead shall be buried in uncultivated

places, where they will be out of the way and do least injury to the

living.  For no one either in life or after death has any right to deprive

other men of the sustenance which mother earth provides for them.  No

sepulchral mound is to be piled higher than five men can raise it in five

days, and the grave-stone shall not be larger than is sufficient to contain

an inscription of four heroic verses.  The dead are only to be exposed for

three days, which is long enough to test the reality of death.  The

legislator will instruct the people that the body is a mere shadow or

image, and that the soul, which is our true being, is gone to give an

account of herself before the Gods below.  When they hear this, the good

are full of hope, and the evil are terrified.  It is also said that not

much can be done for any one after death.  And therefore while in life all

man should be helped by their kindred to pass their days justly and holily,

that they may depart in peace.  When a man loses a son or a brother, he

should consider that the beloved one has gone away to fulfil his destiny in

another place, and should not waste money over his lifeless remains.  Let

the law then order a moderate funeral of five minae for the first class, of

three for the second, of two for the third, of one for the fourth.  One of

the guardians of the law, to be selected by the relatives, shall assist

them in arranging the affairs of the deceased.  There would be a want of

delicacy in prescribing that there should or should not be mourning for the

dead.  But, at any rate, such mourning is to be confined to the house;

there must be no processions in the streets, and the dead body shall be

taken out of the city before daybreak.  Regulations about other forms of

burial and about the non-burial of parricides and other sacrilegious

persons have already been laid down.  The work of legislation is therefore

nearly completed; its end will be finally accomplished when we have

provided for the continuance of the state.



Do you remember the names of the Fates?  Lachesis, the giver of the lots,

is the first of them; Clotho, the spinster, the second; Atropos, the

unchanging one, is the third and last, who makes the threads of the web

irreversible.  And we too want to make our laws irreversible, for the

unchangeable quality in them will be the salvation of the state, and the

source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens.  'But

can such a quality be implanted?'  I think that it may; and at any rate we

must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric which

has no foundation would be too ridiculous.  'What foundation would you

lay?'  We have already instituted an assembly which was composed of the ten

oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who had received prizes

of virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone abroad to enquire

into the laws of other countries.  Moreover, each of the members was to

choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of age, to be approved by

the rest; and they were to meet at dawn, when all the world is at leisure.

This assembly will be an anchor to the vessel of state, and provide the

means of permanence; for the constitutions of states, like all other

things, have their proper saviours, which are to them what the head and

soul are to the living being.  'How do you mean?'  Mind in the soul, and

sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and

sense, may be justly called every man's salvation.  'Certainly.'  Yes; but

of what nature is this union?  In the case of a ship, for example, the

senses of the sailors are added to the intelligence of the pilot, and the

two together save the ship and the men in the ship.  Again, the physician

and the general have their objects; and the object of the one is health, of

the other victory.  States, too, have their objects, and the ruler must

understand, first, their nature, and secondly, the means of attaining them,

whether in laws or men.  The state which is wanting in this knowledge

cannot be expected to be wise when the time for action arrives.  Now what

class or institution is there in our state which has such a saving power? 

'I suspect that you are referring to the Nocturnal Council.'  Yes, to that

council which is to have all virtue, and which should aim directly at the

mark.  'Very true.'  The inconsistency of legislation in most states is not

surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered.  One of them

makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another aims at

wealth; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some who call

themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all of them at

once.  But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is of four kinds. 

'Yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the three other kinds

of virtue and of all else.'  True, Cleinias; and now, having already

declared the object which is present to the mind of the pilot, the general,

the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the statesman.  Tell me, I

say, as the physician and general have told us their object, what is the

object of the statesman.  Can you tell me?  'We cannot.'  Did we not say

that there are four virtues--courage, wisdom, and two others, all of which

are called by the common name of virtue, and are in a sense one? 

'Certainly we did.'  The difficulty is, not in understanding the

differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their unity.  Why do we

call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and

courage?  The reason is that courage is concerned with fear, and is found

both in children and in brutes; for the soul may be courageous without

reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise without reason.  'That is

true.'  I have explained to you the difference, and do you in return

explain to me the unity.  But first let us consider whether any one who

knows the name of a thing without the definition has any real knowledge of

it.  Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of sense, especially where

great and glorious truths are concerned? and can any subject be more worthy

of the attention of our legislators than the four virtues of which we are

speaking--courage, temperance, justice, wisdom?  Ought not the magistrates

and officers of the state to instruct the citizens in the nature of virtue

and vice, instead of leaving them to be taught by some chance poet or

sophist?  A city which is without instruction suffers the usual fate of

cities in our day.  What then shall we do?  How shall we perfect the ideas

of our guardians about virtue? how shall we give our state a head and eyes? 

'Yes, but how do you apply the figure?'  The city will be the body or

trunk; the best of our young men will mount into the head or acropolis and

be our eyes; they will look about them, and inform the elders, who are the

mind and use the younger men as their instruments:  together they will save

the state.  Shall this be our constitution, or shall all be educated alike,

and the special training be given up?  'That is impossible.'  Let us then

endeavour to attain to some more exact idea of education.  Did we not say

that the true artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the

many, but to the one, and to order all things with a view to the one?  Can

there be any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things

which are unlike to one idea?  'Perhaps not.'  Say rather, 'Certainly not.' 

And the rulers of our divine state ought to have an exact knowledge of the

common principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is called

by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one or many, we

shall hardly know what virtue is.  Shall we contrive some means of

engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give the matter up?  'Anything

rather than that.'  Let us begin by making an agreement.  'By all means, if

we can.'  Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought to know, not

only how the good and the honourable are many, but also how they are one? 

'Yes, certainly.'  The true guardian of the laws ought to know their truth,

and should also be able to interpret and execute them?  'He should.'  And

is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the existence and power

of the Gods?  The people may be excused for following tradition; but the

guardian must be able to give a reason of the faith which is in him.  And

there are two great evidences of religion--the priority of the soul and the

order of the heavens.  For no man of sense, when he contemplates the

universe, will be likely to substitute necessity for reason and will. 

Those who maintain that the sun and the stars are inanimate beings are

utterly wrong in their opinions.  The men of a former generation had a

suspicion, which has been confirmed by later thinkers, that things

inanimate could never without mind have attained such scientific accuracy;

and some (Anaxagoras) even in those days ventured to assert that mind had

ordered all things in heaven; but they had no idea of the priority of mind,

and they turned the world, or more properly themselves, upside down, and

filled the universe with stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. 

This led to great impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against

the philosophers, whom they compared to 'yelping she-dogs,' besides making

other abusive remarks.  No man can now truly worship the Gods who does not

believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the ruler of

all bodies, and does not perceive also that there is mind in the stars; or

who has not heard the connexion of these things with music, and has not

harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a reason of things which are

matters of reason.  He who is unable to acquire this knowledge, as well as

the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can only be a servant, and not a ruler

in the state.



Let us then add another law to the effect that the Nocturnal Council shall

be a guard set for the salvation of the state.  'Very good.'  To establish

this will be our aim, and I hope that others besides myself will assist. 

'Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide us.'  We cannot,

Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will hereafter be

needed; they must be supplied by experience.  'What do you mean?'  First of

all a register will have to be made of all those whose age, character, or

education would qualify them to be guardians.  The subjects which they are

to learn, and the order in which they are to be learnt, are mysteries which

cannot be explained beforehand, but not mysteries in any other sense.  'If

that is the case, what is to be done?'  We must stake our all on a lucky

throw, and I will share the risk by stating my views on education.  And I

would have you, Cleinias, who are the founder of the Magnesian state, and

will obtain the greatest glory if you succeed, and will at least be praised

for your courage, if you fail, take especial heed of this matter.  If we

can only establish the Nocturnal Council, we will hand over the city to its

keeping; none of the present company will hesitate about that.  Our dream

will then become a reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen

and well educated, will be saviours and guardians such as the world

hitherto has never seen.



The want of completeness in the Laws becomes more apparent in the later

books.  There is less arrangement in them, and the transitions are more

abrupt from one subject to another.  Yet they contain several noble

passages, such as the 'prelude to the discourse concerning the honour and

dishonour of parents,' or the picture of the dangers attending the

'friendly intercourse of young men and maidens with one another,' or the

soothing remonstrance which is addressed to the dying man respecting his

right to do what he will with his own, or the fine description of the

burial of the dead.  The subject of religion in Book X is introduced as a

prelude to offences against the Gods, and this portion of the work appears

to be executed in Plato's best manner.



In the last four books, several questions occur for consideration:  among

them are (I) the detection and punishment of offences; (II) the nature of

the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism, and

against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs; (IV) the

remarks upon retail trade; (V) the institution of the Nocturnal Council.



I.  A weak point in the Laws of Plato is the amount of inquisition into

private life which is to be made by the rulers.  The magistrate is always

watching and waylaying the citizens.  He is constantly to receive

information against improprieties of life.  Plato does not seem to be aware

that espionage can only have a negative effect.  He has not yet discovered

the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of morality or

social life.  Men will not tell of one another; nor will he ever be the

most honoured citizen, who gives the most frequent information about

offenders to the magistrates.



As in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe the

effect of age.  Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older, and he

would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are above fifty

years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of stability.  He

does not remark that, in destroying the freedom he is destroying also the

life of the State.  In reducing all the citizens to rule and measure, he

would have been depriving the Magnesian colony of those great men 'whose

acquaintance is beyond all price;' and he would have found that in the

worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of a carriere ouverte for

extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own.



Plato has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries; he prefers a few

judges who take a leading part in the conduct of trials to a great number

who only listen in silence.  He allows of two appeals--in each case however

with an increase of the penalty.  Modern jurists would disapprove of the

redress of injustice being purchased only at an increasing risk; though

indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which seems to have been little

felt among the Athenians, has a similar effect.  The love of litigation,

which is a remnant of barbarism quite as much as a corruption of

civilization, and was innate in the Athenian people, is diminished in the

new state by the imposition of severe penalties.  If persevered in, it is

to be punished with death.



In the Laws murder and homicide besides being crimes, are also pollutions.

Regarded from this point of view, the estimate of such offences is apt to

depend on accidental circumstances, such as the shedding of blood, and not

on the real guilt of the offender or the injury done to society.  They are

measured by the horror which they arouse in a barbarous age.  For there is

a superstition in law as well as in religion, and the feelings of a

primitive age have a traditional hold on the mass of the people.  On the

other hand, Plato is innocent of the barbarity which would visit the sins

of the fathers upon the children, and he is quite aware that punishment has

an eye to the future, and not to the past.  Compared with that of most

European nations in the last century his penal code, though sometimes

capricious, is reasonable and humane.



A defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence is his remission of the

punishment when the homicide has obtained the forgiveness of the murdered

person; as if crime were a personal affair between individuals, and not an

offence against the State.  There is a ridiculous disproportion in his

punishments.  Because a slave may fairly receive a blow for stealing one

fig or one bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for selling adulterated goods to

the value of one drachma, it is rather hard upon the slave that he should

receive as many blows as he has taken grapes or figs, or upon the tradesman

who has sold adulterated goods to the value of a thousand drachmas that he

should receive a thousand blows.



II.  But before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator must

determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary.  The great question

of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn threadbare

with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato and

Aristotle--first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical point

of view.  They were puzzled by the degrees and kinds of crime; they

observed also that the law only punished hurts which are inflicted by a

voluntary agent on an involuntary patient.



In attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, Plato says that mere

hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit may

sometimes injure, e.g. when conferred without regard to right and wrong, or

to the good or evil consequences which may follow.  He means to say that

the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle which

characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently described by the terms

voluntary and involuntary.  You may hurt another involuntarily, and no one

would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him voluntarily,

as in inflicting punishment--neither is this injury; but if you hurt him

from motives of avarice, ambition, or cowardly fear, this is injury. 

Injustice is also described as the victory of desire or passion or self-

conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of them to reason.  In

some paradoxical sense Plato is disposed to affirm all injustice to be

involuntary; because no man would do injustice who knew that it never paid

and could calculate the consequences of what he was doing.  Yet, on the

other hand, he admits that the distinction of voluntary and involuntary,

taken in another and more obvious sense, is the basis of legislation.  His

conception of justice and injustice is complicated (1) by the want of a

distinction between justice and virtue, that is to say, between the quality

which primarily regards others, and the quality in which self and others

are equally regarded; (2) by the confusion of doing and suffering justice;

(3) by the unwillingness to renounce the old Socratic paradox, that evil is

involuntary.



III.  The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they bear

the stamp of primitive legislation.  They do not escape the almost

inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal.  If laws are based upon

religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion.  Hence the

necessity for what in modern language, and according to a distinction which

Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed persecution.  But the

spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of modern religious bodies,

arises out of the desire to enforce a true and simple form of religion, and

is directed against the superstitions which tend to degrade mankind.  Sir

Thomas More, in his Utopia, is in favour of tolerating all except the

intolerant, though he would not promote to high offices those who

disbelieved in the immortality of the soul.  Plato has not advanced quite

so far as this in the path of toleration.  But in judging of his

enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of necromancy and divination

were far greater than those of intolerance in the ancient world.  Human

nature is always having recourse to the first; but only when organized into

some form of priesthood falls into the other; although in primitive as in

later ages the institution of a priesthood may claim probably to be an

advance on some form of religion which preceded.  The Laws would have

rested on a sounder foundation, if Plato had ever distinctly realized to

his mind the difference between crime and sin or vice.  Of this, as of many

other controversies, a clear definition might have been the end.  But such

a definition belongs to a later age of philosophy.



The arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely

modern character:  first, the consensus gentium; secondly, the argument

which has already been adduced in the Phaedrus, of the priority of the

self-moved.  The answer to those who say that God 'cares not,' is, that He

governs by general laws; and that he who takes care of the great will

assuredly take care of the small.  Plato did not feel, and has not

attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with the

general providence of God.  Yet he is on the road to a solution, when he

regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together towards

the final end.



We are surprised to find that the scepticism, which we attribute to young

men in our own day, existed then (compare Republic); that the Epicureanism

expressed in the line of Horace (borrowed from Lucretius)--



'Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,'



was already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of another

world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other men in this. 

The same objection which struck the Psalmist--'when I saw the prosperity of

the wicked'--is supposed to lie at the root of the better sort of unbelief. 

And the answer is substantially the same which the modern theologian would

offer:--that the ways of God in this world cannot be justified unless there

be a future state of rewards and punishments.  Yet this future state of

rewards and punishments is in Plato's view not any addition of happiness or

suffering imposed from without, but the permanence of good and evil in the

soul:  here he is in advance of many modern theologians.  The Greek, too,

had his difficulty about the existence of evil, which in one solitary

passage, remarkable for being inconsistent with his general system, Plato

explains, after the Magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (compare

Theaet., Statesman).  This passage is also remarkable for being at variance

with the general optimism of the Tenth Book--not 'all things are ordered by

God for the best,' but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit.



The Tenth Book of the Laws presents a picture of the state of belief among

the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live.  Plato is

disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several causes. 

First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he retains his

disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is unwilling, as in

the Republic, wholly to proscribe them.  Secondly, he remarks the self-

conceit of a newly-fledged generation of philosophers, who declare that the

sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only; and who also maintain that

the Gods are made by the laws of the state.  Thirdly, he notes a confusion

in the minds of men arising out of their misinterpretation of the

appearances of the world around them:  they do not always see the righteous

rewarded and the wicked punished.  So in modern times there are some whose

infidelity has arisen from doubts about the inspiration of ancient

writings; others who have been made unbelievers by physical science, or

again by the seemingly political character of religion; while there is a

third class to whose minds the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to

man' has been the chief stumblingblock.  Plato is very much out of temper

at the impiety of some of his contemporaries; yet he is determined to

reason with the victims, as he regards them, of these illusions before he

punishes them.  His answer to the unbelievers is twofold:  first, that the

soul is prior to the body; secondly, that the ruler of the universe being

perfect has made all things with a view to their perfection.  The

difficulties arising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious

in the age of Plato than in our own.



We too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go on

as if there were no God.  When the belief in Him, whether of ancient or

modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate Him, either in theory or

practice, into a distant heaven.  They do not like expressly to deny God

when it is more convenient to forget Him; and so the theory of the

Epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general.  Nor can we be said

to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst unbelief

--of those who put superstition in the place of true religion.  For the

larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of God may be

turned aside by gifts, and, if not by the 'odour of fat, and the sacrifice

steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of sacrifice placed upon the

altar--by masses for the quick and dead, by dispensations, by building

churches, by rites and ceremonies--by the same means which the heathen

used, taking other names and shapes.  And the indifference of Epicureanism

and unbelief is in two ways the parent of superstition, partly because it

permits, and also because it creates, a necessity for its development in

religious and enthusiastic temperaments.  If men cannot have a rational

belief, they will have an irrational.  And hence the most superstitious

countries are also at a certain point of civilization the most unbelieving,

and the revolution which takes one direction is quickly followed by a

reaction in the other.  So we may read 'between the lines' ancient history

and philosophy into modern, and modern into ancient.  Whether we compare

the theory of Greek philosophy with the Christian religion, or the practice

of the Gentile world with the practice of the Christian world, they will be

found to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have

supposed.  The greater opposition which is sometimes made between them

seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with the

practice of the other.



To the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and

natural truth of religion; the best and highest, whether conceived in the

form of a person or a principle--as the divine mind or as the idea of good

--is believed by him to be the basis of human life.  That all things are

working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in this or in

some other world to which human actions are transferred, is the sum of his

faith or theology.  Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free from

superstition.  Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him.  He

dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks, was

not tolerated in Crete, and perhaps (for the meaning of his words is not

quite clear) at Sparta.  He gives no encouragement to individual

enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a

mighty intellect.'  Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the

avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods to the

public temples.  He would not have men and women consecrating the accidents

of their lives.  He trusts to human punishments and not to divine

judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition that

certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.'  He

considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now be

recalled.  Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of

religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind--Barbarians as well as

Hellenes.  He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner or

later, experiencing its power.  To which we may add the further remark that

the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the religious

reaction.



It is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the Laws goes

beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous writings. 

Aristotle, in a well-known passage (Met.) which is an echo of the Phaedo,

remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing the agency of

mind, and yet having recourse to other and inferior, probably material

causes.  But Plato makes the further criticism, that the error of

Anaxagoras consisted, not in denying the universal agency of mind, but in

denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity of it.  Yet in the

Timaeus he had himself allowed that God made the world out of pre-existing

materials:  in the Statesman he says that there were seeds of evil in the

world arising out of the remains of a former chaos which could not be got

rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the Laws he has admitted that there

are two souls, a good and evil.  In the Meno, the Phaedrus, and the Phaedo,

he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a former state of existence. 

But now he has attained to a clearer point of view:  he has discarded these

fancies.  From meditating on the priority of the human soul to the body, he

has learnt the nature of soul absolutely.  The power of the best, of which

he gave an intimation in the Phaedo and in the Republic, now, as in the

Philebus, takes the form of an intelligence or person.  He no longer, like

Anaxagoras, supposes mind to be introduced at a certain time into the world

and to give order to a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos,

everlasting and evermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all

things.  This appears to be the last form of Plato's religious philosophy,

which might almost be summed up in the words of Kant, 'the starry heaven

above and the moral law within.'  Or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven

above and mind prior to the world.'



IV.  The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about

mendicity, have a very modern character.  Greek social life was more like

our own than we are apt to suppose.  There was the same division of ranks,

the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, and, even in a democracy, the

same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits.  Plato may be

claimed as the first free trader, when he prohibits the imposition of

customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly not aware of the

importance of the principle which he enunciated.  The discredit of retail

trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders, and is inclined to believe

that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which heaven forbid! retail trade

might become honourable.  He has hardly lighted upon the true reason, which

appears to be the essential distinction between buyers and sellers, the one

class being necessarily in some degree dependent on the other.  When he

proposes to fix prices 'which would allow a moderate gain,' and to regulate

trade in several minute particulars, we must remember that this is by no

means so absurd in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost

every one would know and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast

population.  Among ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to

charge what he pleases.  Of many things the prices are fixed by law.  Do we

not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of

employers?  The objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding the

conflicts which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour,

is not so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. 

Wherever free competition is not reconcileable either with the order of

society, or, as in the case of adulteration, with common honesty, the

government may lawfully interfere.  The only question is,--Whether the

interference will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may

not be greater than the evil which is prevented by it.



He would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no good man

would be left to starve.  This again is a prohibition which might have been

easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the poor when

the population is small.  In our own times the difficulty of pauperism is

rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by the facility of

locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human life and suffering. 

And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems to be by modern nations

subdividing themselves into small bodies having local knowledge and acting

together in the spirit of ancient communities (compare Arist. Pol.)



V.  Regarded as the framework of a polity the Laws are deemed by Plato to

be a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years. 

He nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation.  He

is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns to

his original idea.  For the guardians of the Republic, who were the elder

citizens, and were all supposed to be philosophers, is now substituted a

special body, who are to review and amend the laws, preserving the spirit

of the legislator.  These are the Nocturnal Council, who, although they are

not specially trained in dialectic, are not wholly destitute of it; for

they must know the relation of particular virtues to the general principle

of virtue.  Plato has been arguing throughout the Laws that temperance is

higher than courage, peace than war, that the love of both must enter into

the character of the good citizen.  And at the end the same thought is

summed up by him in an abstract form.  The true artist or guardian must be

able to reduce the many to the one, than which, as he says with an

enthusiasm worthy of the Phaedrus or Philebus, 'no more philosophical

method was ever devised by the wit of man.'  But the sense of unity in

difference can only be acquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us

the nature of this study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a

remarkable omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectic of the

Republic.



The Nocturnal Council is to consist of the priests who have obtained the

rewards of virtue, of the ten eldest guardians of the law, and of the

director and ex-directors of education; each of whom is to select for

approval a younger coadjutor.  To this council the 'Spectator,' who is sent

to visit foreign countries, has to make his report.  It is not an

administrative body, but an assembly of sages who are to make legislation

their study.  Plato is not altogether disinclined to changes in the law

where experience shows them to be necessary; but he is also anxious that

the original spirit of the constitution should never be lost sight of.



The Laws of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in

many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life and

the world.  His Theory of Ideas in the next generation passed into one of

Numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the Metaphysics of

Aristotle.  Of the speculative side of this theory there are no traces in

the Laws, but doubtless Plato found the practical value which he attributed

to arithmetic greatly confirmed by the possibility of applying number and

measure to the revolution of the heavens, and to the regulation of human

life.  In the return to a doctrine of numbers there is a retrogression

rather than an advance; for the most barren logical abstraction is of a

higher nature than number and figure.  Philosophy fades away into the

distance; in the Laws it is confined to the members of the Nocturnal

Council.  The speculative truth which was the food of the guardians in the

Republic, is for the majority of the citizens to be superseded by practical

virtues.  The law, which is the expression of mind written down, takes the

place of the living word of the philosopher.  (Compare the contrast of

Phaedrus, and Laws; also the plays on the words nous, nomos, nou dianome;

and the discussion in the Statesman of the difference between the personal

rule of a king and the impersonal reign of law.)  The State is based on

virtue and religion rather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer

identified with knowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the

sense generally understood.  Yet there are many traces of advance as well

as retrogression in the Laws of Plato.  The attempt to reconcile the ideal

with actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from

heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be claimed for him as well as for

his master Socrates.  And the members of the Nocturnal Council are to

continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of God.  Education

is the last word with which Plato supposes the theory of the Laws to end

and the reality to begin.



Plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs, and

of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an indication

not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become more conversant

with realities.  Nor can we fairly attribute any want of originality to

him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from Sparta and Athens.

Laws and institutions grow out of habits and customs; and they have 'better

opinion, better confirmation,' if they have come down from antiquity and

are not mere literary inventions.  Plato would have been the first to

acknowledge that the Book of Laws was not the creation of his fancy, but a

collection of enactments which had been devised by inspired legislators,

like Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon, to meet the actual needs of men, and had

been approved by time and experience.



In order to do justice therefore to the design of the work, it is necessary

to examine how far it rests on an historical foundation and coincides with

the actual laws of Sparta and Athens.  The consideration of the historical

aspect of the Laws has been reserved for this place.  In working out the

comparison the writer has been greatly assisted by the excellent essays of

C.F. Hermann ('De vestigiis institutorum veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per

Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis,' and 'Juris domestici et familiaris

apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris Graeciae inque primis Athenarum

institutis comparatio':  Marburg, 1836), and by J.B. Telfy's 'Corpus Juris

Attici' (Leipzig, 1868).



EXCURSUS ON THE RELATION OF THE LAWS OF PLATO TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF CRETE

AND LACEDAEMON AND TO THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.



The Laws of Plato are essentially Greek:  unlike Xenophon's Cyropaedia,

they contain nothing foreign or oriental.  Their aim is to reconstruct the

work of the great lawgivers of Hellas in a literary form.  They partake

both of an Athenian and a Spartan character.  Some of them too are derived

from Crete, and are appropriately transferred to a Cretan colony.  But of

Crete so little is known to us, that although, as Montesquieu (Esprit des

Lois) remarks, 'the Laws of Crete are the original of those of Sparta and

the Laws of Plato the correction of these latter,' there is only one point,

viz. the common meals, in which they can be compared.  Most of Plato's

provisions resemble the laws and customs which prevailed in these three

states (especially in the two former), and which the personifying instinct

of the Greeks attributed to Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon.  A very few

particulars may have been borrowed from Zaleucus (Cic. de Legibus), and

Charondas, who is said to have first made laws against perjury (Arist.

Pol.) and to have forbidden credit (Stob. Florileg., Gaisford).  Some

enactments are Plato's own, and were suggested by his experience of defects

in the Athenian and other Greek states.  The Laws also contain many lesser

provisions, which are not found in the ordinary codes of nations, because

they cannot be properly defined, and are therefore better left to custom

and common sense.  'The greater part of the work,' as Aristotle remarks

(Pol.), 'is taken up with laws':  yet this is not wholly true, and applies

to the latter rather than to the first half of it.  The book rests on an

ethical and religious foundation:  the actual laws begin with a hymn of

praise in honour of the soul.  And the same lofty aspiration after the good

is perpetually recurring, especially in Books X, XI, XII, and whenever

Plato's mind is filled with his highest themes.  In prefixing to most of

his laws a prooemium he has two ends in view, to persuade and also to

threaten.  They are to have the sanction of laws and the effect of sermons. 

And Plato's 'Book of Laws,' if described in the language of modern

philosophy, may be said to be as much an ethical and educational, as a

political or legal treatise.



But although the Laws partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan character,

the elements which are borrowed from either state are necessarily very

different, because the character and origin of the two governments

themselves differed so widely.  Sparta was the more ancient and primitive: 

Athens was suited to the wants of a later stage of society.  The relation

of the two states to the Laws may be conceived in this manner:--The

foundation and ground-plan of the work are more Spartan, while the

superstructure and details are more Athenian.  At Athens the laws were

written down and were voluminous; more than a thousand fragments of them

have been collected by Telfy.  Like the Roman or English law, they

contained innumerable particulars.  Those of them which regulated daily

life were familiarly known to the Athenians; for every citizen was his own

lawyer, and also a judge, who decided the rights of his fellow-citizens

according to the laws, often after hearing speeches from the parties

interested or from their advocates.  It is to Rome and not to Athens that

the invention of law, in the modern sense of the term, is commonly

ascribed.  But it must be remembered that long before the times of the

Twelve Tables (B.C. 451), regular courts and forms of law had existed at

Athens and probably in the Greek colonies.  And we may reasonably suppose,

though without any express proof of the fact, that many Roman institutions

and customs, like Latin literature and mythology, were partly derived from

Hellas and had imperceptibly drifted from one shore of the Ionian Sea to

the other (compare especially the constitutions of Servius Tullius and of

Solon).



It is not proved that the laws of Sparta were in ancient times either

written down in books or engraved on tablets of marble or brass.  Nor is it

certain that, if they had been, the Spartans could have read them.  They

were ancient customs, some of them older probably than the settlement in

Laconia, of which the origin is unknown; they occasionally received the

sanction of the Delphic oracle, but there was a still stronger obligation

by which they were enforced,--the necessity of self-defence:  the Spartans

were always living in the presence of their enemies.  They belonged to an

age when written law had not yet taken the place of custom and tradition. 

The old constitution was very rarely affected by new enactments, and these

only related to the duties of the Kings or Ephors, or the new relations of

classes which arose as time went on.  Hence there was as great a difference

as could well be conceived between the Laws of Athens and Sparta:  the one

was the creation of a civilized state, and did not differ in principle from

our modern legislation, the other of an age in which the people were held

together and also kept down by force of arms, and which afterwards retained

many traces of its barbaric origin 'surviving in culture.'



Nevertheless the Lacedaemonian was the ideal of a primitive Greek state. 

According to Thucydides it was the first which emerged out of confusion and

became a regular government.  It was also an army devoted to military

exercises, but organized with a view to self-defence and not to conquest. 

It was not quick to move or easily excited; but stolid, cautious,

unambitious, procrastinating.  For many centuries it retained the same

character which was impressed upon it by the hand of the legislator.  This

singular fabric was partly the result of circumstances, partly the

invention of some unknown individual in prehistoric times, whose ideal of

education was military discipline, and who, by the ascendency of his

genius, made a small tribe into a nation which became famous in the world's

history.  The other Hellenes wondered at the strength and stability of his

work.  The rest of Hellas, says Thucydides, undertook the colonisation of

Heraclea the more readily, having a feeling of security now that they saw

the Lacedaemonians taking part in it.  The Spartan state appears to us in

the dawn of history as a vision of armed men, irresistible by any other

power then existing in the world.  It can hardly be said to have understood

at all the rights or duties of nations to one another, or indeed to have

had any moral principle except patriotism and obedience to commanders.  Men

were so trained to act together that they lost the freedom and spontaneity

of human life in cultivating the qualities of the soldier and ruler.  The

Spartan state was a composite body in which kings, nobles, citizens,

perioeci, artisans, slaves, had to find a 'modus vivendi' with one another. 

All of them were taught some use of arms.  The strength of the family tie

was diminished among them by an enforced absence from home and by common

meals.  Sparta had no life or growth; no poetry or tradition of the past;

no art, no thought.  The Athenians started on their great career some

centuries later, but the Spartans would have been easily conquered by them,

if Athens had not been deficient in the qualities which constituted the

strength (and also the weakness) of her rival.



The ideal of Athens has been pictured for all time in the speech which

Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles, called the Funeral Oration.  He

contrasts the activity and freedom and pleasantness of Athenian life with

the immobility and severe looks and incessant drill of the Spartans.  The

citizens of no city were more versatile, or more readily changed from land

to sea or more quickly moved about from place to place.  They 'took their

pleasures' merrily, and yet, when the time for fighting arrived, were not a

whit behind the Spartans, who were like men living in a camp, and, though

always keeping guard, were often too late for the fray.  Any foreigner

might visit Athens; her ships found a way to the most distant shores; the

riches of the whole earth poured in upon her.  Her citizens had their

theatres and festivals; they 'provided their souls with many relaxations';

yet they were not less manly than the Spartans or less willing to sacrifice

this enjoyable existence for their country's good.  The Athenian was a

nobler form of life than that of their rivals, a life of music as well as

of gymnastic, the life of a citizen as well as of a soldier.  Such is the

picture which Thucydides has drawn of the Athenians in their glory.  It is

the spirit of this life which Plato would infuse into the Magnesian state

and which he seeks to combine with the common meals and gymnastic

discipline of Sparta.



The two great types of Athens and Sparta had deeply entered into his mind.

He had heard of Sparta at a distance and from common Hellenic fame:  he was

a citizen of Athens and an Athenian of noble birth.  He must often have sat

in the law-courts, and may have had personal experience of the duties of

offices such as he is establishing.  There is no need to ask the question,

whence he derived his knowledge of the Laws of Athens:  they were a part of

his daily life.  Many of his enactments are recognized to be Athenian laws

from the fragments preserved in the Orators and elsewhere:  many more would

be found to be so if we had better information.  Probably also still more

of them would have been incorporated in the Magnesian code, if the work had

ever been finally completed.  But it seems to have come down to us in a

form which is partly finished and partly unfinished, having a beginning and

end, but wanting arrangement in the middle.  The Laws answer to Plato's own

description of them, in the comparison which he makes of himself and his

two friends to gatherers of stones or the beginners of some composite work,

'who are providing materials and partly putting them together:--having some

of their laws, like stones, already fixed in their places, while others lie

about.'



Plato's own life coincided with the period at which Athens rose to her

greatest heights and sank to her lowest depths.  It was impossible that he

should regard the blessings of democracy in the same light as the men of a

former generation, whose view was not intercepted by the evil shadow of the

taking of Athens, and who had only the glories of Marathon and Salamis and

the administration of Pericles to look back upon.  On the other hand the

fame and prestige of Sparta, which had outlived so many crimes and

blunders, was not altogether lost at the end of the life of Plato.  Hers

was the only great Hellenic government which preserved something of its

ancient form; and although the Spartan citizens were reduced to almost one-

tenth of their original number (Arist. Pol.), she still retained, until the

rise of Thebes and Macedon, a certain authority and predominance due to her

final success in the struggle with Athens and to the victories which

Agesilaus won in Asia Minor.



Plato, like Aristotle, had in his mind some form of a mean state which

should escape the evils and secure the advantages of both aristocracy and

democracy.  It may however be doubted whether the creation of such a state

is not beyond the legislator's art, although there have been examples in

history of forms of government, which through some community of interest or

of origin, through a balance of parties in the state itself, or through the

fear of a common enemy, have for a while preserved such a character of

moderation.  But in general there arises a time in the history of a state

when the struggle between the few and the many has to be fought out.  No

system of checks and balances, such as Plato has devised in the Laws, could

have given equipoise and stability to an ancient state, any more than the

skill of the legislator could have withstood the tide of democracy in

England or France during the last hundred years, or have given life to

China or India.



The basis of the Magnesian constitution is the equal division of land.  In

the new state, as in the Republic, there was to be neither poverty nor

riches.  Every citizen under all circumstances retained his lot, and as

much money as was necessary for the cultivation of it, and no one was

allowed to accumulate property to the amount of more than five times the

value of the lot, inclusive of it.  The equal division of land was a

Spartan institution, not known to have existed elsewhere in Hellas.  The

mention of it in the Laws of Plato affords considerable presumption that it

was of ancient origin, and not first introduced, as Mr. Grote and others

have imagined, in the reformation of Cleomenes III.  But at Sparta, if we

may judge from the frequent complaints of the accumulation of property in

the hands of a few persons (Arist. Pol.), no provision could have been made

for the maintenance of the lot.  Plutarch indeed speaks of a law introduced

by the Ephor Epitadeus soon after the Peloponnesian War, which first

allowed the Spartans to sell their land (Agis):  but from the manner in

which Aristotle refers to the subject, we should imagine this evil in the

state to be of a much older standing.  Like some other countries in which

small proprietors have been numerous, the original equality passed into

inequality, and, instead of a large middle class, there was probably at

Sparta greater disproportion in the property of the citizens than in any

other state of Hellas.  Plato was aware of the danger, and has improved on

the Spartan custom.  The land, as at Sparta, must have been tilled by

slaves, since other occupations were found for the citizens.  Bodies of

young men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty were engaged in making

biennial peregrinations of the country.  They and their officers are to be

the magistrates, police, engineers, aediles, of the twelve districts into

which the colony was divided.  Their way of life may be compared with that

of the Spartan secret police or Crypteia, a name which Plato freely applies

to them without apparently any consciousness of the odium which has

attached to the word in history.



Another great institution which Plato borrowed from Sparta (or Crete) is

the Syssitia or common meals.  These were established in both states, and

in some respects were considered by Aristotle to be better managed in Crete

than at Lacedaemon (Pol.).  In the Laws the Cretan custom appears to be

adopted (This is not proved, as Hermann supposes ('De Vestigiis,' etc.)): 

that is to say, if we may interpret Plato by Aristotle, the cost of them

was defrayed by the state and not by the individuals (Arist. Pol); so that

the members of the mess, who could not pay their quota, still retained

their rights of citizenship.  But this explanation is hardly consistent

with the Laws, where contributions to the Syssitia from private estates are

expressly mentioned.  Plato goes further than the legislators of Sparta and

Crete, and would extend the common meals to women as well as men:  he

desires to curb the disorders, which existed among the female sex in both

states, by the application to women of the same military discipline to

which the men were already subject.  It was an extension of the custom of

Syssitia from which the ancient legislators shrank, and which Plato himself

believed to be very difficult of enforcement.



Like Sparta, the new colony was not to be surrounded by walls,--a state

should learn to depend upon the bravery of its citizens only--a fallacy or

paradox, if it is not to be regarded as a poetical fancy, which is fairly

enough ridiculed by Aristotle (Pol.).  Women, too, must be ready to assist

in the defence of their country:  they are not to rush to the temples and

altars, but to arm themselves with shield and spear.  In the regulation of

the Syssitia, in at least one of his enactments respecting property, and in

the attempt to correct the licence of women, Plato shows, that while he

borrowed from the institutions of Sparta and favoured the Spartan mode of

life, he also sought to improve upon them.



The enmity to the sea is another Spartan feature which is transferred by

Plato to the Magnesian state.  He did not reflect that a non-maritime power

would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the great

highway.  Their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which had to be

protected by them, their struggles first of all with the Phoenicians and

Carthaginians, and secondly with the Persian fleets, forced the Greeks,

mostly against their will, to devote themselves to the sea.  The islanders

before the inhabitants of the continent, the maritime cities before the

inland, the Corinthians and Athenians before the Spartans, were compelled

to fit out ships:  last of all the Spartans, by the pressure of the

Peloponnesian War, were driven to establish a naval force, which, after the

battle of Aegospotami, for more than a generation commanded the Aegean. 

Plato, like the Spartans, had a prejudice against a navy, because he

regarded it as the nursery of democracy.  But he either never considered,

or did not care to explain, how a city, set upon an island and 'distant not

more than ten miles from the sea, having a seaboard provided with excellent

harbours,' could have safely subsisted without one.



Neither the Spartans nor the Magnesian colonists were permitted to engage

in trade or commerce.  In order to limit their dealings as far as possible

to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the Magnesians were only

allowed to use the common currency of Hellas when they travelled abroad,

which they were forbidden to do unless they received permission from the

government.  Like the Spartans, Plato was afraid of the evils which might

be introduced into his state by intercourse with foreigners; but he also

shrinks from the utter exclusiveness of Sparta, and is not unwilling to

allow visitors of a suitable age and rank to come from other states to his

own, as he also allows citizens of his own state to go to foreign countries

and bring back a report of them.  Such international communication seemed

to him both honourable and useful.



We may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the Laws

approximates to the Athenian model.  These are much more numerous than the

previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the laws of

Plato with those of Athens, because a good deal more is known to us of

Athens than of Sparta.



The information which we possess about Athenian law, though comparatively

fuller, is still fragmentary.  The sources from which our knowledge is

derived are chiefly the following:--



(1)  The Orators,--Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes,

Aeschines, Lycurgus, and others.



(2)  Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, as well as later

writers, such as Cicero de Legibus, Plutarch, Aelian, Pausanias.



(3)  Lexicographers, such as Harpocration, Pollux, Hesychius, Suidas, and

the compiler of the Etymologicum Magnum, many of whom are of uncertain

date, and to a great extent based upon one another.  Their writings extend

altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to the tenth

century.



(4)  The Scholia on Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes.



(5)  A few inscriptions.



Our knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the

most part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious.  No

critic can separate the actual laws of Solon from those which passed under

his name in later ages.  Nor do the Scholiasts and Lexicographers attempt

to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the time when

they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found in books

only.  Nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur in the Laws of

Plato were also a part of Athenian law, however probable this may appear.



There are two classes of similarities between Plato's Laws and those of

Athens:  (i) of institutions (ii) of minor enactments.



(i)  The constitution of the Laws in its general character resembles much

more nearly the Athenian constitution of Solon's time than that which

succeeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in Plato's own day. 

It was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a Syracusan

tyranny or the mob-government of the Athenian assembly.  There are various

expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of moderation. 

(1) The whole people were to be educated:  they could not be all trained in

philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements of music,

arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; they were also to be subject to military

discipline, archontes kai archomenoi.  (2) The majority of them were, or

had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had the experience

which is given by office.  (3) The persons who held the highest offices

were to have a further education, not much inferior to that provided for

the guardians in the Republic, though the range of their studies is

narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue:  here their philosophy

comes to an end.  (4) The entire number of the citizens (5040) rarely, if

ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections.  The whole people were

divided into four classes, each having the right to be represented by the

same number of members in the Council.  The result of such an arrangement

would be, as in the constitution of Servius Tullius, to give a

disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who may be

supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer.  This tendency

was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote, previous to

the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be to hand over to

the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many poor, and vice versa. 

(5) The most important body in the state was the Nocturnal Council, which

is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it existed, or was supposed to

have existed, in the days before Ephialtes and the Eumenides of Aeschylus,

when its power was undiminished.  In some particulars Plato appears to have

copied exactly the customs and procedure of the Areopagus:  both assemblies

sat at night (Telfy).  There was a resemblance also in more important

matters.  Like the Areopagus, the Nocturnal Council was partly composed of

magistrates and other state officials, whose term of office had expired. 

(7) The constitution included several diverse and even opposing elements,

such as the Assembly and the Nocturnal Council.  (8)  There was much less

exclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in the

government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in the

rest of the world.--All these were moderating influences.



A striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the Magnesian

colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges and other

magistrates.  That such a mode of election should have been resorted to in

any civilized state, or that it should have been transferred by Plato to an

ideal or imaginary one, is very singular to us.  The most extreme democracy

of modern times has never thought of leaving government wholly to chance. 

It was natural that Socrates should scoff at it, and ask, 'Who would choose

a pilot or carpenter or flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)?  Yet there were

many considerations which made this mode of choice attractive both to the

oligarch and to the democrat:--(1) It seemed to recognize that one man was

as good as another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether

few or many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word.  (2) To

the pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven

(compare Laws).  (3) It afforded a protection against corruption and

intrigue...It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot, the

persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered on their

office, and were therefore liable, after election, if disqualified, to be

rejected (Laws).  They were, moreover, liable to be called to account after

the expiration of their office.  In the election of councillors Plato

introduces a further check:  they are not to be chosen directly by lot from

all the citizens, but from a select body previously elected by vote.  In

Plato's state at least, as we may infer from his silence on this point,

judges and magistrates performed their duties without pay, which was a

guarantee both of their disinterestedness and of their belonging probably

to the higher class of citizens (compare Arist. Pol.).  Hence we are not

surprised that the use of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of

the Athenian Council, but also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's

colony.  The evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if

the magistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at Athens, receive pay

from the state.



Another parallel is that of the Popular Assembly, which at Athens was

omnipotent, but in the Laws has only a faded and secondary existence.  In

Plato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and

little political power entrusted to it.  At Athens it was the mainspring of

the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and death; the

acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned by it; no office

or person was above its control.  Plato was far from allowing such a

despotic power to exist in his model community, and therefore he minimizes

the importance of the Assembly and narrows its functions.  He probably

never asked himself a question, which naturally occurs to the modern

reader, where was to be the central authority in this new community, and by

what supreme power would the differences of inferior powers be decided.  At

the same time he magnifies and brings into prominence the Nocturnal Council

(which is in many respects a reflection of the Areopagus), but does not

make it the governing body of the state.



Between the judicial system of the Laws and that of Athens there was very

great similarity, and a difference almost equally great.  Plato not

unfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle.  At Athens

any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of the Heliaea. 

This was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior courts, but an

occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in number six thousand, met

in a single court (Andoc. de Myst.).  Plato significantly remarks that a

few judges, if they are good, are better than a great number.  He also, at

least in capital cases, confines the plaintiff and defendant to a single

speech each, instead of allowing two apiece, as was the common practice at

Athens.  On the other hand, in all private suits he gives two appeals, from

the arbiters to the courts of the tribes, and from the courts of the tribes

to the final or supreme court.  There was nothing answering to this at

Athens.  The three courts were appointed in the following manner:--the

arbiters were to be agreed upon by the parties to the cause; the judges of

the tribes to be elected by lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the

end of each year by the great officers of state out of their own number--

they were to serve for a year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the

Athenian judges, to vote openly.  Plato does not dwell upon methods of

procedure:  these are the lesser matters which he leaves to the younger

legislators.  In cases of murder and some other capital offences, the cause

was to be tried by a special tribunal, as was the custom at Athens: 

military offences, too, as at Athens, were decided by the soldiers.  Public

causes in the Laws, as sometimes at Athens, were voted upon by the whole

people:  because, as Plato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them.

They were to be previously investigated by three of the principal

magistrates.  He believes also that in private suits all should take part;

'for he who has no share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine

that he has no share in the state at all.'  The wardens of the country,

like the Forty at Athens, also exercised judicial power in small matters,

as well as the wardens of the agora and city.  The department of justice is

better organized in Plato than in an ordinary Greek state, proceeding more

by regular methods, and being more restricted to distinct duties.



The executive of Plato's Laws, like the Athenian, was different from that

of a modern civilized state.  The difference chiefly consists in this, that

whereas among ourselves there are certain persons or classes of persons set

apart for the execution of the duties of government, in ancient Greece, as

in all other communities in the earlier stages of their development, they

were not equally distinguished from the rest of the citizens.  The

machinery of government was never so well organized as in the best modern

states.  The judicial department was not so completely separated from the

legislative, nor the executive from the judicial, nor the people at large

from the professional soldier, lawyer, or priest.  To Aristotle (Pol.) it

was a question requiring serious consideration--Who should execute a

sentence?  There was probably no body of police to whom were entrusted the

lives and properties of the citizens in any Hellenic state.  Hence it might

be reasonably expected that every man should be the watchman of every

other, and in turn be watched by him.  The ancients do not seem to have

remembered the homely adage that, 'What is every man's business is no man's

business,' or always to have thought of applying the principle of a

division of labour to the administration of law and to government.  Every

Athenian was at some time or on some occasion in his life a magistrate,

judge, advocate, soldier, sailor, policeman.  He had not necessarily any

private business; a good deal of his time was taken up with the duties of

office and other public occupations.  So, too, in Plato's Laws.  A citizen

was to interfere in a quarrel, if older than the combatants, or to defend

the outraged party, if his junior.  He was especially bound to come to the

rescue of a parent who was ill-treated by his children.  He was also

required to prosecute the murderer of a kinsman.  In certain cases he was

allowed to arrest an offender.  He might even use violence to an abusive

person.  Any citizen who was not less than thirty years of age at times

exercised a magisterial authority, to be enforced even by blows.  Both in

the Magnesian state and at Athens many thousand persons must have shared in

the highest duties of government, if a section only of the Council,

consisting of thirty or of fifty persons, as in the Laws, or at Athens

after the days of Cleisthenes, held office for a month, or for thirty-five

days only.  It was almost as if, in our own country, the Ministry or the

Houses of Parliament were to change every month.  The average ability of

the Athenian and Magnesian councillors could not have been very high,

considering there were so many of them.  And yet they were entrusted with

the performance of the most important executive duties.  In these respects

the constitution of the Laws resembles Athens far more than Sparta.  All

the citizens were to be, not merely soldiers, but politicians and

administrators.



(ii)  There are numerous minor particulars in which the Laws of Plato

resemble those of Athens.  These are less interesting than the preceding,

but they show even more strikingly how closely in the composition of his

work Plato has followed the laws and customs of his own country.



(1)  Evidence.  (a) At Athens a child was not allowed to give evidence

(Telfy).  Plato has a similar law:  'A child shall be allowed to give

evidence only in cases of murder.'  (b) At Athens an unwilling witness

might be summoned; but he was not required to appear if he was ready to

declare on oath that he knew nothing about the matter in question (Telfy). 

So in the Laws.  (c) Athenian law enacted that when more than half the

witnesses in a case had been convicted of perjury, there was to be a new

trial (anadikos krisis--Telfy).  There is a similar provision in the Laws. 

(d) False-witness was punished at Athens by atimia and a fine (Telfy). 

Plato is at once more lenient and more severe:  'If a man be twice

convicted of false-witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he

shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he

has been convicted three times,...he shall be punished with death.'



(2)  Murder.  (a) Wilful murder was punished in Athenian law by death,

perpetual exile, and confiscation of property (Telfy).  Plato, too, has the

alternative of death or exile, but he does not confiscate the murderer's

property.  (b) The Parricide was not allowed to escape by going into exile

at Athens (Telfy), nor, apparently, in the Laws.  (c) A homicide, if

forgiven by his victim before death, received no punishment, either at

Athens (Telfy), or in the Magnesian state.  In both (Telfy) the contriver

of a murder is punished as severely as the doer; and persons accused of the

crime are forbidden to enter temples or the agora until they have been

tried (Telfy).  (d) At Athens slaves who killed their masters and were

caught red-handed, were not to be put to death by the relations of the

murdered man, but to be handed over to the magistrates (Telfy).  So in the

Laws, the slave who is guilty of wilful murder has a public execution:  but

if the murder is committed in anger, it is punished by the kinsmen of the

victim.



(3)  Involuntary homicide.  (a) The guilty person, according to the

Athenian law, had to go into exile, and might not return, until the family

of the man slain were conciliated.  Then he must be purified (Telfy).  If

he is caught before he has obtained forgiveness, he may be put to death. 

These enactments reappear in the Laws.  (b) The curious provision of Plato,

that a stranger who has been banished for involuntary homicide and is

subsequently wrecked upon the coast, must 'take up his abode on the sea-

shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of

sailing,' recalls the procedure of the Judicium Phreatteum at Athens,

according to which an involuntary homicide, who, having gone into exile, is

accused of a wilful murder, was tried at Phreatto for this offence in a

boat by magistrates on the shore.  (c) A still more singular law, occurring

both in the Athenian and Magnesian code, enacts that a stone or other

inanimate object which kills a man is to be tried, and cast over the border

(Telfy).



(4)  Justifiable or excusable homicide.  Plato and Athenian law agree in

making homicide justifiable or excusable in the following cases:--(1) at

the games (Telfy); (2) in war (Telfy); (3) if the person slain was found

doing violence to a free woman (Telfy); (4) if a doctor's patient dies; (5)

in the case of a robber (Telfy); (6) in self-defence (Telfy).



(5)  Impiety.  Death or expulsion was the Athenian penalty for impiety

(Telfy).  In the Laws it is punished in various cases by imprisonment for

five years, for life, and by death.



(6)  Sacrilege.  Robbery of temples at Athens was punished by death,

refusal of burial in the land, and confiscation of property (Telfy).  In

the Laws the citizen who is guilty of such a crime is to 'perish

ingloriously and be cast beyond the borders of the land,' but his property

is not confiscated.



(7)  Sorcery.  The sorcerer at Athens was to be executed (Telfy):  compare

Laws, where it is enacted that the physician who poisons and the

professional sorcerer shall be punished with death.



(8)  Treason.  Both at Athens and in the Laws the penalty for treason was

death (Telfy), and refusal of burial in the country (Telfy).



(9)  Sheltering exiles.  'If a man receives an exile, he shall be punished

with death.'  So, too, in Athenian law (Telfy.).



(10)  Wounding.  Athenian law compelled a man who had wounded another to go

into exile; if he returned, he was to be put to death (Telfy).  Plato only

punishes the offence with death when children wound their parents or one

another, or a slave wounds his master.



(11)  Bribery.  Death was the punishment for taking a bribe, both at Athens

(Telfy) and in the Laws; but Athenian law offered an alternative--the

payment of a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe.



(12)  Theft.  Plato, like Athenian law (Telfy), punishes the theft of

public property by death; the theft of private property in both involves a

fine of double the value of the stolen goods (Telfy).



(13)  Suicide.  He 'who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own

best friend,' is regarded in the same spirit by Plato and by Athenian law.

Plato would have him 'buried ingloriously on the borders of the twelve

portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless,' and

'no column or inscription is to mark the place of his interment.'  Athenian

law enacted that the hand which did the deed should be separated from the

body and be buried apart (Telfy).



(14)  Injury.  In cases of wilful injury, Athenian law compelled the guilty

person to pay double the damage; in cases of involuntary injury, simple

damages (Telfy).  Plato enacts that if a man wounds another in passion, and

the wound is curable, he shall pay double the damage, if incurable or

disfiguring, fourfold damages.  If, however, the wounding is accidental, he

shall simply pay for the harm done.



(15)  Treatment of parents.  Athenian law allowed any one to indict another

for neglect or illtreatment of parents (Telfy).  So Plato bids bystanders

assist a father who is assaulted by his son, and allows any one to give

information against children who neglect their parents.



(16)  Execution of sentences.  Both Plato and Athenian law give to the

winner of a suit power to seize the goods of the loser, if he does not pay

within the appointed time (Telfy).  At Athens the penalty was also doubled

(Telfy); not so in Plato.  Plato however punishes contempt of court by

death, which at Athens seems only to have been visited with a further fine

(Telfy).



(17)  Property.  (a) Both at Athens and in the Laws a man who has disputed

property in his possession must give the name of the person from whom he

received it (Telfy); and any one searching for lost property must enter a

house naked (Telfy), or, as Plato says, 'naked, or wearing only a short

tunic and without a girdle.  (b) Athenian law, as well as Plato, did not

allow a father to disinherit his son without good reason and the consent of

impartial persons (Telfy).  Neither grants to the eldest son any special

claim on the paternal estate (Telfy).  In the law of inheritance both

prefer males to females (Telfy).  (c) Plato and Athenian law enacted that a

tree should be planted at a fair distance from a neighbour's property

(Telfy), and that when a man could not get water, his neighbour must supply

him (Telfy).  Both at Athens and in Plato there is a law about bees, the

former providing that a beehive must be set up at not less a distance than

300 feet from a neighbour's (Telfy), and the latter forbidding the decoying

of bees.



(18)  Orphans.  A ward must proceed against a guardian whom he suspects of

fraud within five years of the expiration of the guardianship.  This

provision is common to Plato and to Athenian law (Telfy).  Further, the

latter enacted that the nearest male relation should marry or provide a

husband for an heiress (Telfy),--a point in which Plato follows it closely.



(19)  Contracts.  Plato's law that 'when a man makes an agreement which he

does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a

vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the

influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from

fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance,--the other party may

go to law with him,' according to Pollux (quoted in Telfy's note) prevailed

also at Athens.



(20)  Trade regulations.  (a) Lying was forbidden in the agora both by

Plato and at Athens (Telfy).  (b) Athenian law allowed an action of

recovery against a man who sold an unsound slave as sound (Telfy).  Plato's

enactment is more explicit:  he allows only an unskilled person (i.e. one

who is not a trainer or physician) to take proceedings in such a case.  (c)

Plato diverges from Athenian practice in the disapproval of credit, and

does not even allow the supply of goods on the deposit of a percentage of

their value (Telfy).  He enacts that 'when goods are exchanged by buying

and selling, a man shall deliver them and receive the price of them at a

fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter,' and that 'he who

gives credit must be satisfied whether he obtain his money or not, for in

such exchanges he will not be protected by law.  (d) Athenian law forbad an

extortionate rate of interest (Telfy); Plato allows interest in one case

only--if a contractor does not receive the price of his work within a year

of the time agreed--and at the rate of 200 per cent. per annum ('for every

drachma a monthly interest of an obol.  (e) Both at Athens and in the Laws

sales were to be registered (Telfy), as well as births (Telfy).



(21)  Sumptuary laws.  Extravagance at weddings (Telfy), and at funerals

(Telfy) was forbidden at Athens and also in the Magnesian state.



There remains the subject of family life, which in Plato's Laws partakes

both of an Athenian and Spartan character.  Under this head may

conveniently be included the condition of women and of slaves.  To family

life may be added citizenship.



As at Sparta, marriages are to be contracted for the good of the state; and

they may be dissolved on the same ground, where there is a failure of

issue,--the interest of the state requiring that every one of the 5040 lots

should have an heir.  Divorces are likewise permitted by Plato where there

is an incompatibility of temper, as at Athens by mutual consent.  The duty

of having children is also enforced by a still higher motive, expressed by

Plato in the noble words:--'A man should cling to immortality, and leave

behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place.' 

Again, as at Athens, the father is allowed to put away his undutiful son,

but only with the consent of impartial persons (Telfy), and the only suit

which may be brought by a son against a father is for imbecility.  The

class of elder and younger men and women are still to regard one another,

as in the Republic, as standing in the relation of parents and children. 

This is a trait of Spartan character rather than of Athenian.  A peculiar

sanctity and tenderness was to be shown towards the aged; the parent or

grandparent stricken with years was to be loved and worshipped like the

image of a God, and was to be deemed far more able than any lifeless statue

to bring good or ill to his descendants.  Great care is to be taken of

orphans:  they are entrusted to the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Law,

who are to be 'lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural

fathers,' as at Athens they were entrusted to the Archons.  Plato wishes to

make the misfortune of orphanhood as little sad to them as possible.



Plato, seeing the disorder into which half the human race had fallen at

Athens and Sparta, is minded to frame for them a new rule of life.  He

renounces his fanciful theory of communism, but still desires to place

women as far as possible on an equality with men.  They were to be trained

in the use of arms, they are to live in public.  Their time was partly

taken up with gymnastic exercises; there could have been little family or

private life among them.  Their lot was to be neither like that of Spartan

women, who were made hard and common by excessive practice of gymnastic and

the want of all other education,--nor yet like that of Athenian women, who,

at least among the upper classes, retired into a sort of oriental

seclusion,--but something better than either.  They were to be the perfect

mothers of perfect children, yet not wholly taken up with the duties of

motherhood, which were to be made easy to them as far as possible (compare

Republic), but able to share in the perils of war and to be the companions

of their husbands.  Here, more than anywhere else, the spirit of the Laws

reverts to the Republic.  In speaking of them as the companions of their

husbands we must remember that it is an Athenian and not a Spartan way of

life which they are invited to share, a life of gaiety and brightness, not

of austerity and abstinence, which often by a reaction degenerated into

licence and grossness.



In Plato's age the subject of slavery greatly interested the minds of

thoughtful men; and how best to manage this 'troublesome piece of goods'

exercised his own mind a good deal.  He admits that they have often been

found better than brethren or sons in the hour of danger, and are capable

of rendering important public services by informing against offenders--for

this they are to be rewarded; and the master who puts a slave to death for

the sake of concealing some crime which he has committed, is held guilty of

murder.  But they are not always treated with equal consideration.  The

punishments inflicted on them bear no proportion to their crimes.  They are

to be addressed only in the language of command.  Their masters are not to

jest with them, lest they should increase the hardship of their lot.  Some

privileges were granted to them by Athenian law of which there is no

mention in Plato; they were allowed to purchase their freedom from their

master, and if they despaired of being liberated by him they could demand

to be sold, on the chance of falling into better hands.  But there is no

suggestion in the Laws that a slave who tried to escape should be branded

with the words--kateche me, pheugo, or that evidence should be extracted

from him by torture, that the whole household was to be executed if the

master was murdered and the perpetrator remained undetected:  all these

were provisions of Athenian law.  Plato is more consistent than either the

Athenians or the Spartans; for at Sparta too the Helots were treated in a

manner almost unintelligible to us.  On the one hand, they had arms put

into their hands, and served in the army, not only, as at Plataea, in

attendance on their masters, but, after they had been manumitted, as a

separate body of troops called Neodamodes:  on the other hand, they were

the victims of one of the greatest crimes recorded in Greek history

(Thucyd.).  The two great philosophers of Hellas sought to extricate

themselves from this cruel condition of human life, but acquiesced in the

necessity of it.  A noble and pathetic sentiment of Plato, suggested by the

thought of their misery, may be quoted in this place:--'The right treatment

of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible,

even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally

and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his

dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust.  And he who

in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety

and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be

truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority

in relation to his inferiors.'



All the citizens of the Magnesian state were free and equal; there was no

distinction of rank among them, such as is believed to have prevailed at

Sparta.  Their number was a fixed one, corresponding to the 5040 lots.  One

of the results of this is the requirement that younger sons or those who

have been disinherited shall go out to a colony.  At Athens, where there

was not the same religious feeling against increasing the size of the city,

the number of citizens must have been liable to considerable fluctuations.

Several classes of persons, who were not citizens by birth, were admitted

to the privilege.  Perpetual exiles from other countries, people who

settled there to practise a trade (Telfy), any one who had shown

distinguished valour in the cause of Athens, the Plataeans who escaped from

the siege, metics and strangers who offered to serve in the army, the

slaves who fought at Arginusae,--all these could or did become citizens. 

Even those who were only on one side of Athenian parentage were at more

than one period accounted citizens.  But at times there seems to have

arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension of the citizen body, an

expression of which is to be found in the law of Pericles--monous

Athenaious einai tous ek duoin Athenaion gegonotas (Plutarch, Pericles);

and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the full rights of

citizenship--e.g. he might not be elected archon or to the office of priest

(Telfy), although this prohibition did not extend to his children, if born

of a citizen wife.  Plato never thinks of making the metic, much less the

slave, a citizen.  His treatment of the former class is at once more gentle

and more severe than that which prevailed at Athens.  He imposes upon them

no tax but good behaviour, whereas at Athens they were required to pay

twelve drachmae per annum, and to have a patron:  on the other hand, he

only allows them to reside in the Magnesian state on condition of following

a trade; they were required to depart when their property exceeded that of

the third class, and in any case after a residence of twenty years, unless

they could show that they had conferred some great benefit on the state. 

This privileged position reflects that of the isoteleis at Athens, who were

excused from the metoikion.  It is Plato's greatest concession to the

metic, as the bestowal of freedom is his greatest concession to the slave.



Lastly, there is a more general point of view under which the Laws of Plato

may be considered,--the principles of Jurisprudence which are contained in

them.  These are not formally announced, but are scattered up and down, to

be observed by the reflective reader for himself.  Some of them are only

the common principles which all courts of justice have gathered from

experience; others are peculiar and characteristic.  That judges should sit

at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order, that evidence should be

laid before them, that false witnesses should be disallowed, and corruption

punished, that defendants should be heard before they are convicted,--these

are the rules, not only of the Hellenic courts, but of courts of law in all

ages and countries.  But there are also points which are peculiar, and in

which ancient jurisprudence differs considerably from modern; some of them

are of great importance...It could not be said at Athens, nor was it ever

contemplated by Plato, that all men, including metics and slaves, should be

equal 'in the eye of the law.'  There was some law for the slave, but not

much; no adequate protection was given him against the cruelty of his

master...It was a singular privilege granted, both by the Athenian and

Magnesian law, to a murdered man, that he might, before he died, pardon his

murderer, in which case no legal steps were afterwards to be taken against

him.  This law is the remnant of an age in which the punishment of offences

against the person was the concern rather of the individual and his kinsmen

than of the state...Plato's division of crimes into voluntary and

involuntary and those done from passion, only partially agrees with the

distinction which modern law has drawn between murder and manslaughter; his

attempt to analyze them is confused by the Socratic paradox, that 'All vice

is involuntary'...It is singular that both in the Laws and at Athens theft

is commonly punished by a twofold restitution of the article stolen.  The

distinction between civil and criminal courts or suits was not yet

recognized...Possession gives a right of property after a certain

time...The religious aspect under which certain offences were regarded

greatly interfered with a just and natural estimate of their guilt...As

among ourselves, the intent to murder was distinguished by Plato from

actual murder...We note that both in Plato and the laws of Athens, libel in

the market-place and personality in the theatre were forbidden...Both in

Plato and Athenian law, as in modern times, the accomplice of a crime is to

be punished as well as the principal...Plato does not allow a witness in a

cause to act as a judge of it...Oaths are not to be taken by the parties to

a suit...Both at Athens and in Plato's Laws capital punishment for murder

was not to be inflicted, if the offender was willing to go into

exile...Respect for the dead, duty towards parents, are to be enforced by

the law as well as by public opinion...Plato proclaims the noble sentiment

that the object of all punishment is the improvement of the offender...

Finally, he repeats twice over, as with the voice of a prophet, that the

crimes of the fathers are not to be visited upon the children.  In this

respect he is nobly distinguished from the Oriental, and indeed from the

spirit of Athenian law (compare Telfy,--dei kai autous kai tous ek touton

atimous einai), as the Hebrew in the age of Ezekial is from the Jewish

people of former ages.



Of all Plato's provisions the object is to bring the practice of the law

more into harmony with reason and philosophy; to secure impartiality, and

while acknowledging that every citizen has a right to share in the

administration of justice, to counteract the tendency of the courts to

become mere popular assemblies.



...



Thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the last

stage of philosophy which was really his.  For in what followed, which we

chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the spirit of

the master no longer survived.  The doctrine of Ideas passed into one of

numbers; instead of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, the

theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and either asserted or

refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or Platonic element in

his teaching was absorbed into the Pythagorean or Megarian.  His poetry was

converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial visions were assailed secundum

artem by the rules of logic.  His political speculations lost their

interest when the freedom of Hellas had passed away.  Of all his writings

the Laws were the furthest removed from the traditions of the Platonic

school in the next generation.  Both his political and his metaphysical

philosophy are for the most part misinterpreted by Aristotle.  The best of

him--his love of truth, and his 'contemplation of all time and all

existence,' was soonest lost; and some of his greatest thoughts have slept

in the ear of mankind almost ever since they were first uttered.



We have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from

the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of Socrates in

a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of Socrates had

disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato's own mind upon

Hellas and upon philosophy.  He, who was 'the last of the poets,' in his

book of Laws writes prose only; he has himself partly fallen under the

rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was combating.  The

progress of his writings is also the history of his life; we have no other

authentic life of him.  They are the true self of the philosopher, stripped

of the accidents of time and place.  The great effort which he makes is,

first, to realize abstractions, secondly, to connect them.  In the attempt

to realize them, he was carried into a transcendental region in which he

isolated them from experience, and we pass out of the range of science into

poetry or fiction.  The fancies of mythology for a time cast a veil over

the gulf which divides phenomena from onta (Meno, Phaedrus, Symposium,

Phaedo).  In his return to earth Plato meets with a difficulty which has

long ceased to be a difficulty to us.  He cannot understand how these

obstinate, unmanageable ideas, residing alone in their heaven of

abstraction, can be either combined with one another, or adapted to

phenomena (Parmenides, Philebus, Sophist).  That which is the most familiar

process of our own minds, to him appeared to be the crowning achievement of

the dialectical art.  The difficulty which in his own generation threatened

to be the destruction of philosophy, he has rendered unmeaning and

ridiculous.  For by his conquests in the world of mind our thoughts are

widened, and he has furnished us with new dialectical instruments which are

of greater compass and power.  We have endeavoured to see him as he truly

was, a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of

knowledge, not prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues

ideas which he had long conceived, but contradictory, enquiring as he goes

along, following the argument, first from one point of view and then from

another, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering around

the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always moving in

the same element of ideal truth.  We have seen him also in his decline,

when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his experience

of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of the eternal to

take a last sad look at human affairs.



...



And so having brought into the world 'noble children' (Phaedr.), he rests

from the labours of authorship.  More than two thousand two hundred years

have passed away since he returned to the place of Apollo and the Muses. 

Yet the echo of his words continues to be heard among men, because of all

philosophers he has the most melodious voice.  He is the inspired prophet

or teacher who can never die, the only one in whom the outward form

adequately represents the fair soul within; in whom the thoughts of all who

went before him are reflected and of all who come after him are partly

anticipated.  Other teachers of philosophy are dried up and withered,--

after a few centuries they have become dust; but he is fresh and blooming,

and is always begetting new ideas in the minds of men.  They are one-sided

and abstract; but he has many sides of wisdom.  Nor is he always consistent

with himself, because he is always moving onward, and knows that there are

many more things in philosophy than can be expressed in words, and that

truth is greater than consistency.  He who approaches him in the most

reverent spirit shall reap most of the fruit of his wisdom; he who reads

him by the light of ancient commentators will have the least understanding

of him.



We may see him with the eye of the mind in the groves of the Academy, or on

the banks of the Ilissus, or in the streets of Athens, alone or walking

with Socrates, full of those thoughts which have since become the common

possession of mankind.  Or we may compare him to a statue hid away in some

temple of Zeus or Apollo, no longer existing on earth, a statue which has a

look as of the God himself.  Or we may once more imagine him following in

another state of being the great company of heaven which he beheld of old

in a vision (Phaedr.).  So, 'partly trifling, but with a certain degree of

seriousness' (Symp.), we linger around the memory of a world which has

passed away (Phaedr.).









LAWS



by



Plato



Translated by Benjamin Jowett





BOOK I.



PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:  An Athenian Stranger, Cleinias (a Cretan),

Megillus (a Lacedaemonian).





ATHENIAN:  Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the

author of your laws?



CLEINIAS:  A God, Stranger; in very truth a God:  among us Cretans he is

said to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, whence our friend here comes, I

believe they would say that Apollo is their lawgiver:  would they not,

Megillus?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And do you, Cleinias, believe, as Homer tells, that every ninth

year Minos went to converse with his Olympian sire, and was inspired by him

to make laws for your cities?



CLEINIAS:  Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a

brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he is reputed to have

been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he earned this

reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive.



ATHENIAN:  Yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son of Zeus.  As

you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say that

you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and laws;

on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for I am

told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is

considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under the lofty trees,

which will protect us from this scorching sun.  Being no longer young, we

may often stop to rest beneath them, and get over the whole journey without

difficulty, beguiling the time by conversation.



CLEINIAS:  Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves

of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green

meadows, in which we may repose and converse.



ATHENIAN:  Very good.



CLEINIAS:  Very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us

move on cheerily.



ATHENIAN:  I am willing--And first, I want to know why the law has ordained

that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.



CLEINIAS:  I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily

intelligible to any one.  Look at the character of our country:  Crete is

not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen in

Thessaly, and we have runners--the inequality of the ground in our country

is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you

must have light arms--no one can carry a heavy weight when running, and

bows and arrows are convenient because they are light.  Now all these

regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears

to me to have looked to this in all his arrangements:--the common meals, if

I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he

saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the

case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual

protection.  He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not

understanding that all men are always at war with one another; and if in

war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed

under others to protect an army, they should be continued in peace.  For

what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name; in

reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not

indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting.  And if you look closely,

you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all

institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view

to war; in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or

institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the

good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.



ATHENIAN:  You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in

the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell

me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you

would lay down?  You seem to imagine that a well-governed state ought to be

so ordered as to conquer all other states in war:  am I right in supposing

this to be your meaning?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly; and our Lacedaemonian friend, if I am not mistaken,

will agree with me.



MEGILLUS:  Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything

else?



ATHENIAN:  And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to

villages?



CLEINIAS:  To both alike.



ATHENIAN:  The case is the same?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And in the village will there be the same war of family against

family, and of individual against individual?



CLEINIAS:  The same.



ATHENIAN:  And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy:--what

shall we say?



CLEINIAS:  O Athenian Stranger--inhabitant of Attica I will not call you,

for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself,

because you go back to first principles,--you have thrown a light upon the

argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just saying,

--that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately

his own.



(ATHENIAN:  My good sir, what do you mean?)--



CLEINIAS:...Moreover, there is a victory and defeat--the first and best of

victories, the lowest and worst of defeats--which each man gains or

sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that

there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us.



ATHENIAN:  Let us now reverse the order of the argument:  Seeing that every

individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we say that

there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?



CLEINIAS:  You mean that in each of them there is a principle of

superiority or inferiority to self?



ATHENIAN:  Yes.



CLEINIAS:  You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly

is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the

better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes

may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised,

where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.



ATHENIAN:  Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a

question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the

present.  But I now quite understand your meaning when you say that

citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may unjustly

conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave

the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own

inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior

and therefore good.



CLEINIAS:  Your remark, Stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly

deny it.



ATHENIAN:  Here is another case for consideration;--in a family there may

be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly

the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.



CLEINIAS:  Very possibly.



ATHENIAN:  And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to

whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they

conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not now

considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking,

but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.



CLEINIAS:  What you say, Stranger, is most true.



MEGILLUS:  Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone.



ATHENIAN:  Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom

we were speaking?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Now, which would be the better judge--one who destroyed the bad

and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the

good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit?  Or

third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who,

finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy any one, but

reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which

they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.



CLEINIAS:  The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.



ATHENIAN:  And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the

reverse of war.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man

have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil,

which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own

state; and when occurring, every one would wish to be quit of as soon as

possible?



CLEINIAS:  He would have the latter chiefly in view.



ATHENIAN:  And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by

the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or

that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that, being

reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies?



CLEINIAS:  Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state.



ATHENIAN:  And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the

best?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the

need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good

will, are best.  Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded

as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that

the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting

that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge.  And in like

manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of

the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external

warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the

sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.



CLEINIAS:  I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of

yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and

object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.



ATHENIAN:  I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel

with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning

them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest.  Please follow

me and the argument closely:--And first I will put forward Tyrtaeus, an

Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all men was most

eager about war:  Well, he says,



'I sing not, I care not, about any man,



even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he

gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave warrior.'  I

imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend

has probably heard more than enough of them.



MEGILLUS:  Very true.



CLEINIAS:  And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.



ATHENIAN:  Come now and let us all join in asking this question of

Tyrtaeus:  O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise

which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that

you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I

believe, entirely agree with you.  But we should like to be quite sure that

we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in

thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say?  A far

inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly,

that war is of two kinds,--one which is universally called civil war, and

is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we

should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a

different race, is a far milder form of warfare.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly, far milder.



ATHENIAN:  Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown

strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you

referring?  I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from

expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those



'Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike

at their enemies.'



And we shall naturally go on to say to him,--You, Tyrtaeus, as it seems,

praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he

must admit this.



CLEINIAS:  Evidently.



ATHENIAN:  They are good; but we say that there are still better men whose

virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles.  And we too have a poet

whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily:



'Cyrnus,' he says, 'he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight

in gold and silver.'



And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more

difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance

and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a

man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. 

But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take

his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and

almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most

senseless of human beings.  You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I

am seeking to prove:  I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like

any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things

in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to

Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect

justice.  Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well

enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and

dignity may be said to be only fourth rate (i.e., it ranks after justice,

temperance, and wisdom.).



CLEINIAS:  Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which

is far beneath him.



ATHENIAN:  Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we

imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete

mainly with a view to war.



CLEINIAS:  What ought we to say then?



ATHENIAN:  What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken,

when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;--that the legislator when

making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of

virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to

the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make

the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is

felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses,

another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters.  But

we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we

have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you were

quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of

the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that

all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of

virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks.  Will you allow me

then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the

matter?



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  You ought to have said, Stranger--The Cretan laws are with

reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which

is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of good. 

Now goods are of two kinds:  there are human and there are divine goods,

and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the

greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater,

has neither.  Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty,

the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility

generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god (Pluto), but one who

is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion.  For wisdom is

chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance;

and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in

the scale of virtue is courage.  All these naturally take precedence of the

other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them,

and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens

with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine

looking to their leader mind.  Some of his ordinances will relate to

contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the

procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of

the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and

at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in

reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider

their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their

passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them

rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves.  Also with regard to anger and

terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of

misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the

experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the

opposite of these; in all these states he should determine and teach what

is the good and evil of the condition of each.  In the next place, the

legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what

way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and

dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary:  he should see

how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is

found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honour

those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey,

until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the

consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead.  And the

lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these

things,--some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and

then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in

harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition.  This

is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should

pursue the subject.  And I want to know the nature of all these things, and

how they are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those

of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of

them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by

study or habit, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest

of mankind like ourselves.



CLEINIAS:  How shall we proceed, Stranger?



ATHENIAN:  I think that we must begin again as before, and first consider

the habit of courage; and then we will go on and discuss another and then

another form of virtue, if you please.  In this way we shall have a model

of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the

way.  And when we have gone through all the virtues, we will show, by the

grace of God, that the institutions of which I was speaking look to virtue.



MEGILLUS:  Very good; and suppose that you first criticize this praiser of

Zeus and the laws of Crete.



ATHENIAN:  I will try to criticize you and myself, as well as him, for the

argument is a common concern.  Tell me,--were not first the syssitia, and

secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?



MEGILLUS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And what comes third, and what fourth?  For that, I think, is

the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining parts of

virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is,

provided the meaning is clear.



MEGILLUS:  Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is

third in order.



ATHENIAN:  Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.



MEGILLUS:  I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is the

frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain hand-to-

hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a good beating;

there is, too, the so-called Crypteia, or secret service, in which

wonderful endurance is shown,--our people wander over the whole country by

day and by night, and even in winter have not a shoe to their foot, and are

without beds to lie upon, and have to attend upon themselves.  Marvellous,

too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their naked exercises,

contending against the violent summer heat; and there are many similar

practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless.



ATHENIAN:  Excellent, O Lacedaemonian Stranger.  But how ought we to define

courage?  Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or

also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise

such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable

citizens to melt like wax?



MEGILLUS:  I should say the latter.



ATHENIAN:  In what preceded, as you will remember, our Cnosian friend was

speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves:--Were you not,

Cleinias?



CLEINIAS:  I was.



ATHENIAN:  Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is

overcome by pleasure or by pain?



CLEINIAS:  I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men

deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is

overcome by pain.



ATHENIAN:  But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not

legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet

attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious

flatteries which come from the right?



CLEINIAS:  Able to meet both, I should say.



ATHENIAN:  Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either

of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any

more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them,

and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of

them?  Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to

be found in your laws?  Tell me what there is of this nature among you:--

What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and

pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies

who are most dangerous and nearest home?



MEGILLUS:  I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed

against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious

examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there

are some lesser provisions, however, which I might mention.



CLEINIAS:  Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all equally

prominent in the Cretan laws.



ATHENIAN:  No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our

search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of

the others, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another says.



CLEINIAS:  You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you

say.



ATHENIAN:  At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of

irritation.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly not.



ATHENIAN:  I will not at present determine whether he who censures the

Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong.  But I believe that I

can tell better than either of you what the many say about them.  For

assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will

be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or

wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the laws

are all good, for they came from God; and any one who says the contrary is

not to be listened to.  But an old man who remarks any defect in your laws

may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no

young man is present.



CLEINIAS:  Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at

the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator,

and to say what is most true.



ATHENIAN:  As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given

old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these

very matters now that we are alone.



CLEINIAS:  True.  And therefore you may be as free as you like in your

censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he

who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be all the

better for it.



ATHENIAN:  Very good; however, I am not going to say anything against your

laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am going

to raise doubts about them.  For you are the only people known to us,

whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all

great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them; whereas in the

matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought

that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears and sorrows,

when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were

hardened in them, and would become their subjects.  Now the legislator

ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should

have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward

unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the

temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things

evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would

overcome the former class; and in another, and even a worse manner, they

will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have

had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of

mankind.  One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and

they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. 

Tell me whether you assent to my words?



CLEINIAS:  On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to

be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be

very childish and simple.



ATHENIAN:  Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue

which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage

comes temperance), what institutions shall we find relating to temperance,

either in Crete or Lacedaemon, which, like your military institutions,

differ from those of any ordinary state.



MEGILLUS:  That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say that

the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for

the promotion both of temperance and courage.



ATHENIAN:  There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, with regard to states,

in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no dispute about

them.  As in the human body, the regimen which does good in one way does

harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is

adapted to a particular constitution.  Now the gymnasia and common meals do

a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles;

as is shown in the case of the Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth,

among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade

the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man,

but of the beasts.  The charge may be fairly brought against your cities

above all others, and is true also of most other states which especially

cultivate gymnastics.  Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or

seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises

out of the intercourse between men and women; but that the intercourse of

men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the

bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust.  The Cretans are always

accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they

wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the

practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver.  Leaving

the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost

entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals:  these

are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where

and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and

animals--of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them

ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the reverse of happy.



MEGILLUS:  I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken, and I hardly

know what to say in answer to you; but still I think that the Spartan

lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure.  Of the Cretan laws, I

shall leave the defence to my Cnosian friend.  But the laws of Sparta, in

as far as they relate to pleasure, appear to me to be the best in the

world; for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure

and licence, and every other folly, the law has clean driven out; and

neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta,

will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure

which accompany them; and any one who meets a drunken and disorderly

person, will immediately have him most severely punished, and will not let

him off on any pretence, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival;

although I have remarked that this may happen at your performances 'on the

cart,' as they are called; and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen

the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival; but nothing of the sort

happens among us.



ATHENIAN:  O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy

where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are

under no regulations.  In order to retaliate, an Athenian has only to point

out the licence which exists among your women.  To all such accusations,

whether they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is

one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. 

When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees, any

inhabitant will naturally answer him:--Wonder not, O stranger; this is our

custom, and you may very likely have some other custom about the same

things.  Now we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but

about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves.  Let us then

discourse a little more at length about intoxication, which is a very

important subject, and will seriously task the discrimination of the

legislator.  I am not speaking of drinking, or not drinking, wine at all,

but of intoxication.  Are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and

Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians, who

are all warlike nations, or that of your countrymen, for they, as you say,

altogether abstain?  But the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women,

drink unmixed wine, which they pour on their garments, and this they think

a happy and glorious institution.  The Persians, again, are much given to

other practices of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation

in them than the Thracians and Scythians.



MEGILLUS:  O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we

send all these nations flying before us.



ATHENIAN:  Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there

always will be, flights and pursuits of which no account can be given, and

therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords more than

a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions.  For when the

greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the Syracusans have done

the Locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of

the world, or as the Athenians have done the Ceans (and there are ten

thousand other instances of the same sort of thing), all this is not to the

point; let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about each institution

in itself and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats.  Let us

only say that such and such a custom is honourable, and another not.  And

first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in

reference to these very matters.



MEGILLUS:  How do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or

censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed

in a wrong way.  Let me give you an illustration of what I mean:--You may

suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind of food, whereupon

another person instantly blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its

effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state

and how, wheat is to be given.  And that is just what we are doing in this

discussion.  At the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is

ready with their praises and the other with their censures; which is

absurd.  For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of

us think that we speak with authority because we have many witnesses; and

others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this

again is disputed by us.  Now I cannot say that I shall be satisfied, if we

go on discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way.  And about

this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way,

which I hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the criterion, are

there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with

you, who are only two cities?



MEGILLUS:  I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.



ATHENIAN:  Let me put the matter thus:--Suppose a person to praise the

keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have,

and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd in

cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any other

animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or

justice in such censure?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly not.



ATHENIAN:  Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order

to be a good captain, whether he is sea-sick or not?  What do you say?



MEGILLUS:  I say that he is not a good captain if, although he have

nautical skill, he is liable to sea-sickness.



ATHENIAN:  And what would you say of the commander of an army?  Will he be

able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward,

who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?



MEGILLUS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?



MEGILLUS:  He is a miserable fellow, not fit to be a commander of men, but

only of old women.



ATHENIAN:  And what would you say of some one who blames or praises any

sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well

enough when under his presidency?  The critic, however, has never seen the

society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a

president, but always without a ruler or with a bad one:--when observers of

this class praise or blame such meetings, are we to suppose that what they

say is of any value?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a

meeting when rightly ordered.



ATHENIAN:  Reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a

kind of meeting?



MEGILLUS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  And did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly

ordered?  Of course you two will answer that you have never seen them at

all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country; but I have

come across many of them in many different places, and moreover I have made

enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may say, and never did I see or

hear of anything of the kind which was carried on altogether rightly; in

some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly

wrong.



CLEINIAS:  What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark?  Explain.  For we,

as you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely not

know, even if they came in our way, what was right or wrong in such

societies.



ATHENIAN:  Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor:  You would

acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of whatever

sort, there ought to be a leader?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly I should.



ATHENIAN:  And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader

ought to be a brave man?



CLEINIAS:  We were.



ATHENIAN:  The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by

fears?



CLEINIAS:  That again is true.



ATHENIAN:  And if there were a possibility of having a general of an army

who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means

appoint him?



CLEINIAS:  Assuredly.



ATHENIAN:  Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is to command

an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to regulate

meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt

to be unquiet.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly; the reverse of quiet.



ATHENIAN:  In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers

will require a ruler?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure; no men more so.



ATHENIAN:  And we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler?



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  And he should be a man who understands society; for his duty is

to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the

time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of

the revels?  For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken, and

not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved from

doing some great evil.



CLEINIAS:  It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.



ATHENIAN:  Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way

possible in states, and that some one blames the very fact of their

existence--he may very likely be right.  But if he blames a practice which

he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows in the first place that he is

not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that everything done in

this way will turn out to be wrong, because done without the

superintendence of a sober ruler.  Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a

drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army--anything, in

short, of which he has the direction?



CLEINIAS:  The last remark is very true, Stranger; and I see quite clearly

the advantage of an army having a good leader--he will give victory in war

to his followers, which is a very great advantage; and so of other things. 

But I do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states

gain from the good management of a feast; and I want you to tell me what

great good will be effected, supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly

established.



ATHENIAN:  If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the

right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus--when the question

is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any

particular instance.  But if you ask what is the good of education in

general, the answer is easy--that education makes good men, and that good

men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. 

Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces

forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in

war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many

a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is

never suicidal.



CLEINIAS:  You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when

rightly ordered, are an important element of education.



ATHENIAN:  Certainly I do.



CLEINIAS:  And can you show that what you have been saying is true?



ATHENIAN:  To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which

there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man,

Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as

we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and

constitutions.



CLEINIAS:  Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now being

raised, is precisely what we want to hear.



ATHENIAN:  Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning,

and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me.  But first let me

make an apology.  The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to

be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the Cretans

have more wit than words.  Now I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very

long discourse out of very small materials.  For drinking indeed may appear

to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered

according to nature, without correct principles of music; these are

necessary to any clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music

again runs up into education generally, and there is much to be said about

all this.  What would you say then to leaving these matters for the

present, and passing on to some other question of law?



MEGILLUS:  O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not

know, that our family is the proxenus of your state.  I imagine that from

their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni

of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this

has certainly been my own feeling.  I can well remember from the days of my

boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians, they

used to say to me,--'See, Megillus, how ill or how well,' as the case might

be, 'has your state treated us'; and having always had to fight your

battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I became warmly

attached to you.  And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken; the

common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily

good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine

inspiration of his own nature, and is not manufactured.  Therefore be

assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.



CLEINIAS:  Yes, Stranger; and when you have heard me speak, say boldly what

is in your thoughts.  Let me remind you of a tie which unites you to Crete. 

You must have heard here the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my

family, and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war, in accordance

with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the

God commanded.  The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian

invasion; and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when

they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their

objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted.  At that time my

forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus ancient is the

friendship which I and my parents have had for you.



ATHENIAN:  You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready to

perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will

nevertheless attempt.  At the outset of the discussion, let me define the

nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument

must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.



CLEINIAS:  Let us proceed, if you please.



ATHENIAN:  Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will

you consider whether they satisfy you?



CLEINIAS:  Let us hear.



ATHENIAN:  According to my view, any one who would be good at anything must

practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in

its several branches:  for example, he who is to be a good builder, should

play at building children's houses; he who is to be a good husbandman, at

tilling the ground; and those who have the care of their education should

provide them when young with mimic tools.  They should learn beforehand the

knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art.  For example,

the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and

the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for

amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's

inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim

in life.  The most important part of education is right training in the

nursery.  The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of

that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have

to be perfected.  Do you agree with me thus far?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-

defined.  At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the

bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another

uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated

for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the

like.  For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of

that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man

eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how

rightly to rule and how to obey.  This is the only education which, upon

our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the

acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from

intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be

called education at all.  But let us not quarrel with one another about a

word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: 

to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. 

Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and

fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable

to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation.  And this work of

reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.



CLEINIAS:  Very true; and we entirely agree with you.



ATHENIAN:  And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule

themselves, and bad men who are not.



CLEINIAS:  You are quite right.



ATHENIAN:  Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little

further by an illustration which I will offer you.



CLEINIAS:  Proceed.



ATHENIAN:  Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?



CLEINIAS:  We do.



ATHENIAN:  And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both

foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the

other pain.



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general

name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation

is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection

about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the

State, is called Law.



CLEINIAS:  I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.



MEGILLUS:  I am in the like case.



ATHENIAN:  Let us look at the matter thus:  May we not conceive each of us

living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or

created with a purpose--which of the two we cannot certainly know?  But we

do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull

us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies

the difference between virtue and vice.  According to the argument there is

one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but

to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden

cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others

which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there

are several other kinds.  Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of

the best, which is law.  For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle,

and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the

golden principle in vanquishing the other principles.  And thus the moral

of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the

meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will

become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this

matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its

rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has

knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in

her dealings with herself and with other states.  In this way virtue and

vice will be more clearly distinguished by us.  And when they have become

clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become

clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which

may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a

great many more words than were necessary.



CLEINIAS:  Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of

the length of discourse.



ATHENIAN:  Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on

our present object.



CLEINIAS:  Proceed.



ATHENIAN:  Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,--what will be

the effect on him?



CLEINIAS:  Having what in view do you ask that question?



ATHENIAN:  Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is brought

to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow.  I will endeavour to

explain my meaning more clearly:  what I am now asking is this--Does the

drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions

and loves?



CLEINIAS:  Very greatly.



ATHENIAN:  And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence,

heightened and increased?  Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if

he becomes saturated with drink?



CLEINIAS:  Yes, they entirely desert him.



ATHENIAN:  Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a

young child?



CLEINIAS:  He does.



ATHENIAN:  Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?



CLEINIAS:  The least.



ATHENIAN:  And will he not be in a most wretched plight?



CLEINIAS:  Most wretched.



ATHENIAN:  Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second

time a child?



CLEINIAS:  Well said, Stranger.



ATHENIAN:  Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to

encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?



CLEINIAS:  I suppose that there is; you at any rate, were just now saying

that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.



ATHENIAN:  True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both

declared that you are anxious to hear me.



CLEINIAS:  To be sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox,

which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter

degradation.



ATHENIAN:  Are you speaking of the soul?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And what would you say about the body, my friend?  Are you not

surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity,

leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and

takes medicine, is he not aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he

will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the

permanent condition of his life?  Are not those who train in gymnasia, at

first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?



CLEINIAS:  Yes, all that is well known.



ATHENIAN:  Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the

subsequent benefit?



CLEINIAS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other

practices?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine,

if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  If such convivialities should turn out to have any advantage

equal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very nature to

be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no

accompaniment of pain.



CLEINIAS:  True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any

such benefits to be derived from them.



ATHENIAN:  That is just what we must endeavour to show.  And let me ask you

a question:--Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very

different?



CLEINIAS:  What are they?



ATHENIAN:  There is the fear of expected evil.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of

being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which

fear we and all men term shame.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the

opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and

most numerous sort of pleasures.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And does not the legislator and every one who is good for

anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour?  This is what he terms

reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms

insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to

individuals and to states.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? 

What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war?  For there

are two things which give victory--confidence before enemies, and fear of

disgrace before friends.



CLEINIAS:  There are.



ATHENIAN:  Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we

should be either has now been determined.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring

him face to face with many fears.



CLEINIAS:  Clearly.



ATHENIAN:  And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not

introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against

them, and to overcome them?  Or does this principle apply to courage only,

and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his

own natural character,--since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in

such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been,--and

are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who

has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his

pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, by word,

deed, and act, will still be perfectly temperate?



CLEINIAS:  A most unlikely supposition.



ATHENIAN:  Suppose that some God had given a fear-potion to men, and that

the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at every draught

as a child of misfortune, and that he feared everything happening or about

to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost

his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had

slept off the influence of the draught.



CLEINIAS:  But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among

men?



ATHENIAN:  No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been

of use to the legislator as a test of courage?  Might we not go and say to

him, 'O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretan, or for any

other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and

cowardice of your citizens?'



CLEINIAS:  'I should,' will be the answer of every one.



ATHENIAN:  'And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no

risk and no great danger than the reverse?'



CLEINIAS:  In that proposition every one may safely agree.



ATHENIAN:  'And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them

amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear

was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and

admonishing them; and also honouring them, but dishonouring any one who

will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him;

and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go

unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him?  Or would

you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason

for abstaining?'



CLEINIAS:  He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.



ATHENIAN:  This would be a mode of testing and training which would be

wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied

to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do

well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than with any number

of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude, and

there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye

of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and

habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he

did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and

display his power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the

draught--his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any

great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived

at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by

the potion.



CLEINIAS:  Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his

self-control.



ATHENIAN:  Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:--'Well, lawgiver,

there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received from

the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. 

But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and

excessive and indiscreet boasting?



CLEINIAS:  I suppose that he will say, Yes,--meaning that wine is such a

potion.



ATHENIAN:  Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of

the other?  When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with

himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes,

and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened,

and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no

more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything.



CLEINIAS:  I think that every one will admit the truth of your description.



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two

things which should be cultivated in the soul:  first, the greatest

courage; secondly, the greatest fear--



CLEINIAS:  Which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if I am not

mistaken.



ATHENIAN:  Thank you for reminding me.  But now, as the habit of courage

and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the

opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.



CLEINIAS:  That is probably the case.



ATHENIAN:  There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than

commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these

occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and

to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless

such as these?--when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride,

ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all

the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us?  What is better adapted

than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second

place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it? 

What is there cheaper, or more innocent?  For do but consider which is the

greater risk:--Would you rather test a man of a morose and savage nature,

which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains

with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the

festival of Dionysus?  Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to

a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters

to him, perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the

condition of his soul?  I might mention numberless cases, in which the

advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and

without paying dearly for experience.  And I do not believe that either a

Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and

safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.



CLEINIAS:  That is certainly true.



ATHENIAN:  And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will

be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and

that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.



CLEINIAS:  Exactly so.





BOOK II.



ATHENIAN:  And now we have to consider whether the insight into human

nature is the only benefit derived from well-ordered potations, or whether

there are not other advantages great and much to be desired.  The argument

seems to imply that there are.  But how and in what way these are to be

attained, will have to be considered attentively, or we may be entangled in

error.



CLEINIAS:  Proceed.



ATHENIAN:  Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education; which,

if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial

intercourse.



CLEINIAS:  You talk rather grandly.



ATHENIAN:  Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first perceptions of

children, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and vice are

originally present to them.  As to wisdom and true and fixed opinions,

happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in years; and we

may say that he who possesses them, and the blessings which are contained

in them, is a perfect man.  Now I mean by education that training which is

given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children;--

when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted

in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find

them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her.  This

harmony of the soul, taken as a whole, is virtue; but the particular

training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate

what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love from the beginning

of life to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly

called education.



CLEINIAS:  I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that you have

said and are saying about education.



ATHENIAN:  I am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the

discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a principle

of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life.  And the

Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed

holy festivals, wherein men alternate rest with labour; and have given them

the Muses and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be

companions in their revels, that they may improve their education by taking

part in the festivals of the Gods, and with their help.  I should like to

know whether a common saying is in our opinion true to nature or not.  For

men say that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or

in their voices; they are always wanting to move and cry out; some leaping

and skipping, and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something,

others uttering all sorts of cries.  But, whereas the animals have no

perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or

harmony, as they are called, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, have been

appointed to be our companions in the dance, have given the pleasurable

sense of harmony and rhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow

them, joining hands together in dances and songs; and these they call

choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness.  Shall we

begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through

Apollo and the Muses?  What do you say?



CLEINIAS:  I assent.



ATHENIAN:  And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus,

and the educated is he who has been well trained?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance

well?



CLEINIAS:  I suppose that he will.



ATHENIAN:  Let us see; what are we saying?



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  He sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings

what is good and dances what is good?



CLEINIAS:  Let us make the addition.



ATHENIAN:  We will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad

to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly:  which now is the better

trained in dancing and music--he who is able to move his body and to use

his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight

in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but

is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and

is offended at what is evil?



CLEINIAS:  There is a great difference, Stranger, in the two kinds of

education.



ATHENIAN:  If we three know what is good in song and dance, then we truly

know also who is educated and who is uneducated; but if not, then we

certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and

whether there is any or not.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of beauty

of figure, and melody, and song, and dance; if these escape us, there will

be no use in talking about true education, whether Hellenic or barbarian.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody?  When a manly

soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is in similar case, are they

likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the

same sounds?



CLEINIAS:  How can they, when the very colours of their faces differ?



ATHENIAN:  Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, that in

music there certainly are figures and there are melodies:  and music is

concerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or

figure having good rhythm or good harmony--the term is correct enough; but

to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a 'good colour,' as

the masters of choruses do, is not allowable, although you can speak of the

melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and

censuring the other.  And not to be tedious, let us say that the figures

and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images

of virtue, are without exception good, and those which are expressive of

vice are the reverse of good.



CLEINIAS:  Your suggestion is excellent; and let us answer that these

things are so.



ATHENIAN:  Once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of

dance?



CLEINIAS:  Far otherwise.



ATHENIAN:  What, then, leads us astray?  Are beautiful things not the same

to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of

them?  For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more

beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms of

vice, and others in a muse of another character.  And yet most persons say,

that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls.  But this is

intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a much more plausible

account of the delusion.



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  The adaptation of art to the characters of men.  Choric

movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, fortunes,

dispositions,--each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or

songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help

feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful. 

But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are unsuited to them, cannot

delight in them or applaud them, and they call them base.  There are

others, again, whose natures are right and their habits wrong, or whose

habits are right and their natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but

are pleased at another.  For they say that all these imitations are

pleasant, but not good.  And in the presence of those whom they think wise,

they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner, or of

deliberately lending any countenance to such proceedings; and yet, they

have a secret pleasure in them.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs, or

any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?



CLEINIAS:  I think that there is.



ATHENIAN:  'I think' is not the word, but I would say, rather, 'I am

certain.'  For must they not have the same effect as when a man associates

with bad characters, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and

only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his own badness?  In

that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in

whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed to praise them.  And what

greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?



CLEINIAS:  I know of none.



ATHENIAN:  Then in a city which has good laws, or in future ages is to have

them, bearing in mind the instruction and amusement which are given by

music, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the

dance anything which they themselves like, in the way of rhythm, or melody,

or words, to the young children of any well-conditioned parents?  Is the

poet to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or

vice?



CLEINIAS:  That is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought of.



ATHENIAN:  And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of

Egypt.



CLEINIAS:  And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?



ATHENIAN:  You will wonder when I tell you:  Long ago they appear to have

recognized the very principle of which we are now speaking--that their

young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue.  These

they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and no

painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the

traditional forms and invent new ones.  To this day, no alteration is

allowed either in these arts, or in music at all.  And you will find that

their works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had

ten thousand years ago;--this is literally true and no exaggeration,--their

ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better or worse than the

work of to-day, but are made with just the same skill.



CLEINIAS:  How extraordinary!



ATHENIAN:  I should rather say, How statesmanlike, how worthy of a

legislator!  I know that other things in Egypt are not so well.  But what I

am telling you about music is true and deserving of consideration, because

showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth

and correctness without any fear of failure.  To do this, however, must be

the work of God, or of a divine person; in Egypt they have a tradition that

their ancient chants which have been preserved for so many ages are the

composition of the Goddess Isis.  And therefore, as I was saying, if a

person can only find in any way the natural melodies, he may confidently

embody them in a fixed and legal form.  For the love of novelty which

arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not

strength enough to corrupt the consecrated song and dance, under the plea

that they have become antiquated.  At any rate, they are far from being

corrupted in Egypt.



CLEINIAS:  Your arguments seem to prove your point.



ATHENIAN:  May we not confidently say that the true use of music and of

choral festivities is as follows:  We rejoice when we think that we

prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  And when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be

still?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who

are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look

on at them.  Having lost our agility, we delight in their sports and merry-

making, because we love to think of our former selves; and gladly institute

contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of our youth.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Is it altogether unmeaning to say, as the common people do about

festivals, that he should be adjudged the wisest of men, and the winner of

the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth?  For on

such occasions, and when mirth is the order of the day, ought not he to be

honoured most, and, as I was saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to

the greatest number?  Now is this a true way of speaking or of acting?



CLEINIAS:  Possibly.



ATHENIAN:  But, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different cases,

and not be hasty in forming a judgment:  One way of considering the

question will be to imagine a festival at which there are entertainments of

all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, and equestrian contests:  the

citizens are assembled; prizes are offered, and proclamation is made that

any one who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who

gives the most pleasure to the spectators--there is to be no regulation

about the manner how; but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is

to be crowned victor, and deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: 

What is likely to be the result of such a proclamation?



CLEINIAS:  In what respect?



ATHENIAN:  There would be various exhibitions:  one man, like Homer, will

exhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one will have a

tragedy, and another a comedy.  Nor would there be anything astonishing in

some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet-

show.  Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but

innumerable others as well--can you tell me who ought to be the victor?



CLEINIAS:  I do not see how any one can answer you, or pretend to know,

unless he has heard with his own ears the several competitors; the question

is absurd.



ATHENIAN:  Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this

question which you deem so absurd?



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  If very small children are to determine the question, they will

decide for the puppet show.



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  The older children will be advocates of comedy; educated women,

and young men, and people in general, will favour tragedy.



CLEINIAS:  Very likely.



ATHENIAN:  And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure

in hearing a rhapsodist recite well the Iliad and Odyssey, or one of the

Hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him.  But, who would really

be the victor?--that is the question.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  Clearly you and I will have to declare that those whom we old

men adjudge victors ought to win; for our ways are far and away better than

any which at present exist anywhere in the world.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Thus far I too should agree with the many, that the excellence

of music is to be measured by pleasure.  But the pleasure must not be that

of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the best and

best educated, and especially that which delights the one man who is pre-

eminent in virtue and education.  And therefore the judges must be men of

character, for they will require both wisdom and courage; the true judge

must not draw his inspiration from the theatre, nor ought he to be unnerved

by the clamour of the many and his own incapacity; nor again, knowing the

truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a

lying judgment, with the very same lips which have just appealed to the

Gods before he judged.  He is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre,

but, in his proper place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy

of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators.  The ancient and common

custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, did certainly

leave the judgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by

show of hands.  But this custom has been the destruction of the poets; for

they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste

of their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct

themselves;--and also it has been the ruin of the theatre; they ought to be

having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a

higher pleasure, but now by their own act the opposite result follows. 

What inference is to be drawn from all this?  Shall I tell you?



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time

is, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that

right reason, which the law affirms, and which the experience of the eldest

and best has agreed to be truly right.  In order, then, that the soul of

the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at

variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather follow

the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged--in order, I

say, to produce this effect, chants appear to have been invented, which

really enchant, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. 

And, because the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious

training, they are called plays and songs, and are performed in play; just

as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them

wholesome diet in pleasant meats and drinks, but unwholesome diet in

disagreeable things, in order that they may learn, as they ought, to like

the one, and to dislike the other.  And similarly the true legislator will

persuade, and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express, as

he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his

melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men.



CLEINIAS:  But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in

which poets generally compose in States at the present day?  As far as I

can observe, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, there are no

regulations like those of which you speak; in other places novelties are

always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the

authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and

these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the

Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the

same.



ATHENIAN:  Most true, Cleinias; and I daresay that I may have expressed

myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some

really existing state of things, whereas I was only saying what regulations

I would like to have about music; and hence there occurred a

misapprehension on your part.  For when evils are far gone and

irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at

times necessary.  But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you

whether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the

Cretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly they are.



ATHENIAN:  And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be an

improvement on the present state of things?



CLEINIAS:  A very great improvement, if the customs which prevail among

them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as you

were just now saying ought to prevail.



ATHENIAN:  Let us see whether we understand one another:--Are not the

principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows:  you

compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is

fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong or small and

weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a

wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and

lives in misery?  As the poet says, and with truth:  I sing not, I care not

about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him

who 'draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just

man.'  But if he be unjust, I would not have him 'look calmly upon bloody

death,' nor 'surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas;' and let no other

thing that is called good ever be his.  For the goods of which the many

speak are not really good:  first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty

next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a

keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or,

again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of

happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired

them to become at once immortal.  But you and I say, that while to the just

and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they

are all, including even health, the greatest of evils.  For in truth, to

have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all

without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called

goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so

great, if the bad man lives only a very short time.  These are the truths

which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to

utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they

must train up your youth.  Am I not right?  For I plainly declare that

evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the

just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil.  Let

me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?



CLEINIAS:  I think that we partly agree and partly do not.



ATHENIAN:  When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, and

when he is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of

immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these

goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature--of such an

one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather

than happy.



CLEINIAS:  That is quite true.



ATHENIAN:  Once more:  Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome

and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still, if

he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of you agree that he will of

necessity live basely?  You will surely grant so much?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And an evil life too?



CLEINIAS:  I am not equally disposed to grant that.



ATHENIAN:  Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?



CLEINIAS:  How can I possibly say so?



ATHENIAN:  How!  Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are

of two.  To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is as plain as

the fact that Crete is an island.  And, if I were a lawgiver, I would try

to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain, and I would

inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare

to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the

profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and there are

many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in a manner

different from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say,

indeed, from the world in general.  For tell me, my good friends, by Zeus

and Apollo tell me, if I were to ask these same Gods who were your

legislators,--Is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there

two lives, one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest?--and

they were to reply that there are two; and thereupon I proceeded to ask,

(that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry), Which are the

happier--those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest

life? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest--that would be a

very strange answer, which I should not like to put into the mouth of the

Gods.  The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and

legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of

them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life

is the happiest.  And to that I rejoin:--O my father, did you not wish me

to live as happily as possible?  And yet you also never ceased telling me

that I should live as justly as possible.  Now, here the giver of the rule,

whether he be legislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and will in vain

endeavour to be consistent with himself.  But if he were to declare that

the justest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire,

if I am not mistaken, what is that good and noble principle in life which

the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure.  For what good can the

just man have which is separated from pleasure?  Shall we say that glory

and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless

unpleasant, and infamy pleasant?  Certainly not, sweet legislator.  Or

shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is

good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the

doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?



CLEINIAS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  The view which identifies the pleasant and the pleasant and the

just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious

tendency.  And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of

the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can

help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. 

But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood,

the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth;

he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises

and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that injustice, which

seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by the unjust and evil man

appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant; but that from the just man's

point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment--that of the

inferior or of the better soul?



CLEINIAS:  Surely, that of the better soul.



ATHENIAN:  Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved,

but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?



CLEINIAS:  That seems to be implied in the present argument.



ATHENIAN:  And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument

has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures

to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful

lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do

what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily.



CLEINIAS:  Truth, Stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing of

which men are hard to be persuaded.



ATHENIAN:  And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so

improbable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales.



CLEINIAS:  What is that story?



ATHENIAN:  The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth,

which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of

the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what

belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his

efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their

songs and tales and discourses all their life long.  But if you do not

agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other

side.



CLEINIAS:  I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of

us against what you are now saying.



ATHENIAN:  The next suggestion which I have to offer is, that all our three

choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in

their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or

are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by

the Gods deemed to be the happiest is also the best;--we shall affirm this

to be a most certain truth; and the minds of our young disciples will be

more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might

address to them.



CLEINIAS:  I assent to what you say.



ATHENIAN:  First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir

composed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to the

whole city.  Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of

thirty, who will call upon the God Paean to testify to the truth of their

words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their

hearts.  Thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to sixty

years of age, will also sing.  There remain those who are too old to sing,

and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as with the

voice of an oracle.



CLEINIAS:  Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger? for I do

not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.



ATHENIAN:  And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a

view to them.



CLEINIAS:  Will you try to be a little plainer?



ATHENIAN:  I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you will

remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures:  I said that they were

unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and

jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal attained to

any perception of order, but man only.  Now the order of motion is called

rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled,

is called harmony; and both together are termed choric song.  And I said

that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our

playfellows and leaders in the dance; and Dionysus, as I dare say that you

will remember, was the third.



CLEINIAS:  I quite remember.



ATHENIAN:  Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses,

and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of

Dionysus.



CLEINIAS:  How is that arranged?  There is something strange, at any rate

on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean that

those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to sixty years

of age, are to dance in his honour.



ATHENIAN:  Very true; and therefore it must be shown that there is good

reason for the proposal.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Are we agreed thus far?



CLEINIAS:  About what?



ATHENIAN:  That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the

whole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of

which we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and

variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the

singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary

of them?



CLEINIAS:  Every one will agree.



ATHENIAN:  Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of

age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of

strains, which are to do so much good?  Shall we be so foolish as to let

them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of

songs?



CLEINIAS:  But, says the argument, we cannot let them off.



ATHENIAN:  Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum?  Will this

be the way?



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  When a man is advancing in years, he is afraid and reluctant to

sing;--he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion is

used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet he

grows;--is not this true?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand up

and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?--and if moreover when he is

required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have

been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he will

certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very

unwilling to exhibit.



CLEINIAS:  No doubt.



ATHENIAN:  How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing?  Shall we

begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are

eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon

fire, whether in the body or in the soul, until they begin to go to work--

this is a precaution which has to be taken against the excitableness of

youth;--afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of

thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from

intoxication and from excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty

years, after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other

Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder

men, making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness

of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and

also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire,

may become softer and so more impressible.  In the first place, will not

any one who is thus mellowed be more ready and less ashamed to sing--I do

not say before a large audience, but before a moderate company; nor yet

among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to

chant, and to enchant?



CLEINIAS:  He will be far more ready.



ATHENIAN:  There will be no impropriety in our using such a method of

persuading them to join with us in song.



CLEINIAS:  None at all.



ATHENIAN:  And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn? 

The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And what strain is suitable for heroes?  Shall they sing a

choric strain?



CLEINIAS:  Truly, Stranger, we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain other

than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus.



ATHENIAN:  I dare say; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the

most beautiful kind of song, in your military way of life, which is

modelled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities; and

you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts.  No

one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows

against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom to attend to

him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the

qualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier, but

also a governor of a state and of cities.  Such an one, as we said at

first, would be a greater warrior than he of whom Tyrtaeus sings; and he

would honour courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as the

first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.



CLEINIAS:  Once more, Stranger, I must complain that you depreciate our

lawgivers.



ATHENIAN:  Not intentionally, if at all, my good friend; but whither the

argument leads, thither let us follow; for if there be indeed some strain

of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres, I

should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are ashamed of these, and

want to have the best.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  When things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in

them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility possessed by

them;--for example, I should say that eating and drinking, and the use of

food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but

that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness of the things

served up to us, which is their true rightness.



CLEINIAS:  Just so.



ATHENIAN:  Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain accompanying

charm which is the pleasure; but that the right and the profitable, the

good and the noble, are qualities which the truth gives to it.



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  And so in the imitative arts--if they succeed in making

likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to

have a charm?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not

pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of

pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on

the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for

the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term 'pleasure' is most

appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are absent.



CLEINIAS:  You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?



ATHENIAN:  Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good

in any degree worth speaking of.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation

is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true of

all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical,

because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by

the standard of truth, and by no other whatever.



CLEINIAS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Then, when any one says that music is to be judged of by

pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of

which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or

deemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music which

is an imitation of the good.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not

to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and the

truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing

imitated according to quantity and quality.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And every one will admit that musical compositions are all

imitative and representative.  Will not poets and spectators and actors all

agree in this?



CLEINIAS:  They will.



ATHENIAN:  Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each

composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and meaning

of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the

intention is true or false.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly not.



ATHENIAN:  And will he who does not know what is true be able to

distinguish what is good and bad?  My statement is not very clear; but

perhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another way.



CLEINIAS:  How?



ATHENIAN:  There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is

imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed?  I

mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and the

true situation of the parts; what those proportions are, and how the parts

fit into one another in due order; also their colours and conformations, or

whether this is all confused in the execution:  do you think that any one

can know about this, who does not know what the animal is which has been

imitated?



CLEINIAS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a

man, who has received at the hand of the artist all his proper parts and

colours and shapes, must we not also know whether the work is beautiful or

in any respect deficient in beauty?



CLEINIAS:  If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us be

judges of beauty.



ATHENIAN:  Very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated,

whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent

judge must possess three things;--he must know, in the first place, of what

the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that

it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of

music.  Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and

therefore requires the greatest care of them all.  For if a man makes a

mistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil

dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the

poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses themselves, who

would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men

the gestures and songs of women; nor after combining the melodies with the

gestures of freemen would they add on the rhythms of slaves and men of the

baser sort; nor, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, would

they assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character;

nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and

instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one.  But

human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and

so make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says,

'are ripe for true pleasure.'  The experienced see all this confusion, and

yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm

and the figure of the dance from the melody, setting bare words to metre,

and also separating the melody and the rhythm from the words, using the

lyre or the flute alone.  For when there are no words, it is very difficult

to recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any

worthy object is imitated by them.  And we must acknowledge that all this

sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish

noise, and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of

the dance and song, is exceedingly coarse and tasteless.  The use of either

instrument, when unaccompanied, leads to every sort of irregularity and

trickery.  This is all rational enough.  But we are considering not how our

choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over

fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how they are to use them.  And the

considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty

years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be better

trained.  For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of

harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how can they ever know whether a melody

would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet

has assigned to it?



CLEINIAS:  Clearly they cannot.



ATHENIAN:  The many are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in

proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to

sing and step in rhythm by force; it never occurs to them that they are

ignorant of what they are doing.  Now every melody is right when it has

suitable harmony and rhythm, and wrong when unsuitable.



CLEINIAS:  That is most certain.



ATHENIAN:  But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know

that the thing is right?



CLEINIAS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  Then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that our

newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and, although they are

their own masters, compel to sing, must be educated to such an extent as to

be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that

they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to select what are

suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and may sing them, and

have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger

men to welcome with dutiful delight good dispositions.  Having such

training, they will attain a more accurate knowledge than falls to the lot

of the common people, or even of the poets themselves.  For the poet need

not know the third point, viz., whether the imitation is good or not,

though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm.  But the

aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the best, and

that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will never be able to

charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue.  And now the original

design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the

Chorus of Dionysus, has been accomplished to the best of our ability, and

let us see whether we were right:--I should imagine that a drinking

assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes

on:  this, as we were saying at first, will certainly be the case.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Every man has a more than natural elevation; his heart is glad

within him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at

such a time; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all

mankind.



CLEINIAS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the

drinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and younger,

and are easily moulded by him who knows how to educate and fashion them,

just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of them is the same

who prescribed for them in the days of their youth, viz., the good

legislator; and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet, which, when a

man is confident, bold, and impudent, and unwilling to wait his turn and

have his share of silence and speech, and drinking and music, will change

his character into the opposite--such laws as will infuse into him a just

and noble fear, which will take up arms at the approach of insolence, being

that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them are

the calm and sober generals of the drinkers; and without their help there

is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against

enemies when the commander of an army is not himself calm; and he who is

unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts who are more

than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who

disobeys military leaders, or even greater.



CLEINIAS:  Right.



ATHENIAN:  If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in this way,

would not the companions of our revels be improved? they would part better

friends than they were, and not, as now, enemies.  Their whole intercourse

would be regulated by law and observant of it, and the sober would be the

leaders of the drunken.



CLEINIAS:  I think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose.



ATHENIAN:  Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and

unfit to be received into the State.  For wine has many excellences, and

one pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the

many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said.



CLEINIAS:  To what do you refer?



ATHENIAN:  There is a tradition or story, which has somehow crept about the

world, that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Here, and

that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madnesses in

others; for which reason he gave men wine.  Such traditions concerning the

Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered (compare

Euthyph.; Republic); I only know that no animal at birth is mature or

perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in which he has

not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars without rhyme or

reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme

or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been already said by us to

be the origin of music and gymnastic.



CLEINIAS:  To be sure, I remember.



ATHENIAN:  And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang

from this beginning among men, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus

were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  The other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge,

and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the contrary,

is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant modesty in

the soul, and health and strength in the body.



CLEINIAS:  That, Stranger, is precisely what was said.



ATHENIAN:  Then half the subject may now be considered to have been

discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?



CLEINIAS:  What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?



ATHENIAN:  The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education;

and of this art, rhythms and harmonies form the part which has to do with

the voice.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  The movement of the body has rhythm in common with the movement

of the voice, but gesture is peculiar to it, whereas song is simply the

movement of the voice.



CLEINIAS:  Most true.



ATHENIAN:  And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the soul,

we have ventured to term music.



CLEINIAS:  We were right.



ATHENIAN:  And the movement of the body, when regarded as an amusement, we

termed dancing; but when extended and pursued with a view to the excellence

of the body, this scientific training may be called gymnastic.



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  Music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to have

been completely discussed.  Shall we proceed to the other half or not? 

What would you like?



CLEINIAS:  My good friend, when you are talking with a Cretan and

Lacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer

are either of us likely to make to such an enquiry?



ATHENIAN:  An answer is contained in your question; and I understand and

accept what you say not only as an answer, but also as a command to proceed

with gymnastic.



CLEINIAS:  You quite understand me; do as you say.



ATHENIAN:  I will; and there will not be any difficulty in speaking

intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more

familiar than with music.



CLEINIAS:  There will not.



ATHENIAN:  Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the

tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were

saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented dancing;

and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral

art?



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us,

and there still remains another to be discussed?



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  I have first a final word to add to my discourse about drink, if

you will allow me to do so.



CLEINIAS:  What more have you to say?



ATHENIAN:  I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the

practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the

enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle,

will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them--in

this way all of them may be used.  But if the State makes drinking an

amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with

whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree

or allow that this city or this man should practise drinking.  I would go

further than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the

law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be

allowed to taste wine at all, but that he should drink water during all

that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink

wine; and that no magistrates should drink during their year of office, nor

should pilots of vessels or judges while on duty taste wine at all, nor any

one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance; nor

in the day-time at all, unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine;

nor again at night, when any one, either man or woman, is minded to get

children.  There are numberless other cases also in which those who have

good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is

true, no city will need many vineyards.  Their husbandry and their way of

life in general will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of

the vine will be the most limited and the least common of their

employments.  And this, Stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about

wine, if you agree.



CLEINIAS:  Excellent:  we agree.





BOOK III.



ATHENIAN:  Enough of this.  And what, then, is to be regarded as the origin

of government?  Will not a man be able to judge of it best from a point of

view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to

good or evil?



CLEINIAS:  What do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time,

and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.



CLEINIAS:  How so?



ATHENIAN:  Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed

since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?



CLEINIAS:  Hardly.



ATHENIAN:  But are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being

during this period and as many perished?  And has not each of them had

every form of government many times over, now growing larger, now smaller,

and again improving or declining?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  Let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these changes; for

that will probably explain the first origin and development of forms of

government.



CLEINIAS:  Very good.  You shall endeavour to impart your thoughts to us,

and we will make an effort to understand you.



ATHENIAN:  Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?



CLEINIAS:  What traditions?



ATHENIAN:  The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have

been occasioned by deluges and pestilences, and in many other ways, and of

the survival of a remnant?



CLEINIAS:  Every one is disposed to believe them.



ATHENIAN:  Let us consider one of them, that which was caused by the famous

deluge.



CLEINIAS:  What are we to observe about it?



ATHENIAN:  I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill

shepherds,--small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of

mountains.



CLEINIAS:  Clearly.



ATHENIAN:  Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts

and the various devices which are suggested to the dwellers in cities by

interest or ambition, and with all the wrongs which they contrive against

one another.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the

sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.



CLEINIAS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  Would not all implements have then perished and every other

excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom have utterly

disappeared?



CLEINIAS:  Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they

are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in

the least particular?  For it is evident that the arts were unknown during

ten thousand times ten thousand years.  And no more than a thousand or two

thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, Orpheus and

Palamedes,--since Marsyas and Olympus invented music, and Amphion the lyre

--not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday.



ATHENIAN:  Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really

of yesterday?



CLEINIAS:  I suppose that you mean Epimenides.



ATHENIAN:  The same, my friend; he does indeed far overleap the heads of

all mankind by his invention; for he carried out in practice, as you

declare, what of old Hesiod (Works and Days) only preached.



CLEINIAS:  Yes, according to our tradition.



ATHENIAN:  After the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state

of man was something of this sort:--In the beginning of things there was a

fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of

oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a

few goats, these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who tended

them?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are

now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?



CLEINIAS:  None whatever.



ATHENIAN:  And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we

now are and have:  cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great

deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?



CLEINIAS:  What do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who

knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their

full development, whether of virtue or of vice?



CLEINIAS:  I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.



ATHENIAN:  But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to

be what the world is.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by

little, during a very long period of time.



CLEINIAS:  A highly probable supposition.



ATHENIAN:  At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears

which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  The fewness of the survivors at that time would have made them

all the more desirous of seeing one another; but then the means of

travelling either by land or sea had been almost entirely lost, as I may

say, with the loss of the arts, and there was great difficulty in getting

at one another; for iron and brass and all metals were jumbled together and

had disappeared in the chaos; nor was there any possibility of extracting

ore from them; and they had scarcely any means of felling timber.  Even if

you suppose that some implements might have been preserved in the

mountains, they must quickly have worn out and vanished, and there would be

no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived.



CLEINIAS:  There could not have been.



ATHENIAN:  In how many generations would this be attained?



CLEINIAS:  Clearly, not for many generations.



ATHENIAN:  During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts

which require iron and brass and the like would disappear.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for

many reasons.



CLEINIAS:  How would that be?



ATHENIAN:  In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would

create in them a feeling of affection and goodwill towards one another;

and, secondly, they would have no occasion to quarrel about their

subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at

first, and in some particular cases; and from their pasture-land they would

obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having plenty of

milk and flesh; moreover they would procure other food by the chase, not to

be despised either in quantity or quality.  They would also have abundance

of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of

standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts do not

require any use of iron:  and God has given these two arts to man in order

to provide him with all such things, that, when reduced to the last

extremity, the human race may still grow and increase.  Hence in those days

mankind were not very poor; nor was poverty a cause of difference among

them; and rich they could not have been, having neither gold nor silver:--

such at that time was their condition.  And the community which has neither

poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; in it there is

no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or

envyings.  And therefore they were good, and also because they were what is

called simple-minded; and when they were told about good and evil, they in

their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised

it.  No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now;

but what they heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived

accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have

described them.



CLEINIAS:  That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend

here.



ATHENIAN:  Would not many generations living on in a simple manner,

although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in

particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts,

termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all

conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed;--although

inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in

these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and more manly, and also

more temperate and altogether more just?  The reason has been already

explained.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what

is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention of

explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, and who was their

lawgiver.



CLEINIAS:  And thus far what you have said has been very well said.



ATHENIAN:  They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet; nothing of that

sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at

this early period; they lived by habit and the customs of their ancestors,

as they are called.



CLEINIAS:  Probably.



ATHENIAN:  But there was already existing a form of government which, if I

am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and this still remains in

many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians (compare Arist. Pol.), and

is the government which is declared by Homer to have prevailed among the

Cyclopes:--



'They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow caves

on the tops of high mountains, and every one gives law to his wife and

children, and they do not busy themselves about one another.'  (Odyss.)



CLEINIAS:  That seems to be a charming poet of yours; I have read some

other verses of his, which are very clever; but I do not know much of him,

for foreign poets are very little read among the Cretans.



MEGILLUS:  But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince of

them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not Spartan,

but rather Ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying, when

he traces up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to

barbarism.



ATHENIAN:  Yes, he does confirm it; and we may accept his witness to the

fact that such forms of government sometimes arise.



CLEINIAS:  We may.



ATHENIAN:  And were not such states composed of men who had been dispersed 

in single habitations and families by the poverty which attended the

devastations; and did not the eldest then rule among them, because with

them government originated in the authority of a father and a mother, whom,

like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop under the

patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of all

sovereignties is the most just?



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  After this they came together in greater numbers, and increased

the size of their cities, and betook themselves to husbandry, first of all

at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose walls and works

of defence, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus creating a single large

and common habitation.



CLEINIAS:  Yes; at least we may suppose so.



ATHENIAN:  There is another thing which would probably happen.



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original

ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger; every family

would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from

one another, would have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which

they would have received from their several parents who had educated them;

and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the

element of order in their nature, and to courage, when they had the element

of courage.  And they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon

their children's children, their own likings; and, as we are saying, they

would find their way into the larger society, having already their own

peculiar laws.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of

others not so well.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of

legislation.



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  The next step will be that these persons who have met together,

will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and

will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the

tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those

which they think best.  These persons will themselves be called

legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of

aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in

this altered state of the government they will live.



CLEINIAS:  Yes, that would be the natural order of things.



ATHENIAN:  Then, now let us speak of a third form of government, in which

all other forms and conditions of polities and cities concur.



CLEINIAS:  What is that?



ATHENIAN:  The form which in fact Homer indicates as following the second. 

This third form arose when, as he says, Dardanus founded Dardania:--



'For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a city of

speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of many-fountained

Ida.'



For indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks

the words of God and nature; for poets are a divine race, and often in

their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which will

probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed design:--Shall

we do so?



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  Ilium was built, when they descended from the mountain, in a

large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers

descending from Ida.



CLEINIAS:  Such is the tradition.



ATHENIAN:  And we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages

after the deluge?



ATHENIAN:  A marvellous forgetfulness of the former destruction would

appear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under

numerous streams flowing from the heights, trusting for their security to

not very high hills, either.



CLEINIAS:  There must have been a long interval, clearly.



ATHENIAN:  And, as population increased, many other cities would begin to

be inhabited.



CLEINIAS:  Doubtless.



ATHENIAN:  Those cities made war against Troy--by sea as well as land--for

at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea.



CLEINIAS:  Clearly.



ATHENIAN:  The Achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew Troy.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And during the ten years in which the Achaeans were besieging

Ilium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight.  Their

youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities and

families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to have

done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the consequence.  The

exiles came again, under a new name, no longer Achaeans, but Dorians,--a

name which they derived from Dorieus; for it was he who gathered them

together.  The rest of the story is told by you Lacedaemonians as part of

the history of Sparta.



MEGILLUS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into

music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to

the same point, and presents to us another handle.  For we have reached the

settlement of Lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in

institutions the sister of Crete.  And we are all the better for the

digression, because we have gone through various governments and

settlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second,

and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time.  And now there

appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in process

of settlement and has continued settled to this day.  If, out of all this,

we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the

salvation and what are the destruction of cities, and what changes would

make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may now begin again, unless

we have some fault to find with the previous discussion.



MEGILLUS:  If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry

about legislation would be as good and full as the present, I would go a

great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as this

--and we are now approaching the longest day of the year--was too short for

the discussion.



ATHENIAN:  Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment when Lacedaemon

and Argos and Messene and the rest of the Peloponnesus were all in complete

subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors; for afterwards, as the legend

informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three

cities, Argos, Messene, Lacedaemon.



MEGILLUS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles

and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would

assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom.



MEGILLUS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  But can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of

government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves?  No indeed, by

Zeus.  Have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago?



MEGILLUS:  No.



ATHENIAN:  And may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned?  For

we have come upon facts which have brought us back again to the same

principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring

about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened.  The case

was as follows:--Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were

under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers

and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were

common to all of them:  the rulers promised that as time and the race went

forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects

said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never

subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms; the kings were to

assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist

peoples and kings in like manner.  Is not this the fact?



MEGILLUS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And the three states to whom these laws were given, whether

their kings or any others were the authors of them, had therefore the

greatest security for the maintenance of their constitutions?



MEGILLUS:  What security?



ATHENIAN:  That the other two states were always to come to the rescue

against a rebellious third.



MEGILLUS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as

the mass of the people will be ready to receive; but this is just as if one

were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their

pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.



MEGILLUS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore

health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain.



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that

day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws.



MEGILLUS:  What advantage?



ATHENIAN:  The legislators of that day, when they equalized property,

escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a

person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts,

because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real

equality.  Now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new

settlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, that 'he is

not to disturb vested interests,'--declaring with imprecations that he is

introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his

wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for distributing

the land,--there was nothing to hinder them; and as for debts, they had

none which were considerable or of old standing.



MEGILLUS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and

legislation of their country turn out so badly?



MEGILLUS:  How do you mean; and why do you blame them?



ATHENIAN:  There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted

their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was

the Spartan.



MEGILLUS:  The question which you ask is not easily answered.



ATHENIAN:  And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, this

being our old man's sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way, as I

was saying when we first set out on our journey.



MEGILLUS:  Certainly; and we must find out why this was.



ATHENIAN:  What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have

regulated such cities? or what settlements of states are greater or more

famous?



MEGILLUS:  I know of none.



ATHENIAN:  Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not

only for the protection of Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes, in case

they were attacked by the barbarian?  For the inhabitants of the region

about Ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan war, relied

upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus, which still

existed and had a great prestige; the people of those days fearing the

united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the Great King.  And the second

capture of Troy was a serious offence against them, because Troy was a

portion of the Assyrian Empire.  To meet the danger the single army was

distributed between three cities by the royal brothers, sons of Heracles,--

a fair device, as it seemed, and a far better arrangement than the

expedition against Troy.  For, firstly, the people of that day had, as they

thought, in the Heraclidae better leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next

place, they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which

went against Troy; for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they

were themselves conquered by the Heraclidae--Achaeans by Dorians.  May we

not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days

framed the constitutions of their states?



MEGILLUS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers,

and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the

advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo, be likely to

think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established?



MEGILLUS:  Of course they would.



ATHENIAN:  Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were

entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception, as

I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land.  And

this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two

others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had

agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.



MEGILLUS:  No doubt.



ATHENIAN:  But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy?  Here is a

subject well worthy of consideration.



MEGILLUS:  Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of laws

or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and noble

interests, than are here presented to his view.



ATHENIAN:  Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important

question.



MEGILLUS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we

ourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing

which might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make a

right use of it in some way; and yet this mode of looking at things may

turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in

our own case or in any other?



MEGILLUS:  To what are you referring, and what do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid

expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results

for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing at myself.



MEGILLUS:  But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we

in assenting to you?



ATHENIAN:  Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees

anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that--'If the owner

only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be,

and what great results would he achieve!'



MEGILLUS:  And would he not be justified?



ATHENIAN:  Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear

just:  First, in reference to the question in hand:--If the then commanders

had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained

success?  Would not this have been the way?  They would have bound them all

firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and

dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world,

Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired.  What

other aim would they have had?



MEGILLUS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration

at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise

them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the

greater and chief part of what he desires.



MEGILLUS:  He would.



ATHENIAN:  Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one

common desire of all mankind?



MEGILLUS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible,--at

any rate, things human,--may come to pass in accordance with his soul's

desire.



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And having this desire always, and at every time of life, in

youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment

of it.



MEGILLUS:  No doubt.



ATHENIAN:  And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what

they ask for themselves.



MEGILLUS:  We do.



ATHENIAN:  Dear is the son to the father--the younger to the elder.



MEGILLUS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father

prays that he may not obtain.



MEGILLUS:  When the son is young and foolish, you mean?



ATHENIAN:  Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of

youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the

influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the

unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of

right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?



MEGILLUS:  I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a

hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at

variance with his reason.  But every state and every individual ought to

pray and strive for wisdom.



ATHENIAN:  Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at

first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to

wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all

with a view to war.  And to this I replied that there were four virtues,

but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation;

whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes

first, and is the leader of all the rest--I mean wisdom and mind and

opinion, having affection and desire in their train.  And now the argument

returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in

earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being

likely to end in the opposite of what he desires.  And if you would rather

receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will

find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause

of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of

military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects;

but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially

to their ignorance of the most important human affairs.  That was then, and

is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will

allow me, to make out and demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are

my friends, in the course of the argument.



CLEINIAS:  Pray go on, Stranger;--compliments are troublesome, but we will

show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will

give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a freeman best

shows his approval or disapproval.



MEGILLUS:  Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.



CLEINIAS:  By all means, if Heaven wills.  Go on.



ATHENIAN:  Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say that

the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as

then, ignorance is ruin.  And if this be true, the legislator must

endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost

of his power.



CLEINIAS:  That is evident.



ATHENIAN:  Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance.  I

should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I

am about to say; for my opinion is--



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he

nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which

he knows to be unrighteous and evil.  This disagreement between the sense

of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the

worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of

the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the

individual is like the mass or populace in a state.  And when the soul is

opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords,

that I call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey

their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair

reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather

the reverse of good.  All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether

in individuals or in states.  You will understand, Stranger, that I am

speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of

handicraftsmen.



CLEINIAS:  Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.



ATHENIAN:  Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the

citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of

authority entrusted to him:  he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even

though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of

accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be

called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither

how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is

to be committed.  For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of

wisdom when there is no harmony?  There is none; but the noblest and

greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of

this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is

devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a

saviour of the state:  he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom.  Let

this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.



CLEINIAS:  Let it be so laid down.



ATHENIAN:  I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in

cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families?  What are they,

and how many in number?  Is there not one claim of authority which is

always just,--that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to

rule over their offspring?



CLEINIAS:  There is.



ATHENIAN:  Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the

ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters

rule?



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the

stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?



CLEINIAS:  That is a rule not to be disobeyed.



ATHENIAN:  Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures,

and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said; and the

sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and

command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise

Pindar, as I should reply him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but

according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a

rule of compulsion.



CLEINIAS:  Most true.



ATHENIAN:  There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is

dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune:  he on whom the lot falls is

a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the

subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  'Then now,' as we say playfully to any of those who lightly

undertake the making of laws, 'you see, legislator, the principles of

government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each

other.  There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you

must attend.  And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in

what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and

ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic power of the olden

time.  Was it because they did not know how wisely Hesiod spoke when he

said that the half is often more than the whole?  His meaning was, that

when to take the whole would be dangerous, and to take the half would be

the safe and moderate course, then the moderate or better was more than the

immoderate or worse.'



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when

found among kings than when among peoples?



CLEINIAS:  The probability is that ignorance will be a disorder especially

prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.



ATHENIAN:  Is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that time

was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in

harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe by word and

oath?  This want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was

really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the

whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord.



CLEINIAS:  Very likely.



ATHENIAN:  Good; and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken

in order to avert this calamity?  Truly there is no great wisdom in

knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened;

but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser

head than ours.



MEGILLUS:  What do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  Any one who looks at what has occurred with you Lacedaemonians,

Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done

at that time.



MEGILLUS:  Speak a little more clearly.



ATHENIAN:  Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to

make.



MEGILLUS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a

sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the

mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the

wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other

to injustice, which is the child of excess.  I mean to say, my dear

friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be

able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power--no one who will not,

under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases,

and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends:  when this happens his

kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him.  And great

legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger.  As far as we

can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:--



MEGILLUS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you

two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more within the

limits of moderation.  In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with

divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still

feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with

the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight

elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters.  But

your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and

foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors,

whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot; and by

this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements

and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the

rest.  Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus,

Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned not

even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no

proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined

that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which

might be converted into a tyranny.  Now that God has instructed us what

sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom,

as I have already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty

in learning from an example which has already occurred.  But if any one

could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the

government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have

saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and no

Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have

regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them; and

the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not win glorious victories

both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first

of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf

of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one

was waging a mighty war against Lacedaemon, and was thus preventing her

from rendering assistance, while the city of Argos, which had the

precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling

the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid.  Many things

might be told about Hellas in connexion with that war which are far from

honourable; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the

invader; for the truth is, that unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians,

acting in concert, had warded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of

Hellas would have been fused in a chaos of Hellenes mingling with one

another, of barbarians mingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with

barbarians; just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing

to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and

scattered, and live miserably.  These, Cleinias and Megillus, are the

reproaches which we have to make against statesmen and legislators, as they

are called, past and present, if we would analyse the causes of their

failure, and find out what else might have been done.  We said, for

instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers; and

this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and

harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this

end.  Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing

aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same; but we

should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is

to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these aims are

really the same; and if so, a variety in the modes of expression ought not

to disturb us.



CLEINIAS:  Let us resume the argument in that spirit.  And now, speaking of

friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish that you would tell me at what,

in your opinion, the legislator should aim.



ATHENIAN:  Hear me, then:  there are two mother forms of states from which

the rest may be truly said to be derived; and one of them may be called

monarchy and the other democracy:  the Persians have the highest form of

the one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as I was saying, are

variations of these.  Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination

of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in

a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well

governed which is not made up of both.



CLEINIAS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  Neither the one, if it be exclusively and excessively attached

to monarchy, nor the other, if it be similarly attached to freedom,

observes moderation; but your states, the Laconian and Cretan, have more of

it; and the same was the case with the Athenians and Persians of old time,

but now they have less.  Shall I tell you why?



CLEINIAS:  By all means, if it will tend to elucidate our subject.



ATHENIAN:  Hear, then:--There was a time when the Persians had more of the

state which is a mean between slavery and freedom.  In the reign of Cyrus

they were freemen and also lords of many others:  the rulers gave a share

of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were

on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in

the hour of danger.  And if there was any wise man among them, who was able

to give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king

was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honour to

those who could advise him in any matter.  And the nation waxed in all

respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of mind

among them.



CLEINIAS:  That certainly appears to have been the case.



ATHENIAN:  How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again

recovered under Darius?  Shall I try to divine?



CLEINIAS:  The enquiry, no doubt, has a bearing upon our subject.



ATHENIAN:  I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had

never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order of his

household.



CLEINIAS:  What makes you say so?



ATHENIAN:  I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and

entrusted the education of his children to the women; and they brought them

up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were blessed

already, and needed no more blessings.  They thought that they were happy

enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and

they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did.  This was how

they brought them up.



CLEINIAS:  A splendid education truly!



ATHENIAN:  Such an one as women were likely to give them, and especially

princesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men, too,

who were occupied in wars and dangers, and had no time to look after them.



CLEINIAS:  What would you expect?



ATHENIAN:  Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many herds

of men and other animals, but he did not consider that those to whom he was

about to make them over were not trained in his own calling, which was

Persian; for the Persians are shepherds--sons of a rugged land, which is a

stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the

open air and go without sleep, and also to fight, if fighting is required

(compare Arist. Pol.).  He did not observe that his sons were trained

differently; through the so-called blessing of being royal they were

educated in the Median fashion by women and eunuchs, which led to their

becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreproved.  And

so, after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fulness of luxury and

licence, took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he could

not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, mad with wine and

brutality, lost his kingdom through the Medes and the Eunuch, as they

called him, who despised the folly of Cambyses.



CLEINIAS:  So runs the tale, and such probably were the facts.



ATHENIAN:  Yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the

Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Let us note the rest of the story.  Observe, that Darius was not

the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education.  When he

came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into

seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still

remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal

equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his laws the

settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised,--thus creating a feeling of

friendship and community among all the Persians, and attaching the people

to him with money and gifts.  Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him

countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him.  Darius was

succeeded by his son Xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and

luxurious fashion.  Might we not most justly say:  'O Darius, how came you

to bring up Xerxes in the same way in which Cyrus brought up Cambyses, and

not to see his fatal mistake?'  For Xerxes, being the creation of the same

education, met with much the same fortune as Cambyses; and from that time

until now there has never been a really great king among the Persians,

although they are all called Great.  And their degeneracy is not to be

attributed to chance, as I maintain; the reason is rather the evil life

which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; for

never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus

educated.  And this, I say, is what the legislator has to consider, and

what at the present moment has to be considered by us.  Justly may you, O

Lacedaemonians, be praised, in that you do not give special honour or a

special education to wealth rather than to poverty, or to a royal rather

than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not

originally commanded them to be given.  For no man ought to have pre-

eminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more

than because he is swift of foot or fair or strong, unless he have some

virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular

virtue of temperance.



MEGILLUS:  What do you mean, Stranger?



ATHENIAN:  I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?



MEGILLUS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  Then, now hear and judge for yourself:--Would you like to have

for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control

over himself?



MEGILLUS:  Heaven forbid!



ATHENIAN:  Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly not.



ATHENIAN:  And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?



MEGILLUS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  Any more than our pattern wise man, whom we exhibited as having

his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true

reason, can be intemperate?



MEGILLUS:  No.



ATHENIAN:  There is a further consideration relating to the due and undue

award of honours in states.



MEGILLUS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  I should like to know whether temperance without the other

virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be praised or

blamed?



MEGILLUS:  I cannot tell.



ATHENIAN:  And that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had

chosen, I think that you would have gone wrong.



MEGILLUS:  I am fortunate.



ATHENIAN:  Very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things which

can be praised or blamed, does not deserve an expression of opinion, but is

best passed over in silence.



MEGILLUS:  You are speaking of temperance?



ATHENIAN:  Yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this appendage

is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honour, and next that

which is beneficial in the next degree; and so each of them will be rightly

honoured according to a regular order.



MEGILLUS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly he should.



ATHENIAN:  Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details.  But

the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and

second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves.



MEGILLUS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy,

as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honour and

dishonour in the right way.  And the right way is to place the goods of the

soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance to be the

condition of them; and to assign the second place to the goods of the body;

and the third place to money and property.  And if any legislator or state

departs from this rule by giving money the place of honour, or in any way

preferring that which is really last, may we not say, that he or the state

is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?



MEGILLUS:  Yes; let that be plainly declared.



ATHENIAN:  The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far to

enlarge.  We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse.  And we

affirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished the

freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so

destroyed friendship and community of feeling.  And when there is an end of

these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of

the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that they can

gain ever so small an advantage for themselves, they devastate cities, and

send fire and desolation among friendly races.  And as they hate ruthlessly

and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want the people to fight for

them, they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives

on their behalf; their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of

battle, and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of

mercenaries and strangers whom they hire, as if they were in want of more

men.  And they cannot help being stupid, since they proclaim by their

actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong which are made in

a state are a trifle, when compared with gold and silver.



MEGILLUS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  And now enough of the Persians, and their present mal-

administration of their government, which is owing to the excess of slavery

and despotism among them.



MEGILLUS:  Good.



ATHENIAN:  Next, we must pass in review the government of Attica in like

manner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all

superior authority is not by any means so good as government by others when

properly limited, which was our ancient Athenian constitution at the time

when the Persians made their attack on Hellas, or, speaking more correctly,

on the whole continent of Europe.  There were four classes, arranged

according to a property census, and reverence was our queen and mistress,

and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws which then prevailed. 

Also the vastness of the Persian armament, both by sea and on land, caused

a helpless terror, which made us more and more the servants of our rulers

and of the laws; and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed

among us.  About ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis, Datis

came, leading a Persian host by command of Darius, which was expressly

directed against the Athenians and Eretrians, having orders to carry them

away captive; and these orders he was to execute under pain of death.  Now

Datis and his myriads soon became complete masters of Eretria, and he sent

a fearful report to Athens that no Eretrian had escaped him; for the

soldiers of Datis had joined hands and netted the whole of Eretria.  And

this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes,

and above all to the Athenians, and they dispatched embassies in all

directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief, with the

exception of the Lacedaemonians; and they, either because they were

detained by the Messenian war, which was then going on, or for some other

reason of which we are not told, came a day too late for the battle of

Marathon.  After a while, the news arrived of mighty preparations being

made, and innumerable threats came from the king.  Then, as time went on, a

rumour reached us that Darius had died, and that his son, who was young and

hot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design.  The

Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed

against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon; and hearing of the

bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the host of ships,

considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea,

for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first

expedition, when the Persians destroyed Eretria, no one came to their help,

or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this

would happen again, at least on land; nor, when they looked to the sea,

could they descry any hope of salvation; for they were attacked by a

thousand vessels and more.  One chance of safety remained, slight indeed

and desperate, but their only one.  They saw that on the former occasion

they had gained a seemingly impossible victory, and borne up by this hope,

they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the Gods.  All

these things created in them the spirit of friendship; there was the fear

of the moment, and there was that higher fear, which they had acquired by

obedience to their ancient laws, and which I have several times in the

preceding discourse called reverence, of which the good man ought to be a

willing servant, and of which the coward is independent and fearless.  If

this fear had not possessed them, they would never have met the enemy, or

defended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything

that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they

would have been all scattered and dispersed.



MEGILLUS:  Your words, Athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself and

of your country.



ATHENIAN:  They are true, Megillus; and to you, who have inherited the

virtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that day. 

And I would wish you and Cleinias to consider whether my words have not

also a bearing on legislation; for I am not discoursing only for the

pleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake.  Please to remark that

the experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain sense,

the same; for as they led their people into utter servitude, so we too led

ours into all freedom.  And now, how shall we proceed? for I would like you

to observe that our previous arguments have good deal to say for

themselves.



MEGILLUS:  True; but I wish that you would give us a fuller explanation.



ATHENIAN:  I will.  Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not

as now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws.



MEGILLUS:  What laws do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music,--that

is to say, such music as then existed--in order that we may trace the

growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning.  Now music was early

divided among us into certain kinds and manners.  One sort consisted of

prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and

opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another,

celebrating the birth of Dionysus, called, I believe, 'dithyrambs.'  And

they used the actual word 'laws,' or nomoi, for another kind of song; and

to this they added the term 'citharoedic.'  All these and others were duly

distinguished, nor were the performers allowed to confuse one style of

music with another.  And the authority which determined and gave judgment,

and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most

unmusical shouts of the multitude, as in our days, nor in applause and

clapping of hands.  But the directors of public instruction insisted that

the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their

tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a

stick.  Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to

observe; they would never have dared to give judgment by noisy cries.  And

then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar

and lawless innovation.  They were men of genius, but they had no

perception of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and

possessed with inordinate delights--mingling lamentations with hymns, and

paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and

making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth,

and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of

the hearer (compare Republic).  And by composing such licentious works, and

adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with

lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge for

themselves about melody and song.  And in this way the theatres from being

mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in

music and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of

theatrocracy has grown up (compare Arist. Pol.).  For if the democracy

which judged had only consisted of educated persons, no fatal harm would

have been done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of

omniscience and general lawlessness;--freedom came following afterwards,

and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any

fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness.  For what is this

shamelessness, which is so evil a thing, but the insolent refusal to regard

the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?



MEGILLUS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom, of

disobedience to rulers (compare Republic); and then the attempt to escape

the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the

end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the

contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the Gods,--herein

they exhibit and imitate the old so-called Titanic nature, and come to the

same point as the Titans when they rebelled against God, leading a life of

endless evils.  But why have I said all this? I ask, because the argument

ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not be allowed to run away,

but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says,

fall off our ass.  Let us then once more ask the question, To what end has

all this been said?



MEGILLUS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  This, then, has been said for the sake--



MEGILLUS:  Of what?



ATHENIAN:  We were maintaining that the lawgiver ought to have three things

in view:  first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and

secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding;

--these were our principles, were they not?



MEGILLUS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one

the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering

which of them is the right form:  we took a mean in both cases, of

despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw that in a

mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were carried to the

extreme of either, slavery or licence, neither party were the gainers.



MEGILLUS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And that was our reason for considering the settlement of the

Dorian army, and of the city built by Dardanus at the foot of the

mountains, and the removal of cities to the seashore, and of our mention of

the first men, who were the survivors of the deluge.  And all that was

previously said about music and drinking, and what preceded, was said with

the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and how an

individual might best order his own life.  And now, Megillus and Cleinias,

how can we put to the proof the value of our words?



CLEINIAS:  Stranger, I think that I see how a proof of their value may be

obtained.  This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly

fortunate, and just what I at this moment want; most auspiciously have you

and my friend Megillus come in my way.  For I will tell you what has

happened to me; and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen.  The

greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony, and they have

entrusted the management of the affair to the Cnosians; and the Cnosian

government to me and nine others.  And they desire us to give them any laws

which we please, whether taken from the Cretan model or from any other; and

they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better.  Grant me

then this favour, which will also be a gain to yourselves:--Let us make a

selection from what has been said, and then let us imagine a State of which

we will suppose ourselves to be the original founders.  Thus we shall

proceed with our enquiry, and, at the same time, I may have the use of the

framework which you are constructing, for the city which is in

contemplation.



ATHENIAN:  Good news, Cleinias; if Megillus has no objection, you may be

sure that I will do all in my power to please you.



CLEINIAS:  Thank you.



MEGILLUS:  And so will I.



CLEINIAS:  Excellent; and now let us begin to frame the State.





BOOK IV.



ATHENIAN:  And now, what will this city be?  I do not mean to ask what is

or will hereafter be the name of the place; that may be determined by the

accident of locality or of the original settlement--a river or fountain, or

some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly-founded city;

but I do want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland.



CLEINIAS:  I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are

speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.



ATHENIAN:  And are there harbours on the seaboard?



CLEINIAS:  Excellent harbours, Stranger; there could not be better.



ATHENIAN:  Alas! what a prospect!  And is the surrounding country

productive, or in need of importations?



CLEINIAS:  Hardly in need of anything.



ATHENIAN:  And is there any neighbouring State?



CLEINIAS:  None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place;

in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region

has been deserted from time immemorial.



ATHENIAN:  And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and

wood?



CLEINIAS:  Like the rest of Crete in that.



ATHENIAN:  You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous:  had

you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importing

rather than a producing country, some mighty saviour would have been

needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance

of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners

(compare Ar. Pol.).  But there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although

the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbours are so good. 

Still we may be content.  The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion,

but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with

merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and

unfaithful ways--making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own

citizens, and also to other nations.  There is a consolation, therefore, in

the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness

of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance.  Had there been

abundance, there might have been a great export trade, and a great return

of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal

results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble

sentiments:  this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous

discussion.



CLEINIAS:  I remember, and am of opinion that we both were and are in the

right.



ATHENIAN:  Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber

for ship-building?



CLEINIAS:  There is no fir of any consequence, nor pine, and not much

cypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which

shipwrights always require for the interior of ships.



ATHENIAN:  These are also natural advantages.



CLEINIAS:  Why so?



ATHENIAN:  Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies

in what is mischievous.



CLEINIAS:  How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been

speaking?



ATHENIAN:  Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about the Cretan

laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both agreed, was

war; and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote

virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and not the whole

of virtue, I disapproved of them.  And now I hope that you in your turn

will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything but virtue,

or with a view to a part of virtue only.  For I consider that the true

lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is

always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any

other benefit, when separated from virtue.  I was saying that the imitation

of enemies was a bad thing; and I was thinking of a case in which a

maritime people are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I

do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances); but he, as we

know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of Attica

to pay him a cruel tribute; and in those days they had no ships of war as

they now have, nor was the country filled with ship-timber, and therefore

they could not readily build them.  Hence they could not learn how to

imitate their enemy at sea, and in this way, becoming sailors themselves,

directly repel their enemies.  Better for them to have lost many times over

the seven youths, than that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have

been turned into sailors, and accustomed to be often leaping on shore, and

again to come running back to their ships; or should have fancied that

there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying

boldly; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man

throwing away his arms, and betaking himself to flight,--which is not

dishonourable, as people say, at certain times.  This is the language of

naval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise.  For we

should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. 

You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom Odysseus is

introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he desires to draw down the ships

to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans,--he

gets angry with him, and says:



'Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the well-

benched ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may be

accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us.  For the Achaeans will

not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they

will look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which you

give will prove injurious.'



You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neighbourhood of

fighting men, to be an evil;--lions might be trained in that way to fly

from a herd of deer.  Moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to

ships, do not give honour to that sort of warlike excellence which is most

deserving of it.  For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain,

and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather inferior persons, cannot rightly

give honour to whom honour is due.  But how can a state be in a right

condition which cannot justly award honour?



CLEINIAS:  It is hardly possible, I admit; and yet, Stranger, we Cretans

are in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of

Hellas.



ATHENIAN:  Why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both

among Hellenes and barbarians.  But Megillus and I say rather, that the

battle of Marathon was the beginning, and the battle of Plataea the

completion, of the great deliverance, and that these battles by land made

the Hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium--for

I may as well put them both together--made them no better, if I may say so

without offence about the battles which helped to save us.  And in

estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of the

country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation

and continuance of life is not the most honourable thing for men, as the

vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; and that

again, if I am not mistaken, is a remark which has been made already.



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  Then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course which

we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states.



CLEINIAS:  The best by far.



ATHENIAN:  And now let me proceed to another question:  Who are to be the

colonists?  May any one come out of all Crete; and is the idea that the

population in the several states is too numerous for the means of

subsistence?  For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general

invitation to any Hellene who likes to come.  And yet I observe that to

your country settlers have come from Argos and Aegina and other parts of

Hellas.  Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present

enterprise?



CLEINIAS:  They will come from all Crete; and of other Hellenes,

Peloponnesians will be most acceptable.  For, as you truly observe, there

are Cretans of Argive descent; and the race of Cretans which has the

highest character at the present day is the Gortynian, and this has come

from Gortys in the Peloponnesus.



ATHENIAN:  Cities find colonization in some respects easier if the

colonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a

single country, either when friends leave friends, owing to some pressure

of population or other similar necessity, or when a portion of a state is

driven by factions to emigrate.  And there have been whole cities which

have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war.  This,

however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in

another point of view creates a difficulty.  There is an element of

friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common

temples and rites of worship; but colonies which are of this homogeneous

sort are apt to kick against any laws or any form of constitution differing

from that which they had at home; and although the badness of their own

laws may have been the cause of the factions which prevailed among them,

yet from the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which

were their ruin, and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator,

finds them troublesome and rebellious.  On the other hand, the conflux of

several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then,

to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most

difficult task, and the work of years.  And yet there is nothing which

tends more to the improvement of mankind than legislation and colonization.



CLEINIAS:  No doubt; but I should like to know why you say so.



ATHENIAN:  My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations

is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if the word

be to the purpose, there can be no harm.  And yet, why am I disquieted, for

I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things?



CLEINIAS:  To what are you referring?



ATHENIAN:  I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of

all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways.  The violence of

war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning

governments and changing laws.  And the power of disease has often caused

innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there

has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years.  Any one

who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was

speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs

chance is almost everything.  And this may be said of the arts of the

sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to

be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal

truth of all of them.



CLEINIAS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-

operate with Him in the government of human affairs.  There is, however, a

third and less extreme view, that art should be there also; for I should

say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having the

aid of the pilot's art.  You would agree?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And does not a like principle apply to legislation as well as to

other things:  even supposing all the conditions to be favourable which are

needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator must from

time to time appear on the scene?



CLEINIAS:  Most true.



ATHENIAN:  In each case the artist would be able to pray rightly for

certain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then

only require to exercise his art?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were

bidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so?



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  And the legislator would do likewise?



CLEINIAS:  I believe that he would.



ATHENIAN:  'Come, legislator,' we will say to him; 'what are the conditions

which you require in a state before you can organize it?'  How ought he to

answer this question?  Shall I give his answer?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  He will say--'Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and

let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at

learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that quality

which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other

parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.'



CLEINIAS:  I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the

Stranger speaks, must be temperance?



ATHENIAN:  Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which in

the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called

prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of

whom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated,

was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods.  I think

that you must understand my meaning.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities,

if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the

form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither

is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than

by a tyranny.



CLEINIAS:  By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade

himself of such a monstrous doctrine?



ATHENIAN:  There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in

accordance with the order of nature?



CLEINIAS:  You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate,

quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?



ATHENIAN:  Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be

that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy

chance brings them together.  When this has been accomplished, God has done

all that he ever does for a state which he desires to be eminently

prosperous; He has done second best for a state in which there are two such

rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three.  The

difficulty increases with the increase, and diminishes with the diminution

of the number.



CLEINIAS:  You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is produced

from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant,

and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect form of government

takes place most easily; less easily when from an oligarchy; and, in the

third degree, from a democracy:  is not that your meaning?



ATHENIAN:  Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of

a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort

of democracy:  fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy,

which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because

the government is in the hands of a number of potentates.  I am supposing

that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is

united with that of the chief men of the state; and when the ruling element

is numerically small, and at the same time very strong, as in a tyranny,

there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.



CLEINIAS:  How?  I do not understand.



ATHENIAN:  And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but

I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?



CLEINIAS:  No, and I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one.



ATHENIAN:  And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that

of which I am now speaking.



CLEINIAS:  What do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very

long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a

state:  he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever

he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct,

praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others, and degrading

those who disobey.



CLEINIAS:  But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once

follow the example set to them; and how can he have this power both of

persuading and of compelling them?



ATHENIAN:  Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker

and easier way in which states change their laws than when the rulers lead: 

such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other way.  The

real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely

surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted, ten

thousand or rather all blessings follow.



CLEINIAS:  Of what are you speaking?



ATHENIAN:  The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just

institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a

monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth.  You might as well hope to

reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in

the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance.  This, however,

according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our own days there

is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come

into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear

the wise words that flow from his lips.  And this may be said of power in

general:  When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom

and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into

being; but in no other way.  And let what I have been saying be regarded as

a kind of sacred legend or oracle, and let this be our proof that, in one

point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but

that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or

sooner effected, granting our supposition.



CLEINIAS:  How do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  Let us try to amuse ourselves, old boys as we are, by moulding

in words the laws which are suitable to your state.



CLEINIAS:  Let us proceed without delay.



ATHENIAN:  Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state; may He

hear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the State and the

laws!



CLEINIAS:  May He come!



ATHENIAN:  But what form of polity are we going to give the city?



CLEINIAS:  Tell us what you mean a little more clearly.  Do you mean some

form of democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or monarchy?  For we

cannot suppose that you would include tyranny.



ATHENIAN:  Which of you will first tell me to which of these classes his

own government is to be referred?



MEGILLUS:  Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?



CLEINIAS:  Perhaps you should.



MEGILLUS:  And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more

thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seems to

me to be like a tyranny,--the power of our Ephors is marvellously

tyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most

democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy

(compare Ar. Pol.)?  We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is

said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of

all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot precisely

say which form of government the Spartan is.



CLEINIAS:  I am in the same difficulty, Megillus; for I do not feel

confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.



ATHENIAN:  The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have

polities, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merely

aggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of

a part of their own state, and each of them is named after the dominant

power; they are not polities at all.  But if states are to be named after

their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who

rules over wise men.



CLEINIAS:  And who is this God?



ATHENIAN:  May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I

may be better able to answer your question:  shall I?



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came

into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been

in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and life, of which the best-ordered of

existing states is a copy (compare Statesman).



CLEINIAS:  It will be very necessary to hear about that.



ATHENIAN:  I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced the

subject.



CLEINIAS:  Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you will

do well in giving us the whole story.



ATHENIAN:  I will do as you suggest.  There is a tradition of the happy

life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant.  And

of this the reason is said to have been as follows:--Cronos knew what we

ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power

is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. 

Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a

higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he

did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals.  For we do not

appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves

are a superior race, and rule over them.  In like manner God, in His love

of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they

with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care

of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never

failing, made the tribes of men happy and united.  And this tradition,

which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is

the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils.  Still we must do all that

we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of

Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that

we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities

and houses according to law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the

distribution of mind.  But if either a single person or an oligarchy or a

democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires--wanting to be

filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted

with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil spirit, having first

trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an

individual,--then, as I was saying, salvation is hopeless.  And now,

Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale

of mine.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly we will.



ATHENIAN:  You are aware,--are you not?--that there are often said to be as

many forms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we have

already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized.  Now you must

regard this as a matter of first-rate importance.  For what is to be the

standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue.  Men say that

the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general,

but only the interests and power and preservation of the established form

of government; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the

natural definition of justice.



CLEINIAS:  How?



ATHENIAN:  Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger

(Republic).



CLEINIAS:  Speak plainer.



ATHENIAN:  I will:--'Surely,' they say, 'the governing power makes whatever

laws have authority in any state'?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  'Well,' they would add, 'and do you suppose that tyranny or

democracy, or any other conquering power, does not make the continuance of

the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their

laws'?



CLEINIAS:  How can they have any other?



ATHENIAN:  'And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil-doer

by the legislator, who calls the laws just'?



CLEINIAS:  Naturally.



ATHENIAN:  'This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice

exists.'



CLEINIAS:  Certainly, if they are correct in their view.



ATHENIAN:  Why, yes, this is one of those false principles of government to

which we were referring.



CLEINIAS:  Which do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to

govern whom.  Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to

govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the

ignoble?  And there were many other principles, if you remember, and they

were not always consistent.  One principle was this very principle of

might, and we said that Pindar considered violence natural and justified

it.



CLEINIAS:  Yes; I remember.



ATHENIAN:  Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted.  For there

is a thing which has occurred times without number in states--



CLEINIAS:  What thing?



ATHENIAN:  That when there has been a contest for power, those who gain the

upper hand so entirely monopolize the government, as to refuse all share to

the defeated party and their descendants--they live watching one another,

the ruling class being in perpetual fear that some one who has a

recollection of former wrongs will come into power and rise up against

them.  Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at

all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes

and not for the good of the whole state.  States which have such laws are

not polities but parties, and their notions of justice are simply

unmeaning.  I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not

entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich, or

because he possesses any other advantage, such as strength, or stature, or

again birth:  but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he

shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall

be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second

to him who bears the second palm; and on a similar principle shall all the

other offices be assigned to those who come next in order.  And when I call

the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for

the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe that upon such service

or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the state.  For that state in

which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the

highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the

rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and

every blessing which the Gods can confer.



CLEINIAS:  Truly, Stranger, you see with the keen vision of age.



ATHENIAN:  Why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision

dullest, and when he is old keenest.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And now, what is to be the next step?  May we not suppose the

colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  'Friends,' we say to them,--'God, as the old tradition declares,

holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels

according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of

His end.  Justice always accompanies Him, and is the punisher of those who

fall short of the divine law.  To justice, he who would be happy holds

fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order; but he who is

lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young

and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no

need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others,

he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to

him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into

confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he

pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed,

and his family and city with him.  Wherefore, seeing that human things are

thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think'?



CLEINIAS:  Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the

followers of God; there can be no doubt of that.



ATHENIAN:  Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His

followers?  One only, expressed once for all in the old saying that 'like

agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have no measure

agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have.  Now God

ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man (compare Crat.;

Theaet.), as men commonly say (Protagoras):  the words are far more true of

Him.  And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like

Him and such as He is.  Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God,

for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different

from Him, and unjust.  And the same applies to other things; and this is

the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings,--that

for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with

them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the

noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy

life, and very fit and meet.  But with the bad man, the opposite of this is

true:  for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure; and

from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God can without

impropriety receive gifts.  Wherefore the unholy do only waste their much

service upon the Gods, but when offered by any holy man, such service is

most acceptable to them.  This is the mark at which we ought to aim.  But

what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them?  In the first

place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the

State, honour should be given to the Gods below; they should receive

everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and ill omen, while

the odd numbers, and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are

given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. 

Next to these Gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits,

and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and

ancestral Gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places

which are sacred to them.  Next comes the honour of living parents, to

whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all

debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him

birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister

to them, first, in his property, secondly, in his person, and thirdly, in

his soul, in return for the endless care and travail which they bestowed

upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay

back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need.  And all

his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming

word to them; for of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe;

Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over all such

matters.  When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or

deed, he should give way to them; for a father who thinks that he has been

wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry.  At their

death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary

expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown

by the former generation to their parents.  And let a man not forget to pay

the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by

omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and

giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead.  Doing this, and

living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and

those who are above us (i.e. the demons); and we shall spend our days for

the most part in good hope.  And how a man ought to order what relates to

his descendants and his kindred and friends and fellow-citizens, and the

rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out

of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly

regulation of his own life--these things, I say, the laws, as we proceed

with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do

not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right,

and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous

and happy.  But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator

who is of my way of thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be

out of place--of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction

of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far

as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to

the work of legislation.  Now, what will be the form of such prefaces? 

There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a

single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can

guarantee one thing.



CLEINIAS:  What is that?



ATHENIAN:  I should wish the citizens to be as readily persuaded to virtue

as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  The proposal appears to me to be of some value; and I think that

a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts

addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether

unprepared to receive them.  Even a little done in the way of conciliation

gains his ear, and is always worth having.  For there is no great

inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as

quickly good, as possible.  The case of the many proves the wisdom of

Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and can be travelled

without perspiring, because it is so very short:



'But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour, and

long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when you have

reached the top, although difficult before, it is then easy.'  (Works and

Days.)



CLEINIAS:  Yes; and he certainly speaks well.



ATHENIAN:  Very true:  and now let me tell you the effect which the

preceding discourse has had upon me.



CLEINIAS:  Proceed.



ATHENIAN:  Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator,

and say to him--'O, legislator, speak; if you know what we ought to say and

do, you can surely tell.'



CLEINIAS:  Of course he can.



ATHENIAN:  'Did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator ought

not to allow the poets to do what they liked?  For that they would not know

in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt of the

state.'



CLEINIAS:  That is true.



ATHENIAN:  May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets?



CLEINIAS:  What answer shall we make to him?



ATHENIAN:  That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever

prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the

tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to

flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is often

compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict

himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that

he has said than in another.  This is not the case in a law; the legislator

must give not two rules about the same thing, but one only.  Take an

example from what you have just been saying.  Of three kinds of funerals,

there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third

in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without

qualification.  But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury

her and describe her burial in a poem, I should praise the extravagant

sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would

approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means, who was himself

moderate, would praise a moderate funeral.  Now you in the capacity of

legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,' but you must define

what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not

suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly not.



ATHENIAN:  And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but to say

at once Do this, avoid that--and then holding the penalty in terrorem, to

go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to

those for whom he is legislating, after the manner of some doctors?  For of

doctors, as I may remind you, some have a gentler, others a ruder method of

cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask

the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies.  What I

mean to say is, that besides doctors there are doctors' servants, who are

also styled doctors.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference; they

acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters;

empirically and not according to the natural way of learning, as the manner

of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which

they impart scientifically to their pupils.  You are aware that there are

these two classes of doctors?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  And did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients

in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about and cure the

slaves, or wait for them in the dispensaries--practitioners of this sort

never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk about their own

individual complaints?  The slave doctor prescribes what mere experience

suggests, as if he had exact knowledge; and when he has given his orders,

like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who

is ill; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of his

invalid slaves.  But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and

practices upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes

into the nature of the disorder; he enters into discourse with the patient

and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man,

and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe

for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the

patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the

road to health, he attempts to effect a cure.  Now which is the better way

of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer?  Is he the better who

accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that

the ruder and inferior?



CLEINIAS:  I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far better.



ATHENIAN:  Should you like to see an example of the double and single

method in legislation?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly I should.



ATHENIAN:  What will be our first law?  Will not the legislator, observing

the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about births?



CLEINIAS:  He will.



ATHENIAN:  In all states the birth of children goes back to the connexion

of marriage?



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  And, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage

should be those which are first determined in every state?



CLEINIAS:  Quite so.



ATHENIAN:  Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form; it

may run as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and

thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or

shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges.  This would be the

simple law about marriage.  The double law would run thus:--A man shall

marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that in a

manner the human race naturally partakes of immortality, which every man is

by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every man

that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only

the love of continuance.  Now mankind are coeval with all time, and are

ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so they are

immortal, because they leave children's children behind them, and partake

of immortality in the unity of generation.  And for a man voluntarily to

deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a

wife or children, is impiety.  He who obeys the law shall be free, and

shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not marry, when he

has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly fine of a certain

amount, in order that he may not imagine his celibacy to bring ease and

profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in

the state give to the aged.  Comparing now the two forms of the law, you

will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws--whether they

should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to

persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of

half the length.



MEGILLUS:  The shorter form, Stranger, would be more in accordance with

Lacedaemonian custom; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask me

which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favour

of the longer; and I would have every law made after the same pattern, if I

had to choose.  But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted,

for his is the state which is going to use these laws.



CLEINIAS:  Thank you, Megillus.



ATHENIAN:  Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a very

foolish question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be approved;

nor is length at all to be regarded.  Of the two forms of law which have

been recited, the one is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as

the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, which I

was just now mentioning.  And yet legislators never appear to have

considered that they have two instruments which they might use in

legislation--persuasion and force; for in dealing with the rude and

uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can; they do not

mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and simple. 

Moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and

never is, regarded in our existing laws.



CLEINIAS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes into

my mind in some mysterious way.  All this time, from early dawn until noon,

have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat:  now we are going

to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. 

Why do I mention this?  For this reason:--Because all discourses and vocal

exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic

beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be performed; lyric

measures and music of every other kind have preludes framed with wonderful

care.  But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has

ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or published any, as though there

was no such thing in nature.  Whereas our present discussion seems to me to

imply that there is;--these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not

exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the

law.  The arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of doctors,

whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and

that which preceded, and was described by our friend here as being

hortatory only, was, although in fact, an exhortation, likewise analogous

to the preamble of a discourse.  For I imagine that all this language of

conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the

law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom he addressed, in

order that, by reason of this good-will, he might more intelligently

receive his command, that is to say, the law.  And therefore, in my way of

speaking, this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter

of the law.  And I must further proceed to observe, that to all his laws,

and to each separately, the legislator should prefix a preamble; he should

remember how great will be the difference between them, according as they

have, or have not, such preambles, as in the case already given.



CLEINIAS:  The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate in

the form which you advise.



ATHENIAN:  I think that you are right, Cleinias, in affirming that all laws

have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation

every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that

which is to follow is most important, and it makes all the difference

whether we clearly remember the preambles or not.  Yet we should be wrong

in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of

the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they may be

natural to all, they are not always necessary, and whether they are to be

employed or not has in each case to be left to the judgment of the speaker

or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver.



CLEINIAS:  That I think is most true.  And now, Stranger, without delay let

us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a second and

better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have been

laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but

of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be

chance topics of discourse.  Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a

preamble.  About the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents, enough

has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next

in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete; and after

that you shall go through the laws themselves.



ATHENIAN:  I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble

about Gods and demigods, and about parents living or dead; and now you

would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day?



CLEINIAS:  Exactly.



ATHENIAN:  After this, as is meet and for the interest of us all, I the

speaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates to

the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both their

occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the

nature of education.  These then are the topics which follow next in order.



CLEINIAS:  Very good.





BOOK V.



ATHENIAN:  Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and

about our dear forefathers:--Of all the things which a man has, next to the

Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own.  Now in every man

there are two parts:  the better and superior, which rules, and the worse

and inferior, which serves; and the ruling part of him is always to be

preferred to the subject.  Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next

to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them (i.e.

the demons), to honour his own soul, which every one seems to honour, but

no one honours as he ought; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing

is honourable; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or

gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better,

seems to honour her, but honours her not at all.  For example, every man,

from his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and

thinks that he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to

let her do whatever she may like.  But I mean to say that in acting thus he

injures his soul, and is far from honouring her; whereas, in our opinion,

he ought to honour her as second only to the Gods.  Again, when a man

thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which

he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which

befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and

innocent, he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul; whereas the

very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her.  And when,

disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in

pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her; he only dishonours her,

and fills her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the

end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator

approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour

the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor

when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but

yet once more he dishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the

world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or

convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below,

instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods.  Again, when any

one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour

of the soul?  For such a preference implies that the body is more

honourable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of

earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks

otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful

possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to

acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts--far

otherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but all

the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange

for virtue.  In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base

and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator,

and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other to

the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these respects he is

most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part

of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to

be the greatest penalty of evil-doing--namely, to grow into the likeness of

bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good,

and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the

bad.  And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by

nature do and say to one another,--a suffering which is not justice but

retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the

suffering which waits upon injustice; and whether a man escape or endure

this, he is miserable,--in the former case, because he is not cured; while

in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.



Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the

inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, as far as this is possible. 

And of all human possessions, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid

the evil, and track out and find the chief good; which when a man has

found, he should take up his abode with it during the remainder of his

life.  Wherefore the soul also is second (or next to God) in honour; and

third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural

order.  Having determined this, we have next to consider that there is a

natural honour of the body, and that of honours some are true and some are

counterfeit.  To decide which are which is the business of the legislator;

and he, I suspect, would intimate that they are as follows:--Honour is not

to be given to the fair body, or to the strong or the swift or the tall, or

to the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to

their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the

safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and

insolent, and the other, illiberal and base; and money, and property, and

distinction all go to the same tune.  The excess of any of these things is

apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals;

and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery.  And, therefore, I

would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his

children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible.  For the

possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. 

The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time

not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of

all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be

most entirely free from sorrow.  Let parents, then, bequeath to their

children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence.  We, indeed,

fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they

show a want of reverence.  But this quality is not really imparted to them

by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young

ought always to be reverential.  A sensible legislator will rather exhort

the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no

young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything

disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most

certainly be devoid of reverence.  The best way of training the young is to

train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always

carrying out your own admonitions in practice.  He who honours his kindred,

and reveres those who share in the same Gods and are of the same blood and

family, may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be

propitious to him, and will quicken his seed.  And he who deems the

services which his friends and acquaintances do for him, greater and more

important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less

than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of life. 

And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow citizens, he is by

far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or

war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country, and

who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through

life.  In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract

is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are

more directly dependent on the protection of God, than wrongs done to

citizens; for the stranger, having no kindred and friends, is more to be

pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to avenge him

is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the genius and the

god of the stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus, the god of strangers. 

And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best

to pass through life without sinning against the stranger.  And of offences

committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against

suppliants is the greatest.  For the God who witnessed to the agreement

made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the

sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.



Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his

parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state,

and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and

in what concerns the stranger.  We will now consider what manner of man he

must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things

which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise

and blame educate a man, and make him more tractable and amenable to the

laws which are about to be imposed.



Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to Gods and men; and he

who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the

truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be

trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he

who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool.  Neither condition is enviable,

for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he

becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age

when life is on the wane:  so that, whether his children or friends are

alive or not, he is equally solitary.--Worthy of honour is he who does no

injustice, and of more than twofold honour, if he not only does no

injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count

as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of

the injustice of others.  And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-

operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can--he

shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm

of virtue.  The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and

all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a

man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men,

and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place;

but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake

in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame:  the good, however,

which he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by

him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power.  Let every

man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. 

For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states--he himself

contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man; but the envious,

who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less

energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to

despair by his unjust slanders of them.  And so he makes the whole city to

enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and diminishes her

glory as far as in him lies.  Now every man should be valiant, but he

should also be gentle.  From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether

incurable acts of injustice done to him by others, a man can only escape by

fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to

punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish

this.  As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable,

in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of

his own free will.  For no man of his own free will would choose to possess

the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of

himself.  And the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the

most honourable.  In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of

him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the

greatest of evils (compare Republic).  The unrighteous and vicious are

always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as

pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not getting into

a passion, like a woman, and nursing ill-feeling.  But upon him who is

incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be

poured out; wherefore I say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to

be both gentle and passionate.



Of all evils the greatest is one which in the souls of most men is innate,

and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean,

what is expressed in the saying that 'Every man by nature is and ought to

be his own friend.'  Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the

source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the

beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the

honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer himself to the truth. 

But he who would be a great man ought to regard, not himself or his

interests, but what is just, whether the just act be his own or that of

another.  Through a similar error men are induced to fancy that their own

ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing,

think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for

us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. 

Wherefore let every man avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow

a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the

way.  There are also minor precepts which are often repeated, and are quite

as useful; a man should recollect them and remind himself of them.  For

when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and

recollection flows in while wisdom is departing.  Therefore I say that a

man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears, and should

exhort his neighbour to do the same; he should veil his immoderate sorrow

or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether the genius of his good

fortune remains with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he

seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of

his enterprises.  Still he may ever hope, in the case of good men, that

whatever afflictions are to befall them in the future God will lessen, and

that present evils He will change for the better; and as to the goods which

are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added

to them, and that they will be fortunate.  Such should be men's hopes, and

such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never

losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding

themselves and others of all these things, both in jest and earnest.



Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices

which men ought to follow, and as to the sort of persons who they ought

severally to be.  But of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we

must; for to men we are discoursing and not to Gods.  Pleasures and pains

and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must

of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest.  And therefore

we must praise the noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but

as being one which, if a man will only taste, and not, while still in his

youth, desert for another, he will find to surpass also in the very thing

which we all of us desire,--I mean in having a greater amount of pleasure

and less of pain during the whole of life.  And this will be plain, if a

man has a true taste of them, as will be quickly and clearly seen.  But

what is a true taste?  That we have to learn from the argument--the point

being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature. 

One life must be compared with another, the more pleasurable with the more

painful, after this manner:--We desire to have pleasure, but we neither

desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in

exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we also wish for less pain and

greater pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not wish for;

and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should

desire.  And all these differ or do not differ severally in number and

magnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when

regarded as objects of choice, in relation to desire.  And such being the

necessary order of things, we wish for that life in which there are many

great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the pleasures

are in excess, and do not wish for that in which the opposites exceed; nor,

again, do we wish for that in which the elements of either are small and

few and feeble, and the pains exceed.  And when, as I said before, there is

a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the

balanced life; while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in

what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. 

All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we

must also consider what sort of lives we by nature desire.  And if we wish

for any others, I say that we desire them only through some ignorance and

inexperience of the lives which actually exist.



Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and

beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of

them a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and

noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible?  Let us say that the

temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the

courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let us

oppose four other lives--the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the

diseased.  He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all

things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires

and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all

things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging

desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures

exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the

pleasures in greatness and number and frequency.  Hence one of the two

lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more

painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live

intemperately.  And if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man

is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack

temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or from want of self-

control, or both.  And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life;

they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the

pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure.  Now our intention in

choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed, but the life in

which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to be the more

pleasant life.  And we should say that the temperate life has the elements

both of pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less frequent than the

intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of

courage than the life of cowardice; one of each pair exceeding in pleasure

and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the cowardly, and the wise

exceeding the foolish.  And so the one class of lives exceeds the other

class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed

the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives; and generally

speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter

than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and

excellence and reputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be

infinitely happier than the opposite.



Enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more

correctly, an outline of them.  As, then, in the case of a web or any other

tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same materials (compare

Statesman), but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and

having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has

a proper degree of elasticity;--in a similar manner those who are to hold

great offices in states, should be distinguished truly in each case from

those who have been but slenderly proven by education.  Let us suppose that

there are two parts in the constitution of a state--one the creation of

offices, the other the laws which are assigned to them to administer.



But, before all this, comes the following consideration:--The shepherd or

herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his

animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a

manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and

unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the

unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that

his labours will be vain and have no effect, either on the souls or bodies

of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will

involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other

animal, if he should neglect to purify them.  Now the case of other animals

is not so important--they are only worth introducing for the sake of

illustration; but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the

legislator should make enquiries, and indicate what is proper for each one

in the way of purification and of any other procedure.  Take, for example,

the purification of a city--there are many kinds of purification, some

easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most

difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to

effect; but the legislator, who, not being a despot, sets up a new

government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may

think himself happy if he can complete his work.  The best kind of

purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving

righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in the last resort.  For

in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are

the greatest injury of the whole state.  But the milder form of

purification is as follows:--when men who have nothing, and are in want of

food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the

property of the rich--these, who are the natural plague of the state, are

sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and

this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony.  And every

legislator should contrive to do this at once.  Our present case, however,

is peculiar.  For there is no need to devise any colony or purifying

separation under the circumstances in which we are placed.  But as, when

many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or mountain

torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the

confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this,

should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political

arrangement there may be trouble and danger.  But, seeing that we are now

only discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be

completed, and the desired purity attained.  Touching evil men, who want to

join and be citizens of our state, after we have tested them by every sort

of persuasion and for a sufficient time, we will prevent them from coming;

but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with

open arms.



Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were

saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours,--that we have

escaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are always a

source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven by necessity to

legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor

yet venture to alter them.  We must have recourse to prayers, so to speak,

and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of

time.  And such a change can be accomplished by those who have abundance of

land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to

share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving,

holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the

increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property.  For

this is the great beginning of salvation to a state, and upon this lasting

basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under

the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle,

the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. 

That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had

better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may

venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad,

can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of justice--upon this

rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among

citizens about property.  If there are quarrels of long standing among

them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the

arrangement of the state until they are settled.  But that they to whom God

has given, as He has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free

from enmity--that they should create themselves enmities by their mode of

distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness.



How then can we rightly order the distribution of the land?  In the first

place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the number

and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed; and the

land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we

can.  The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in

relation to the territory and the neighbouring states.  The territory must

be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way

of life--more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should

be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their

neighbours, and also to give them the power of rendering efficient aid to

their neighbours when they are wronged.  After having taken a survey of

their's and their neighbours' territory, we will determine the limits of

them in fact as well as in theory.  And now, let us proceed to legislate

with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state.  The number of

our citizens shall be 5040--this will be a convenient number; and these

shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment.  The houses

and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may

correspond to a lot.  Let the whole number be first divided into two parts,

and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided

into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten.  Every

legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what

number is most likely to be useful to all cities; and we are going to take

that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken

series of divisions.  The whole of number has every possible division, and

the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of

these proceed without interval from one to ten:  this will furnish numbers

for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and

divisions of the land.  These properties of number should be ascertained at

leisure by those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and

should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. 

Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and

decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples,--the temples which are to be

built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be

called,--if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which

the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or the God Ammon, or any ancient tradition

has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed

inspiration of Heaven, in obedience to which mankind have established

sacrifices in connexion with mystic rites, either originating on the spot,

or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the

strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images, and

altars and temples, and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. 

The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator;

but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demi-god, or

hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first

their chosen domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the

several districts may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply

their various wants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become

friends and acquaintances; for there is no greater good in a state than

that the citizens should be known to one another.  When not light but

darkness and ignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no

one will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the

justice to which he is fairly entitled:  wherefore, in every state, above

all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him, but

that he be always true and simple; and that no deceitful person take any

advantage of him.



The next move in our pastime of legislation, like the withdrawal of the

stone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one,

will probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time.  And yet, if

a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see that

our city is ordered in a manner which, if not the best, is the second best. 

Perhaps also some one may not approve this form, because he thinks that

such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic

power.  The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best,

the second and the third best, which we may just mention, and then leave

the selection to the ruler of the settlement.  Following this method in the

present instance, let us speak of the states which are respectively first,

second, and third in excellence, and then we will leave the choice to

Cleinias now, or to any one else who may hereafter have to make a similar

choice among constitutions, and may desire to give to his state some

feature which is congenial to him and which he approves in his own country.



The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the

law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that

'Friends have all things in common.'  Whether there is anywhere now, or

will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in

which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and

things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have

become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men

express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and

whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost (compare Republic),--

whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any

other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better

or more exalted in virtue.  Whether such a state is governed by Gods or

sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after

this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the

pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might

for one which is like this.  The state which we have now in hand, when

created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the

second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the

third one.  And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the

second.



Let the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the

land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed

origin, and nurture, and education.  But in making the distribution, let

the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the

whole city; and seeing that the earth is their parent, let them tend her

more carefully than children do their mother.  For she is a goddess and

their queen, and they are her mortal subjects.  Such also are the feelings

which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demi-gods of the country. 

And in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to

consider further that the present number of families should be always

retained, and neither increased nor diminished.  This may be secured for

the whole city in the following manner:--Let the possessor of a lot leave

the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the

heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the

Gods, the state and the family, as well the living members of it as those

who are departed when he comes into the inheritance; but of his other

children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage

according to the law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall

distribute as sons to those citizens who have no children, and are disposed

to receive them; or if there should be none such, and particular

individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the

case of barrenness--in all these cases let the highest and most honourable

magistracy created by us judge and determine what is to be done with the

redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses

shall always remain the same.  There are many ways of regulating numbers;

for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain (compare

Arist. Pol.), and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase

the number of births by rewards and stigmas, or we may meet the evil by the

elder men giving advice and administering rebuke to the younger--in this

way the object may be attained.  And if after all there be very great

difficulty about the equal preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an

excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together,

and we are at our wits' end, there is still the old device often mentioned

by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us, and be

composed of suitable persons.  If, on the other hand, there come a wave

bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become

much fewer than the appointed number by reason of bereavement, we ought not

to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be

avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity.



Wherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us in the

following terms:--Best of men, cease not to honour according to nature

similarity and equality and sameness and agreement, as regards number and

every good and noble quality.  And, above all, observe the aforesaid number

5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and

modest proportions of the inheritances which you received in the

distribution, by buying and selling them to one another.  For then neither

will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator;

and indeed the law declares to the disobedient that these are the terms

upon which he may or may not take the lot.  In the first place, the earth

as he is informed is sacred to the Gods; and in the next place, priests and

priestesses will offer up prayers over a first, and second, and even a

third sacrifice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has

received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their

prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood,

for the instruction of posterity.  Moreover they will set a watch over all

these things, that they may be observed;--the magistracy which has the

sharpest eyes shall keep watch that any infringement of these commands may

be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the God. 

How great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which

obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old

proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits.  For in such an

order of things there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man

either ought, or indeed will be allowed, to exercise any ignoble

occupation, of which the vulgarity is a matter of reproach to a freeman,

and should never want to acquire riches by any such means.



Further, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess

gold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in

dealing with artisans, and for payment of hirelings, whether slaves or

immigrants, by all those persons who require the use of them.  Wherefore

our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current among

themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view,

however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands,--for embassies, or for

any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must

also possess a common Hellenic currency.  If a private person is ever

obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the magistrates and go;

and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the

surplus back to the treasury, and receive a corresponding sum in the local

currency.  And if he is discovered to appropriate it, let it be

confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse

and dishonour equally him who brought the money, and also to a fine not

less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back.  In

marrying and giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at

all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as

a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be

under no obligation to repay either capital or interest.  That these

principles are best, any one may see who compares them with the first

principle and intention of a state.  The intention, as we affirm, of a

reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a

good legislator, namely, that the state for the true interests of which he

is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess

gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;--this they

imagine to be the real object of legislation, at the same time adding,

inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best

and happiest possible.  But they do not see that some of these things are

possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will

desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to

accomplish that which is impossible.  The citizen must indeed be happy and

good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very

good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which

the many speak of riches.  For they mean by 'the rich' the few who have the

most valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be a

rogue.  And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the

rich man will be happy--he must be good as well as rich.  And good in a

high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. 

Some one will ask, why not?  And we shall answer--Because acquisitions

which come from sources which are just and unjust indifferently, are more

than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are

expended neither honourably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as

those which are expended honourably and on honourable purposes.  Thus, if

the one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite

case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he.  The first--I

am speaking of the saver and not of the spender--is not always bad; he may

indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he

never is.  For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends

neither nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty.  On the

other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore very

poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just

means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be

very poor.  Our statement, then, is true, that the very rich are not good,

and, if they are not good, they are not happy.  But the intention of our

laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as may be, and as friendly

as possible to one another.  And men who are always at law with one

another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends

to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and

slight.  Therefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in

the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by

lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the

produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in

pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist--I mean,

soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never

be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times,

the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts.  For there

are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the

interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of

them:  midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of

the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly

constituted if it ordains honours according to this scale.  But if, in any

of the laws which have been ordained, health has been preferred to

temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly

be wrong.  Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon

himself the question--'What do I want?' and 'Do I attain my aim, or do I

miss the mark?'  In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself

and free others from the work of legislation.



Let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have

mentioned.



It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things

equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater

possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular in order to

preserve equality in special crises of the state, qualifications of

property must be unequal, in order that offices and contributions and

distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and

not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the

strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or

poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his

wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and

there will be no quarrels and disputes.  To which end there should be four

different standards appointed according to the amount of property:  there

should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the

citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these or similar names: 

they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual

case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. 

The form of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as

follows:--In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of

all plagues--not faction, but rather distraction;--there should exist among

the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for

both are productive of both these evils.  Now the legislator should

determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth.  Let the limit of

poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler,

nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the

lot to be impaired in any case.  This the legislator gives as a measure,

and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four

times the amount of this (compare Arist. Pol.).  But if a person have yet

greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him,

or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune

that which is in excess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the

state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no

penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who

likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and

the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property,

and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods.  And let every

possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly

registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits

about money may be easy and quite simple.



The next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly as

possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place which

possesses what is suitable for a city, and this may easily be imagined and

described.  Then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first

founding temples to Hestia, to Zeus and to Athene, in a spot which we will

call the Acropolis, and surround with a circular wall, making the division

of the entire city and country radiate from this point.  The twelve

portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are of good

land shall be smaller, while those of inferior quality shall be larger. 

The number of the lots shall be 5040, and each of them shall be divided

into two, and every allotment shall be composed of two such sections; one

of land near the city, the other of land which is at a distance (compare

Arist. Pol.).  This arrangement shall be carried out in the following

manner:  The section which is near the city shall be added to that which is

on the borders, and form one lot, and the portion which is next nearest

shall be added to the portion which is next farthest; and so of the rest. 

Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of

equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness

shall be compensated by more and less.  And the legislator shall divide the

citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the rest of their property, as far

as possible, so as to form twelve equal parts; and there shall be a

registration of all.  After this they shall assign twelve lots to twelve

Gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each God their several

portions, and call the tribes after them.  And they shall distribute the

twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the

country; and every man shall have two habitations, one in the centre of the

country, and the other at the extremity.  Enough of the manner of

settlement.



Now we ought by all means to consider that there can never be such a happy

concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things

coincide as they are wanted.  Men who will not take offence at such a mode

of living together, and will endure all their life long to have their

property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance

with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and

other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments,

will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the situation of the

land with the city in the middle and dwellings round about;--all this is as

if the legislator were telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens of

wax.  There is truth in these objections, and therefore every one should

take to heart what I am going to say.  Once more, then, the legislator

shall appear and address us:--'O my friends,' he will say to us, 'do not

suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in your words;

but I am of opinion that, in matters which are not present but future, he

who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall

short of the fairest and truest; and that if he finds any part of this work

impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should

contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must

allow the legislator to perfect his design, and when it is perfected, you

should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is

expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to

be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-

consistent.'



Having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts, let

us now see in what way this may be accomplished.  There is no difficulty in

perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions

of that which they include, or in seeing the other numbers which are

consequent upon them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; wherefore

the law ought to order phratries and demes and villages, and also military

ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid, and

weights, so as to be commensurable and agreeable to one another.  Nor

should we fear the appearance of minuteness, if the law commands that all

the vessels which a man possesses should have a common measure, when we

consider generally that the divisions and variations of numbers have a use

in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible, both in

themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in all sounds, and in

motions, as well those which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or

downwards, as in those which go round and round.  The legislator is to

consider all these things and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not

to lose sight of numerical order; for no single instrument of youthful

education has such mighty power, both as regards domestic economy and

politics, and in the arts, as the study of arithmetic.  Above all,

arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him

quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine he makes

progress quite beyond his natural powers (compare Republic).  All such

things, if only the legislator, by other laws and institutions, can banish

meanness and covetousness from the souls of men, so that they can use them

properly and to their own good, will be excellent and suitable instruments

of education.  But if he cannot, he will unintentionally create in them,

instead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil tendency may be observed

in the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races, through the general

vulgarity of their pursuits and acquisitions, whether some unworthy

legislator of theirs has been the cause, or some impediment of chance or

nature.  For we must not fail to observe, O Megillus and Cleinias, that

there is a difference in places, and that some beget better men and others

worse; and we must legislate accordingly.  Some places are subject to

strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse winds and violent heats,

some by reason of waters; or, again, from the character of the food given

by the earth, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or evil,

but produces similar results in their souls.  And in all such qualities

those spots excel in which there is a divine inspiration, and in which the

demigods have their appointed lots, and are propitious, not adverse, to the

settlers in them.  To all these matters the legislator, if he have any

sense in him, will attend as far as man can, and frame his laws

accordingly.  And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of

this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new

country.



CLEINIAS:  Your words, Athenian Stranger, are excellent, and I will do as

you say.





BOOK VI.



ATHENIAN:  And now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed

to the appointment of magistracies.



CLEINIAS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  In the ordering of a state there are two parts:  first, the

number of the magistracies, and the mode of establishing them; and,

secondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be

provided for each of them, suitable in nature and number.  But before

electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season

about the election of them.



CLEINIAS:  What have you got to say?



ATHENIAN:  This is what I have to say;--every one can see, that although

the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered

city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only will there be no

use in having the good laws,--not only will they be ridiculous and useless,

but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them.



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the

constitution of out intended state.  In the first place, you will

acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and

their families, should severally have given satisfactory proof of what they

are, from youth upward until the time of election; in the next place, those

who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law, and be well

educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or

reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. 

But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first

time, and are strangers to one another, and also uneducated, will avoid

making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?



CLEINIAS:  Impossible.



ATHENIAN:  The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn.  I

will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you tell

me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the

people of Crete, and I am to help you by the invention of the present

romance.  I certainly should not like to leave the tale wandering all over

the world without a head;--a headless monster is such a hideous thing.



CLEINIAS:  Excellent, Stranger.



ATHENIAN:  Yes; and I will be as good as my word.



CLEINIAS:  Let us by all means do as you propose.



ATHENIAN:  That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit

us.



CLEINIAS:  But God will be gracious.



ATHENIAN:  Yes; and under his guidance let us consider a further point.



CLEINIAS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this

our city is.



CLEINIAS:  What had you in your mind when you said that?



ATHENIAN:  I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are

ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws.  Now a

man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily

receive laws at their first imposition.  But if we could anyhow wait until

those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured

in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public

elections of the state; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly

accomplished by any way or contrivance--then, I think that there would be

very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not

being permanent.



CLEINIAS:  A reasonable supposition.



ATHENIAN:  Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the

difficulty; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the

other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty

to the colony, but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the

offices which are first created by them in the best and surest manner. 

Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law, who

must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of

less importance.



CLEINIAS:  What method can we devise of electing them?



ATHENIAN:  This will be the method:--Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to

them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they

should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of

thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, and

the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus.  Of these latter the Cnosians

shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the

eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and if you and they

cannot be persuaded to go, the Cnosians may fairly use a little violence in

order to make you.



CLEINIAS:  But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our

new city?



ATHENIAN:  O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both

a long way off.  But you and likewise the other colonists are conveniently

situated as you describe.  I have been speaking of the way in which the new

citizens may be best managed under present circumstances; but in after-

ages, if the city continues to exist, let the election be on this wise. 

All who are horse or foot soldiers, or have seen military service at the

proper ages when they were severally fitted for it (compare Arist. Pol.),

shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held

in whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and every one shall

carry his vote to the altar of the God, writing down on a tablet the name

of the person for whom he votes, and his father's name, and his tribe, and

ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner.  Any one

who pleases may take away any tablet which he does not think properly

filled up, and exhibit it in the Agora for a period of not less than thirty

days.  The tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300,

shall be shown by the magistrates to the whole city, and the citizens shall

in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this

second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the

citizens; in the third, let any one who pleases select whom he pleases out

of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them choose for

magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the greatest number

of votes.  But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony

all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them?  If we

reflect, we shall see that cities which are in process of construction like

ours must have some such persons, who cannot possibly be elected before

there are any magistrates; and yet they must be elected in some way, and

they are not to be inferior men, but the best possible.  For as the proverb

says, 'a good beginning is half the business'; and 'to have begun well' is

praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the

business, and has never been praised by any one enough.



CLEINIAS:  That is very true.



ATHENIAN:  Then let us recognize the difficulty, and make clear to our own

minds how the beginning is to be accomplished.  There is only one proposal

which I have to offer, and that is one which, under our circumstances, is

both necessary and expedient.



CLEINIAS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, who

are no other than the colonizing state.  Well I know that many colonies

have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents.  But in early days

the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time

later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he

naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to his

relatives for protection, and finds in them his only natural allies in time

of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnosians, as is

shown by their care of the new city; and there is a similar feeling on the

part of the young city towards Cnosus.  And I repeat what I was saying--for

there is no harm in repeating a good thing--that the Cnosians should take a

common interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the

eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred;

and let there be another hundred of the Cnosians themselves.  These, I say,

on their arrival, should have a joint care that the magistrates should be

appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should

undergo a scrutiny.  When this has been effected, the Cnosians shall return

home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and

happiness.  I would have the seven-and-thirty now, and in all future time,

chosen to fulfil the following duties:--Let them, in the first place, be

the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one

registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four

minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three allowed to

the second, two to the third, and a single mina to the fourth.  And if any

one, despising the laws for the sake of gain, be found to possess anything

more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be

confiscated, and let him be liable to a suit which shall be the reverse of

honourable or fortunate.  And let any one who will, indict him on the

charge of loving base gains, and proceed against him before the guardians

of the law.  And if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public

possessions, and when there is any public distribution, let him have

nothing but his original lot; and let him be written down a condemned man

as long as he lives, in some place in which any one who pleases can read

about his offences.  The guardian of the law shall not hold office longer

than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is

elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold

office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine

that he will be permitted to hold such an important office as that of

guardian of the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.



These are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law; as the

work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them their

further duties.  And now we may proceed in order to speak of the election

of other officers; for generals have to be elected, and these again must

have their ministers, commanders, and colonels of horse, and commanders of

brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by their popular name of

brigadiers.  The guardians of the law shall propose as generals men who are

natives of the city, and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be

made by those who are or have been of the age for military service.  And if

one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who

is, let him name whom he prefers in the place of whom, and make oath that

he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote

shall be admitted to the final selection; and the three who have the

greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents

of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the

guardians of the law.  And let the generals thus elected propose twelve

brigadiers, one for each tribe; and there shall be a right of counter-

proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall

take place in the same way.  Until the prytanes and council are elected,

the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which

is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the

cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. 

All are to vote for the generals (and for the colonels of horse), but the

brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields (i.e. the

hoplites).  Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the generals; but

captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army,

shall be appointed by the generals for themselves.  There only remains the

appointment of officers of cavalry:  these shall be proposed by the same

persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the counter-

proposal of other candidates shall be arranged in the same way as in the

case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at

the election; the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the

leaders of all the horse.  Disputes about the voting may be raised once or

twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the officers who preside

at the several elections shall decide.



The council shall consist of 30 x 12 members--360 will be a convenient

number for sub-division.  If we divide the whole number into four parts of

ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class.  First, all the

citizens shall select candidates from the first class; they shall be

compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined.  When the

candidates have been selected, some one shall mark them down; this shall be

the business of the first day.  And on the following day, candidates shall

be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the same

conditions as on the previous day; and on the third day a selection shall

be made from the third class, at which every one may, if he likes vote, and

the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and

lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who

does not vote shall not be punished.  On the fourth day candidates shall be

selected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be selected by all,

but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of

the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or

second class, if he does not vote shall be punished;--he who is of the

second class shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at

first, and he who is of the first class quadruple.  On the fifth day the

rulers shall bring out the names noted down, for all the citizens to see,

and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of

suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of

the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a

scrutiny:--These are to form the council for the year.



The mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy

and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to observe; for

servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because

they are declared to have equal privileges.  For to unequals equals become

unequal, if they are not harmonised by measure; and both by reason of

equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. 

The old saying, that 'equality makes friendship,' is happy and also true;

but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. 

For there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in

reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be

introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the

distribution of honours:  this is the rule of measure, weight, and number,

which regulates and apportions them.  But there is another equality, of a

better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized.  This is the

judgment of Zeus; among men it avails but little; that little, however, is

the source of the greatest good to individuals and states.  For it gives to

the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature

of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and

to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure

of virtue and education.  And this is justice, and is ever the true

principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule

order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may

be hereafter founded.  To this the legislator should look,--not to the

interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to

justice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural

equality among unequals in each case.  But there are times at which every

state is compelled to use the words, 'just,' 'equal,' in a secondary sense,

in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions.  For equity and

indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice.  And

this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in

order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we invoke God and

fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot

with a view to supreme justice.  And therefore, although we are compelled

to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance

enters as seldom as possible.



Thus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which

would endure and be saved.  But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be

watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of

politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and therefore

from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands

with rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving up their

trust in a perpetual succession.  Now a multitude can never fulfil a duty

of this sort with anything like energy.  Moreover, the greater number of

the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to

order their concerns at their own homes.  They will therefore have to be

arranged in twelve portions, answering to the twelve months, and furnish

guardians of the state, each portion for a single month.  Their business is

to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them,

whether to give information, or to put one of those questions, to which,

when asked by other cities, a city should give an answer, and to which, if

she ask them herself, she should receive an answer; or again, when there is

a likelihood of internal commotions, which are always liable to happen in

some form or other, they will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if

they have already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the

city, and healing the evil.  Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding

body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and

of the dissolutions of them, ordinary as well as extraordinary.  All this

is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to

keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion

of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions.



Thus will the city be fairly ordered.  And now, who is to have the

superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement?  Seeing

that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided

into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of

the streets of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbours,

and the agora, and fountains, and sacred domains, and temples, and the

like?



CLEINIAS:  To be sure there ought.



ATHENIAN:  Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the

temples, and priests and priestesses.  There must also be superintendents

of roads and buildings, who will have a care of men, that they may do no

harm, and also of beasts, both within the enclosure and in the suburbs. 

Three kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed, in order that the

city may be suitably provided according to her needs.  Those who have the

care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who have

the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who

have the care of the temples shall be called priests.  Those who hold

hereditary offices as priests or priestesses, shall not be disturbed; but

if there be few or none such, as is probable at the foundation of a new

city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the Gods

who have no servants.  Some of our officers shall be elected, and others

appointed by lot, those who are of the people and those who are not of the

people mingling in a friendly manner in every place and city, that the

state may be as far as possible of one mind.  The officers of the temples

shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to

God, that He may do what is agreeable to Him.  And he who obtains a lot

shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of

legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a

perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in

his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar

unstained life.  Now the laws about all divine things should be brought

from Delphi, and interpreters appointed, under whose direction they should

be used.  The tenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no

longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the

laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age--the laws shall

be the same about priestesses.  As for the interpreters, they shall be

appointed thus:--Let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of four,

and let each group select four, one out of each tribe within the group,

three times; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes (out

of the twelve appointed by each group), after undergoing a scrutiny, nine

in all, be sent to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each

triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny

of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be interpreters for

life, and when any one dies let the four tribes select another from the

tribe of the deceased.  Moreover, besides priests and interpreters, there

must be treasurers, who will take charge of the property of the several

temples, and of the sacred domains, and shall have authority over the

produce and the letting of them; and three of them shall be chosen from the

highest classes for the greater temples, and two for the lesser, and one

for the least of all; the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them

shall be the same as that of the generals.  This shall be the order of the

temples.



Let everything have a guard as far as possible.  Let the defence of the

city be commited to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and

phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora,

when the election of them has been completed.  The defence of the country

shall be provided for as follows:--The entire land has been already

distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the

tribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the

country and commanders of the watch; and let each body of five have the

power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own tribe,--

these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than

thirty.  And let there be allotted to them severally every month the

various districts, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and

experience of the whole country.  The term of service for commanders and

for watchers shall continue during two years.  After having had their

stations allotted to them, they will go from place to place in regular

order, making their round from left to right as their commanders direct

them; (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that they are to go to

the east).  And at the commencement of the second year, in order that as

many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country

at any one season of the year, but may also have experience of the manner

in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year,

their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to

place in succession, until they have completed the second year.  In the

third year other wardens of the country shall be chosen and commanders of

the watch, five for each division, who are to be the superintendents of the

bands of twelve.  While on service at each station, their attention shall

be directed to the following points:--In the first place, they shall see

that the country is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and

dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by

fortifications keep off the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from

doing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts of

burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot:  these will be their

instruments whom they will superintend, taking them, as far as possible, at

the times when they are not engaged in their regular business.  They shall

make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible

as possible to friends (compare Arist. Pol.); there shall be ways for man

and beasts of burden and for cattle, and they shall take care to have them

always as smooth as they can; and shall provide against the rains doing

harm instead of good to the land, when they come down from the mountains

into the hollow dells; and shall keep in the overflow by the help of works

and ditches, in order that the valleys, receiving and drinking up the rain

from heaven, and providing fountains and streams in the fields and regions

which lie underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good

water.  The fountains of water, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be

ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty; and let them bring

together the streams in subterraneous channels, and make all things

plenteous; and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the

neighbourhood, they shall conduct the water to the actual temples of the

Gods, and so beautify them at all seasons of the year.  Everywhere in such

places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the

aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those

labouring under disease--there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with

toil, will receive a kindly welcome, far better than he would at the hands

of a not over-wise doctor.



The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental;

they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious

employment too; for the sixty wardens will have to guard their several

divisions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to

professing friends.  When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens,

and any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five wardens

decide small matters on their own authority; but where the charge against

another relates to greater matters, the seventeen composed of the fives and

twelves, shall determine any charges which one man brings against another,

not involving more than three minae.  Every judge and magistrate shall be

liable to give an account of his conduct in office, except those who, like

kings, have the final decision.  Moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens

of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care,

whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of

the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent; also if they

receive anything in the way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if

they yield to the influences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonoured;

and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the

country, if the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of

the villagers in the neighbourhood; but in suits of greater amount, or in

case of lesser, if they refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly

removal into another part of the country will enable them to escape--in

such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and if

he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant, who refused to submit,

a double penalty.



The wardens and the overseers of the country, while on their two years'

service, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall all

live together; and he who is absent from the common meal, or sleeps out, if

only for one day or night, unless by order of his commanders, or by reason

of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe his name in

the agora as not having kept his guard, let him be deemed to have betrayed

the city, as far as lay in his power, and let him be disgraced and beaten

with impunity by any one who meets him and is willing to punish him.  If

any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company

of sixty shall see to it, and he who is cognisant of the offence, and does

not bring the offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the

younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of

ever commanding the young.  The guardians of the law are to be careful

inspectors of these matters, and shall either prevent or punish offenders. 

Every man should remember the universal rule, that he who is not a good

servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon

serving well than upon commanding well:  first upon serving the laws, which

is also the service of the Gods; in the second place, upon having served

ancient and honourable men in the days of his youth.  Furthermore, during

the two years in which any one is a warden of the country, his daily food

ought to be of a simple and humble kind.  When the twelve have been chosen,

let them and the five meet together, and determine that they will be their

own servants, and, like servants, will not have other slaves and servants

for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers and

husbandmen for their private advantage, but for the public service only;

and in general they should make up their minds to live independently by

themselves, servants of each other and of themselves.  Further, at all

seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them be under arms and

survey minutely the whole country; thus they will at once keep guard, and

at the same time acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality.  There can

be no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a

man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of

pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should

be pursued by the young.  The service to whom this is committed may be

called the secret police or wardens of the country; the name does not much

signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use

his utmost diligence in this service.



After the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of

wardens of the agora and of the city.  The wardens of the country were

sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide

the twelve parts of the city into three; like the former, they shall have

care of the ways, and of the different high roads which lead out of the

country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made

according to law;--also of the waters, which the guardians of the supply

preserve and convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the

fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the

city.  These also should be men of influence, and at leisure to take care

of the public interest.  Let every man propose as warden of the city any

one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been

given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest

number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the

six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according

to the laws laid down for them.  Next, let the wardens of the agora be

elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: 

ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by

lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city:--these when they have

undergone a scrutiny are to be declared magistrates.  Every one shall vote

for every one, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before

the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a

bad citizen.  Let any one who likes go to the assembly and to the general

council; it shall be compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second

class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not

answering to their names at the assembly.  But the third and fourth class

shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless

the magistrates have commanded all to be present, in consequence of some

urgent necessity.  The wardens of the agora shall observe the order

appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples

and fountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that no one

injures anything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be

a slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way,

they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the

amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the

city up to double that amount.  And let the wardens of the city have a

similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department;

and let them impose fines by their own department; and let them impose

fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the

consent of the wardens of the agora.



In the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music and

gymnastic, two kinds of each--of the one kind the business will be

education, of the other, the superintendence of contests.  In speaking of

education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and

instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and of

school buildings for boys and girls; and in speaking of contests, the law

refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again are divided

into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with

gymnastics; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall

judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo

singing, and of imitation--I mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the

flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choral song.  First of

all, we must choose directors for the choruses of boys, and men, and

maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and for our

other musical arrangements;--one director will be enough for the choruses,

and he should be not less than forty years of age.  One director will also

be enough to introduce the solo singers, and to give judgment on the

competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age.  The

director and manager of the choruses shall be elected after the following

manner:--Let any persons who commonly take an interest in such matters go

to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law

shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be

compelled.  The elector shall propose as director some one who understands

music, and he in the scrutiny may be challenged on the one part by those

who say he has no skill, and defended on the other hand by those who say

that he has.  Ten are to be elected by vote, and he of the ten who is

chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year

according to law.  And in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall

be leader of the solo and concert music for that year; and he who is thus

elected shall deliver the award to the judges.  In the next place, we have

to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men; these shall be

selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and

three first classes shall be compelled to go to the election, but the

lowest may stay away with impunity; and let there be three elected by lot

out of the twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have

the vote and approval of the examiners.  But if any one is rejected in the

scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same

manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny.



There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he

too will rule according to law; one such minister will be sufficient, and

he must be fifty years old, and have children lawfully begotten, both boys

and girls by preference, at any rate, one or the other.  He who is elected,

and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of

state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant, if it makes a

good start towards the attainment of its natural excellence, has the

greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but

of animals wild and tame, and also of men.  Man, as we say, is a tame or

civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a

fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and

most civilized (Arist. Pol.); but if he be insufficiently or ill educated

he is the most savage of earthly creatures.  Wherefore the legislator ought

not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental

matter.  In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them,

should begin by taking care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is

in every way best; him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint

guardian and superintendent.  To this end all the magistrates, with the

exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of Apollo,

and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally

think will be the best superintendent of education.  And he who has the

greatest number of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of

all the magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the

guardians of the law,--shall hold office for five years; and in the sixth

year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office.



If any one dies while he is holding a public office, and more than thirty

days before his term of office expires, let those whose business it is

elect another to the office in the same manner as before.  And if any one

who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's

and mother's side, who are residing at home, including cousins, appoint

another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect

to do so.



A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and again,

if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings than the

litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be able to decide

justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well, nor a

few if they are bad.  The point in dispute between the parties should be

made clear; and time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly

tend to clear up doubts.  For this reason, he who goes to law with another,

should go first of all to his neighbours and friends who know best the

questions at issue.  And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory

decision, let him have recourse to another court; and if the two courts

cannot settle the matter, let a third put an end to the suit.



Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of

magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things; and

the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very

important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit. 

Regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be

judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to

judge in each suit.  Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants

appoint in common for themselves, choosing certain persons by agreement. 

And let there be two other tribunals:  one for private causes, when a

citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision; the

other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the

public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the

common interests.  And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to

be qualified, and who they are to be.  In the first place, let there be a

tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against

another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows:--All the

officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer

period, when the new year is about to commence, in the month following

after the summer solstice, on the last day but one of the year, shall meet

in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge from

every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who

seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the

causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and

holiest manner.  And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be

held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected

another shall be chosen in the same manner.  Those who have undergone the

scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior

courts, and shall give their vote openly.  The councillors and other

magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and

spectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases.  If

one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go

to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who

is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal

to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty,

the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and

how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who

brought the suit.



In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to

participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may

reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision.  Such

causes ought to originate with the people, and the ought also to have the

final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three

of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall

agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the

council shall choose one of the two proposed.  And in private suits, too,

as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in

the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in

the state at all.  And for this reason there shall be a court of law in

every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot;--they shall give their

decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties.  The final

judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been

established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit: 

this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of

their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes.



Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be precisely

defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been

given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted.  For

the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under

their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation;--let us

then expect them at the end.  Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly

occupied with the appointment of offices.  Perfect unity and exactness,

extending to the whole and every particular of political administration,

cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a

beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part.  At present we

have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a

sufficient termination of what preceded.  And now there need no longer be

any delay or hesitation in beginning the work of legislation.



CLEINIAS:  I like what you have said, Stranger; and I particularly like

your manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end of

the former one.



ATHENIAN:  Thus far, then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off

well.



CLEINIAS:  You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?



ATHENIAN:  Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are agreed

about a certain thing.



CLEINIAS:  About what thing?



ATHENIAN:  You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their

pictures--they are always putting in or taking out colours, or whatever be

the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease

touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more

beautiful.



CLEINIAS:  I know something of these matters from report, although I have

never had any great acquaintance with the art.



ATHENIAN:  No matter; we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding:

--Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful

manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as

time went on--do you not see that being a mortal, unless he leaves some one

to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce, and be

able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and

who will further brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour

will last but a short time?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And is not the aim of the legislator similar?  First, he desires

that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness; in the

second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his

decrees, will he not find omissions?  Do you imagine that there ever was a

legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily

omitted, which some one coming after him must correct, if the constitution

and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the

state which he has established?



CLEINIAS:  Assuredly, that is the sort of thing which every one would

desire.



ATHENIAN:  And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word

or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to

understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should finish what he

has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?



CLEINIAS:  What have we to do?



ATHENIAN:  As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of

the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared

with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to

endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators

themselves, as far as this is possible.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly; if we can.



ATHENIAN:  At any rate, we must do our best.



CLEINIAS:  Of course.



ATHENIAN:  We will say to them--O friends and saviours of our laws, in

laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit, and

this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe

what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up.  And I

will explain on what principle you are to act.  Megillus and Cleinias and I

have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of

opinion that we have spoken well.  And we hope that you will be of the same

mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which

in our united opinion the legislator and guardian of the law ought to keep

in view.  There was one main point about which we were agreed--that a man's

whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the

virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained by study, or habit,

or some mode of acquisition, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge--and this

applies equally to men and women, old and young--the aim of all should

always be such as I have described; anything which may be an impediment,

the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards.  And if at last

necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather

than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he

has to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than

accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse. 

These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon

the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise

and blame the laws--blame those which have not this power of making the

citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and

live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at

goods, as they are termed, of a different kind.



Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in

religion.  And we must first return to the number 5040--the entire number

had, and has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number of the

tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 

21 x 20 (5040/(21 x 20), i.e., 5040/420 = 12), also has them.  And not only

is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the number of each tribe

is divisible by twelve.  Now every portion should be regarded by us as a

sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of

the universe (compare Tim.).  Every city has a guiding and sacred principle

given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more

right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate.  In our

opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040,

which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single

exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if,

turning to the dividend (5040), we deduct two families, the defect in the

division is cured.  And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have

leisure.  But for the present, trusting to the mere assertion of this

principle, let us divide the state; and assigning to each portion some God

or son of a God, let us give them altars and sacred rites, and at the

altars let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month--twelve

assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their

divisions; the first in honour of the Gods and divine things, and the

second to promote friendship and 'better acquaintance,' as the phrase is,

and every sort of good fellowship with one another.  For people must be

acquainted with those into whose families and whom they marry and with

those to whom they give in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible, a

man should deem it all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious

purpose let games be instituted (compare Republic) in which youths and

maidens shall dance together, seeing one another and being seen naked, at a

proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of

modesty.



The directors of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators of

these games, and they, together with the guardians of the law, will

legislate in any matters which we have omitted; for, as we said, where

there are numerous and minute details, the legislator must leave out

something.  And the annual officers who have experience, and know what is

wanted, must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until such

enactments and provisions are sufficiently determined.  A ten years'

experience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars, will

be quite sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate

with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall refer the

omissions which come under their notice to the guardians of the law, and

correct them, until all is perfect; and from that time there shall be no

more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others

which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never, if

they can help, to change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the

magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they

must go to all the oracles of the Gods; and if they are all agreed, in that

case they may make the change, but if they are not agreed, by no manner of

means, and any one who dissents shall prevail, as the law ordains.



Whenever any one over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been seen

by others, believes himself to have found a marriage connexion which is to

his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he

be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how

he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate (compare Arist.

Pol.).  For, as Cleinias says, every law should have a suitable prelude.



CLEINIAS:  You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not miss the

opportunity which the argument affords of saying a word in season.



ATHENIAN:  I thank you.  We will say to him who is born of good parents--O

my son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve.  Now

they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to

desire a rich one; but if other things are equal, always to honour

inferiors, and with them to form connexions;--this will be for the benefit

of the city and of the families which are united; for the equable and

symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed.  And he who

is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting

in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly

parents; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite

alliance.  Let there be one word concerning all marriages:--Every man shall

follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after

that which is most beneficial to the state.  For somehow every one is by

nature prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the whole

city becomes unequal in property and in disposition; and hence there arise

in most states the very results which we least desire to happen.  Now, to

add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not

marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the

powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into

marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken

anger as well as laughter in the minds of many; for there is a difficulty

in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which

the maddening wine is hot and fiery, but when chastened by a soberer God,

receives a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temperate drink

(compare Statesman).  Yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same

result occurs.  Wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but we

should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of

their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in

excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of making a

rich marriage we should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches, not,

however, by any compulsion of written law.



Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember

what was said before--that a man should cling to immortality, and leave

behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place for

ever.  All this and much more may be truly said by way of prelude about the

duty of marriage.  But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and

alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five

years of age, let him pay a yearly fine;--he who of the highest class shall

pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine

of seventy drachmae; the third class shall pay sixty drachmae, and the

fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to Here; he who does

not pay the fine annually shall owe ten times the sum, which the treasurer

of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be

answerable and give an account of the money at his audit.  He who refuses

to marry shall be thus punished in money, and also be deprived of all

honour which the younger show to the elder; let no young man voluntarily

obey him, and, if he attempt to punish any one, let every one come to the

rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not

come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad

citizen.  Of the marriage portion I have already spoken; and again I say

for the instruction of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a

dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our

state are provided with the necessaries of life, and wives will be less

likely to be insolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on

account of property.  And he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but

he who will not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the

price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a mina,

or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae

if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public treasury a similar

sum, and that which is given or received shall be sacred to Here and Zeus;

and let the treasurers of these Gods exact the money, as was said before

about the unmarried--that the treasurers of Here were to exact the money,

or pay the fine themselves.



The betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a

grandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by

brothers who have the same father; but if there are none of these alive,

the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of

unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the guardians shall have

authority.  What are to be the rites before marriages, or any other sacred

acts, relating either to future, present, or past marriages, shall be

referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice may be

satisfied.  Touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble not more

than five male and five female friends of both families; and a like number

of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall spend more than

his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina,--he

who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same proportion as the census

of each decreases:  all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law;

but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as

a man wanting in true taste, and uninstructed in the laws of bridal song. 

Drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the God who gave

wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of

marriage; at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to

have all their wits about them--they ought to take care that their

offspring may be born of reasonable beings; for on what day or night Heaven

will give them increase, who can say?  Moreover, they ought not to

begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but

their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly;

whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and beside himself

both in body and soul.  Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and

unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget offspring

who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk

straight either in body or mind.  Hence during the whole year and all his

life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take

care and not intentionally do what is injurious to health, or what involves

insolence and wrong; for he cannot help leaving the impression of himself

on the souls and bodies of his offspring, and he begets children in every

way inferior.  And especially on the day and night of marriage should a man

abstain from such things.  For the beginning, which is also a God dwelling

in man, preserves all things, if it meet with proper respect from each

individual.  He who marries is further to consider, that one of the two

houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to

marry and make a home for himself and bring up his children, going away

from his father and mother.  For in friendships there must be some degree

of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character;

but excessive intercourse not having the desire which is created by time,

insensibly dissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man

and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own

dwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and

visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up

children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and

worshipping the Gods according to law for ever.



In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most

convenient.  There is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring

most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what relates to

slaves.  And the reason is, that we speak about them in a way which is

right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is

consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.



MEGILLUS:  I do not understand, Stranger, what you mean.



ATHENIAN:  I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of the Helots among

the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most

controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it;

there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots,

who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. 

Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning

property in slaves?  I made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited

a question about my meaning from you.  It was this:--We know that all would

agree that we should have the best and most attached slaves whom we can

get.  For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren

or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their

masters and their whole house--such tales are well known.



MEGILLUS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly

corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them?  And the wisest of

our poets, speaking of Zeus, says:



'Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day of

slavery subdues.'



Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves in their

minds--some of them utterly distrust their servants, and, as if they were

wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their souls three

times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before;--and others do

just the opposite.



MEGILLUS:  True.



CLEINIAS:  Then what are we to do in our own country, Stranger, seeing that

there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?



ATHENIAN:  Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome

animal, and therefore he is not very manageable, nor likely to become so,

when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman,

and master.



CLEINIAS:  That is obvious.



ATHENIAN:  He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown by

the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which

happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the

numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are

called.  A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss.  Two remedies

alone remain to us,--not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if

possible, speaking the same language (compare Aris. Pol.); in this way they

will more easily be held in subjection:  secondly, we should tend them

carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to

ourselves.  And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to

them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who

are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and

hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to

whom he can easily be unjust.  And he who in regard to the natures and

actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow

the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master,

and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his

inferiors.  Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished

as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited.  The language

used to a servant ought always to be that of a command (compare Arist.

Pol.), and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or

females--this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their

slaves, and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them

and for their masters.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible,

with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has

to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings.



CLEINIAS:  Very good.



ATHENIAN:  The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be

taken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them, and

also of the temples and walls.  These, Cleinias, were matters which

properly came before the marriages;--but, as we are only talking, there is

no objection to changing the order.  If, however, our plan of legislation

is ever to take effect, then the house shall precede the marriage if God so

will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at

present we are only describing these matters in a general outline.



CLEINIAS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  The temples are to be placed all round the agora, and the whole

city built on the heights in a circle (compare Arist. Pol.), for the sake

of defence and for the sake of purity.  Near the temples are to be placed

buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and

defendant will receive their due, and the places will be regarded as most

holy, partly because they have to do with holy things:  and partly because

they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods:  and in them will be held the

courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offences may

fitly take place.  As to the walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta in

thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we

should not attempt to disinter them (compare Arist. Pol.); there is a

poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that 'walls ought to be of

steel and iron, and not of earth;' besides, how ridiculous of us to be

sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench,

and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are

not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should

surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means

conducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain

effeminacy in the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither

instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their

safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they

are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they

were not meant to labour, and did not know that true repose comes from

labour, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is

only the renewal of trouble.  But if men must have walls, the private

houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be

one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their

uniformity and equality towards the streets (compare Arist. Pol.).  The

form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable

aspect, and being easily guarded will be infinitely better for security. 

Until the original building is completed, these should be the principal

objects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should superintend

the work, and should impose a fine on him who is negligent; and in all that

relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and not allow a

private person to encroach upon any public property either by buildings or

excavations.  Further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven

flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered

either within or without the city.  The guardians of the law shall pass any

further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and

supply any other points in which the law may be deficient.  And now that

these matters, and the buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and

places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars

and spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the

order of legislation.



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode of

life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow

next in order.  In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city

which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all easy for us

to determine.  There have been many difficulties already, but this will be

the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many.  Still I

cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, Cleinias.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  He who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct of

states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of

itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and

that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, I say, who gives up

the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to

law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake.  Why have I

made this remark?  Why, because I am going to enact that the bridegrooms

should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage.  This

was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the

world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some

war or other similar danger, which caused the passing of the law, and which

would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of

pressure.  But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common

table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security;

and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose among you.



CLEINIAS:  Likely enough.



ATHENIAN:  I said that there may have been singularity and danger in

imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same

difficulty.  There is, however, another institution which is the natural

sequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at

present it does not.  The institution of which I am about to speak is not

easily described or executed; and would be like the legislator 'combing

wool into the fire,' as people say, or performing any other impossible and

useless feat.



CLEINIAS:  What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?



ATHENIAN:  You shall hear without any fruitless loss of time.  That which

has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is

disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered;

and at this point the argument is now waiting.  For with you, Cleinias and

Megillus, the common tables of men are, as I said, a heaven-born and

admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women

unregulated by law.  They have no similar institution of public tables in

the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature

prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness--I mean the

female sex--has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a

great mistake.  And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown

lax among you, which might have been far better, if they had been only

regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only

be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter (Arist. Pol.), but in

proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity for

virtue, in that degree the consequence of such neglect is more than twice

as important.  The careful consideration of this matter, and the arranging

and ordering on a common principle of all our institutions relating both to

men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state.  But at

present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense

will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which

they have never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being

utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show in public how much

they eat and drink?  There is nothing at which the sex is more likely to

take offence.  For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when

dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of

resistance, and be far too much for the legislator.  And therefore, as I

said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken

without raising a tremendous outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. 

And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been

mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to

listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather

not, I will refrain.



CLEINIAS:  There is nothing which we should both of us like better,

Stranger, than to hear what you have to say.



ATHENIAN:  Very good; and you must not be surprised if I go back a little,

for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from

considering in every point of view the subject of law.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first.

Every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at

all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or that

it began an immense while ago.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions of

states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly, and diverse

desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of

changes of the seasons in which animals may be expected to have undergone

innumerable transformations of themselves?



CLEINIAS:  No doubt.



ATHENIAN:  And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had previously

no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her daughter,

of which one Triptolemus was the minister, and that, before these existed,

animals took to devouring each other as they do still?



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Again, the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists

among many nations; while, on the other hand, we hear of other human beings

who did not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and had no animal

sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey, and similar pure

offerings, but no flesh of animals; from these they abstained under the

idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the

Gods with blood.  For in those days men are said to have lived a sort of

Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all

living things.



CLEINIAS:  Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true.



ATHENIAN:  Some one might say to us, What is the drift of all this?



CLEINIAS:  A very pertinent question, Stranger.



ATHENIAN:  And therefore I will endeavour, Cleinias, if I can, to draw the

natural inference.



CLEINIAS:  Proceed.



ATHENIAN:  I see that among men all things depend upon three wants and

desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led by them, or

the opposite if wrongly.  Now these are eating and drinking, which begin at

birth--every animal has a natural desire for them, and is violently

excited, and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy all his

pleasures and appetites, and get rid of all the corresponding pains--and

the third and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is

the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness

and madness.  And these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the

three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away

from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the Muses and the

Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx.



But to return:--After marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and

after their birth of their nurture and education.  In the course of

discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive

at the common tables.  Whether such associations are to be confined to men,

or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a

nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions

are required and will have to precede them.  As I said before, we shall see

them more in detail, and shall be better able to lay down the laws which

are proper or suited to them.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN:  Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for

hereafter there may be need of them.



CLEINIAS:  What do you bid us keep in mind?



ATHENIAN:  That which we comprehended under the three words--first, eating,

secondly, drinking, thirdly, the excitement of love.



CLEINIAS:  We shall be sure to remember, Stranger.



ATHENIAN:  Very good.  Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach

persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they

disobey, with the terrors of the law.



CLEINIAS:  What do you mean?



ATHENIAN:  The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to

produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they

can.  Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they

attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not

give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore let the bridegroom

give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride

in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and particularly at the

time when their children are not yet born.  And let the women whom we have

chosen be the overseers of such matters, and let them in whatever number,

large or small, and at whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble

every day in the temple of Eileithyia during a third part of the day, and

being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they

see, whether man or woman, of those who are begetting children,

disregarding the ordinances given at the time when the nuptial sacrifices

and ceremonies were performed.  Let the begetting of children and the

supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no

longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful.  But if any continue

without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred

and with the women holding the office of overseer and be divorced for their

mutual benefit.  If, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and

for the interest of either party, they shall choose ten of the guardians of

the law and abide by their permission and appointment.  The women who

preside over these matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and

partly by admonitions and partly by threats make them give over their folly

and error:  if they persist, let the women go and tell the guardians of the

law, and the guardians shall prevent them.  But if they too cannot prevent

them, they shall bring the matter before the people; and let them write up

their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and

let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict

those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the privileges of a

citizen in the following respects:--let him not go to weddings nor to the

thanksgivings after the birth of children; and if he go, let any one who

pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about

women:  let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or

go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if she in like manner be written up

as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict.  And if, when they

themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or

woman have connexion with another man or woman who are still begetting

children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who

are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let

the man or woman who refrains in such matters be held in esteem, and let

those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem--that is to say,

disesteem.  Now, if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the

enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the

enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution.  To

every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth

ought to be written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning

of existence to every child, whether boy or girl.  Let every phratria have

inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the

years are reckoned.  And near to them let the living members of the

phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased.  The

limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty

years at the longest,--for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and let

a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years.  Let a man go out

to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any

need to make use of her in military service, let the time of service be

after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and

let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.





BOOK VII.



And now, assuming children of both sexes to have been born, it will be

proper for us to consider, in the next place, their nurture and education;

this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought a subject

fitted rather for precept and admonition than for law.  In private life

there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the

pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which run counter to the

intention of the legislator, and make the characters of the citizens

various and dissimilar:--this is an evil in states; for by reason of their

smallness and frequent occurrence, there would be an unseemliness and want

of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the

destruction of the written law because mankind get the habit of frequently

transgressing the law in small matters.  The result is that you cannot

legislate about them, and still less can you be silent.  I speak somewhat

darkly, but I shall endeavour also to bring my wares into the light of day,

for I acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am

saying.



CLEINIAS:  Very true.



ATHENIAN.  Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that

which tends most to the improvement of mind and body?



CLEINIAS:  Undoubtedly.



ATHENIAN:  And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are

those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  And do we not further observe that the first shoot of every

living thing is by far the greatest and fullest?  Many will even contend

that a man at twenty-five does not reach twice the height which he attained

at five.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant

exercise the source endless evils in the body?



CLEINIAS:  Yes.



ATHENIAN:  And the body should have the most exercise when it receives most

nourishment?



CLEINIAS:  But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise

upon newly-born infants?



ATHENIAN:  Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn.



CLEINIAS:  What do you mean, my good sir?  In the process of gestation?



ATHENIAN:  Exactly.  I am not at all surprised that you have never heard of

this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures,

which, although strange, I will endeavour to explain to you.



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by

reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at Athens. 

Not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of keeping quails

and cocks (compare Republic), which they train to fight one another.  And

they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to

fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this,

they carry them about tucked beneath their armpits, holding the smaller

birds in their hands, the larger under their arms, and go for a walk of a

great many miles for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own

health, but the health of the birds; whereby they prove to any intelligent

person, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements, when they

are moved without weariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves,

or is caused by a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or by other bodies in

whatever way moving, and that thus gaining the mastery over food and drink,

they are able to impart beauty and health and strength.  But admitting all

this, what follows?  Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman

shall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before it

hardens, and after birth swathe the infant for two years?  Suppose that we

compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the

children somewhere or other, either to the temples, or into the country, or

to their relations' houses, until they are well able to stand, and to take

care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are

too young (compare Arist. Pol.),--they should continue to carry them until

the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and

there should be more than one of them.  Shall these be our rules, and shall

we impose a penalty for the neglect of them?  No, no; the penalty of which

we were speaking will fall upon our own heads more than enough.



CLEINIAS:  What penalty?



ATHENIAN:  Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine and

servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.



CLEINIAS:  Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?



ATHENIAN:  The reason is, that masters and freemen in states, when they

hear of it, are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due

regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down of laws

is hardly to be expected (compare Republic); and he who makes this

reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting

them, may order his house and state well and be happy.



CLEINIAS:  Likely enough.



ATHENIAN:  And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have

determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children,

in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the rules relating

to their bodies.



CLEINIAS:  By all means.



ATHENIAN:  Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to

the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about by

day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are, the more

they will need it (compare Arist. Pol.); infants should live, if that were

possible, as if they were always rocking at sea.  This is the lesson which

we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of

the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want

their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the

contrary, motion--rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them

silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the

Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of

the dance and of music.



CLEINIAS:  Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?



ATHENIAN:  The reason is obvious.



CLEINIAS:  What?



ATHENIAN:  The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an

emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul.  And when

some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion

coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal

one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless

palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the

children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake,

to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom they offer

acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the

place of their frenzy.  And, to express what I mean in a word, there is a

good deal to be said in favour of this treatment.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  But if fear has such a power we ought to infer from these facts,

that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will

be made more liable to fear (compare Republic), and every one will allow

that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage.



CLEINIAS:  No doubt.



ATHENIAN:  And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth

upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an

exercise of courage.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the

earliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in

the soul.



CLEINIAS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as

having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on

the other.



CLEINIAS:  To be sure.



ATHENIAN:  Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what extent we

may, if we please, without difficulty implant either character in the

young.



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of

youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles; that on

the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and abject,

and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates.



CLEINIAS:  But how must the state educate those who do not as yet

understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of

appreciating any sort of instruction?



ATHENIAN:  I will tell you how:--Every animal that is born is wont to utter

some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected

with the inclination to weep more than any other animal.



CLEINIAS:  Quite true.



ATHENIAN:  Do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires,

judge by these signs?--when anything is brought to the infant and he is

silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries

out, then he is not pleased.  For tears and cries are the inauspicious

signs by which children show what they love and hate.  Now the time which

is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable

portion of life to be passed ill or well.



CLEINIAS:  True.



ATHENIAN:  Does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you to

be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?



CLEINIAS:  Certainly.



ATHENIAN:  Well, but if during these three years every possible care were

taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in

general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to

make his soul more gentle and cheerful?  (Compare Arist. Pol.)



CLEINIAS:  To be sure, Stranger--more especially if we could procure him a

variety of pleasures.



ATHENIAN:  There I can no longer agree, Cleinias:  you amaze me.  To bring

him up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is always

the most critical part of education.  Let us see whether I am right.



CLEINIAS:  Proceed.



ATHENIAN:  The point about which you and I differ is of great importance,

and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us.  For I

maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the

other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state

(compare Republic), which I just spoke of as gentle and benign, and is a

state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to

God.  Now, I say, he among men, too, who would be divine ought to pursue

after this mean habit--he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he

will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old,

male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all

the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the

character is engrained by habit.  Nay, more, if I were not afraid of

appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of

pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from

violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and should at that time cultivate

gentleness and benevolence and kindness.



CLEINIAS:  You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has most truly

spoken; for I myself agree that all men ought to avoid the life of

unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course.  And having

spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?



ATHENIAN:  Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further

point.



CLEINIAS:  What is it?



ATHENIAN:  That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly

called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the

laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature.  And the reflection which

lately arose in our minds, that we can neither call these things laws, nor

yet leave them unmentioned, is justified; for they are the bonds of the

whole state, and come in between the written laws which are or are

hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancestral customs of great

antiquity, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, shield and

preserve the previousl